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BUREAUCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE EMERGING NATIONS: AN ECOLOGICAL APPROACH

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Introduction

Political and Economic Development cannot be achieved without a competent bureaucracy, regardless of how popular its goals are because programs and policy decisions are not self-enforcing. It is the bureaucracy, which puts policy decisions into practical results. However, structural, and functional problems have plagued the effectiveness of the bureaucracy in the developing countries.

In order to accomplish multidirectional ends of development, governments have embraced aspects of development planning and administration efforts that involve the reshaping of the public and official attitudes and behavior in accordance with national aspiration. The administrator remains a vital cog in the achievement of social planning.

The bureaucracy determines the manner in which responsibilities and functions are distributed among various levels of administrative hierarchy, and the linkages and functional relationships among them. This confers on the officers of the bureaucracies, formal and informal roles because of their high visibility.

In order to achieve the economic, social, cultural, political and administrative aspects of development, modernity must be sought. The process of modernization continues even in the most developed countries. Administrative Development, which is the increasing ability of the political system to formulate and implement government decisions through the civil service, is very crucial.

In the context of the emerging nations, development administration embraces the administration of developmental programs designed to transform the quality of life of the people and the manner in which planned changes are affected. The underlying assumption in Development Administration is that there is a direct relationship between the levels of administrative development, which embrace the beliefs and attitudes of the bureaucrats towards modernizing values and the successful formulation and implementation of development plans.

Administrative reform is needed, to artificially induce administrative transformation in order to address perceived problems. Lack of committed politicians has been a major factor obstructing administrative change and reforms at the decision-making levels of the bureaucracy.
The bureaucratic culture in the developing systems is very complex, often ambivalent and contradictory. The explanation may be the interaction between the values of the bureaucracy and those of the rest of the larger society.

This study takes an ecological approach to the administrative analysis of the bureaucracy in the emerging systems. Bureaucracies in the developing countries, for fear of survival tend to resist change. This paper intends to examine the support systems as well as sources of resistance which impact on the bureaucracies and the consequences of such mechanisms on the administration of change and development.

**The Ecology of Administration**

Various systems of administration have been transplanted into the third World countries mainly due to their colonial relationship prior to independence. It is obvious that this history greatly affects the way in which administration is carried out in these countries.

Public Administration operates in a dual environment because of its nature as a public body, as well as a formal organization. Also, administration is intimately involved with a variety of political acts and actors, involving complex processes of bargaining and negotiation. We conceive of the administrative structure of government as political, not only because it makes decisions affecting the authoritative allocation of values, but also because the manner in which it goes about affecting this allocation is political. This is obvious when agencies bargain for their growth and survival in the budgetary process. Public administration operates in a political arena and therefore must adopt political methods. The social and economic systems of society place boundaries on actions of government, and more specifically on public administration. The political culture is equally important in setting boundaries of acceptable political actions.

The effectiveness and inefficiency of the administrative systems lie in the kinds of social values internalized and practiced by the society. One aspect of societal culture, which impacts on the performance of administrative system, is the level at which it is legitimized as an instrument of organization and development.

Since bureaucracies are developed in conformity with the Weberian ethos to provide consistency and rationality in the application of rules, and to uphold fairness in all organizational practices, it becomes imperative that for a bureaucracy to function effectively, it must be predictable and impersonal.

Almond and Verba speak of parochial, subject and participant cultures on the basis of the willingness of the individual to participate in politics. Political culture alludes to the attitudes, values and orientations of the governors (leaders) and the governed toward the political system and particularly what the role of the political system should be in the development process.
Good development plans need an effective political system to translate them into actual output programs. On the same token, an inadequate bureaucracy can corrupt politicians. Also, inefficient civil servants and insensitive and apathetic public can undermine well-articulated development plans. Political development, which is the process in which political systems become more effective and self-directing, is always a prelude for a meaningful economic development.

The amount of resources and the manner in which available resources are distributed, the size and competence of the administrative bureaucracy, the honesty of the participants, and the nature of the culture influence the way in which the political systems function.

Recalling problems of administration in Eastern Nigeria, David and Audrey Smoke (1972) observe that the “dash” — The practice of giving and receiving gifts has become a common practice at all levels. Ministers and Permanent Secretaries, through kickbacks and inflation of contract fees have introduced bad habits into the civil service. By using public office or authority for private material gains, the endemic nature of public official corruption makes people to view politics as a great market place in which people barter influence for material assets. Hence, corruption inhibits the bureaucracies from becoming more effective vehicles for administration and development.

In many developing countries, the parochial political cultures tend to replace the participant civic standards. Most civil servants, politicians and citizens view politics as a quick means to accrue wealth. Thus, this becomes the motivational tendency for political participation and the basis for running for public office. Emphasis on resource allocation and distributive functions of government is solely based on the expansion of social services and amenities, which lack productive and parsimonious benefits.

Political orientations harm rural development. Political consideration also, outweighs other program evaluation techniques in siting projects. Even in some instances, civil servants, for fear of rebukes and retaliation from politicians sometimes succumb to political pressures. Hence, resources are allocated unfairly among competing interests and groups. Political intimidation and pressure to extend services to select areas under a specific time table with the amounts of resources and skilled manpower not put into consideration make rural development projects to be carried out haphazardly.

The bureaucracy operates under political leadership. In the third world countries, where the leadership is very monolithic, there is little or no choice for the bureaucratic manager. The political institutions: legislature, cabinet, political parties and in some instances pressure groups, provide the framework of purpose, goals, timetable and resources for development purposes within which the bureaucracy must work.

The bureaucracy functions in a largely traditional society characterized by regional and communal heterogeneity, rural underdevelopment, illiteracy, poverty and economic inequ-
The interaction between society and the bureaucracy is not always favourable to the growth of effective administration and to any socio-economic change, or modernization. The effectiveness of the bureaucracy as an instrument of development is influenced by its culture – its systems of values and the way it operates. In looking at the Indian bureaucracy, Ramesh Arora (1974) observes that the image of the power and prestige of its bureaucracy is lessening. It is losing its paternalistic overtones and values, and is now becoming very adaptive and accommodating. However, Arora (1974) identified select salient features exhibited by contemporary Indian bureaucracy to include adherence to formal rules and precedents, frustration for the officials, rigidity and lack of internal communication, lack of initiative, responsibility, challenge and innovation.

Politics and Administrative Relationships: Patronage and Clientelism

The patron-client relationship develops between parties unequal in status, wealth and influence. The formation and maintenance of the relationship depends on reciprocity in the exchange of goods and services. The development and maintenance of a patron-client relationship rest heavily on face to face contact between the two parties.

A client-bureaucrat within a patron-client system is expected to place the interest of his patron above that of the organization. He distributes and withholds favours in keeping with the needs of his patron, and breaking the rule, if he needs to. A person wishing to receive from the government, a service due him under the law must develop a personal reciprocal relationship with a client-bureaucrat through bribes in order to receive it; otherwise he cannot expect the law to be obeyed. It is this type of social relationship that Edward Schumacher (1975) observed in Senegal.

According to Schumacher (1975) clientage and patronage pervade the functioning of political, social, economic and administrative structures of the new nations. He defined political clientelism as a personalized relationship between actors (patrons and clients) or sets of actors commanding unequal wealth, status or influence based on conditional loyalties and involving mutually beneficial transactions. Those transactions entail the reciprocal flow of goods and services. The power figure provides short-run material rewards, political protection, or opportunities for social mobility in exchange for his followers’ loyalty, political support and public esteem.

The “machine” has necessarily no political ideological underpinning. Its basic interest lies in distributing incomes to those who run it and also operate under its umbrella. Public institutions are indispensable elements of power in its arsenal. They are valued as the basic and main sources of patronage.

Politics is viewed as a source of “give and take.” It is looked upon as preoccupied with government jobs, contracts, licenses, subsidies, loans, scholarships, public works, payoffs, sinecures and favours.
Clientelism creates vertical links between the leaders and the masses through the intervention of middlemen or brokers whose mediating endeavours tend to enhance the legitimacy of the regime, especially among groups and populations undergoing developmental changes. Thus “machine” politics in this instance maintains a conservative attitude to change.

The public policy implications of this “machine” politics are that it encourages short-term gains in lieu of long run transformation and development goals. Its ability to operate as an institution within the political and administrative arrangements allows it to oppose changes, which are perceived to work against the interests of political elites. Describing the attributes and consequences of machine style clientelism to the operation of the ruling party in Senegal; Schumacher (1975) postulates that expectations of short-run, concrete material payoffs are paramount; the struggle over patronage is becoming an end in itself; and ethnic regional groups are incorporated primarily through computation and the distribution of material benefits.

Expectations for material payoffs are a part of a larger complex set of motivations. Material incentives are used as a means of maximizing the symbols of affective regard to which the agents consider their entitlement. Leaders to cement their power-hold use machine form of clientelism. It is parochial, divisive and inherently factional in its allocation of goods and services. It is obsessively concerned with patronage, prestige and personal aggrandizement. It has damaging and corrupting impacts on administration and the use of authority. Hence, its distorting effects on government programs are consequential.

There is lack of public service orientation among civil service personnel at various levels of administration. Widespread practice of politicized recruitment and delegation of tasks and assignment are reported. Promotions disregard merit-based criteria. Thus, low levels of productivity emanating from poor work habits, indiscipline, corruption, and over-staffing threaten administrative efficiency.

The structure and patterns of administrative behaviour discourage any meaningful form of popular participation in matters affecting the lives and welfare of the populace. Such levels of alienation breed suspicion and distrust among the masses towards the agents of administration. With the apparatus of administration highly centralized poor coordination of administration activity result. There is lack of efficient public bureaucracy linking the urban administration with the rural population. This negatively impacts on planning and implementation of rural economic development.

The administrative process presupposes a positive relationship between the administrator and his clientele members of the public who enjoy his services. But, according to Fred Riggs (1964) relationships between administrator and clientele are structured in the “Prismatic Mode” in such a way that the weight of sanctions brought to bear upon the “sala” official encourages violation of the laws and regulations guiding the professional conduct of administrators.
Expectation of rewards activates the “sala” officials to devise procedural delays and other forms of technical reasons and obstructions in order to induce clients to offer payment for what they are entitled to by right.

In some cases, the “sala” official may have a divided loyalty and interest. He may become a trustee or manager of a business entity. Time devoted to his engagements is divided. He finds himself devoting as much time to his extra curricula activities as to his bureaucratic duties. Major conflicts of interest arise, since the rationale of his entrepreneurial role is his ability, as an official to provide contracts, perquisites, and protection for his own enterprises, in competition with those of his rivals. Fred Riggs (1964) further posits that in the “prismatic” situation, the bureaucratic post in nominally public business provides opportunities for diverting public funds into the pockets of officials. This explains why a government enterprise engaged in a potentially profitable undertaking appears to lose money. Hence, it attempts to rely on increased tax revenues and possibly foreign aid. The recalcitrance of prismatic clienteles effectively obstructs administration in the sale model and contributes to bureaucratic prodigality.

Structural and Institutional Problems of the Bureaucracy

Colonial and imperial rules left new states after independence with Western forms of parliamentary, legal and economic systems. These alien institutions were transplanted and superimposed upon their body politics. The developing bureaucracies unlike their Western counterparts, which developed into “hard” state became less disciplined, and more corrupt.

Modern bureaucracies are based on Max Weber's “rational – legal” model, where the administrative units are structured to maximize efficiency and where employees are recruited on the basis of achievement.

As Monte Palmer (1978) observes, former colonial territories inherited bureaucratic structures patterned after those of the colonial systems. Such administrative arrangements may have functioned well in their European settings and environment but failed in the emerging nations because they were mainly designed to maintain internal security in the colonies, and to control the masses rather than to mobilize them for the purposes of national development. When the colonies achieved independence, they acquired the full burdens of economic development as well as responsibility of a myriad of administrative activities previously assumed by the pre-independence bureaucracies.

Ferrel Heady (1991) observes that the colonial administrative heritage was suited to the requirements of colonial governments rather than those of the newly independent states. It was more elitist, authoritarian, aloof and paternalistic. It is then, not surprising that some of these bureaucracies characterize the new states. Also, the fact that precedents from outside have largely shaped the developing bureaucracies does not necessarily mean that they are less suited than if they were indigenous. But, it does emphasize the importance of making adaptations after independence as conditions change, in order to enhance the legitimacy
of these bureaucracies, and to point them towards the accomplishment of developmental goals.

The bureaucracies are in short supply of skilled manpower necessary for development programs. Their problems are not necessarily lack of employable technical manpower, but under-employment – people are not employed where their skills are utilized to the maximum. The aftermath of such venture is that the developing bureaucracies suffer from staffing problems as well as shortage for qualified administration personnel. When the developing countries nationalized their inherited bureaucracies, the expatriate personnel were replaced with limited indigenous skills and manpower. Thus, individuals of limited training and experience filled upper level positions in several developing states.

The administrative vacuum created by the upward mobility of middle level manpower to high-ranking positions in the bureaucracy remained unfilled. So, crash programmes became the only plausible approach. As Monte Palmer (1978) observes, new functions were either scattered more or less indiscriminately among existing units or were allocated to hastily conceived organizations bearing little relationship to the needs of the total system. The frequent result was waste, inefficiency and disenchantment.

In the face of manpower shortage, the new governments initiate new extensive development programs, thereby stretching the available supply of qualified bureaucrats. It should be recalled that in the lower echelon of most of the developing bureaucracies, there is an abundant pool of lower level manpower, most of whom lack the requisite administrative skills, because of the practice of using the public service as a substitute for a social security programme or as a way to relieve the problem of unemployment, and without question, one of the reasons for maintaining a surplus of rank and file employees on the public payroll. In most cases, in-service training programmes seem to be futile since even the few who possess skills are not often used in areas relevant to their skill.

In developing countries, income-per capita is low. Thus, personnel problems have been aggravated by the substandard wages paid to lower and middle range bureaucrats, frequently forcing them to seek additional employment. In some instances, they may be tempted to compromise their integrity by taking bribes. This kind of practice is predictable in social groups where the extended family system is the norm.

Most bureaucratic systems in developing countries provide very little incentive for individual initiative and performance. Promotions are mostly based on factors of long service records and conformity to the hierarchy, thereby reflecting Guy Peters’ assertion that traditional societies recruit individuals to positions in society and administration on the basis of ascriptive criteria – status, language, religion, gender and ethnicity. Non-merit considerations greatly influence promotions, assignment dismissals, and other personnel actions within the service, as well as the conduct of business with agency clientele on the outside.

Public administration in the developing countries suffers from technical and procedural
problems. Most equipment are inadequate, old, antiquated and obsolete. This hampers recording and filing systems. Typewriter maintenance is a case in point.

Planning purposes require statistical data. Higher level bureaucrats are responsible for designing and implementing development programs, which are frequently complex. There is always lack of basic statistical information about resources and population. With shortage of computers and adequate data, census figures where available are not accurate and as such serve as little more than gross estimates. There are no reliable survey data regarding infant mortality, birth and death statistic for rural development and planning purposes without which the ability of programme planners is hindered.

Bureaucracies as well as political institutions play a crucial role in systems maintenance and goal attainment functions in the society. In the third world countries, the administrative systems tend to be more developed than the political sector. The consequence is that after independence, the political sector is ill equipped to determine the appropriate goals of administration. Hence, the weakness of the political institutions was exacerbated by the excessive growth of the bureaucracy and government programs.

The concept of unequal administrative development provides an insight into the way the developing bureaucracies behave under certain circumstances. Public bureaucracies in these emerging nations tend to become powerful as a result of the persisting legacy of colonial bureaucratic rule and because of the deliberate efforts made by governing elites to expand and fortify the administrative arm of government as a primary instrument for promoting planned economic growth.

The rapid expansion of the bureaucracy inhibits the development of effective political institutions like the legislature and the judiciary. In this way, the fundamental imbalance in the relationships between administrative and political structure is maintained. Lack of moderating forces in the political system promotes non-merit standards in the administrative process.

Because of the absence of effective political control, the administration of public policy is marked by pervasive practices of bribery, nepotism, over-staffing, self-enrichment, concealment of poor performance, and lack of commitment in the implementation of the programmes and the realization of development goals.

Organization of the Bureaucracy

There is a direct relationship between the organization of the bureaucracy, the political system and the promotion of rural development and transformation. In developing countries, the majority of the population resides in the rural areas. The major organizational challenge facing the systems is the establishment of linkages between central decision making institutions and the local communities.

It is necessary to have communication networks and strategies through which some techniques for development projects like agricultural innovation methods can be communicated.
to farmers, coupled with technical assistance they may require in order to implement new farming practices. The duplication of diverse functions within ministries often threatens development programs. By establishing several ministries concerned with rural development, the government encounters a new set of problems relating to competition for resources, conflicts over priorities and programmes, and in some instances, duplication of staff and coordination efforts. In some instances, such inter-ministerial or interagency rivalries have negative consequences on rural development efforts.

In most cases, development coordination committees, comprising political and high-ranking administrators and civil servants rarely work together because the representatives of the ministries often reflect the preferences and prejudices of their respective ministries. The committee is led to formulate broad policy guideline just to accommodate all competing interest, at the expense of a specific policy option to address development problems.

Over-centralization and poor coordination impede development programmes. It is difficult to carry out a constructive project without the concurrence of many actors who may have the power to block the eventual progress of the programmes. Top administrators sometimes immerse in interagency conflicts while subordinates waste their energies waiting for requisite approvals.

Organizational deficiencies are responsible for the failure of bureaucracies in the developing countries to achieve development planning and administrative goals. These administrative programmes experience lack of adequate attention to middle and lower level administrative needs, excessive centralization of authority and control; insufficient middle level personnel; inadequate contact between managers and subordinate employees, excessive paper work, need for greater responsiveness to the citizen’s needs, unnecessary secrecy, superfluous committees and meetings, inconsistency of promotions, lack of incentive and initiatives, and inattention to production standards. These are problems affecting teamwork, leadership, communication, initiative, personnel management, definition of work, and authority, in ways, usually considered dysfunctional in the pursuit of organizational goals.

Line-staff conflicts exist in developing bureaucracies. The line official is the specialist while staff officials serve as the support system. A generalist, as a public servant does not enjoy a specialized background and thus can be an asset in interdepartmental tasks. It is observed that a modern administrator cannot effectively operate on the basis of broad knowledge alone. Technical knowledge is important in managing a steel plant. He must understand how the steel is manufactured. Generalists have no such professional orientations. The generalists may need a specialist to interpret and translate technical data to a non-technical audience to enhance comprehension of the language, for development implementation purposes.

As Ramesh Arora (1974) observes in the Indian bureaucracy, the lengthy argument has been presented to show the conflict, which exists, between the generalists in the civil service and
the technical personnel who are pressing their claim for recognition and power in the administra-
tion. Bureaucratic decision making is concentrated at the center. People in the rural areas have limited input in the policy formulation processes. There is little or no discussion of plans at grass-root levels while public debate is missing. However, it appears that whenever there comes policy implementation programme designed for the poor, they end up benefiting the elites. Public inputs and debates are very important exercises in policy-making processes because they help to shape public policy.

Bureaucratic Attitudes and Behaviour

Bureaucratic responsibility requires that administrators subscribe to ethical professionalism, which places quality performance above the temptations of corruption and shady work. Hence, they must be dedicated to the concept of doing away with the practices of nepotism and parochialism and all their manifestations in the bureaucracy.

Most attitudes and behaviours of bureaucrats in the developing countries are not conducive to either innovation or efficient administration. They are pre-occupied with the security of their positions. Since innovation involves risk-taking and a change in the way organizations do things, their security is tied to the preservation and maintenance of organizational status quo.

This attitude manifests itself in the way superiors delegate and assume authority. Factors of personal security are largely responsible for the reluctance to delegate authority. The diverse range of values and loyalty patterns which characterize transitional societies inhibit the ability of superiors to place a great deal of trust and confidence in the organizational members because both the goals of the regime and the position of the supervisor may be jeopardized. Furthermore, ambitious subordinates to supplant the supervisor may utilize the delegation of too much authority.

Bureaucrats are eager to command authority. The greater the authority in the hand of an individual, the more other people must deal with him to receive their desired services. Such symbols enhance the prestige of the bureaucrat and ensure that reciprocal favours would go to him rather than his subjects.

Procedural devices designed to compensate for the tendencies towards petty graft and nepotism have impeded delegation of authority. The authorization for the dispersal of funds and similar operations frequently requires the signatures of more than one person. Such operations, while having the potential to create opportunities for graft, increase red tapeism which reduces the ability to get things done.

As a result of the super-ordinate and subordinate relationship which exist between various cadres of bureaucrats, the subordinates are not keen to bear the burdens and risks of decision making. Junior officers always dodge responsibility and therefore pass on administrative matters to their superiors to act on. High level officials have to grapple with the problem of
attending to minor as well as major decisions with little time at their disposal. Less time is then given to over-riding decision-making tasks in the bureaucracy.

Various heads of departments tend to see themselves in competitive relationship rather than cooperation. This kind of relationship impedes the levels of coordination for programmes. In some instances, they go as far as withholding crucial information from competing departments to insure favourable outcomes. They are more concerned with the growing size of their department in order to attract more funds and other resource allocations that will enhance their status than with matters of efficiency, performance and economy.

The “don’t dirty me” attitude still exists among bureaucrats in developing countries. They are reluctant to get their hands dirty in a task perceived by them to be exclusively for the lower classes. This problem of self-image has hampered efforts to disseminate the practical applications of agricultural and mechanical technology to the masses in various areas.

Work habits and motivational levels of most bureaucrats are substandard. There is a drop in their supervisory capacity. They carry out their functions sluggishly. This practice is consistent with the observations made in Ceylon where public servants stroll around after the appointed hour, take several tea breaks and prolonged lunch intervals, go through non-official work at their desk, and leave office before the official closing hour.

Role of Modernizing Elites

Modernizing elites play important roles in society. The future of any political system, depends on the quality and creativity of its political, administrative and intellectual elite who have access to political power and interact with each other in a bid to control the institutions of the state bureaucracy. The intellectuals in the new nations constitute the planners of the socio-economic development.

They have modernizing influences and so could exploit their access to power as an instrument of national development. Usually, there are two main political elites – the local and the intellectual elites. The intellectual elites are usually Western educated. Their knowledge and experience tend to be far broader than those of the parochial political elites. The intellectual elites control the machinery of government at the central level, which gives them special prerogative to guide the natural plans for modernization. The parochial political elites with their agrarian values constantly strive to influence national planning and bureaucracy, which really implements those plans. The division between the political elites at the local provinces and those at the central levels further intensifies, as the issues of modernization become a dialogue between the contending forces. The orientation of the administrative elites is geared towards large-scale modernization through social control and mobilization.

The administrative elites are particularly responsible for sustaining a constitutional form of government by checking the threatening action of anomic behaviour, lawlessness, and by
helping formulate and execute public policies designed to create political order, integration, and decisions conducive to socio-political modernization. National commissions for planning, which provide elite forum, have justified social control under the official state ideology. The aim is to achieve mobilization and change. However, it activates inter-elite competition and conflict, over whose ideologies will emerge to direct the cause of modernization. The urge to exert influence sometimes forces the elites to run for public office.

Modernizing elites attempt to foster behavioral changes among groups of citizens to engage in practices that will enhance development – induce farmers to use fertilizers, persuade rural women to practice birth control; provide incentives for manufacturers to produce for export; and encourage teachers to revise classroom methods.

Elite recruitment in the bureaucracy has salient consequences for public administration, and the “sala” official, In Rigg’s (1964) “prismatic” model, although selection is based on merit, the characteristic result is nepotism, a mode of recruitment in which ascriptive considerations dominate appointments although the formal rules prescribed otherwise. Candidates for office are concerned with the power potential of a position more than its professional responsibilities, and hiring officers pay much attention to the impacts of appointments on their own power position than on the administrative consequences.

Bureaucratic power and structure encourage the administrative elites to by-pass the formal rules of merit system. Since there are no effective political controls over the organization, nepotism tends to pervade the bureaucracy. The intellectual is far away from the rural environment. He is an urbanite by orientation and develops an outlook, attitude and language, which separates him culturally from the masses. The villagers cannot communicate with the language of modernization in the same level of shared understanding and purpose as the intellectual elites.

Even the professional elites, like doctors and teachers refuse to work in the rural villages where their services are mostly needed. After retirement, the urban professionals are reluctant to return to the villages where modern amenities are lacking. Even, social workers whose services extend to the rural places choose either to operate from their headquarters in the city or resign.

Conclusion

Modernization relies on the adoption of improved administrative techniques and their utilization to achieve development goals. Another structural weakness of administration is the absence of ready machinery for decisively resolving differences, lack of effective coordination, resulting in delay, inaction, and lack of initiative and dilution of responsibility.

Such administrative realities, which are unsuited to dynamic decision making and effective coordination, discourage initiative, delegation and responsibility, thereby leading to delay,
inaction, confusion and lack of accountability. Development administration emphasizes the appropriate structural, functional and value changes in the administration needed for the implementation of the goals of modernization.

The developing systems face the problem of effective political control over public bureaucracies, which carry along with them, traditional attitude of mistrust of the independent administrator. Deeply marked by social and cultural (ecological) forces, the effectiveness of public bureaucracies has been severely impaired by the self-serving influence over administrators enjoyed by outside groups.

Civil servants should be equipped to tackle the political, economic, social, scientific and technical problems. They have to be aware of interests and opinions throughout the country and even of developments abroad. They must keep up with the rapid growth of knowledge and acquire new techniques to apply it. The civil service has to be equipped to administer change.

Personnel management, as it obtains in the developing bureaucracies is out of date and inadequate. Career planning constitutes a part of the problem. Civil servants are moved too frequently between unrelated jobs, with little or no regard to personnel preferences and aptitude. There is not enough encouragement and reward for individual initiative and objective means of measuring performance. For many civil servants, especially in the lower and middle echelons of the bureaucracy, promotions depend so much on seniority.

Economic growth and political development tend to generate conflicts among social, regional and ethnic groups at a faster rate than what the institutions of management can handle. As regards the allocation of financial and symbolic resources, and the distribution of cost and benefits of public policies, the administrators must calculate the long-term implications of their actions. Policies and actions of government must be oriented to need and fairness in order to avert the possibility of conflict.

Any effective administration should attain popular participation and decentralization. Development efforts should be directed towards the rural areas. The professional elites and politicians should all extend their services: medical, legal, and farming to the rural population. Policy decentralization and popular grass-root participation are needed instead of empty slogans and promises.

Before making progress in administering public programmes, the developing systems must embark on large-scale enlistment and training of public administrators. Bureaucrats should be selected on the basis of merit rather than ascriptive criteria.
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