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Contested Terrains: Social Relations of Production and the Living Place

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In petty commodity production, which flourishes in most pre-industrial cities, residence and workplace are often joined, and a good part of subsistence may still be produced within the household itself. Capitalist development, on the other hand, entails the progressive commoditization of labour, land, and housing as well as other goods, and a correlative tendency to separate production from the home. Residential and production units may remain intermingled in spatial terms, with both workers and owners living close to work. The advent of large-scale factory production, however, is one of a complex of factors promoting the concentration and segregation of economic functions and social classes within a rapidly expanding urban space. These tendencies, despite uneven development, local reverses, and new locational trends, are still gathering force at the level of the world-system as a whole.

The separation of workplace and living place has more than spatial implications. With the splitting of the “space-time trajectories” of everyday life a social distancing also occurs, between spheres now governed by distinct sets of social and economic relationships, oriented to different objectives, and subject to different forms of resistance and control. There has been an analytic disjunction as well, with such fields as Marxist economics, class analysis, and industrial sociology, on the one hand, the study of urban social structures, housing, and spatial patterns, on the other, consigned to quite different galaxies. With the exception of a few special areas — the study of occupational or ethnic communities, for instance — the conjunction of the spheres of production and reproduction was long neglected.

The relationship between these two domains is now gradually coming into focus, with developments in urban theory playing a leading role. Here, the principal approach to the problem is through the analysis of space — the struggle between rich and poor, between capital and communities, to appropriate space for different uses or for exchange. This theme, of course, is not altogether new. Despite a veil of naturalistic metaphor, “class” struggles over land and housing in capitalist societies were in fact preoccupation
of the urban ecology of the Chicago School. It was in the 1960s, however, that urban conflicts came into their own, as object of analysis as well as historical event, aided by a revival of Weberian and Marxian ideas. In the former perspective, deployed by such analysts as Rex and Pahl, distributional struggles over housing and urban space were seen as another form of class struggle, separate from the realm of work. Marxist theory has taken a further, more different step, attempting to incorporate urban phenomena to the wider framework of political economy, in which the antinomy of capital and labour in production plays a dominant role.

Having internalized, as it were, the duality of production/accumulation, on the one hand, and reproduction/consumption, on the other, the pioneers of the new "urban political economy" have emphasized different aspects of the urban link. For Harvey, the city was above all a site for the management, circulation, and investment of capital, its "built form" serving as "a resource system . . . for the production of value and surplus value." Castells, on the other hand, has seen the urban spatial unit as the major locus of "collective consumption," the reproduction of labour power and the socialization of costs of reproduction by the state. Cutting across these differences (in any case increasingly synthesized in recent work), is a common emphasis on the primacy of capital, generating and exploiting housing and spatial inequalities, and subordinating consumption to accumulation needs.

The degree of determination by the accumulation process, however, the extent to which urban structures and processes may escape or resist its imperatives, or even emerge on different bases altogether, remain matters of intense debate. One may distinguish three broad positions on these points. One is an economistic Marxist-structuralist tendency, initially embraced by Castells, a number of other French scholars, and, for a time, by Harvey as well. Here, the theorization of not only the urban economy but of urban forms of consciousness and politics, tends to be closely subordinated to the central categories and tendencies of the capitalist mode. Saunders, on the other hand, a trenchant critic of this school, has maintained a rear guard intellectual operation in which distributional strata and conflicts are almost completely divorced from the production realm. A more dialectical style of Marxist analysis, finally, has now taken center stage, where Castells and Harvey have rejoined more inveterate critics of the structuralist approach. Here the emphasis is on the relative autonomy of the urban/community level, where specific forms of culture, consciousness, and conflict with capital take shape; and the centrality of processes at this level for the political survival — and eventual demise — of the capitalist formation as a whole.
If a dialectical approach proves fruitful in advanced capitalist contexts, this should be even more the case in areas such as West Africa, where capital is less deeply embedded, and confronted by local structures and orientations of very different descent. This paper will try to look at both parts of the world, in the course of a preliminary reconnaissance of the literature on workplace-living place links. The focus will be on wage labour, capitalist production units, and the spatial context and patterns in which both factory and workforce are involved. Remarkably little work has been done on this complex of variables. The urban political economy literature raises interesting questions, discussed in the first section of this essay, concerning the relations of different sorts of capitalists and consumers in land and housing markets. Despite frequent references to "labour," however, the urban theorists pay little attention to that other "contested terrain" — made up of real production units and the workers and work relations they contain.

The rest of this paper will attempt to fill in this gap, looking first at the impact of industry on worker housing, and then turning to the implications of residential patterns for working-class consciousness and behaviour, within the workplace and without. The field of industrial sociology thus provides a valuable complement to the analysis, although explicit connections to housing are still few and far between. One area of convergence, given some attention by Mingione, involves the impact of the internal differentiation of the workforce; another, pioneered by Burawoy, incorporates the "mode of reproduction of labour" (including company housing), to the analysis of factory regimes. Industrial location, finally, which we often take as a "given" to which workers simply respond, may be powerfully affected by the class and community structures of particular locales. The relevant literature, needless to say, has only been partially scanned. The outline of important questions, tentative connections, and areas of ignorance however, begin to be discerned.

Land, Labour and Capital
Many of the early factories in Europe and America were dispersed in small towns and villages, often finding their work-force already at home, as it were, or sometimes erecting new housing for their use. By the late 19th century, however, industries became increasingly concentrated in large cities, where masses of cheap labour had been summoned to struggle for employment — and shelter — as best they could. Here, companies rarely provided housing for their employees, and still less, before the 20th century, did the state. This function, rather, was largely consigned to an expanding real estate market, where an array of profit-oriented developers, landlords, builders, and speculators was coming to the fore. Thus the contradictory vocation of the city — to serve the reproduction of both capital and labour power — entail-
ed ambivalent relations of dependency and antagonism not only between labour and its employers, but between each of these and a heterogeneous property class.

The housing question is an aspect of a broader struggle over the disposition and costs of space — a resource essential for all activities, yet relatively finite in supply. This is particularly the case in cities, where demand is intensified by the density and purchasing power of potential users, and again, by the economic advantages conferred by the very agglomeration of population and activities in space. Housing, of course, can be produced, but it remains relatively expensive, due in part to constraints on productivity in the construction industry, and also to restrictions on “substandard” and self-built forms. Real estate markets, moreover, are notoriously “imperfect”, marked by strong tendencies towards speculation, inflation and waste. Prices reflect not only initial purchase plus improvement costs, but are powerfully affected by the externalities of sheer location, including the characteristics of adjoining areas.

Additional tolls (the absolute or monopoly forms of ground rent noted by Marx) may be extracted for particularly unique or strategic locations which may otherwise be simply withheld from use.

Under market conditions, then, the distribution of urban space will be strongly skewed by differences in purchasing power, with some categories of users perhaps excluded altogether. This is spatially expressed in the segregation of different types of economic activities, on the one hand, different classes of residential consumers, on the other. Low-income categories are pushed towards undesirable, deteriorated, or distant locations, and tend to suffer from absolute shortages in housing supply: old housing stock may be expropriated for purposes of redevelopment, while new low-income housing is relatively unprofitable to build. Despite improvements in real incomes and housing standards, and constant interventions by the state, distributional crises stubbornly reappear, in new conjunctures, cities and parts of the world.

With a few possible exceptions (e.g. Singapore?), housing inequalities in the Third World, along with real estate markets, are still in a phase of rapid growth, widely generalized only since the Second World War and the end of colonial rule. West African cities, for instance, are still marked by the persistence of customary tenure and inheritance rules — particularly in slower-growing cities and those with strong indigenous cores — and the often extensive tracts of land administered by the state. With rapid urban growth, however, critical supply problems emerge, due to extensive commercial investment and speculation in real estate, and a polarized social structure in
which low local wage levels coexist with elite incomes, housing standards and real estate prices which tend towards metropolitan norms. Thus, in addition to the familiar problems of congestion and deterioration of old housing stock (insofar as this exists), illegal subdivisions and constructions, squatting, and self-housing of the most minimal kind have occurred on an unprecedented scale.26

The precise spatial distribution of different sectors and classes is affected, among other things, by a city's position in wider national and international divisions of labour. There have been dramatic changes in this respect in recent decades, spurred by global competition and increasing technical possibilities for the separation of central corporate administration from production cities. Investment flows have thus become much more sensitive to worldwide variations in labour markets, tax and tariff regimes, and general operating costs.27 In the advanced capitalist countries, many older industrial areas have declined, while a partially overlapping set of major metropolitan centers have been reorganized around corporate administration and services, and the consumption needs of an increasingly whitecollar and professional labour force. These trends have supported a process of “gentrification” of the urban core, and a correlative displacement of productive activities and the working class towards peripheral zones.28

Such neo-imperial “world cities”29 appear in certain developing countries as well: Hong Kong, Mexico City, or Singapore, for instance, perform similar economic functions as a regional plane. Here, the problems associated with the metropolitan form, such as congestion, infrastructural deficiencies, and increased commuting time and costs, are likely to be even more pronounced.30 As in many lower-ranking Third World cities, moreover, the growth and urban concentration of industry and wage labour may still be underway (sometimes as a direct result of relocation from higher-cost areas overseas). The content of “tertiarization” also differs, being weighted towards the expansion of an informal sector of low-income, small-scale enterprise, necessitated by inadequate supply of waged and salarised work.31

The role of real estate interests in these distributional and spatial shifts, particularly in the advanced countries, has been a major concern of the urban political economists. Mingione has noted the underlying cleavages involved:

the rentiers and speculators want to impose higher costs to get an important share of the produced surplus value; the capitalists theoretically oppose this tendency as they are obliged to pay for it through a direct subtraction of surplus value or through higher wages; the workers struggle for better housing and living conditions at decreasing costs . . . 32
Interpretation is coloured by the historical role of property capital, which antedates industrial capitalism, fails to play an equivalent role in raising productivity or lowering costs and long remains confined to a small-scale, petty-bourgeois form. Thus for Ricardo, Marx and Engels, and certain theorists today, ground rent may erode productive capital and brake long-term capacity for growth. Similarly, the proclivity of Third-World bourgeoisies to invest in real estate and trade has been cited as proof of their incapacity to play an economically progressive role.

In mature capitalist formations, however, as Harvey suggests, property investment may simply figure as a “secondary circuit” of capital, taking up the slack in periods (and places - KPM) marked by sluggish demand and profits in the goods-producing sectors. Particularly with the emergence of large-scale property development corporations, merged with financial and even industrial capital, nothing prevents real estate proceeds from being recycled back to industry when market conditions change. Thus, if property capital is an agent of the restructuring of major metropolitican centres, it is not likely to be the cause — still less when we remember that production is not being abandoned, but relocated, in part to less developed areas overseas. There, extensive concentrations of capital in real estate and construction are also beginning to appear, in tandem with, not instead of, industrial growth. Indeed, the extent to which real estate may provide a strategic niche for industrial capital accumulation, facilitating, at a later stage, entry into the more competitive often foreign-dominated, industrial sphere, is a matter deserving more research.

Property and industrial capital are also linked more indirectly, through housing costs and wage rates, as they come to bear on the worker himself. This is a key aspect of the workplace-living place connection that is our principal concern, and thus will be alluded to at later points in the text. Here we should note the basic variations in the wage-rent equation, which structuralist analysis has identified but not yet satisfactorily explained. On the other hand, capital may “externalize” housing and urban costs by shifting them to labour, in which case property capital has most to gain. Living conditions may then deteriorate, or wage pressures and adjustments may occur to cover the additional costs. In the latter case, there is an effective subtraction from industrial surplus value, which state rent controls or housing subsidies may do something to restore. In these formulations, it seems, labour never wins; the empirical evidence, however, suggests that the average real housing conditions of labour in core countries have, over time, clearly improved.

A more differentiated treatment of the share-out of urbanization costs might be possible if we consider the distinction between large and small-to-
medium scale business concerns. While the former may thrive on spatial mobility and long-distance integration of their activities, small ones more often rely on localized economic networks, and suffer disproportionately from urban redevelopment and locational change. If ground rents or wages rise, moreover, larger, oligopolistic firms are more able to absorb this by raising prices; their employees, in fact, are likely to be well-organized and capable of pressing home wage demands if housing or transport costs increase. Competitive sector workers, on the other hand, will tend to bear the brunt.

Such contrasts are even more extreme in the Third World, where profits and wages in the “informal sector” are relatively depressed, and where the need for physical proximity of small-scale activities to each other and to customers is more acute. These variations, however, have been recuperated by yet another diffuse functionalist model in which the small-scale sector is seen to represent less the inadequacies or limits of capitalist growth than the very conditions of its success. The basic argument here is that various forms of subsistence production and non-wage work keep general reproduction costs in check. Even wage labour, can be paid at less than “value” (i.e. fully monetarized consumption costs), providing “excess” surplus-value for capital, and/or, through “unequal exchange,” effectively subsidizing consumption costs of wage labour, even overseas. Such formulations have also been extended to explicitly refer to such phenomena as self-housing, squatting, flimsy construction, and sites-and-service schemes which, by lowering housing costs, ultimately rebound to the benefit of formal-sector employers.

Various aspects of the super exploitation/surplus-transfer model have come under attack; as for low-cost housing, one wonders why, if it is so functional for capital, it is confronted by such incessant efforts at regulation, demolition, and renewal, replicating the experience of the developed world. Our main concern here is to note that, as with urban structuralist theory, the question of who benefits from cheap housing is actually left unresolved. As the structuralists would point out, first of all, the gain to employers might only be property capital’s loss; moreover, petty landlords often do gain from letting “irregular” housing, sometimes at the same price that would be paid for more standard buildings and plots. Or windfall differentials in real income may accrue to the formally employed, whose wage levels may be predicated on standard vs. informal housing costs, and who in any case will be enjoying access to the same cheap housing as the poorer informal-sector employees and the self-employed.

The wage-rent equation may also be affected by capitalist cycles of contraction and growth. With respect to the advanced capitalist countries, it has
been suggested that in times of expansion and high labour demand, industrial capital may side with workers in favour of state intervention to reduce housing costs, while in periods of contraction, industrial and property capital are more closely aligned.49 There seem to be many exceptions to this rule, however,50 as well as significant international variations despite similar economic trends. The power of labour and other popular forces, along with differences in inherited political culture, need obviously to be taken into greater account, as does the budgetary and fiscal situation of the state. Through the political process, moreover, a variety of coalitions of business and labour interests may be forged, oriented to strategies of growth and redistribution in good times, or defense of the local economy in periods of competitive stress.51 The current downturn has been generally marked by declining or stagnant employment and real wages in industry, a polarization of incomes within expanding sectors, and a shift in state spending from social welfare to infrastructural costs. There has also been extensive competition and variation between cities with respect to capital flows; particularly where restructuring has been most successful, the lower echelons of the labour force are likely to be caught in a scissors movement between low wages and increasing rents.52 Again, it is in the intersection of these larger shifts with those on local terrain that one is most likely to find answers to the question of “who pays?” and to identify the conditions under which “unproductive” capital may thrive.

The variability of the role and content of state policy is even more marked if we include the Third World in our compass. Not only development and class formation, but the very capacity of the state to articulate class interests and regulate urban processes is extremely uneven here. The dialectic of the state and international capital has historically been prominent, while conflicts over the structuring of space at the municipal level have emerged in tandem with the establishment of new urban centers, European settlement and capitalist-industrial penetration. As Cooper53 suggests, the struggle to gain control over urban land use and residence, as well as labour and workplace, has become increasingly acute in recent years. As elsewhere, the net effect of state welfare and planning measures seems to be to reproduce rather than overcome the inequalities produced by the market itself.54

Marxists of the structuralist school, as we have seen, tend to emphasize the strength of capitalist interests, and to down-play possibilities for urban-based redistribution and change. Recent work, however — notably that of Castells55 — is less pessimistic on this score, while Mingione has noted that reforms may be so extensive as to undermine the solvency and legitimacy of the state, and even “endanger the rhythm and the possibility of the accumulation process itself.”56 Distributional struggles are given greatest
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weight, finally, in non-Marxist work — but here they are often viewed in isolation from the the problem of the reproduction of capital or, indeed, from the capitalist system as a whole. Saunders has taken a particularly strong position on this point, initially arguing that the analysis of distribution should be delinked not only from accumulation processes, but from any special focus on housing or the use of space.

Our own survey of the field suggests contrary conclusions. In capitalist settings, at least, the "built environment" clearly occupies a privileged position among both consumption and investment goods, and can only be illuminated by a political economy approach. As suggested at several points, however, elegant models of the accumulation process must be tempered by a primary fidelity to historically and spatially specific groups and structures, themselves conditioned by broader networks of relations created by markets, states, and the world system as a whole. Moreover, the influence of capital or of productive organization on the economics of consumption cannot resolve in advance the political issues relating to lines of cleavage, forms of consciousness or the effectiveness of struggles in the distributional sphere.

Housing Strata and the Industrial Division of Labour

The spheres of production and consumption, each of which involves both social and spatial dimensions, can be approached through various units of analysis. The city, as we have seen, has often been taken as the spatial unit of reproduction or distribution, frequently counterposed to the organization of production in the factory, workplace, or firm. Consumption is not confined to cities, of course, but commoditization, markets, and state provision are there most concentrated and advanced. For purposes of more differentiated analysis, the progressively smaller units of community, neighbourhood, living place, and home or residence are variously employed. The literature on urban land and housing makes remarkably little reference to that basic social, budgetary, and residential unit — the household — now a focus of growing attention in both community and labour research. The household continues to be a site for work of various kinds, including contractual outwork for capitalist concerns; the dominant secular trend, however, is for the major source of livelihood to be put outside the domestic sphere. Those who work for wages outside the home will be our major focus here.

The relations of social inequality and conflict characterizing each of these two terrains, and above all the connections between them, have been a major preoccupation of the urban political economy school. As Harvey observes:

the split between the place of work and the place of residence means that the struggle of labour to control the social conditions of its own existence splits into two seemingly independent struggles. The first,
located in the workplace, is over the wage rate, which provides the purchasing power for consumption goods, and the conditions of work. The second, fought in the place of residence, is against secondary forms of exploitation and appropriation represented by merchant capital, landed property, and the like. This is a fight over the costs and conditions of existence in the living place...)

As suggested, however, by the reference to "seemingly independent" struggles, the degree of congruence or autonomy of the two spheres is a matter of considerable debate. These discussions, which have been building up over the past decade, have largely referred to advanced-capitalist contexts; their significance, however, escapes these confines, spilling over, in fact, to touch on our most general conceptions of class and social change. A first step, in any case, might be to identify the significant social divisions and categories in the housing sphere.

Theories of Residential Inequality

If all big capitalists were also landlords, all small capitalists, homeowners, and all labour, renters or sans domiciles, matters would be simple. In fact, housing, perhaps more than other forms of consumption, gives rise to significant divisions within both proletariat and bourgeoisie. One approach, pioneered by Rex and Moore, has been to treat the "distribution of life-chances" in housing as the basis of a distinct class hierarchy, giving rise to struggles over the use, not of the means of production, but of the "means of residence" and "domestic property." Later work spun out numerous categories based on differences in access, tenure, and the social status of users; the systematic analysis of property classes, however, was lost from sight. Saunders, following Pahl, has noted that a more rigorous application of a Weberian approach might yield three main groups:

- Those who live off the economic returns from house ownership (such as landlords and private developers), those who use housing purely as a means of consumption (tenants in the private and public sectors), and those who, in the process of consuming housing, typically enjoy a return on capital (most owner-occupiers, who achieve considerable capital gains from their ownership of housing).

Further distinctions might be made among large and small property capitals, public and private provision, and particular modalities of pricing and distribution. This sort of analysis is not incompatible with early Marxist approaches to the subject, in which the linkages of heteroclite urban struggles to the global properties of capital began to be explored.

The enlarged, synthetic framework of class analysis implicitly promised here has not, unfortunately, been entirely realized in recent work.
Saunders, at one extreme, has opted for a view of the political process in which "consumption locations," now seem to be significantly determined by housing tenure, take pride of place. These strata, however, are dissociated from capital, occupation, and (production-based) class in not only analytic but very real terms: the generation of income and consumption differences by the larger economic structure, along with the functions of property investment for large-scale accumulation, are almost entirely lost from view. This stance is in part a reaction to the structuralists, particularly Harvey, who took an opposite tack: arguing that "the dichotomy between living and working is an artificial division," Harvey attempted to reduce consumption categories to the dichotomy of capital and labour based in the productive sphere.

As suggested by the preceding section of this paper, this strategy is fairly successful at the level of capital, which, in taking various fractional forms, does indeed dominate production and accumulation in the housing field. It creates serious problems, however, when subordinate housing categories are addressed.

Initially, Harvey had simply referred to these as "occupiers" or consumers, divided by income, tenure, neighbourhood, and the like. These diverse groupings were subsequently hypostatized as mere manifestations of "labour"-in-general, which, through a series of elisions, was attributed a privileged role with respect to consumption and orientation to use. And consumption, being tied to the reproduction of labour power, could then become, by implication, a moment of the production process itself.

This was not to deny the phenomenal reality of consumption cleavages; these were highlighted, in fact, but in quite invidious terms. As Cox observed, with the commodification of the living place, the working class and its everyday community dissolve into distributional groupings according to race, income, location or any other social cleavage created by the necessarily uneven development of capital . . . Fractions of labour are willing to identify with those sharing a similar consumption status and develop consciousness opposing their claims to those of other groupings.

It is homeownership, among other housing inequalities, that is the leading villain of the piece, dividing workers by neighbourhood, placing some of them "on the side of the principle of private property," and generally serving as an instrument of "divide and rule." Beneath the "surface appearance" presented by such cleavages, the "hidden essence . . . the struggle between capital and labour," lies concealed.
Such reductions, no less than Saunders, neo-dualist approach, seem altogether premature. Other and more recent Marxist work, however, including that of Harvey himself, is more cautious on these points. Mingione, for instance, notes that reproduction includes "various social groups, which cannot be considered productive workers," while Castells had pointed to the emergence of disparities related not to "class relationships but to the position in the consumption process itself . . ." In The City and the Grassroots, and Consciousness and the Urban Experience, he and Harvey, respectively, have gone much further along these lines. Taking up a theme introduced by Lefebvre years ago, both books emphasize the non-class, space-based, and cultural character of urban groupings; capital remains the main antagonist, however, along with the primacy of exchange-value and accumulation, and the incessant urban contradictions, which it entails. For Harvey, however, the connections between such groups and capital at the level of economic structure is still a major concern. The key linkage is now located not in production as such, but at the moment of exchange — particularly through the circulation of revenues, which structures all other social solidarities and distinctions in their turn. Urban social relations, then, remain subject to the class antimonies of capitalism, although, once "institutionalized and reified," they take on an apparent life of their own.

This perspective helps open the way to a more empirical analysis of workplace-living links, something which the urban political economists continue to neglect. Such an investigation demands that we move from an exclusive focus on urban consumption and the general impact of capital, to bring real production units — factories, corporations, and so on — into view. This is all the more necessary if we are to study labour in the living place (real, existing labour, that is, and not a metaphor), for it is at the point of production that labour can be clearly identified as such. Of course, there is a workforce internal to the housing field, in construction, maintenance, and so on. But even there, it will tend to dissolve into "consumers" and "citizens" outside the hours and place of work — unless specific mechanisms intervene to carry over workplace identities into the residential sphere. The critical task is to ask to what extent and through what processes this might occur, and how it might react back on workplace relations in turn.

The Impact of Industry
This down-to-earth strategy yields immediate results. With the recent exception of Harvey, who, as just noted, has acknowledged the importance of money incomes, urban theorists have tended to imply that consumption differences are somehow engendered in the consumption process itself. But labour is in fact divided within the workplace as well as in everyday life outside. Looking at even a single firm, let alone an industrial sector or a coun-
try, three major sorts of differentiation can be seen. The first, which seems intrinsic to the industrial labour process (at least under competitive conditions), involves the division of labour in production, and the arrangement of tasks in a hierarchy of wage and skills. The second is the overlapping but broader segmentation of workers into primary and secondary, core and periphery, or formal and informal sectors, based on additional factors such as unionization, job security, and labour market structures. (The differentiation of industries themselves with respect to scale, organization, and market position is an important underlying variable here). Finally, and with considerable local variation in import and form, is the fragmentation of the workforce along ethnic, cultural, and sexual lines, insofar as these ascriptive criteria are interwoven with the structural divisions just described.

There is remarkably little in either the urban or industrial literature which simultaneously brings workplace status and housing situation into view. Everything suggests, however, that these work-based divisions may account for a large part of the housing variations that cut across the working class. Insofar as this is the case, then conflicts around the living place are, indeed, "displaced" from the "work process," as Harvey once put it, but in a much more direct way than he had in mind. As he now suggests, given the importance of work status for income, and of income (and, perhaps, ethnicity) in housing markets, it is hard to see how it could be otherwise. And if this is correct, then Saunders' notion, that consumption-based divisions "are no less 'basic' or 'fundamental' " than those derived from work and class, is certainly placed in doubt. Given the variable development and scope of housing and labour markets, between countries and over time, the strength of correlation between the two spheres will also vary, of course. We cannot attempt a systematic comparative treatment here, but will try to draw attention to some preliminary evidence which may stimulate further work.

One of the contexts in which such correlations clearly appear is the planned housing estate designed entirely or in part for members of the working class. Here, workplace divisions may not only carry over into a segregated community life — as with migrant hostels, for instance — but may be reflected quite exactly in differences in the location and quality of dwelling units. Parkin provides striking details of this sort for two estates in Kampala, Uganda, and in India and in socialist countries, public housing is even more commonly tied to gradations of status at work. In such cases, of course, deliberate policies of a redistributive or egalitarian kind may also constrain the expression of income differences in the living place; racial segregation or egalitarian social norms may have similar effects in unplanned market settings. Here, however, marked housing differences are more common, especially insofar as minimal housing standards are absent or not
enforced. Engels’ pioneer study of mid-nineteenth century Manchester, with its contrasts of respectable working-men’s homes with the sties and cellars of Irish migrants and other subproletarians, is a classic contribution in this respect (and one cannot imagine him arguing that these housing differences are the cause of the cleavages within the working class!). Recent British data reveals that a strong linear correlation between income/occupation and housing situation still stands, extending to wide variation in homeownership between skill categories within the working class. The duration and stability of employment, along with age and household composition, are additional factors here.

Other research focusses on neighbourhood variation as opposed to dwelling units as such. Harvey, for instance, has traced the association between occupational categories and spatial differentiation of 19th-century Paris, while Kornblum’s study of South Chicago steel workers describes the intricate interrelations of labour recruitment and work status, ethnicity and community life. Others have noted the impact of industrial relations on inner-city Black American neighbourhoods, increasing either unemployment or housing costs, and reinforcing housing abandonment and decline. Ethnic segregation, at least among wage workers, is relatively unimportant in much of the Third World; distinctions between ‘strangers’ and indigenes in African cities, however, may have clear occupational and residential links. Although neighbourhood variations in concentrations of wage workers, and of skilled vs. unskilled, can certainly be found, spatial differentiation among workers tends to be restricted by the compression of wages and the absolute scarcity of housing. Thus, even in shanty towns and squatter areas, there tends to be extensive occupational mix. Such housing is generally linked to low incomes and purchasing power, but the coexistence of homeowners, landlords and renters, and of different types of housing, suggests considerable internal variation in this respect as well.

Central location, as noted earlier, may be particularly important for small-scale firms and the self-employed. Economic restructuring, however, may both multiply such enterprises and threaten their hold on central space. Mingione, looking at Italy, has noted the way in which stability and centrality of residence is connected to the core-periphery segmentation of the labour force, arguing that the unemployed are virtually barred from access to the cities where they might find jobs. Apart from some limiting cases (e.g. the pass law regimes in settler territories), such exclusion seems more a wish than a reality. Mingione’s treatment is interesting, however, in that it treats housing differences as a symptom, not a cause, of the disaggregation of the working class. Marginal and unemployed workers, he suggests, “have no chance of gaining anything through factory struggles,” and thus
direct their welfare demands to the state; core workers, on the other hand, act first, and more effectively, in the workplace, where they attempt "to compel individual capitalists to pay directly" for increases in reproduction costs. Not only wages, but free transportation, for instance, or subsidized housing, may figure among their demands. This directs our attention to another possible workplace link — the extent to which non-wage consumption needs of workers may be provided for directly by the firm.

The work of Michael Burawoy offers a valuable starting point for analysis here. One of the determinants of different production or factory regimes, he argues, is "the mode of reproduction of labour power" — which varies as to whether provisioning is assured by auto-subsistence, the wage, the factory, or the state. Capitalist development tends to separate the worker from the means of both subsistence and production: his "appearance at the factory gates has to be renewed each day if he or she is to survive."

Pure cases of such "market despotism," however, are actually quite rare, and one of the interesting variations that occurs is the provision of worker housing by the employer, which, we should note, could be a public agency as well as a private firm. This sort of housing, which has been of episodic importance in the West, is even more significant when other parts of the world are taken into account.

In the early stages of capitalist development, wage workers often retain access to a more or less autonomous subsistence base. One way of recruiting and stabilizing labour under such conditions is to supply and oversee workers' consumption, in some cases combining this with restrictions on mobility and alternative sources of supply. This gives rise to what Burawoy calls the "company state," which "intervene(s) coercively in the reproduction of labour power, binding community to factory through non-market as well as market ties." Such patterns appeared in post-Emancipation Russia, in some of the early Lancashire cotton mills, and in many ventures in rural, frontier, and colonial areas where shortages not only of labour but of private housing stock may have played a role. Major 20th-century examples are the mining compounds of central and southern Africa designed in the latter case less to stabilize migrant labour than to prevent it from settling down.

A second, more liberal type of company housing scheme appeared in a number of core industrial areas during the century prior to the Great Depression. A forerunner was the model worker community established by philanthropist mill owner, Robert Owen, partially replicated by other well-established firms in England, New England, and on the Ruhr. Labour shortage was still a factor in some cases, as suggested by the dormitory system devised for the young farm girls brought to work in the early New England
By the late 19th century, the socialization of immigrants and the containment of radicals seem to have been more prevalent concerns and company towns reappeared as one of several possible components of the "welfare capitalism" adopted by many major American corporations at the time.101 In the big cities, however, rentier capital could now more conveniently take care of housing supply.

A third variant — which no one, to our knowledge, has written about as a type — is the housing routinely provided by many large scale companies and public services in colonial, ex-colonial, and other less-developed areas outside the world system's metropoles. Here, a history of housing and labour shortages is combined with a relatively non-interventionist labour relations regime: living quarters figure more as a perquisite of office than as an instrument of control. Thus, it is the highest-paid professional and executive cadres who receive priority here. Consider the vast stock of fine housing established for administrators in the colonies,102 or built by companies for their senior staff (e.g. the old UAC compounds in many West African cities, 'Shell Camp' in Port Harcourt, or Delta Steel Township in Warri, Nigeria).

For lower cadres, the most comprehensive schemes outside the uniformed services seem to have been offered by the railways — often the largest single employer apart from ports and mines. A well-documented case is the East African Railway Estate in Kampala, which housed all railway workers, dividing them into seven "house classes" according to their administrative grade.103 Company housing seems to have been given special emphasis in settler areas: it still constituted 17 per cent of the total Nairobi housing stock in 1968.104

In interwar England and America, in the meantime, company welfare schemes were being whittled down in the face of labour militancy and business decline. These problems also revealed particular drawbacks which company housing entailed. On the one hand, workers found they had to vacate company housing if they went on strike.105 On the other, companies such as Pullman and Bethlehem Steel found themselves torn between retaining their worker-tenants and the occasional need to shed labour in line with business conditions or rationalization schemes.106 As Harvey notes,

The solution for the individual capitalist is to withdraw from the production of consumption fund items for the workers he or she employs. But the problem remains for the capitalist system as a whole.107

For these and other reasons, company provision of housing has become very uncommon in core countries since the Second World War. On the other hand, housing construction by various cooperative and non-profit organizations
including trade unions assume some importance particularly in the Scandina-
vian case, and state intervention, through a varied patchwork of measures
to moderate prices and increase supply, accelerated throughout the capitalist
world. Generally, there has been an expansion of public housing (especially
in Britain and Scandinavia) and private homeowning (especially in America,
but now a widespread trend); private rental stock is now in decline in core
countries, but is growing in much of the developing world. The specific con-
nections of these developments to industry and industrial workers have still
to be unravelled, although a few broad points can be made. First, employ-
ment status can still condition access to state-provided goods, and we should
investigate further the extent to which this is so. Second, we suspect that
there is still significant variation among firms as concerns the provision of
consumption goods or subsidies, and that this is shaped by further varia-
tions along inter-sectoral and international lines.

A good case in point is provided by Japan, where comprehensive patern-
alistic welfare regimes, often including significant housing benefits, remain
typical of large corporations. Four features of this situation deserve par-
ticular mention. Japan’s industrial structure is extremely segmented; company
benefits are largely restricted to the large-scale sector and, within the
sector, to the permanent as opposed to the temporary or contract labour force.
At the same time, housing is very scarce and costly, and state-provided social
insurance and consumption provision is meager indeed. Finally, Japanese
industry has enjoyed a uniquely favoured position relative to the competi-
tion and contraction that has afflicted the world economy over the past
decade. Elsewhere, the re-privatization of consumption costs by both states
and companies has been the general trend.

In light of this analysis, it seems safe to conclude that the situation of labour
in the living place may reflect, rather than deflect from, differences emerg-
ing within the world of work. In neither case is it useful to attempt a treat-
ment of “labour” in undifferentiated terms (still less to identify labour with
“consumption,” as if other strata do not exist). The complexity of factors
and variations affecting the housing sphere suggests further that the autonomy
of the distributional order vis a vis production should be conceded for analytic
purposes — but for not much more than that. Substantively, pace Saunders,
housing and other kinds of consumption are secondary — ultimately shaped by the production mode that dominates the social system
as a whole, and immediately affected by the sorts of links to production and
employment traced above. Distributional cleavages may be “secondary” in
another sense, of course, in that they distract the workers from the main
issues, particularly that of ruling class control of production and the state.
This brings us to the final topic of this essay — the way in which various
features of the living place in fact condition the political attitudes and behaviour of the working class.

Living-Place Patterns and the Labour Struggle

The analysis of cleavages in the residential domain has been strongly coloured by apprehensions concerning their possible political effects. The Left, traditionally, has been indifferent to "urban" issues; marked by Engels’ negative evaluation of the housing question, its occasional alliances with urban reform movements have been accompanied by deep reserve. Since the protests of the 1960s, as we have seen, these attitudes have begun to shift. The economistic strand of structuralism, however, marked a reversion to a more orthodox political stance, resting on three main points. One has already been noted — the idea that apparent working class gains in the housing field actually redound to the benefit of one or another fraction of the capitalist class. The rise of homeownership in the United States, for instance, or of self-help housing in the Third World, has been interpreted as a more or less deliberate counter to economic crisis and social unrest. Secondly, housing differences promote "parochialist forms of community action that typically lead one fraction of labour to benefit at the expense of another," deflecting attention from class struggle, and reinforcing divisions within the working class.

Most serious, perhaps, is the way in which the commercialization of home and community may promote the domination of capital at the level of ideology, values, and the everyday, intimate spheres of life. As Harvey puts it, it is only in terms of an all-embracing domination of labour in every facet of its life that the "work ethic" and the "bourgeois values" necessarily demanded by the capitalist work process can be created and secured.

Particularly with the spread of homeownership, labour is won over the principle of private property and to the pursuit of status and autonomy through the individualistic and competitive acquisition of goods; the relationship of classes is correspondingly concealed.

These are interesting hypotheses which, however, are weakened by being stated in overly schematic terms. Several preliminary objections, relating to the general significance of distributional cleavages, can be made. If two-thirds of housing units in the United States are occupied by owners, for instance, and one-third of those in Britain publicly provided on the basis of need, are the functions of these phenomena for capital — here, through profits from real estate, there, through lowering the necessary wage — really the key explanatory point? As Saunders once noted, such arguments may entail a
"systematic devaluing of the casual significance of working-class demands." Even in the American case, the "suburban compromise" represented concessions to labour, not merely its cooptation. Granted, this takes us far from revolution — but should we regret a scenario predicated on the immiseration of the working class? Or combat housing reform in order to hasten the capitalist demise? Engels may have thought so, but few contemporary analysts are so blunt. Rather, housing gains in the advanced countries are implicitly accepted as one of several indices of labour strength, while expectations that Third World shanty towns might provide new centers for revolt have been quietly put aside.

The contrast between living-place and workplace demands, more-over, needs to be more carefully thought through. Rather than rigidly counterposing the two, we might observe that the class struggle itself is typically expressed in distributional terms; even in the factory, conflict is more centred on the wage bargain than on issues of property or control. This, of course, can be dismissed as "mystification" as well. In any case, the derogation of real day-to-day struggles as "mere trade unionism" or "false consciousness" does not seem to get us far. It should prove more fruitful to admit that "consumption interests are real and vital," not to be dismissed as "mere ideological barriers" to an ideal polarity of class. Nor are such considerations limited to high-consumption areas of the world: current assessments of African labour studies also suggest revisions along these lines.

The recent work of Harvey and Castells, finally, goes far in answering these complaints: the importance of spatial and distributional issues, their inescapable imbrication in wider projects for change, are no longer left in doubt. Castells, of course, was already quite sympathetic to urban protest groups. Many of these, he had argued, may go no further than ameliorative reforms — but some, in certain conjunctures, and if linked to the broader struggle of the working class, might constitute "urban social movements" of revolutionary thrust. While his immediate expectations remain modest, Castells has now taken a further step: it is the multi-class urban movements that are the primary potential source of change and they should distance themselves from the class-based movements and parties, which may otherwise tend to divide, distract, or coopt. Harvey, similarly, now recognizes "different loci of consciousness formation" and resistance, of which production is only one; with a "material base in daily urban life," they "cannot be dismissed as false." At the same time, however, they breed various forms of fetishism and fragmentation which only a broader political movement can ultimately resolve.

In both formulations, the problem of reduction is avoided, with the link between "urban" and production-based cleavages consigned to the outer
reaches of the infrastructure and the state. One might object, in fact, that they have gone too far in this respect; more proximate, day-to-day connections are empirically noted, but not systematically explored. The remainder of this paper will be devoted to this problem, focusing on the impact of residential variations on class practices of various kinds. Two concrete contexts will be involved — not only the local community, but the workplace, that “hidden abode of production”\(^{125}\) where the urban theorists apparently still fear to tread.

**Spatial Matrices of Class**

Lojkine notes that the subordination of labour to capital may occur

at the level of space, itself . . . either directly (when the town is the appendage of the factory, e.g. as in a mining community) or indirectly . . . when the firm is not involved in either the production or the management of housing . . . \(^{126}\)

The differences between these two situations, however, are equally worthy of note. Burawoy has noted how managerial control is strengthened by joining reproduction directly to the firm;\(^{127}\) the separation of the two, which structuralists consider a sort of original sin,\(^{128}\) thus appears in a very different light. Rather than merely deflecting energy from the class struggle, it gives it space to mature — space in a literal as well as metaphorical sense.

The significance of spatial appropriation and control is illustrated by the short-lived *cites ouvrières*, launched in Paris in 1849: unpopular with workers due to their strict controls, they were even more opposed by conservatives, “as breeding grounds for socialist consciousness and as potential hearths of revolution.”\(^{129}\) At the same time, some businesses in the United States were seeking to insulate their workers from “urban agitation” by building isolated company towns.\(^{130}\) Even the residential clustering of workers around a single firm would have different implications, if the housing was not company-provided but privately acquired. And with increasing real wages and market choice, workers could “move their community life out from under the eyes of their employers,”\(^{131}\) while various fractions of capital developed vested interests in workers’ consumption and purchasing power.

The variegated spatial patterning of working-class settlements is also not without redeeming effects. Expectations of the mobilisation of labour-in-general are at least premature; outside the workplace, rather, the real working class coalesces on local, regional, and national terrains. As Engels\(^{132}\) was particularly aware, it was the concentration of workers not only in large-scale units of production, but in homogeneous residential areas, that would promote a wider consciousness of class. In such communities, distinctive sub-
cultures can emerge or be preserved, providing some insulation from the individualism, mobility aspirations, and consumption styles of the middle class.\textsuperscript{133} Apart from community itself, three major sources for such alternative meanings might be noted here. One is the family, in which effective relationships, reciprocity, and use-values prevail, all potentially subversive of the bourgeois order if projected too far outside the home.\textsuperscript{134} A second is the pre-capitalist cultural elements often associated with ethnicity, nationality, or religion. Lubeck, for instance, has insisted on the role of Islamic networks in Kano in the constitution of the Kano working class.\textsuperscript{135} Finally, of course, is the fund of shared experience and class perceptions which is engendered in the process of work itself.

A large body of research has shown that attachment to work-based identities tends to be maximized in more or less isolated "occupational communities," where the boundaries of work and community relationships closely coincide.\textsuperscript{136} African data also illustrate this point: the relative cohesion and militancy displayed by miners, railwaymen, and dockers has been traced to their residential concentration as well as distinctive characteristics of the work.\textsuperscript{137} Factory workers still tend to be relatively recent recruits, few in number and spatially dispersed, but the direction of the relationship between residence and class-formation seems to be the same.\textsuperscript{138} Generally speaking, ecological segregation and residential stability can reinforce communal-class identity even where workers move between communal-sector firms and jobs; informal recruitment networks, moreover, may tend to cluster co-residents in similar kinds of work.\textsuperscript{139}

The local community not only provides a milieu (indeed, a \textit{chef lieu}) for class-formation, but interacts with class mobilization in synergistic ways. As Harvey has noted, "the 'principle of community' is not a bourgeois invention," and may serve as "a defensive and even offensive weapon" for the working class.\textsuperscript{140} Castells goes further: people require spaces as a "material basis" of opposition, multiple space outside work where they may:

\begin{quote}
find values, ideas, projects and, finally, demands that do not conform to the dominant social interests. The control over space is a major battle in the historic war between people and the state.\textsuperscript{141}
\end{quote}

We should recall here the strategic role of the popular quarters in the militant urban protests of pre-industrial Europe,\textsuperscript{142} the now universal combination of local traditions with the new oppositional tendencies of the industrial working class, and the segregated Black communities of America, England, and South Africa which have been the site of rebellions in recent times. As such cases suggest, the residential community may unite fractions of the working class divided between different kinds of work, and bring together those
with work and those without. Here, too, relations of trust, permitting sustained cooperation, effective organization, and social control may emerge from personal interaction and informal ties.

The interaction of neighbourhood with workplace and trade union, along with the territorial hierarchy that frames the political process, provide further mechanisms of aggregation, often encapsulating local ethnic solidarities as well.\textsuperscript{143} Consciousness and loyalties may remain fragmented, of course, and the politics of ethnic or localistic arithmetic provides an unromantic view, at best, of the mobilization of the working class. Without a combination of the respective issues, discontents, and personal attachments of both the workplace and living place, however, the strength and commitments of the larger class movement may be undermined. Although the fate of such movements is not Castells' concern, his accounts of urban protests in e.g. Glasgow, Chile, and Madrid indicate the extent to which labour unions and parties may draw on residential issues and bases of support.\textsuperscript{144} Conversely, the decline of the American Socialist Party has been linked to the breakup of old inner-city neighbourhoods,\textsuperscript{145} and the relative lack of living-place militancy in much of subsaharan Africa may be a factor in the weak ties between radicals and the grassroots there (South Africa being an exception which supports the rule).

It is thus no accident that policies of urban renewal and residential dispersal in the West have often been aimed at long-established and chronically troublesome working-class residential zones.\textsuperscript{146} In the Third World, on the other hand, the main target has been "spontaneous" settlements, and the affront to market discipline and to the legal and symbolic order that they represent.\textsuperscript{147} In all cases, as Harvey notes,

Control over spatial organization and authority over the use of space becomes a crucial means for the reproduction of social power relations. The state, or some other social grouping such as financiers, developers, or landlords, can thus hide their power to shape social reproduction behind the seeming neutrality of their power to organize space.\textsuperscript{148}

Where labour, in any particular spatial context, cannot be brought under control, the response of capital is often to move away. While the cost and power of labour may be the most important factors here, the character of local subcultures and communities is often involved as well. Too much or too little community cohesion, informal social control, or attachment to certain production methods, divisions of labour, or different kinds of work, may all be factors prompting industrial relocation — and the spread of class and community formation to new terrains.\textsuperscript{149}

Looked at in the context of community, the meaning and impact of homeownership among workers also appears in a much more variable light.
Intraclass conflict over the neighbourhood “turf,” first of all, may occur even where owner-occupancy is nil. And insofar as a neighbourhood is working-class in composition, and particularly if residential turnover is low, there seems little reason for homeowning to have particularly divisive effects. Commercial considerations often remain secondary; indeed, there is substantial “irrationality” in the disposition of real estate by owner-occupiers in general, not to speak of the relatively modest houses likely to be owned by workers. The predominance of orientations to use, needs for self-expression and security, and attachments to particular socio-spatial contexts of everyday life, may play a part in this respect, along with market disadvantages that tend to limit capital gains. The subjective significance of homeowning varies further along neighbourhood, subcultural and national lines. In the Third World, meanwhile, we are discovering the presence of landlords and speculators even in traditional indigenous settlements, shanty-towns and low-income housing projects. The significance of this, however, in terms of individual accumulation or differentiation within the working class, is still not altogether clear. The African data suggests that in the popular neighbourhoods, profits and accumulation are generally slight. Most houses are owner-occupied and, unlike land, are rarely sold. A few cheap rooms may be let out, if not appropriated by kin, yielding a somewhat higher standard of living but rarely a promotion to the rentier class.

A nucleus of homeowners, in fact, may strengthen working-class defenses against various encroachments on local terrain. In advanced capitalist countries, many instances have been noted in which small-scale capitalist and homeowner interests have opposed property speculation and redevelopment schemes. That fractions of labour may be allied, not with capital in general, but with particular fractions of the bourgeoisie, is worth pointing out. Small-scale capital, though accorded short shrift by Marxism-Leninism (if not by the socialist tradition as a whole), has certain anti-capitalist proclivities, in part because of concrete attachments to craft, vocation, or locality that may run counter to unalloyed commitments to profit and exchange. This is even more the case in less-developed economies where pre-capitalist sentiments and relations are still particularly strong. Here, petty-bourgeois status may rest on a fragile material and even legal base (particularly, perhaps, where real estate is involved), requiring the maintenance of extensive kinship, ethnic and patron-client ties. At the community level, then, landlords and homeowners tend to play pivotal social and political roles, joining local and external networks in ways often critical for bringing in amenities and warding off renewal and demolition schemes.

The social heterogeneity which such coalitions imply, joining formal-sector workers with various echelons of the self-employed, is commonly associated
with a diffuse "urban populism" as opposed to radicalism of a class-conscious kind. These contrasts, however, should not be overstated: they rest on an idealised proletariat that only rarely anywhere can be found and they may mask considerable homogeneity at the level of culture and life styles reinforced by the mixture of different kinds of work both within households and in the course of individual lives. It seems more interesting to note the way in which populism itself, as Castells puts it, "walks on the thin edge between clientelism and the triggering of urban social movements," and how complex social networks may promote "a dangerous autonomy" among the poor inimical to ruling class control. Community issues, may stimulate consciousness of the shortcomings of the larger system, and the formation of coalitions favourable to change; such local alliances may lend support to workplace protests, in turn.

In sum, either the intra-class differences or the motley alliances emerging in the living space seem to have necessarily negative net results. It is the dispersion and breakup of the local community, rather, that is the greater threat to the unity and consciousness of the working class, and it is in such circumstances, perhaps, that homeownership may show a more sinister face. Study after study, in different parts of the world, shows that relocation from old popular and working-class neighbourhoods to more recently settled, heterogenous and suburban areas entails a decline in social cohesion in both class and community terms. The new residential areas

bring together a population of strangers . . . Unrelated by the ascriptive ties of kinship, long-standing neighbourliness and shared work experiences . . . workers on the estates tend to live a socially isolated, home-centered existence.

It is here that "commodity consciousness" and pursuit of the "personal life" can prevail, while attitudes to work, workmates, and the labour movement take on a more instrumental cast. Somewhat ironically, state-provided benefits may reinforce this state of affairs, reducing dependence not only on the employer, but on kinship and neighbourhood links as well.

These tendencies should be reinforced in mix-class neighbourhoods dominated by the life-styles of the middle class. This point applies particularly in Western countries where the incomes of the stable working class permit substantial emulation along these lines. Such residential areas "rule out the convergence of workplace and neighbourhood loyalties" that earlier generations experienced, and may reinforce estrangement from the urban newcomers who have succeeded to the old central slums. Even in these circumstances, however, and where homeownership prevails, work-based identities and grievances may remain intense. Where working-class residents
predominate, moreover, and with the passage of time, strong local primary groups, selective settlement and job recruitment patterns — in short a neo-traditional form of community — may well re-emerge. Here, Western and Third-World experience is again analogous — the old homeownering Black suburbs of Detroit or Los Angeles, for instance, or the new low-income housing areas that ring Rio, Lagos, or Singapore, could all be looked at more closely in this regard.

Resistence and Control at Work
The final issue to be considered here is the impact of the housing situation of workers on workplace behaviour. This is critical for all broader generalizations concerning housing and the working class, although actual data is still remarkably scarce. Despite frequent reference to relations of production, relations in production are rarely considered by urban theorists; industrial sociology, on the other hand, may refer to community structure, but seldom to housing as such. We hasten to add that both these generalizations hold less true for the literature on the Third World where various connections between work and housing are often more clearcut. (One wonders if it was not Burawoy’s research in Zambia, in fact, that first alerted him to the wider significance of this theme).

As we have seen, Burawoy points to the association between company provision of worker housing and the reinforcement of managerial control: in some cases, “through their control of housing, provisions, company stores, education and religion, masters were able to consolidate their rule in all spheres of life.” This sort of formulation points the way to more detailed investigation of the links between particular kinds of provisions and particular kinds of behavioural effects. The compound system (and “company states” in general) seems to have been particularly geared to simply keep workers at work, workers whose merely “formal” subordination to capital had to be backed up, not only by a particular housing regime, but by manipulation of credit and debts, provision of recreation and other inducements, and by a panoply of extra-economic controls. As for performance in the labour process itself, the compounds, in South Africa, were designed to prevent diamond thefts; otherwise, improvements in productivity depended on a further set of punishments, bonuses and fines.

Burawoy’s treatment suggests that state intervention in housing will have a countervailing effect: along with other types of collective provision, it creates guarantees of subsistence independent of the wage and, especially, of particular firm. This, in combination with the regulation of industrial relations by the state, signals the transition from a “despotic” to a “hegemonic” factory regime, characterized by formalized work rules, negotiation and
Two variant forms of the housing/workplace nexus might also be mentioned here. For one, as Burawoy is aware, where the state is still directly involved in labour control, even state-provided housing may have coercive effects. Apart from Stalinist labour regimes, this can be seen in contemporary South Africa, where migrant workers lose access to the state-provided hostels (and any other residence) if they leave their jobs. This assures a stable labour for unpleasant and poorly paid jobs they might otherwise be loath to take. Secondly, as we have pointed out, company housing may also coexist with liberal or hegemonic labour systems, with effects that need to be further explored. If such housing has not prevented strikes, for instance, it may have made them less frequent, and there are indications that labour turnover might be reduced.

Housing shortages and related problems, conversely, may be reflected in labour demands and various forms of discontent. In contemporary capitalist countries, where markets for jobs and housing are generally quite distinct, it is hard to find detail on these points. But Jeffries notes, for instance, that housing problems were among the issues underlying the 1961 Sekondi railway strike, and one suspects that more intensive research would unearth many cases of this kind. Interest- ing comparative data exists for the Soviet Union, where it is housing, not jobs, that is in scarce supply, and where both are ultimately provided by the state. While the housing-enterprise linkage has been attenuated in recent years, it remains a potential instrument of managerial control: workers are loath to go so far as to lose their housing privileges, or even their places on the waiting lists. Younger and lower-echelon workers have less to lose in this respect, especially those employed in less well-endowed regions or firms. For these categories of workers, then, labour turnover is now extremely high, while inadequate housing, particularly in peripheral regions, is a major cause of such open labour protests as occur.

What of the relationship of housing status to variations in workplace behaviour of more routine kinds? Harvey once suggested that homeownership for workers in Western countries was designed to promote a sense of satisfaction and contentment that will lead to spontaneous co-operation and efficiency in the work place.

From the actor's point of view, however, the private home may be a symbol of autonomy and self-sufficiency relative to forces emanating from both capital and the state. Is such consciousness necessarily false? Wright and Singlemann have noted the existence of "semi-autonomous employees," who retain substantial control in the labour process, while Burawoy links loss of autonomy in subsistence with submission to workplace controls.
ting these ideas together, might there be a category or "semi-authonomous reproduction" in which homeownership, inter alia, might play a contemporary role? This raises interesting questions, in turn. For instance, is it the "semi-autonomous employees," historically a particularly resistant fraction of the labour force, that are most likely to own homes? Are local labour markets such that being tied to a place also ties one to a certain job? Does ownership entail greater expense than would renting, and can costs be shared out by letting rooms or by increased household size? Most important of all, perhaps, is whether the house is still being paid for or if it is owned outright.

In capitalist settings, owner-occupancy now typically involves purchase rather than inheritance, and substantial long-term debt. And a worker "mortgaged up to the hilt," Harvey notes, is "a pillar of social stability," as homeownership schemes have long assumed. The evidence seems to support this point. A mortgage creates a double vulnerability: heavy installment payments and the threat of loss of equity if payments fall behind. Thus, Canadian data suggest that would-be owners are likely to be extremely faithful to the job, and a New Jersey study found that workers on the "mortgage treadmill" tended to accept harder, longer and more closely supervised work in order to maximize their wage. Similar findings emerge from socialist Hungary, where both private home construction and small-scale enterprise have burgeoned in recent years. As in the Western cases, however, workers' positions in the life cycle strongly pattern the results. Young Hungarian workers, for instance, face an acute shortage of housing. They have no alternative but to begin construction of their own homes, which may take ten years or more. During this time they will also face the costs of bringing up their families.

Older workers, on the other hand, are more likely to have completed this process and, with other household members, to be earning income on the side. With their consumption relatively independent from the job, "they were in a stronger position to withhold effort than were younger workers in need of ready cash." This need not suggest a conscious radicalism, of course. Canadian owner-workers, for instance, feel that homeowning has conservative effects; only a minority, on the other hand, felt that they were less likely to agitate at work or go on strike. It is indicative, perhaps, that the unusually prolonged and militant Hormel strike in the United States occurred in a town whose owner-occupancy rate of 80 percent is one of the highest in the country. Just as company housing failed to prevent worker militancy 50 or 100 years ago, homeownership too may prove to be less reactionary than originally
supposed. If workers seek market freedoms and increased control of personal space, if worldwide structural tendencies now favour privatization, small enterprise, and even work at home, what is important is to not simply reject but to recuperate these trends, grasping the whole cluster of variables that condition their effects and manipulating them insofar as possible so as to shift the balance of advantages towards the poor and working class.

This brings us back to the Third World, where both “semi-autonomous reproduction” and semi-proletarianization are relatively widespread. Here, the contradictions between residential conditions and the imperatives of formal-sector employment are greater than in the West, and, given low wages and inadequate public resources, much more difficult to resolve. As Cooper has eloquently observed, the anarchy which prevails with respect to much urban housing in Africa has been felt an indirect but insidious threat to control over the labour force. Apart from the symbolic respects of the spatial order, there are two main aspects of the housing situation that should be noted. For one, various forms of irregular housing can be very cheap indeed. Thus, Turner contrasts the “supportive shack,” which is virtually free, and the “oppressive house” which, even if subsidized, might absorb over half a Mexican worker’s pay. A modest but permanent self-built house might cost only about three month’s wages — while it might take three years of a worker’s income to buy a house in the USA. The “mortgage trap,” like open unemployment, is a rare luxury, virtually unavailable to the working poor, and home-ownership is often postponed to the end of a wage-worker’s career. It is relatively unlikely, then, to be a significant source of discipline on the job.

The structural asymmetry between work and residence is reinforced insofar as workers retain control of rural land — a common situation in the African case, at least. Whether these rural connections entail net expenditures or gains in income is not at all clear, but they certainly offer a cheap subsistence redoubt in case of urgent need. Historically, low costs of reproduction, generally, and access to rural land, particularly, have been associated with a “backward bending” supply curve and high turnover in wage labour, with resistance expressed through sheer withdrawal from work. Rising living costs and scarcity of jobs, however, have dramatically reversed this situation in recent years. As far as private housing is concerned, we unfortunately have little other information on how residence affects behaviour on the job. One possibility that comes to mind is that chain migrations and chain-employment may have a residential complement, with “land-lords” also occupying or being linked to positions of authority at work. Another, given the inadequacies of public transport in many parts of the world, is the connection between distance of home from work, on the one hand, and, on the
other, lateness, absenteeism and pressures on employers to cover transport costs in wages or in kind.\textsuperscript{193}

The question of location reminds us, finally, of the spatial dimension of capital itself, which moves production facilities between countries, countrysides and towns, finding new reservoirs of labour at destination, or dragging their workforce in their wake. In older industrial areas, threats of plant closure or relocation have been leading to “give-back” contracts, reducing fringe benefits and/or wages, and to a general enhancement of managerial control. “Hegemonic despotism” is the rather fanciful name that Burawoy has given to this new production regime, in which the “reproduction of labour power is bound anew to the production process, but . . . at the level of the firm, region or even nation-state.”\textsuperscript{194} The new destination areas are also not secure, and rising wages, union militancy, or political tensions may put capital on the move again. Resistance outside the workplace, however, may increase — “resistance from neighbourhoods that do not want to disappear, from regional cultures that want to cluster together, and from people, that, previously uprooted, want to create new roots.”\textsuperscript{195} Such movements are fragmented, however, both from each other, and with respect to more determinate levels of control: “relationships of production are integrated at the world-wide level, while experience is culturally specific and power is still concentrated in the nation-states . . .”\textsuperscript{196}

Yet local spatially-based conflicts also express the contradictions of the wider system, and are an element of its prolonged “crisis-transition,”\textsuperscript{197} hopefully towards a system based not on indefinite accumulation but the satisfaction of more authentic human needs. The programmes of the working-class parties of Europe have begun to incorporate urban and territorial concerns, placing workplace and living-place issues under one political roof and providing an essential opening to a broader popular base.\textsuperscript{198} For reasons of praxis as well as theory, then, the connections between the two terrains, as mediated by both capital and labour, should remain a key area of reflection and research.

Footnotes

3. See Saunders (1981: Ch. 2 – 3); Rex (1971).
8. Ibid.
15. An initial version, devoted to theoretical issues and advanced-capitalist case materials, was presented to the Faculty Seminar, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Port Harcourt, June 1986.
16. This term is borrowed, of course, from Edwards (1979).
20. See, e.g., Walker (1978); Harvey (1985: Ch. 3).
30. For a general treatment emphasizing these trends, see Mingione (1981). On Third-World commuting problems, see the chapters on Singapore, Lagos, and Bombay in Pacione (1981).
31. Gilbert & Gugler (1982: Ch. 2); Portes & Walton (1981: Ch. 5).
35. Baran (1960) was a major progenitor of this view.
42. Mingione (1981:56-58); Edwards (1979: Ch. 9).
43. See, e.g., Marris (1962).
44. See Portes & Walton (1981: Ch. 3).
45. Ibid., pp. 94 ff.
50. It was during the First World War, for instance, that workers — with business support — won rent controls in Glasgow (Castells 1983:34 –7). For the interwar period, see Pickvance (1976a:282) and Edel (1984:280).
57. (1981:Ch 4,8).
64. (1973).
68. Ibid. p. 557.
73. Ibid., p. 265.
74. For the following, see esp. Edwards (1979:163 ff.); Bonacich (1979); Rubery (1984); Bromley & Gerry (1979).
77. E.g., Sitkas (1985).
83. For West Africa, see Peil & Sada (1984:297); Barnes (1979:63 - 64; 1982:13, 21). Here, homeownership is strongly associated with self-employment, though both may be made possible by previous savings from wage work. Canadian data (Pratt 1986: 379 ff.) suggests that it is the sale of a house that may provide capital for starting a business on one's own.
86. E.g. Harvey 1973:60 - 64); Castells (1977:411 - 12).
90. Mingione (1981:53, 147 ff.).
91. Ibid., p. 38.
94. Ibid., p. 1.
95. Ibid., p. 92.
98. Ibid., Ch. 5; van Onselen (1976). The latter, pp. 34 - 8, 133 - 36, also notes the importance of self-housing within the Rhodesian compound areas, and its relationship to the stratification of the labour force.
102. The classic study is King's (1976) study of colonial India, where minute gradations in occupational status were mirrored on the residential plane. See also O'Connor (1983:175 ff.).
105. Edwards (1979:91). This may have posed less of a problem to African workers, who often had rural homes to which they could return (cf. Grillo 1973:44-48).


107. Ibid., p. 558. The sheer cost of employee housing for companies should also be taken into greater account, as well as the availability of alternative sources of housing supply. Cf. van Onselen (1976:34-38, 129-32); Walker (1978:189-90).


109. The importance of formal sector employment for access to public housing estates is mentioned for Mexico (Arias & Roberts 1985:163-64) and Ghana (Peil 1981:73).


111. See n. 79, above.


114. Harvey (1982:560); see also Lloyd (1979). Quite unintentionally, the neo-Weberian spectre that Saunders (1964:213-15) has summoned up — in which antagonistic and "exploitative" relations between homeowners and public sector renters displace the traditional class divide — might be cited in confirmation of such fears.


122. Castells (1977:263, 324 ff.).


132. (1958)

133. See Gans (1962); Yancey (1976); Castells (1977), Ch. 7: Harvey (1985:18-19, 256-57).


139. Yancey (1976); Grillo (1973:55 ff.).


141. Castells (1983:70). For the importance of places and social relations outside the point of production for the crystallization of class identity, see also Massey (1984:43, 58); Cooper (1983b:36), and Katznelson (1981). We were unfortunately unable to fully consult the latter source by the time of writing.


143. See, e.g. Kornblum (1974); Remy (1975).


146. See, e.g. Castells (1977:296-97, 319-20); Harvey (1985:Ch. 3), esp. pp. 102-103.

147. Cooper (1983b:32-34); Castells (1983:189); Perlman (1976:Ch. 7-8); Marris (1962:Ch. 9).
154. Chege (1981); Barnes (1979; 1982:22–24); Sandbrook (1982:147–56, 195–98); Castells (1983:Ch. 19,20). Conversely, where owners are weak or indifferent, communities may be destroyed; see White (1983); Marris (1962:Ch. 7); Gans (1972).
163. Ibid., p. 4; Tyler (1966).
164. Supra, pp. 26 ff.
168. Ibid., pp. 125 ff.
170. The railway workers of Kampala and Sekondi-Takoradi show remarkable stability, with most workers having served for 10 years or more, and with turnover rates of only a few percent a year (Grillo 1973:39–40; Jeffries 1978:16). As only one-third of the Ghanaian workers were company-housed, however, other factors must also be involved — probably the railway's very superior wages and over-all conditions of work (cf. Grillo 1973:62).
180. Pratt (1986:366–89). They would be more likely, too, to send their wives to work (ibid., 392–95).
183. Ibid., p. 189.
Studies in East Africa suggest that about three-quarters of urban workers have land (Sandbrook 1981:3; Bujra 1978–79: 56). Of the Kampala railwaymen, over 70 percent had rural houses as well (Grillo 1973: 44–45).


In Nigeria, transport as well as housing allowances are standard benefits in large-scale/formal firms, and staff buses are also a common sight. For women, especially, proximity to work to home may be essential to regular appearance at work, or even to entering the labour market at all (di Domenico 1983:261, 263–4; Prakash 1983:84–87).


References


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