The African e-Journals Project has digitized full text of articles of eleven social science and humanities journals. This item is from the digital archive maintained by Michigan State University Library. Find more at: http://digital.lib.msu.edu/projects/africanjournals/

Available through a partnership with

Scroll down to read the article.
Regional Cooperation and Socialist Transformation in Southern Africa: Lessons for independent Namibia

by Ngila Mwase

Introduction

Among the problems facing the less developed countries (LDCs) is heavy financial, technical and entrepreneurial dependence on the industrialised world. These exploitative dependency relationships are deepened by the LDC's limited internal market, coupled with low effective demand, both of which partly account for slow, if any industrialisation. This somewhat "vicious circle" is exacerbated by non-revolutionised economic structures, whereby nations produce what they do not consume and consume what they do not produce. In 1974, Thomas argued for a reversal of this situation in which case African economies would produce what they consume.¹

One of the options out of this predicament has been regional economic integration. This, it was hoped, would facilitate the attainment of economies of scale, rationalise location and relocation of production units, encourage specialisation in production and enhance industrial efficiency. Regional groupings were furthermore expected to help reduce national autarchy, external dependence, and vulnerability of African economies, boost their bargaining power vis-a-vis the outside world, accelerate South-South "collective self-reliance" and be the prelude for eventual political unification. They could indeed provide a springboard for the Thomas kind of structural transformation to set the economy on a "transition to socialism".²

Integration Benefits

States form various types of economic integration schemes i.e. Common Markets in search of the following actual and potential benefits:

1. greater bargaining power
2. minimisation of duplication and wasteful competition
3. a cheaper and more efficient transportation system
4. expansion of trade, incomes and employment due to the free movement of goods labour and specialisation in production
5. greater division of labour and specialisation in production
6. greater possibilities of technological advance and innovation

In connection with (1) it is important to note that while countries like Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania can make a vigorous attempt to bargain, there are other countries, land-locked and/or too poor to make their voices heard, and accept the 'status quo' or a costly compromise more out of hopelessness than choice. In a way their hopelessness is not very different from that of the "buffer states" of Lesotho, Swaziland and to some extent Botswana with regard to relations with South Africa. Hence the need for a community-approach. The dictum "we mus hang together or we
will be hung separately still holds." Indeed Green and Seidman have in Unity or Poverty? The Economics of Pan-Africanism (1968) argued that joint inter-state projects in Africa would open better prospects for overcoming the Region's dependence on the Metropoles.

With respect to (2), it could be noted that because of the large number of small states in Africa and their low purchasing power, the individual domestic markets provide neither the capital nor the optimum markets especially for basic industries e.g. iron and steel, industrial and farm machinery, heavy chemical, fertiliser, electrical and transport equipment, etc., which are critical for the structural transformation of African economies. This is neither a question of foreign versus local enterprise, nor of public versus private concerns dimensions, but simply the technical problem that small markets in a non-revolutionarised LDC-type economies do not permit certain types of products to be produced at anything less than prohibitive costs. A restructured economy and a revolutionary people whose purchases are geared to the domestic market can make quite some difference in this regard.

With respect to point (3) it can be stated that the 26 land-locked African States face high transport costs because of the greater "economic distance" to world markets and the constraints of transport arteries through her neighbours some of which like the minority regimes in Southern Africa are hostile and/or have to be boycotted. Zambia, for example, has as Hall (1969) verified, paid a high price in her transport diversion northwards especially through Tanzania, conditioned by the changing political scene in Southern Africa of the past two decades. The very essence of the nine-nation Gaborone-based Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) is to reduce dependency on the South African transport outlets. The number of neighbours per land-locked State in Africa ranges from one (Lesotho) to eight (Zambia). Bilateral agreements or joint provision and administration of transport facilities as in the Djibouti-Ethiopia Railway, the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) have been resorted to, to reduce the adverse impacts, give the land-locked state some leverage on its "gateway" to the sea, and lay a basis for greater cooperation in the future when there could be no trade barriers.

The Major African Economic Groupings

The UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) had since its inception in 1958 and especially in the early 1960s, promoted the idea of wider economic communities in Africa. However, the UNECA had until lately fallen into complacency following the formation in 1967 of the then much-acclaimed East African Community. More recent UNECA efforts especially through its Gisenyi, Yaounde-Niamey-Tangiers and Lusaka-based Multinational Programming and Operation Centres (MULPOCs) have led to the launching of the 15-nation Lagos-based ECOWAS and the Lusaka-headquartered Eastern and Southern African Preferential Trade Area (PTA). The former, embracing all the Anglophone and Francophone states in the West African sub-region ranges from the mighty and oil-rich Nigeria to the poverty-stricken Sahelian states such as Mali, Niger and Upper Volta. Surviving alongside ECOWAS are smaller economic groupings such as the Abidjan-based Conseil de L'Entete grouping Marxist-oriented Benin, capitalist Ivory Coast, Niger, Togo and Upper Volta; and the Mano River Union of Liberia and Sierra Leone. Thriving too is the Bangui-seated customs and Economic Union of Central Africa grouping Cameroun, the Central African Republic, Congo and Gabon.

The most interesting integration schemes however are in the Eastern African sub-region. Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have had until lately close economic ties dating back to the 1920s. In 1967 this integration scheme developed into the East
African Community (ECA) - a Common Market coupled with shared common services of a transport and communications nature. Four statutory corporations were established to administer on commercial principles shared rail, harbour, airways and posts and telecommunications. If neither Rome was built, nor the Treaty of Rome implemented in a day, the ECA, despite its comparative youth, was in some respects more advanced than the European Economic Community (EEC) having from outset adopted a common external tariff, abolished internal tariffs with the sole exception of transfer taxes (in the short-run), and operated joint economic services etc.

Serious industrial imbalances between Kenya and her less-industrialized partners reflected in deficits in inter-state trade were experienced. In the case of Tanzania the ratio of imports to exports (vis-a-vis the Common Market) was 4:1 in 1962, 8:1 (1967), 4:1 (1974) and 3:1 (1977). Failure to redress these imbalances coupled with different economic policies underlying their divergent development paths led to continued dissatisfaction which reached a crisis situation in the mid-1970s with unilateral break of the provisions of the EAC Treaty, a futile attempt to save the EAC from collapse through the Demas Treaty Review Commission (1975-75) and the subsequent disintegration and collapse in April 1977. In East Africa both economic cooperation and the federal aspirations, which were viewed as two sides of the same coin, are at their lowest ebb.

Despite these setbacks Regional economic groupings at various stages of development are emerging. They include the SADCC and the PTA. The former established in 1980 soon after Zimbabwe's independence is geared at increased economic and technical cooperation through the promotion and coordination of industrial, agricultural, energy, trade and particularly transport links amongst themselves and with the countries to the north to counterbalance its present disproportionate dependence on South Africa.

A full-fledged SADCC Commission on Transport and Communications based in Maputo has the task of re-routing the rail and road traffic towards the Mozambican and Angolan outlets. This entails rehabilitation of networks destroyed during the (ongoing) liberation wars in the sub-region. The continued damage of bridges, pipelines, rail tracks etc., by the UNITA and "Mozambique National Resistance" (MNR) in Angola and Mozambique respectively, not to mention South Africa's own destabilisation offensive makes the Commission's task not only difficult and costly, but absolutely necessary. Indeed the SADCC could as Seidman and Makgeta (1980) have noted, be a prelude to the liberation of Namibia and South Africa itself, which would increase the potential for rapid regional transformation by building on its extensive industrial base.

The PTA, a branchchild of UNECA Chief, Professor Adebayo Adedeji has a potential membership of 18 states, 14 of which are already members. With the EAC failure and economic integration difficulties elsewhere especially in Latin America i.e. the Andean Pact, it is doubtful whether such a conventional Vinerian free trade approach emphasising the removal of trade and other barriers and downplaying political and other associated constraints can withstand the test of time. Tanzania, despite her strong Pan-African ideals, found the PTA gains less appealing than the pressure of the border closure (closed since the EAC collapse in 1977) on Kenya to seriously negotiate the distribution of assets and liabilities of the defunct EAC. In the final settlement Kenya is expected to pay both Tanzania and Uganda. Membership of, and adherence to the PTA Treaty would have forced Tanzania to re-open the border with Kenya, which is critical for intra-PTA trade. Tanzania's membership would not only have allowed such inter-state joint ventures, like the EADB and the TAZARA to be expanded and transformed into spring boards for PTA cooperation purposes, but would also have added the significant moral force of Tanzania and its President to supplement the economic muscle represented by the economically stronger members such as Zimbabwe.
However such large economic groupings as ECOWAS, SADCC and PTA are milestones towards the OAU Lagos Plan of Action target of an "economically unified, self-reliant continent by the year 2000". Because of their relatively large sizes, these economic groupings have the potential to overcome the limited markets that handicap most of the countries individually.

Arrangements are under way to institute structural and operational reorganisation of the Kampala-based East African Development Bank (EADB) entailing its expansion into a PTA Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank. This could ensure more funds for the poorer partners and an avenue for financial arrangements and multilateral settlement among the banks perhaps along the lines of the West African Clearing House, which could boost inter-state trade. Such a Clearing House could help to promote:

1. the utilisation of the currencies of the member states for sub-regional trade and other transactions,
2. economies in the utilisation of foreign reserves of the member states,
3. trade liberalisation in the sub-region,
4. monetary cooperation and consultation among members,
5. harmonisation of monetary and fiscal policies

However, the EADB cannot be transformed into such a Bank without one of its shareholders, Tanzania, joining the PTA.

The PTA Treaty provides for the establishment of a PTA Payments and Clearing House. Initially one Central Bank of a PTA member state will perform this function.13

The Unequal Distribution of Benefits

As argued elsewhere (Mwase 1978) economic cooperation between partner states with geographical proximity, but differing levels of economic and social underdevelopment, not to mention structural and ideological differences, have had distribution problems of benefits with greater gains accruing to the partner able to attract more investments. Such a partner has greater internal and external economies of scale, better physical and social infrastructure, higher levels of industrial growth, etc. Such was the case with economic cooperation in East Africa. Kenya (the "white Highlands" and Nairobi in particular) with its concentration and centralisation of "superiors" economic, social and infrastructural facilities, experienced greater "spread effects". Kenya appropriated the lion's share of the benefits and the rather autarchic checks to redress the imbalances might have been at the expense of growth in East Africa as a whole.

Nor is this inequality reflected mostly in industrial imbalances and trade deficits for the less industrialised a result of mere arbitrary decision-taking. Indeed such perpetual concentration of benefits is a necessary cost of trying to build a Common Market in a capitalist setting. These imbalanced, exploitative, geographical relations are neither accidental nor easily compensatable.

There are therefore several ways at which individual countries can look at a joint project and its revenue in an integration scheme:
1. The project can be viewed, and sometimes is, erroneously, as an entirely external organisation (compare the balance of payments, with the project as a foreign country),

2. since it is jointly owned, it could be regarded by each country as one half internal and the other external,

3. it can be regarded as internal, provided that such country has its own revenue target i.e. the costs and revenue are attributed to each country.

The virtual adoption of case (a) position by the individual countries was central to the disintegration and break-up of the EAC Corporations especially the East African Railways Corporation, which paved the way for the Community's own demise.

Theoretically at least, the question of these imbalances could be resolved in four different ways:

1. the proportional distribution of any benefits according to the differential growth rates of the various national economies,

2. the redistribution of the benefits in favour of the poorer and slower growing economies,

3. the "uncontrolled" sharing of benefits, whereby the lion's share accrued to the strongest and fastest growing national economy,

4. the equal distribution of costs and benefits.

In East Africa recognising the unequal benefit accruals that characterised the EAC predecessors, the 1967 EAC Treaty for East African Cooperation officially adopted option (2) above; but it seems Kenya did not wholly accept the logic of this distributional devise which would have meant that she would have to "mark time". She would have preferred option (1); her non-adherence to the Treaty and general intransigence was partly responsible for the actual benefits and costs distribution which approximated option (3). Other "like-mindedness" cooperation ventures like the TAZARA have opted for alternative (4) above. Here the sharing of the expenses including loan repayment is on a 50-50 basis.

The unequal access to Common Market benefits is partly a feature of the historical structural imbalances; evolving partly from differential resource endowments and colonial policies. For example, Zimbabwe and Harare in particular - like Kenya and Nairobi in the EAC case - is the SADCC's hub of commerce and industry. With such a concentration of economic activities, the free play of market forces (including factor mobility) could especially if it ensured high growth rates, further strengthen the general agglomeration advantages. On the other hand strict Government-directed industrial programming cannot be accepted given the market-orientation of numerous capitalist-oriented economies. There is therefore the need to balance benefit accruals vis-a-vis coverage growth. This includes the overall question of which imports the stronger partner (e.g. Zimbabwe in SADCC) could bring in from its weaker partners, even at the cost of not establishing certain industries of their own even if they had a comparative advantage therein. This would further entail granting each other tariff and import quota abolition or reductions, etc, thereby furthering not only the industrialisation of the junior partners but also reducing the industrial imbalance. The EADB contained provisions for a bias to the less industrialised partners in its loan offers. Of the funds to be invested, 22½% had to be invested in Kenya and 38½% in each
of the other partner states. If the envisaged PTA Bank can, as in the case of the CARIFTA Development Bank, favour the weaker partners both in its contributions to the Bank’s equity capital and granting of loans, it can redress the inequality in accessibility to the benefits of the Bank and by implication the Community.16

Other Regional Cooperation Problems

Economic cooperation problems are compounded by the differences between the integrating states. The SADCC and PTA states (Appendix 2) for example are dissimilar in size, economic set-up, potential and level of development, ideology and politics. Angola for example is 72 times as large as Swaziland. Population density ranges from 43.9 people/sq km. for Malawi to 1.2 people/sq. km. for Botswana.

As in the EAC case some SADCC countries offer Western-oriented African capitalism (Swaziland, Malawi, Lesotho and Botswana) in contrast to socialist-oriented policies (Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe). The former group of countries will be more eager to give greater concessions to external capital and their local accomplices than Angola, Mozambique or Tanzania. Such divergent inclination is not a good omen for industrial Cooperation (as envisaged in SADCC) or the harmonisation of fiscal incentives. The problem of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) member states in this regard has been well summarised by Landed-Mills:

In joining the Customs Union, these countries effectively forfeit control of indirect taxation, which is normally a very important fiscal tool in developing countries. It is beyond dispute that the tariff is determined by the economic needs and social philosophy of the Republic of South Africa, which are not the same as those of BLS (1971).17

Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (the BLS countries) are members of the South African-dominated Southern African Customs Union (SACU).18 It entails abolition of trade barriers within the Union and the imposition of a common external tariff. Both Lesotho and Swaziland are also members of the Pretoria-controlled Rand Monetary Area. Although the two countries have their own currencies, they are wholly backed up by the Rand which also circulate in these two countries. The BLS countries perceive tangible economic benefits in these links and are unlikely to "disengage" without compensatory arrangements.19

The SADCC countries membership of different organisations is indicative of their differences and affects in particular their external relations especially with the donors. The problems of SADCC projects funding from the European Economic Community (EEC) due to Angola and Mozambique's non-membership of the EEC-ACP grouping (under the EEC-African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries Lome Convention) is a case in point.20 The SADCC states attained their independence at different times, starting with mainland Tanzania in 1961 to Zimbabwe in 1980. Their forms of Government differ from Marxist one-party Republics (Angola and Mozambique) to constitutional and absolute monarchies represented by Lesotho and Swaziland respectively.21 Unlike East Africa which shared the same British colonial experience which meant more or less the same legal, legislative, administrative and commercial control, the SADCC states harbour German, British and Portuguese colonial legacies like different "lingua franca" and administrative norms. In East Africa, Swahili was a widely spoken language and most leaders went through Makerere and/or the University of East Africa. Although some of the leaders of the English-speaking countries of Southern Africa went through the Fort Hare University in South Africa, in general the SADCC leaders backgrounds are more dissimilar than were those of the defunct EAC leaders. The PTA countries and their Governments as Appendix 2 indicates are even more heterogeneous.
The transport issue is quite complicated. Five of the nine railway gauges in use in Africa are for very small railway lines and therefore unimportant vis-a-vis regional integration. However the imperial gauge (found in ex-British, - Belgium and - Portuguese colonies) and the metre gauge (used in ex-French colonies) cause great difficulty. The latter was used in "German East Africa" (e.g. Tanzania). Since the TAZARA gauge is the former type, the entire network from Cape Town to Dar-es-Salaam is now on the same gauge, but politics hinder the possibility of a Dar-Cape Town train drive. We could note that even after South African apartheid is wiped out problems reminiscent of the one preventing Kenya-Tanzania transport links could still arise.

In 1974 to avert road damage Tanzania halted Kenyan traffic through Tanzania by limiting road transport vehicles to 19.4 tons, without a trailer, making the traffic uneconomic. Kenya lost the route altogether with the Kenya-Tanzania border closure in February 1977. Indeed inter-state freight haulage has long been a subject of inter-territorial licensing. As far back as 1969 the EIU documented the fear both by Uganda and Tanzania that:

free movement would result in far more movement of vehicles licensed in Kenya over roads maintained by them than vice versa, thus that they would be forced to maintain roads without compensating revenue.22

Inter-state problem of vehicle weights is not limited to East Africa. In West Africa, the Anglophone countries have adopted the British design standard of 10-ton axle-weight limit for their portions of the Trans-West Africa Highway and the Francophone the French design standard of 13-ton axle-weight limit for their portion of the highway. This is a problem especially for economic cooperation under the ECOWAS which needs an integrated and rationalised inter-state transport service.

Namibia belongs to both the South African dominated Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Rand Monetary Area. It is administered as an integral part of South Africa for purposes of tariffs, trade, and exchange control regulations. This has retarded a home-based industrial strategy altogether with the associated "informal" small-scale cottage industries commensurate with the low qualifications of black workers. Such industrialisation would have boosted urban-rural forward and backward linkages, render services outside the orbit of the modern sector and act as a vehicle for entrepreneurship and grassroots participation in the development process. Even after the customs revenue-sharing formulae was revised in the late 1960s following the independence of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, and recent cosmetic revisions, the SACU has since its original inception in 1910 disadvantaged the junior partners. The 1969 SACU Agreement which was supposedly in favour of the BLS countries is interesting in this regard. It adopted the principle that all customs revenue, import duties, excise and sales taxes levied on specific products e.g. spirits and tobacco, are all channelled into a common revenue pool, and subsequently distributed to partner states on the basis of its share both of total imports and surtaxed home-made goods. The SACU Agreement purports to give the BLS countries some compensation through the revenue-sharing formula including a 1.42 multiplier in favour of the BLS countries (Landed Mills, 1971). Like in the East African case the polarisation effects were neither accidental nor a result of faulty decision-making. They could therefore not be easily compensatable.23 However Governments unless they operate from a more broader and far-sighted national development perspective may settle for the seemingly compensatory revenue distribution formula since as in the BLS case customs union revenue contributes substantially to total government revenue. In 1978 this source accounted for 72% and 55% of total state revenue of Lesotho and Swaziland respectively. In 1980/81 customs union revenue contributed 40% of Botswana's total state revenue. Conventional theory has it that a Customs Union is beneficial if on
balance it is "trade creating" and harmful, if on balance it is "trade diverting". In the SACU case trade creation benefits the exporters, primarily South Africa; trade diversion lowers welfare essentially for the junior partners who are diverted from the more competitive world market to expensive substitutes from less efficient Customs Union partners.

Presently Namibia is unable to import goods cheaply from the most competitive producers on the world market outside the SACU arrangement at low or no tariffs especially for the benefit of domestic consumers. Namibia provides an accessible, lucrative and dependent market to South Africa especially for capital goods and processed foodstuffs. Namibia producers face unequal competition and "dumping". Indeed the Administrator-General in his 1981/82 budget contemplated taking "counter-measures" against the possibility of a form of 'dumping' by South African concerns". (J 1983, p.6).

An alternative trade and exchange disengagement strategy could either be "inward-looking" implying restructuring the economy to reduce dependency on the outside world and boost local initiative and utilisation of home-based resources or more equitable regional cooperation schemes such as the SADCC or other South-South "collective self-reliance" initiatives. Indeed one option for independent Namibia will be to join the SADCC to which she has already been invited and/or the PTA. Namibia with her strong export potential based on extensive mineral endowments and obvious mining comparative advantage and therefore a potential surplus in foreign exchange holdings is in a better position to disengage from SACU and the excessive financial, trade, technological and entrepreneurial dependence on South Africa.

Concluding Remarks

Both the PTA and SADCC - but particularly the latter are supposedly at odds with apartheid South Africa. While for some countries the South African connection is a historical accident and disengagement options including the SADCC's existence itself, are at hand, some are less willing to de-link with Pretoria. Malawi for example has diplomatic relations with South Africa.

Economic integration is a slow and cumbersome process. The very newness of the artificially-created new African states, far from allowing for the circumvention of the paraphernalia of sovereignty and nationalism, as the Nkrumahs had hoped, are just as jealous of their identities. Such jealousies are sometimes engineered by external forces. Indeed Nkrumah argued in 1963 that continental unity would curb outside forces of evil aimed at destabilising (progressive) African states. Furthermore, because of the geographical proximity of integrating states the potential for conflict thrives. Many national decisions have effects, incidental or otherwise, on regional grouping, especially since national interests take precedence to those of the regional groupings. The surrender of the partner states' sovereignty to a supra-national authority, that appeared, or so it seemed, to be around the corner in the early 1960s has not been forthcoming.24 Nor has a high degree of regional or continental outlook allowing national interest to be sublimated to the ideal of regional or continental unity been forthcoming. Indeed regional cooperation agreements are package deals balancing benefits of one partner state against another. Harmonisation and integration of policies is hindered if one or more partner states believe that their national interests are unduly obstructed by participation in a common-inter-state institution.

However unanimity in each and everything is unexpected. Indeed one could agree with Mr. Wamalwa, a Kenyan who in 1975 told the now defunct EAC's Legislative Assembly that:
the correct attitude to regional cooperation should be tinged with 'realism'. Such demand for uniform ideology, equality in the absolute sense and exact identity were factors that we should dispense with". (Mwase 1978).

But meaningful LDC regional groupings and especially "equal and independent" ones, can only be constructed on the basis of a common ideology and socialist ideology at that. Otherwise there would be persistent pressure threatening their very stability and survival. The collapse of the EAC has lessons to offer in this regard. Under capitalism, the envisaged African Common Market is, as Lenin saw it with respect to Europe, "either impossible or reactionary - more so under conditions of peripheral capitalism". Nor is Europe indifferent to regional integration in the LDCs. As Green (1978) has argued, the industrialised capitalist countries while not welcoming large and strong regional economic groupings, prefer numerous relatively small and weak regional groupings for easy "collective neo-colonialism".

The minimum pre-requisites for viable Common Markets are yet to be attained:

1. a common economic strategy
2. the will and ability to confront and minimise regional distributional problems
3. a reasonably common ideological base implying some agreement on such key issues as the nature and causes of underdevelopment and the implications for social relations of different economic systems.
Milestone in Regional Economic Groupings in Africa:

1959  West African Customs Union began (replaced in 1974 by the West African Economic Community)

1959  Equatorial African Customs Union began (replaced in 1966 by the Central African Customs and Economic Union)

1964  Arab Common Market established (of several North African Countries)

1966  Conseil de l'Entente (Entente Council)


1975  Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) established.

1980  Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) established.

1982  Eastern and Southern African States Preferential Trade Area (PTA) launched.
## The Economies of the Integrating States in Eastern and Southern Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Area ('000²)</th>
<th>Population (m)</th>
<th>GDP (US$m)</th>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Industry &amp; Mining</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Exports (US$m)</th>
<th>Imports (US$m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Angola</td>
<td>1,247</td>
<td>6,9</td>
<td>2,490</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Malawi</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>5,8</td>
<td>1,220</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mozambique</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>10,2</td>
<td>2,360</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Zambia</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>5,6</td>
<td>3,240</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1,377</td>
<td>735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Zimbabwe</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>7,1</td>
<td>3,640</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1,194</td>
<td>467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Botswana</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>0,8</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>34,3</td>
<td>38,3</td>
<td>37,5</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Swaziland</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>273.3</td>
<td>33,5</td>
<td>35,7</td>
<td>30,8</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Lesotho</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1,3</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>54,1</td>
<td>7,3</td>
<td>37,5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Tanzania</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>18,0</td>
<td>4,130</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>1,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Kenya</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>16,5</td>
<td>5,280</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1,104</td>
<td>1,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Uganda</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>13,2</td>
<td>8,410</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Rwanda</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4,8</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Burundi</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4,2</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Zaire</td>
<td>2,345</td>
<td>18,2</td>
<td>6,020</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1,324</td>
<td>597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Somalia</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>4,6</td>
<td>1,030</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Madagascar</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>8,7</td>
<td>2,810</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Djibouti</td>
<td>21,7</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Comoro</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Seychelles</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0,7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Mauritius</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>0,97</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>441</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** All figures, except those of the percentage proportion of GDP are from World Bank (1981) which refer to the year 1979 and the Rake (1981). The proportions of GDP (%) are drawn from Faaland and Isaksen (1979).

**Note:** Number 1 - 9 denotes the SADCC states; 6 - 8 the SACU members; 9 - 11 members of the defunct EAC.
Bibliography


