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Although the state, being an instrument of class-rule in class society, has at its disposal a usually effective and repressive machinery (the armed forces, the courts, the administration, etc) it cannot always depend on force to suppress the dominated class(es) within the social formation. To do so would be to encourage a near, or actual perpetual condition of civil war. The state has therefore, as Lenin so well understood, to maintain the ideological weaponry (the ideological state apparatus) of the dominant class so as to ensure class-domination by cohesive means and ensure the peaceful process of social reproduction. Both the repressive and ideological apparatuses have been stressed in recent discussions of the capitalist state, but unfortunately, such discussions have generally not been extended so as to adequately account for the development of neo-colonial state under imperialism, in particular, there has been little or no recognition of the importance of the ideological state apparatus of these states. Before, however, this can be corrected there is a need as this paper restricts itself in doing, to clear the ground of what has passed, generally, for discussion of the question of ideology, within the specific context of Tanzania where the literature on the country's apparently 'novel experience' has been imbued by a spirit of "Tanzaphilia (which) was widespread among progressives, liberals and left-wing radicals". ¹

1. Ideology and Social Classes.

The analysis of ideology must necessarily (not merely as a contingency) be linked with that of social classes for it is actual class practices which give rise to ideology. In capitalist society the dominant class establishes a dominant ideology which projects that class' world-view and this ideology attempts to penetrate all classes and establishes an ideological hegemony over all existing sub-ideologies. The only authentic opposition to this is proletarian ideology understood as being, not the spontaneous sub-ideology of the working-class, but the revolutionary ideology of Marxism-Leninism. Thus, only the two main classes

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in capitalist society are capable of articulating independent, (coherent) ideologies. The dominant ideology of the bourgeoisie is not static, it changes and develops, incorporating elements of the various sub-ideologies, to meet the changing needs of capital. Fundamentally it aims at subjugating the proletariat to the dictatorship of capital; thus, its social role is two-fold: it aims at establishing and maintaining the cohesion of the social formation and thereby provides a peaceful basis for and the actual means content of the reproduction of the relations of production. The principal task of revolutionary ideology is therefore to wage ideological struggle against bourgeois ideology.

In the context of imperialism and underdevelopment in the so-called 'third world' countries this sharp ideological struggle sometimes appear blurred, largely because of the frequent absence of a national bourgeoisie and a large working class. For although under imperialism the capital has penetrated all aspects of these societies - bringing the peasantry under the capitalist mode of production and within capitalist exchange, creating a petit-bourgeoisie and a small working class - due to its internal contradictions imperialism is incapable of thoroughly developing these societies although particular societies may appear to be so and there are significant differences between particular societies. In the absence of any national bourgeoisie and a sizeable, well-developed working class, the petit-bourgeoisie which emerged during the colonial phase of imperialism comes to play a more significant social, economic and political role than was traditionally allocated to it in the home-grounds of capital. The significance of this class is readily seen in the fact that it was willing to organize and lead the nationalist struggle for political independence from which it stood to gain in every way possible within the established framework of imperialism by such a struggle. It is of more than usual importance therefore when looking at the petit-bourgeoisie in these countries to treat their 'ideology' seriously from a class position - a feature which is almost entirely lacking in the literature on the Tanzanian petit-bourgeoisie.

The phenomenon of 'petit-bourgeois ideology' must be related to the reality of that class economic and social position in a given society. The petit-bourgeoisie can be divided into two though not mutually exclusive, types: there is the small-property owner who appeared often in
the Marxist classes and whom Marx sometimes thought would disappear in face of the development of capitalist production. Some members of this group would be pushed down into the working-class whilst others would move upwards into the bourgeoisie proper - it was seen as a transitional group. But no sooner did Marx and Engels talk of the disappearance of this social stratum as capitalism removes that strata's small-property and craft base, than they also spoke of the stratum which would emerge as capitalism expanded and needed more clerks, managers, etc., in short, a group which would earn its living by earning a salary. Their exploitation would be direct and not based on the creation of surplus, thus, for Marx, this group often seemed part of the working-class. But it is possible to speak of certain strata within this group which may be called members of the petit-bourgeoisie. True to Marx's prediction expanded capitalism has given rise to this second faction of the petit-bourgeoisie and although both types can be seen in contemporary African societies (sometimes distinct, sometimes merging, sometimes the one predominating over the other) this second type has been particularly conspicuous with the emergence of the neo-colonial state apparatus. The petit-bourgeois is therefore necessarily fragmentary and disparate in nature: not only is there no unity in the factions' relations to production, they are also dependent upon other social classes and even their ideology which is the class' most cohesive expression is itself composed of elements from the two main classes besides which it exists.

The phenomenon of 'petit-bourgeois ideology', however, corresponds to the two factions of the class.

The small-property consciousness of the small-owner is not surprising, nor is his political (populist) concern with the right of individual to have a stake in the 'community'. The salaried petit-bourgeois holds dear, on the other hand, to the notion of upward mobility and has aspirations to do well by his personal merits. Both sets of values, although corresponding to the factions' social positions in society, fundamentally spring from the dominant bourgeois ideology of capitalist society. But there are also reflections of the ideology of the proletariat in the ideological bag of the petit-bourgeoisie. For example, there is frequent talk of anti-capitalism, but what is usually meant by this is anti-big capitalism for the big capitalist's presence disturbs the petit-bour-
geois' value of equality and equality of opportunity which, presumably, we all need to improve and prove our individual worth. Thus the petit-bourgeois' anti-capitalism never goes beyond social-democratic reformism in a hypocritical attempt to 'equalize', to make all men, as it were, petit-bourgeois. Another important example is that the petit-bourgeois stresses the paramountcy of the state as an institution existing above society; whereas, therefore, the liberal-bourgeois stresses the importance of a weak state, the social democratic petit-bourgeois places emphasis on the interventionist role of the state which he sees, not as an institution which must be smashed as does the proletariat, but as an instrument for effecting reforms. Of course, the petit-bourgeois brings his own contribution to these borrowed elements and this transmutation is what makes it possible to talk about 'petit-bourgeois ideology'. Its ideological constructs are necessarily eclectic and pragmatic thereby reflecting the very insecure, shifty nature of the petit-bourgeoisie itself.

Given these general characteristics of the petit-bourgeoisie, there seems no immediate reason to believe that any particular national petit-bourgeoisie will depart from the norm, significantly. Yet, it has been the case, generally, that the petit-bourgeoisie as a class in Tanzania has been singled out for its seeming departure from this without there being any clear analysis to account for such a situation, apart from the frequent use of the empty phrase that the country is undergoing a 'novel experience'. There is therefore a total absence of an account for the ideological apparatus of the state in Tanzania in the growing literature on the country's political, economic and social developments.

2. The Left and Ideology in Tanzania.

Cliffe and Saul, two of the leaders of the 'Tanzaphilia' movement, have written a great deal in an attempt to explain the 'novel experience' of Tanzania but there is a conspicuous absence of any serious treatment of the question of ideology in their work. This absence is not due to any lack of opportunity, for their titles suggest a continual, if not continuous, preoccupation with socialism in Tanzania. For example, there is their *Socialism in Tanzania*, which, although running into two volumes, has very little or nothing to say about socialism. Analyses of socialism in Tanzania is shied away from as if there are no problems to be dealt with or
if there were any they have already been dealt with and solved. It is
hardly surprizing therefore that currently papers on socialism in Tanza-
nia can be written without a word as to what socialism is and what it
entails. It is taken as a given, above debate and analysis and all that
is now required is to chart the course of its mechanical operations in
the country. This is very different from the admonitions of the President
himself who has encouraged debate in the belief that this will lead to a
greater understanding of the country's commitment. If therefore we
want to know about socialism in Tanzania we have to go back to the
writing of Nyerere himself - Uhuru na Umoja (1966), Uhuru na Ujamaa
(1968) and Uhuru na Maendeleo (1974), which contain a wealth of
material on socialism as he understands it.

Yet, these writer's pretentiously entitled essays would suggest that
they have something worthwhile to say regarding the questions of ideo-
logy. But, for example, Saul's "African Socialism in One Country:
Tanzania" (1972) starts, not with an explanation of socialism nor even of
'African socialism', but with an attack on what he calls the "ultra-left
critique" of African politics (that is, Saul's African politics) which is
"insensitive to African reality and the (sic) range of possibilities of the
continent". It appears that for him patronization is more important than
clarity and his relativism seems to provide him with a sufficiency of
'sensitivity' to 'the range of possibilities' in Africa. The point here is
not to be sensitive to the whole range of possibilities found in Saul and
Cliffe's writing but simply to make a point or two about their assump-
tions on the question of ideology in the Tanzanian context.

In the first instance their discussion of ideology can hardly be
called analysis at all; they amount merely to descriptive accounts more
akin to behavioural political science than to marxist analysis. In an
article entitled "Ideology, Organization and the Settlement Experience
in Tanzania" by Cliffe and Cunningham, not only are there the usual
contradictions and inconsistencies - the peasants, we are told, "although
extremely poor, do not harbour a deep bitterness as a result of oppre-
sion and exploitation" - but there is hardly any treatment of ideology.
Yet, the aim of the paper is stated as being an attempt "to examine this
experience (settlement) and the settlement ideology which motivated it".
It seemed surprizing to the authors that the colonial TAC settlements
"were hardly socialist", but rather, their aim was to create (actually this was so elsewhere also) a yeomanry class to ensure the colonial status quo. They also seem surprised that such an obviously colonial aim should have persisted until 1967 but this is because for these analysts political independence marked a fundamental break with the past. Throughout the paper 'ideology' as a word is bandied about but never analysed. For example, we hear of "settlement ideology", of "explicitly socialist ideology", of a "coherent set of values, essentially Nyerere's idea of ujamaa" and, best of all, "concrete ideology" - none of which, not even 'concrete ideology', are explained.

The authors' conclusions are very revealing: not of ideology in Tanzania as of their own ideological stance. "Socialist development", they write, (and this is taken as given) will not occur in rural Tanzania until there is "a cadre of leaders who will live and work with the peasants" and who are "identified and trained ideologically and in practical skills and that a thorough understanding of Tanzania's ideology (is) spread to all levels". Not only is there no indication as to what socialist ideology entails, but as to who these cadres will be and from which class(es) in the society they will be recruited is not mentioned. It seems too that the 'ideology' is something that can be learnt and applied mechanically; and, of course, it is unrelated to classes. In another essay, "The Policy of Ujamaa Vijijini and Class Struggle" (1970) Cliffe says that he agrees with Lenin by arguing that the peasant in Tanzania, quoting Lenin, "are not antagonists of capitalism" and that there is a process of class differentiation going on in the countryside. Even if we assume this to be so, no sooner does Cliffe make what is in his hands an assertion than he proceeds, not to show the contradiction between peasants and other classes, but, rather, that the contradictions are not antagonistic in the rural areas and "should not be seen as an element in a class struggle." It should be noted here that Cliffe is not applying Mao's understanding of contradictions to the effect that there are principal and secondary contradictions and that these require different handling; what Cliffe is concerned to say here is that although he cannot deny that there are class differentiations developing in the countryside, these, to return to his theme of non-exploitation = absence of class bitterness, which obtains in Tanzania's rural areas, this class difference will not and ought not to lead to
class-consciousness. Again, too, Cliffe, returns to his prescriptive and didactic style; he calls for a "vast army of cadres"\textsuperscript{13} although this time he does recognize that there should be "some class criterion... in the selection of these cadres..."\textsuperscript{14} but as to which class(es) he has in mind there is still no telling. Thus, since there is only a confused understanding of the class relations in the country, it would be too much to expect an analysis of ideology as well.

Saul in his review of Nyerere on Socialism, (1969) sees the President's 'activities' only from a moralist perspective; he talks of 'pragmatism' but does not follow it to its logical conclusion. Nor is the "lack of analytical precision"\textsuperscript{15} that Saul sees in the President's work followed up and explained. Indeed the pragmatism and the positivism he sees in Nyerere's work are not entirely removed from Saul's own work. Throughout the article there is a general mood of apology for Nyerere on the one hand - this is uncalled for since the President is certainly capable of a clarity of expression where Saul is ambiguous and thereby mystifying - and on the other for marxism (others have tried it and it works!) But this seems typical of the man's patronizing attitude.

Saul does not patronize Cabral but abuses him. Recognizing the importance of the African petit-bourgeoisie, Cabral made his famous statement that the:

petit-bourgeoisie can either ally itself with imperialism and a reactionary strata in its own country and try to preserve itself as a petit-bourgeoisie or ally itself with the worker and peasants who must themselves take power.\textsuperscript{16}

Without pondering the last two phrases of this statement Saul jumps to the conclusion that the Tanzanian leadership has committed such altruistic suicide as Cabral had in mind. Coupled with this the Tanzanian leadership has attempted to "find a mass base for Tanzanian socialism among those who have, objectively, a more immediate stake in the promise of socialist transformation".\textsuperscript{17} Of course, it may well be possible to distinguish between those with "a more immediate stake" in socialism from those who should and would have an objective stake in socialism, but Saul does not care to draw such a distinction. Workers and peasants do not and cannot live on a promise, therefore for them it is the fulfilment which is 'at stake'.

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It is also quite clear that Saul, like Cliffe, has no perspective of classes and of class struggle, or, if he has it is an unconscious one and in any event class analysis does not apply to Tanzania. This, of course is quite contrary to Nyerere's own position. For although he has argued that in traditional African Society there were no classes there is at least a strong implication in his writings that it is the danger of further class differentiations which threatens socialism, as he understands it, in Tanzania".17 The President recognizes, as Saul does not, that

"socialism is not built by Government decisions, nor by Acts of Parliament; a country does not become socialistic by nationalisations or grand designs on paper".19 Saul therefore conceives of the class struggle in Tanzania very much in terms on intra-class conflict - although even for this he prefers the term "intra-elite contestation".20 The masses play only a marginal role in his class struggles but this minimum involvement, he is, rather magnanimously, prepared to concede, "may well be of even more crucial long-run importance than intra-elite contestation".21 Moreover, this 'contestation' (in an open, laissez-faire, liberal market-place?) is also helping to demystify the masses" and can make available to them a positive understanding of the terms of their exploitation and the realities of their structural position within the system".22 It certainly is a 'novel experience' to hear marxists speaking in such terms - that is, that a dominant, ruling ideology which is expressly not marxist proletarian ideology and within the framework of imperialism, can become at the same time, a liberating ideology.

This conclusion holds for both Cliffe and Saul. The understanding of ideology as false-consciousness within capitalist society, ideology being an attempt to hide the reality of social existence, not only from the exploited but, eventually, also from the very class for whom it was projected to serve, is entirely rejected by these writers. In their view ideology can be used to liberate the oppressed and exploited class in society even before the political victory of that class. Indeed, in the typical petit-bourgeois-christian fashion the 'ideology' which plays such a liberating role need not be of a marxist proletarian nature. Any ideology will do, for pragmatism and eclecticism which never refuses outrightly and principally nor yet wholeheartedly accepts, are important elements in their own ideological position.
Thus, for these writers, ideology in Tanzania, like current bourgeois social science, is positive for they do not recognize the ultimate negation of what they perceive to be. They can therefore go no further than a description of what they consider reality to be in Tanzania. They do not move from the stage of perception, as Mao would say, to that of logical and theoretical understanding. And this is not surprising for these writers abstracted themselves from the class-struggle itself by their attempts to deny its existence and thereby denied themselves the wherewithal to authentically understand the Tanzanian situation. Cliffe and Saul - as positivists are wont to do - become, moreover, ahistorical in their writings on Tanzania; the present instance is seen as isolated, independent, of the past with the fundamental break occurring in 1967 at Arusha. For them transition is also arrival, but there is no understanding of the 'from' and the 'to' of the process. There is no understanding of imperialism and how Tanzania fits into this. Furthermore, it seems that they had never read the *Communist Manifesto* where Marx and Engels painted a picture of the various schools of socialism then current and that even in that very early document, Marx and Engels had insights into similar 'novel' experiments then current.

The question of ideology in Tanzania therefore remains unclear and unexplained, indeed, the matter is more mystified than ever by such descriptive, positivistic accounts which passed for marxist analysis. It becomes relevant therefore to look at Issa Shivji's *Class Struggles in Tanzania*, (1975) which is not only a more recent work but one which from its title would seem to hold out promise of transcending the 'marxism' of Cliffe and Saul which are buried deep in positivism. As a preface to what follows it should be pointed out that Shivji sets out in the *Class Struggles* to achieve a level of analysis which was absent in previous works on Tanzania and in some very important ways, he achieved this. Certainly he transcended much of what Cliffe and Saul had to say about the country's 'novel experience' and for the first time a marxist perspective was introduced into the discussion. This achievement should not be overlooked in any assessment of his work, either as a whole or as here, in part. But it must also be said almost in the same breath that whatever else Shivji may have to say about the class struggles in Tanzania he does not consider the ideological aspect to be of great importance. There is no syste-
matic discussion of the issue at any point and this is a serious omission in a text on the class struggles. But to be fair: there are passing references (e.g. pp. 22-4, 64-66, etc) and admittedly, to quote, "8.3.2" is entitled "The Ideology of the 'Bureaucratic Bourgeoisie'" and chapter 9 is headed "The Dilemma of Metaphysics", but there is no systematic analysis as would be rightly expected. If, as Shivji, claims, there is a debate in Tanzania over the scientific meaning of socialism then one would expect that this debate is in its infancy and if this estimation is correct then Lenin's warning to Russian marxists in 1902 is not entirely misplaced:

the younger the socialist movement in any given country, the more vigorous it must struggle against all attempts to entrench non-socialist ideology, and the more resolutely the workers must be warned against the bad councillors....25

The aim here is not to assess Shivji's work generally - a task Nabudere has tackled, albeit not without his own omissions and failings - but simply to point to two important flaws which flow from this neglect of the ideological question.

Firstly, Shivji seems not to have any clear understanding of ideology and although he may have transcended Cliffe and Saul in some other aspects, in this particular one he has not been able to do so. In discussing "The Ideology of the 'Bureaucratic Bourgeoisie'?" (pp. 96-7) Shivji points out that the political ideology of this 'class' is basically petit-bourgeois but, he goes on to say,

its approach and method of work are so much characterized by bureaucratic decision-making and technocratic implementation that these may be said to be the particular features of the 'ideology' of the emerging 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie'.27

It seems rather strange to speak of 'bureaucratic decision-making and technocratic implementation' as elements of an ideology. Such a conclusion could only be arrived at from a faulty premise: there is clearly no understanding of ideology in a marxist sense here, rather, what seems to be the main concern of the writer is to level a moral censure at the Tanzanian petit-bourgeoisie. It is not possible to accept that the reality of a situation (bureaucratic decision-making and technocratic implementation of policies) as being a reflection of reality i.e. ideology. The characteristics described as ideological are infact fea-
tures of the Tanzanian administrative state system and must be distinguished from the state's ideological function; this is not to say that the separate functions of the state are mutually exclusive, but to confound them together is to confuse inter-relationships for exact identity. Bureaucratism and technocratism are not values projected by the state in the form presented by Shivji; these are major characteristics of the very operation of the state oppressive machinery. On the contrary, the ideology in this respect is derived from a more developed ideological construct, from bourgeois ideology, particularly its values of hard work, efficiency and neutral-objective nature of the bureaucracy (à la Weber), etc.

Moreover, for Shivji in "this ideology" problems are conceived of in terms of "administering of things" by the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and not the involvement of the people. But, just on a factual level this is hardly true. In the first place Shivji seems to be implying here that in a non-socialist society a bureaucracy can be truly neutral and therefore simply concern itself with the administration of things. Even after 1917 Lenin was gravely concerned with this very problem, whether the new bureaucracy would be adequate to implement socialist policies given the retention and the persistence of bourgeois ideology by the class from which the bureaucracy was recruited. Of course, if Shivji is attempting to say (and I do not think that he is) that the Tanzanian bureaucracy projects this image of itself then he would be correct for it is part of a bureaucracy's ideology to project itself as being above social classes and in this respect the Tanzanian state bureaucracy does seem to resemble the Hegelian state bureaucracy within which freedom is realized. But even if this is Shivji's contention he still stands in need of developing this point and explaining this ideological posture.

In total contradiction to what Shivji says here the governing faction of the Tanzanian petit-bourgeoisie (call it 'bureaucratic' if you like) espouses and projects a stance that the people ought to be involved in the running of the country. This, of course, is hardly surprising for this stance is common to the petit-bourgeoisie the world over and it corresponds to that class' view of democracy. In a period of populist politics in Africa it would indeed be very surprising if the petit-bourgeoisie did
not espouse and project a populist ideology which preaches the virtues of political involvement, or, political participation as against bureaucratic norms. (In this section of his book Shivji reveals his uncertainty about some of his categories by using inverted commas when he refers to ideology and bureaucratic bourgeoisie—presumably this is a cover for himself— but by the time the reader gets this far in the text either he takes the writer seriously or he does not. If he does take Shivji seriously then the over frequent use of inverted commas must be ignored; if not, then the reader must begin to ponder over the multitude of sins the man is covering within his commas and under his many 'par excellence' situations).

Here and there Shivji speaks of 'proletarian ideology'. For example, under the very suggestive heading of "Proletariat and Revolution" where we would expect him to come to grips with the question, Shivji speaks only about the 'revolution' coming under the leadership of 'proletarian ideology leading various classes to the eventual overthrow of "the capitalist social order"'. He presses the point home thus: "the important and decisive point is that the struggle (speaking of China) was led by a party expounding proletarian ideology". But nowhere are we told what "a party expounding proletarian ideology" means and involves; nor do we know what, according to Shivji, constitutes 'proletarian ideology' itself. It may be argued that it was not necessary for Shivji to have explain himself for he was speaking to a known audience which understood his terminologies and his gaps but this is not a marxist approach. His bland statements lead to perhaps unnecessary misunderstandings; nor can it be said that we really do know what Shivji knows and means by these terms. Since he has not told us clearly that he is thinking of a marxist-leninist party which organizes simultaneously, and wage an ideological and a political struggle, it is not far-fetched to assume that he has in mind TANU as the party leading all "potential revolutionary classes and strata" to the revolution. After all, part of TANU's stand is for Uhuru na Umoja, with the stress very much on umoja. Cliffe and Saul themselves took such a position. Othman too, in his article, "The Tanzanian State" although speaking loosely of 'proletarian ideology' and of the need for a 'clear ideology' (as if TANU's ideology is not clear or is incoherent) is more definite and precise than Shivji in this respect. Othman's position is that TANU:
must retain its mass character, and at the same time must put forward a clear ideology. In effect, this is to say that a vanguard party should exist within (his emphasis) the broad national liberation movement that TANU now is. 32

There are a number of mistaken ideas here but at least Othman is definite in his prescriptions where Shivji is at best ambivalent. In this respect Shivji does not in fact go beyond Cliffe, and Saul, not significantly so, and if he does in fact have fundamental difference with them he does not show them. Slogans, however correct, will not do for analysis and besides, slogans, like analysis, have their right place.

Apart from brandishing seemingly correct phrases here and there Shivji does however come very close to saying something worthwhile about ideology in Tanzania. He sees the petty-bourgeoisie in its anti-capitalist stance does not in fact transcend the normal bounds of petit-bourgeois ideology. In opposing imperialism, Shivji argues, the Tanzanian petit-bourgeoisie is against a particular instance of imperialism, that is British capital, not capital per se. In this case it is better the unknown than the known devil (if such a corruption is permissible). But even here where Shivji seems to be in the correct path he quickly lapses into confusion. For example, he attributes the extreme nationalism of the petit-bourgeoisie in Tanzania to the fact that it possesses state power which is loose enough and poses an assumption for an answer. Whereas the possession of formal political power may strengthen the nationalism of petit-bourgeoisie it is less likely to be the source; nationalism is generally part of petit-bourgeois ideology be they holding formal political power or not. This class often poses itself as the 'saviour' of the 'nation' for if the state is paramount and society is truly undivided, it is a single whole. Shivji's mechanical and stiff stance can only be accounted for by his lack of understanding of ideology.

Secondly, because Shivji has no conceptual framework within which to analyse ideology in class society, he utterly failed to understand its function and therefore its importance in Tanzania. He is therefore forced to be very much like the petit-bourgeois, particularly when he attempts to account for the ideology of the classes and factions in the country. For example, in one place we are told that TANU
"never came under the influence of proletarian ideology". And the trade union movement is quickly dismissed because it was "basically structured on traditional (English) lines led by element from the petty-bourgeoisie" and, therefore, "if anything, the TANU ideology was essentially peasant-biased". Shivji just managed to save himself from going over the precipice here - TANU only just about managed to have an ideology! In another place Shivji will speak of the urban petit-bourgeoisie as the "creation of colonialism par excellence!" It is in this class that the "colonial education system had created its own gravediggers in the form of the intelligentsia - teachers and civil servants (the ideological spokesmen of the nationalist movement Shivji stresses) - who provided the necessary leadership". There are at least two important flaws here: the intelligentsia, such as it was created by colonialism did not form a team (much less a class) of gravediggers and if it did it was certainly not for the colonial education system which was inherited and has been developed as part of the ideological state apparatus. Shivji also falls prey to the widespread wisdom of the age that political independence marked a far-reaching and fundamental break in the imperialist process; there was a change of course, but this does not amount to a fundamental break in a living, continuous process.

But the main point here is that Shivji does not know how to handle the issue of ideology in Tanzania. In one instance TANU's ideology - 'if anything' - is peasant biased and in the next instance the ideology of the nationalist movement (headed by TANU) is petit-bourgeois and peasant - peasant seen largely in undifferentiated terms and with petit-bourgeois values accredited to them.

Yet, there is a point to be made here: the nationalist movement, although led by the petit-bourgeoisie, had within its ranks various classes including the working-class the peasantry and the petit-bourgeoisie and in this situation one would expect that at particular stages the ideology of the movement would reflect various elements of sub-ideologies.

The ideology of the petit-bourgeois, one would expect, would struggle for hegemony - which should not be a difficult task since the other classes, left on their own, were already penetrated by elements
of petit-bourgeois ideology. But if this is what Shivji wishes to say, he must argue his case and explain the complexity of these relationships within proper historical perspective. In his failure to do this we are left as befogged as before - with a few phrases added to the petit-bourgeois subjectivism of Cliffe and Saul.

It is not surprising, given his theoretical framework that Shivji should draw the wild conclusions that teachers and civil servants were the gravediggers of the system which produced them and that TANU played a progressive role and is continuing to do so. There is a section of the book entitled "Conclusion: The progressive Nature of the Bureaucratic Bourgeoisie" and it would be interesting to know what precisely is naturally progressive about a petit-bourgeoisie. Even if there are progressive aspects in the policies of a given petit-bourgeoisie these can hardly be explained with reference to its nature; rather, this would be so because of specific conditions prevailing within the historically given which must itself be explained. Shivji seems to be aware of his rash statement and in an attempt to save himself states, rather limply, in a last minute afterthought (footnote) that the petit-bourgeoisie is progressive only in a political sense, for, says Shivji, "at the epochal level it is only the proletariat which is the progressive class in the present era." The effect of this afterthought is to leave us wondering whether the politically progressive petit-bourgeoisie is progressive in nature or artificially and the extent of this artificiality. It does not occur to Shivji to explain here that even the proletariat, left to itself, is not naturally, automatically, progressive.

Shivji, however, offers three instances to illustrate his point that the Tanzanian petit-bourgeoisie is politically progressive. The struggle between what he calls the 'petit-bourgeoisie' and the 'commercial bourgeoisie' has led not to Saul's demystification but to a 'purifying' of the class struggle. By this Shivji does not mean that certain issues are becoming clearer to the main classes in Tanzania. He simply means that the racial factor has been removed from the arena of the class struggle (politics); racial ideology may show its ugly head but only sporadically and as a force it is effectively spent, it is objectively removed because its objective base is removed. Now, it is not
to be belittled that the Tanzanian petit-bourgeoisie opted, in its internal struggle, for a non-racial ideological stance - indeed, it was a salutary posture and to that extent progressive. But it must also be understood that in non-socialist society the dominant class will always exploit any secondary contradictions existing within itself or between (or within) the oppressed class(es) to perpetuate its class rule. Racism has been effectively used by capitalism in this crisis and there is nothing to say that in the specific case of Tanzania where the peculiar East African racial factor obtains in addition to tribalism which is too frequently ignored, the ideology of racism or tribalism for that matter will not be turned into effective political capital by elements in the petit-bourgeoisie at particular junctures. So long as the objective basis for racism remains - and this basis is not merely Shivji's objective basis, i.e., people of Indian or Pakistani origin owning property, but capitalism itself - so long does the possibility of its use remains. (President Nyerere himself has been very aware of this racial dimension of Tanzanian society and politics and spoke in no uncertain terms regarding it.) Such secondary contradictions are not solved by governmental rules and policies; contrary to Shivji's position, the objective condition for racial ideology has not been removed for, as he himself correctly points out, Tanzania is part and parcel of the imperialist world system.

Secondly, argues Shivji, "the most important role played by the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' has been in the sphere of ideology" and here he congratulates this 'class' for its stance against capitalism and its support for the liberation movements in Southern Africa. These policies, he argues, are having their effects on the internal dynamics of Tanzania itself, that is to say:

The question of the meaning of anti-imperialism and the discussion of its scientific nature within Tanzania are a by-product of the official 'anti-imperialism'...

Apart from the cause-effect question that Shivji begs here it would be interesting to know precisely the effect of these policies on Tanzania. Does Shivji, for example, mean that 'on the Hill' people are discussing imperialism or is this being discussed by peasants and workers? If the former - then what is the connection with the Tanzanian reality and if the latter then under whose leadership is this scientific discussion
taking place? These questions were not part of Shivji's concern, precisely because ideology does not form part of his class struggle.

Thirdly, says Shivji (in fact all three points run into each other and are aspects of the same point) the Arusha Declaration placed socialism "in a concrete way" on the agenda for the first time. The conclusion here is that "discussion and debates about socialism are bound to contribute to the consciousness of the people." 43

Few would quarrel with this but we would still want to know - discussion by whom and of what socialism? Shivji seems blind to the 'range of possibilities' (to borrow Saul's phrase) of socialism on the African continent. In the *Communist Manifesto* Marx and Engels spoke of various socialisms including feudal socialism, petit-bourgeois, and bourgeois socialism. For example, the aristocracy loosing its struggle with the bourgeoisie appeared to have abandoned its own class interest and championed those of the working-class, but in fact what they amounted to no more than "half lamentation, half lampoon"; this was the aristocracy's way of taking "revenge by singing lampoons on their new master and whispering in his ears sinister prophecies of coming catastrophe". 44 Petit-bourgeois socialism too championed the working class and 'dissected' many of the contradictions of capitalism but in "its positive aims this form of socialism aspires either to restoring the old means of production and of exchange... or to cramping the modern means of production and of exchange". 45 Both variants of petit-bourgeois socialism are utopian and reactionary. 'True' socialism, bourgeois socialism, etc. also claimed to have the working class as its central concern but they were all unscientific and in one way or the other irrelevant. Socialism seen in this light raises the important question of what socialism one is talked about when the word is mentioned. Shivji takes an ahistorical stance here (like Cliffe and Saul) and therefore there is no need to analyse the meaning of Socialism in Tanzania; by implication the tautology that socialism is socialism would appear to stand. In neglecting this task Shivji (again like Cliffe and Saul) ends up in a position not dissimilar to the feudal socialists - they engage themselves in an activity of "half lamentation, half lampoon" which is even beyond the pale of petit-bourgeois socialism which ends only "in a miserable fit of the blues". 46
In conclusion it is worth pointing out again that Shivji does not
infact go beyond Cliffe and Saul in the way they treat the question of
ideology. Even in the treatment of the class struggle itself there is a
great deal of agreement. Both Saul and Shivji sees the class struggle
largely in terms of conflict between elements of the petit-bourgeois -
what is for Saul a case of 'intra-elite contestation' appears in Shivji
as a struggle between 'petit-bourgeois' and 'commercial bourgeois' in
one instance and in another between the latter and 'the bureaucratic
bourgeois'. For both 'schools' the class struggle is largely a matter
of the workers and peasants observing this intra-elite struggle and
learning from it, but not that they themselves are involved in struggle.
Thus, Shivji does not significantly rise above the Cliffe/Saul perspectives.

This is a sorry conclusion on what has passed for discussion of
ideology by reputedly marxist scholars within an environment where
there is a serious marxist debate on many important issues. It is from
this standpoint that one can adequately assess J.R. Nellis' A Theory of
Ideology: The Tanzanian Example, (1972)\textsuperscript{47} which, although coming out
of the behaviouralist persuasion in political science, has arrived at
some conclusions significantly different from those considered.

3. Social Science and Ideology.
Nellis' thesis, briefly put, is that African governments - and particularly
the Tanzanian Government - find themselves at independence in a situation
of extreme poverty understood in terms of general resources and the
machinery of state; such governments do not

possess large, ready distributable amounts of goods and
services with which behaviour can be purchased...therefore a substitute, non-material 'currency' must be crea-
ted and utilized and it is this non-material, substitute
purchasing agent which is ideology.\textsuperscript{48}

Thus, it is the situation of scarcity which gives rise to ideology, its
content, role, etc in African politics (Nellis is careful to say that this
does not apply elsewhere). There are glaring mistaken ideas involved
here and which will be returned to later, but for now what is important
is to show, briefly, how Nellis, even though his methodology was funda-
mentally weak and incapable of analysing ideology, arrived at making more
substantial points than Cliffe, Saul and even Shivji.
Firstly, Nellis gives ideology a social importance (albeit a wrong one) which is lacking in these writers. It is for him a 'non-material' currency for purchasing much needed time by a regime. In times of severe demands on the regime it appeals to one type of political actors against another type. Thus, in his model, "ideology", Nellis argues, "is inseparably linked to the dimension of actors". If ideology is the promise made by the regime to "politically unaware actors" for their support against "politically aware actors", then the role of function of ideology for Nellis is to provide time for a regime to take steps to prolong its existence.

Secondly, Nellis' thesis recognizes at least important difference between 'politically aware actors' and the regime. Whereas for Nellis there is a conflictual relationship between the regime and politically aware actors which ultimately cannot be solved by the regime (and it is therefore, to use the correct terminology, irreconcilable) for Cliffe and Saul such differences appear as temporary upsets of a lasting and essential concensus. This concensus is arrived at because the small working class constitutes a 'labour aristocracy' and therefore only the peasantry can provide a base for revolutionary transformation, led by others. In short, there is an identity of interest of all classes. For Nellis the regime feels threatened because the 'politically aware actors' have the wherewithal to destabilize it. When the regime (R) appeals to the politically unaware actors' (PUs) to gain time the PUs automatically become PAs also and so there is an unending process of R appealing to PUs against PAs who, in turn add to the number of the PAs; eventually the regime's use of promises diminishes in its returns. In brief, Nellis model, for what it is worth takes him beyond Cliffe and Saul and allows him to make statements substantially different from theirs.

Thirdly, Nellis recognizes that ideology is of crucial importance (although his understanding of the phenomenon itself is questionable) in African politics and particularly in Tanzania. For him, "in Africa there is little wealth and less coercive force available" and although these do not really tell us why ideology plays such a crucial role in African states, at least he recognizes that it is important.

To stress Nellis conclusions is not necessarily to accept them. Indeed, there are more than grave weaknesses in them and discussion
of his thesis is not in order to stimulate a debate over his work (for it is conceived in a very different theoretical framework from that within which one intends to investigate this problem in the near future), rather, such a discussion should be seen as part of a process of self-clarification on this matter. It may be added too that Nellis' work does represent perhaps the only full-scale work of its kind on Tanzania and should therefore command some attention. His analysis is entirely unacceptable because of its (a) methodology and his (b) gross misunderstanding of ideology which inevitably leads to misunderstanding and false conclusions.

a) **Methodology.**

There are bound to be very serious problems when positivist social science attempts to analyse the phenomenon of ideology because it is itself a class ideology. Many, if not most, professional social scientists would deny that their intellectual efforts are performed within a particular ideological framework and as such is part of a wider ideological activity. Yet, contemporary social science, which had for its initiators Comte, Durkheim and Weber who was particularly concerned to refute Marx's work, is bourgeois ideology. But this response by social scientists is not surprising for as Martin Shaw points out, they have "a reductionist view of ideology; they think that to be called bourgeois ideologists means that they are charged with being capitalism's yes-men". In addition, this subjective reductionist view is arrived at by social scientists because the ideological apparatus of the state particularly the educational apparatus - enjoys a great deal of independence and steadily the individual comes to believe "his craft to be the true one". What is meant therefore is not that individual social scientists are yes-men or not, but that social science as a whole presents a world-view, albeit with internal variations, which corresponds to actual class situations. An individual within this whole may or may not understand his role; indeed it becomes nigh-impossible for most to recognize it. On the contrary, concerned with a mistaken notion of 'objectivity' based ultimately on the individual's sense of honesty and intelligence, as Goldman has ably pointed out, the social scientist entirely disregard the "identity of subject and object" in his work. Thus, it is not to be expected that social science, with its inherent
conservatism, stress on the 'positive' and thereby rejection of the 'negative' (of negation) is capable of transcending the limitations of the forces which brought it about so as to offer insight into that society's ideology of which itself is an essential part.

Nellis' failure to tackle the problem of ideology within its proper perspective must be seen in terms of this fundamental drawback of his methodology. But Nellis, seeing through a glass darkly, so to speak, is not entirely unaware of the contradiction involved here, but, of course, he does not present it in this way. Being a behaviouralist he approaches his problem by looking for the observable effects of ideology. The work is conceived as "an enquiry into the composition and behavioural effect, if any, in a young African state" but Nellis feels uneasy with this task and admits that behaviouralists have tended to shy away from the issue because, for them, ideology is a difficult phenomenon to observe; they are not able to link 'ideology' with 'behaviour', 'thought' with 'activity'. Political scientists are therefore content, says Nellis, to simply accept as given the importance of ideology and

\[ \text{they are very willing to discuss the social role of function of ideology, usually in terms of the ultimate and general non-political goals of the ideology's propagators.} \]

Nellis here is simply turning inwards on himself and destroying his earlier point - that political science is not capable of dealing with the phenomenon - for it is not to say that behavioural political science has been able to "discuss the social role or function of ideology". To have been able to do this political science would have had to transcend itself. More correctly, bourgeois political science has been able to describe what it thinks, in its own mystifying way, ideology is and hence its necessarily false explanation of the role of ideology. Nellis also assumes that ideologists and politicians are identical. This not only reflects the failure of social science to understand ideology but also its tendency to over-politicize social phenomenon and thus misses the specificity of the political and of politics. Eventually Nellis is forced to abandon the tools offered by political science - it cannot help him to connect 'thought' with 'activity'. He concludes:

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Whether ideas are motive forces, whether political ideologies have direct behavioural consequences is, given present knowledge, an irrelevant question, in the sense that it is an unanswerable question. 58

Like all extreme, vulgar empiricists, Nellis believes that sheer quantity of knowledge will lead to a clear understanding of social phenomena. Nellis attempts to overcome his problem by constructing what is for him an heuristic model "utilizing assumptions about the actors and the systems in question - that are associated with the field of economics 59 for the psychological assumptions of political science "is a political quagmire". 60 The important 'inputs' of Nellis' model has already been outlined, what is of more importance here is the fundamental problem concerned with model-building itself.

The concept of the model would seem to arise from, and is closely intertwined with, Weber's ideal type. This can be understood, generally as being deliberately exaggerated features of a phenomenon which amount to an 'ideal type' of the phenomenon; the ideal type corresponds to its reality but the ideal type does not itself exist. Its value, like the model, is not its exactitude or its 'correctness' as Nellis reminds us, but its heuristic utility; its goal is "logical consistency", that is, the model, like the ideal type, is useful insofar as it helps to highlight salient features of the concrete, real world. 61 That in itself is correct, adequate in its relations to the concrete, is beside the point; to see Nellis' model in terms of its correctness therefore is to miss, as he rightly says, its point entirely.

What is wrong with this sort of reasoning is that it introduces a false dichotomy between the 'abstract' and the 'real'. This is false because it belittles theoretical understanding of social phenomena; theorization about social practice cannot go beyond the 'ideal' which in other than the real and only a 'type' not the whole of a social practice. The relation between theory and practice is resolved by the more or less exact correspondence of the ideal type to the real, concrete, world. Theory is therefore denied its proper place within the correct understanding of social phenomena.

The distortion of the relation between theory and practice is not however restricted to positivists; it is also to be found within current marxist debates. For example, one reviewer of Hindes and Hirst, Pre-
Capitalist Modes of Production, states that these writers, were "correctly" attempting "to re-establish the primacy of theoretical work in marxism". But this is a false understanding of the marxist classics. Lenin, for instance, basing his view on Marx's Theses (1845) 'Engel's Ludwig Feuerbach (1888) and his Socialism, (1892 Introduction) argued that both Marx and Engels "placed the criterion of practice at the basis of the materialist theory of knowledge". Mao Tse-Tung too, whose theory as well as practice contributed to the development of Marxism after Lenin, stated very clearly the correct relation between social practice and marxist theory. In the first instance there is social practice (P) followed in the second by theory (T) - this theory, Marxist theory, is for Mao an epistemological "leap". (It should be noted that Mao's leap does not deny the relevance of history to Marxism as Althusser's "break" would appear to do in the hands of his disciples.) In the third instance (T) realizes itself in (P) which it acts upon and changes; theory becomes so to speak, part and parcel of practice and although the two can be distinguished their relationship is dialectical. Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary practice, and vice versa.

Social science distorts this situation by postulating that what counts is experience whilst idealist, 'leftist' marxists distorts marxism by preaching the primacy of theory over practice. The latter is not far removed from the vulgar, 'practical' man who bases all reality on the subjective, on what he considers to be as if it can be taken as a given; the latter although claiming to "re-establish" marxism is in reality re-establishing the Cartesion world-outlook - with these marxists we are dangerously close to Descartes' "cogito ergo sum" (I think therefore I am). It has been said of Althusser's reading of Capital that for him the theory it contains is 'ideal' but

only in the sense that it only involves the object of knowledge... not the real object, and the knowledge it produces is perfectly adequate to its object, not as an approximation to it.

Nellis' model can at best get us only to an approximation of the Tanzanian reality, it cannot explain it; it cannot develop a theory perfectly adequate to its object. It is therefore necessary to go beyond radicalism in social science if ideology is to be understood and so for
Nellis to abandon political science for economics is not to go beyond the bounds of a particular general outlook.

Model-builders, moreover, are fond of leaving (or at least wont to leave) out of their model what are distasteful to them. Nellis therefore concerns himself with 'political actors' - PAs and PUs and R - but there is no mention of the existence of social classes in this atomistic Benthamite-like world. There are some dichotomous cliches such as led and leader and politics itself is not surprisingly defined in Lasswellian terms as 'who gets what, when and how'. In this formulation not surprising, politics has little to do with the class struggle and state power. Furthermore, Nellis treats Tanzania as an isolated instance; like the atomic individuals in the political arena, so is the country in respect to the outside world. In short, Nellis does not have a perspective of imperialism. In the period of monopoly capital, imperialism affects the economies of African states in such a profound way that not even a bourgeois scholar should care to attempt to hide this. The very fact that political independence has come about within the general framework of imperialism and it has been able to accommodate the new states must have a great deal to say about the present stage of imperialism and ideology. But such concerns fall outside the pale of Nellis' analysis; his methodology, his model, does not permit a total analysis which could possibly offer some insight into the nature and role of ideology in Tanzania.

b) Ideology

Nellis' model is aimed at a "consistent explanation of why ideologies are put forth, how ideologies are used, and how, given certain assumption, various factors in the ideology follow a logical path". These amount to an ambitious undertaking, particularly in view of Nellis' analytical tools. But inevitably Nellis breaks down and at his crucial point - where he attempts to say what ideology is. In his view ideology should be understood as being

an organized set of justifications for the policies and activities of the ruling regime - meaning the people who control the governmental apparatus - in a political system.

There are a number of mistakes here which are not peculiar to Nellis but which can be traced to the fundamentally irrelevant way in which
the question regarding ideology is posed within (his) general theoretical framework.

Grappling in his own way with the problem of definition and content Nellis attempts to distinguish between Dahl's "limited, careful definition and analysis of ideology" and that of Liehtheim "who writes in a very different tradition". Dahl's definition is restricted to "a set of more of less persistent, integrated doctrines that purport to explain and justify" a leadership's position in a given political system. Although he is able to see the weakness of Dahl's definition and correctly traces this to a wrong formulation of the question within (bourgeois) political science, Nellis prefers this timidity to Liehtheim's characterization of ideology as "both the consciousness of an epoch and the 'false' consciousness of men unaware of their true role". Nellis' rejection of what he very crudely treats in a footnote and sees as a mere difference in American and European scholarship is not surprising for not only is Marxism a "very different tradition" from positivist social science but at this point of his analysis Nellis unconsciously reveals his own unawareness of his social role.

Whereas Dahl focuses on both explanation and justification as elements of ideology, Nellis concentrates only on the latter. They have in common the fact that they accept the pronouncements of politicians as being the kernel of ideology. It is of course proper and correct to distinguish between the various elements of ideology - eg., religious, philosophical, political, economic, etc. - but the narrow definitions offered by Dahl and Nellis result in an empiricism which is incapable of integrating, embracing and explaining all the elements of ideology. Their definitions pre-empts the contents of ideology and Nellis' analysis results in an ideological exercise. In his model the appearance and existence of ideology is dependent on whether R appeals to PUs against PAs; if such an exercise is not carried out then there is no ideology in evidence. As with Cliffe and Saul, ideology becomes almost a mechanical, tangible thing which can be made to appear and disappear according to governmental requirements. Ideology, for these writers, do not appear to have much in common with a broader framework of values, beliefs, etc. which are propagated and maintained within the social formation.
Nellis main conclusion is that the Tanzanian political regime is a weak one because, after the Arusha Declaration, it will not be able to continue much longer to appeal to PUs against PAs and thus prolong its existence. But this conclusion is misleading on at least two counts: there is no doubt that eventually the Tanzanian system like all political systems will change as a result of the class struggle but this is not what Nellis is concerned to say; he is simply concerned to say that as more 'political actors' become PAs the political regime will weaken and break-down. Beyond this breakdown there is no indication as to what will emerge and here Nellis' analysis runs up its final cul-de-sac. Secondly, although it is wrong to draw conclusions about the Tanzanian political system without first discussing the class situation, it can be safely said that at this time the regime would appear to be very stable and with the recent establishment of an ideological as well as political hegemony of a section of the petit-bourgeoisie there seems no immediate threat to the stability of the state. Indeed, perhaps the present Tanzanian political regime is the most stable political regime in Africa largely because of the integrative cohesive role of ideology in the Tanzanian social formation.

Conclusion:
But ideology in a social formation has more than a cohesive function, it also plays a very important part in the reproduction of the relations of production. In a capitalist social formation the process of reproduction is not achieved solely by the material provisions (wages for physical strength to continue work, to bring up offsprings, etc.) but also by the non-material forces of ideology. Althusser singles out the educational system in capitalist society as the main ideological state apparatus, coupled with the family - this was paralleled in the feudal formation by the church-family couple. The inclusion of non-public institutions in the ideological state apparatus may seem surprising but as Althusser reminds us the capitalist state knows no distinction between 'public' and 'private' spheres, such distinctions are internal to itself. Thus, the ideological state apparatuses include not only the more usually understood legal, political and religious apparatus but also the family, education and trade unions. 240
With respect to African politics, and particularly Tanzanian politics, these remarks are pertinent. Where the distinction between civil-society and the policy seems blurred and there is an apparently over-politicization of all aspects of the social formation such remarks, properly utilized, provide the basic elements towards a proper and adequate analysis of ideology and the ideological apparatuses. Such an analysis should necessarily involve an analysis also of classes and of formal and real power in the state. The analyst would then be in a position to transcend the sloganeering approach of Shivji, Nellis' model and the patently false consciousness of Cliffe and Saul - the 'novel experience' of Tanzania could then be explained.

Footnotes:

3. N. Poulantzas, Fascism and Dictatorship (London: New Left Books, 1974) partic. part V.
7. Ibid., p. 131.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p. 139.
10. Ibid., pp. 195ff.
11. Ibid., p. 208.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 209.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., vol. 1.
16. A. Cabral, "Brief Analysis of the Social Structure in Guinea "in Revolution in Guinea, 
17. Arrighi and Saul, op.cit., p. 246.


21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.


28. For example, see, V. I. Lenin, "On the Significance of Militant Materialism", in, Selected Works (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1968), partic. p. 661; see also N. Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes, (London New Left Books, 1973), for an excellent treatment of the question of bureaucracy which Poulantzas links with the question of elites.


30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., p. 55.


34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., p. 56.

36. Ibid., p. 57.


39. I am grateful to I. Bryceson for impressing upon me the importance of this point and for his general comments in this paper.

40. *See* for example, Nyerere, "Socialism is not Racialism" in Freedom and Socialism pp. 257ff.


42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.
45. Ibid., p. 130.
46. Ibid.
49. Ibid., p. 72.
51. Nellis, op.cit. p. 34.
56. Ibid., p. 5.
57. For an important discussion of this point see, N. Poulantzas, op.cit., chapter 1.
58. Nellis, op.cit., p. 28.
59. Ibid., p. x.
60. Ibid., p. 25.
64. Mao Tse-Tung, op.cit., p. 303.
65. cf. Depelchin's report of Hindess and Hirst; either the reporter or the reported - or both - are taking Althusser's 'break' out of historical context, but certainly the anti-historicalism (if such a term can be permitted) seems to stretch Althusser to a breaking point with Marxism.
68. Ibid.,
69. Ibid., p. 15, fn. 7.
70. Ibid., p. 5.
71. Quoted by Nellis, op. cit., p. 15, fn. 7.