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Considerations on the Role of Media and Information in Building a New South Africa*

P. Eric Louw** and Keyan G. Tomaselli***

Abstract

If South Africa’s potential is to be realized, the nation will need to be fully integrated into the global electronic information age. A future South African government can choose between two basic courses of action: (i) emphasis could be placed on reinforcing and expanding the technological infrastructures required to further the development of a post-Fordist South African information economy or (ii) emphasis could be placed on the modernist industrial base at the expense of the information economy and communication technologies of post-Fordism.

The challenge lies in avoiding dependency on the West by accepting the top-down relations associated with multi-national capitalism.

* written before the elections in South Africa.

** P. Eric Louw is senior lecturer at the Centre for Cultural and Media Studies, University of Natal, South Africa.

*** Keyan Tomaselli is Director of and teaches at the Centre for Cultural and Media Studies, University of Natal, South Africa.
Considérations du Rôle des Média et de l'Informations dans la Création d'une Nouvelle Afrique du Sud

par P. Eric Louw* et Keyan G. Tomaselli**

Résumé

Pour que le potentiel de l'Afrique du Sud soit réalisé, ce pays doit être intégré dans l'ère des informations électroniques globale. Un futur gouvernement sud-africain peut adopter une de ces deux lignes de conduite: (i) il peut insister sur le renforcement et le développement des infrastructures technologiques qui sont nécessaires pour l'expansion d'une économie et pour d'un système d'information Sud africains post-fordiste, ou (ii) il peut insister sur une base industrielle moderniste aux frais de l'économie informationnelle et des technologies de communication d'ère post-fordiste.

L'essentiel c'est d'éviter de dépendre de l'Occident en acceptant des relations de prédominance qui sont associées avec le capitalisme multinationnal.

* P. Eric Louw est professeur au Centre des Etudes Culturelles et des Média, à l'Université de Natal, en Afrique du Sud.
** Keyan Tomaselli est Directeur de, et professeur au Centre des Etudes Culturelles et des Média à l'Université de Natal, en Afrique du Sud.
A new mode of production — centered on Information technology and instantaneous world-wide electronic communication — has become dominant in the era of multinational capitalism. Today's key economies in North America, Western Europe and Pacific Rim are all effectively 'information societies.'

South Africa is located in a curious position of duality with regard to this Information Age. In part, South Africa is a partially under developed Third World society. Yet, on the other hand, South Africa's key cities are effectively integrated into the international information economy. This duality imposes important choices for policy formulators in the 'new' South Africa. In fact, in the Information Age, media and communication policy may well prove to be potentially pivotal in the development of a post-apartheid South Africa. The kind of communication system that develops during the initial reconstructive phase will have a profound impact on the nature of the emergent social order.

A number of crucial questions will need to be addressed by South Africa's in-coming policy formulators. For example, will an over-emphasis be placed on the infrastructural needs of non-information modes of production? Much of the discussion amongst the South African Left (including the African National Congress (ANC) involves debating ways of restructuring obsolete (Fordist) modes of production, rather than considering ways of fundamental restructuring in the direction of post-Fordist relations of production.

A future South African government can choose two basic courses of action: firstly, emphasis could be placed on reinforcing and expanding the technological infrastructures required to further the development of a post-Fordist South African information economy. Within the latter economic arrangement, wealth is derived from knowledge, effective use of time and efficient flow of electronic information to manage factories. Under post-Fordist structures of production, factories are computerised and linked into the electronic information grid, so as to allow for shorter production runs.

The second course of action open to a new government will be emphasising a modernist industrial base at the expense of the information economy and communication technologies or post-Fordism. Opting for this second course will effectively doom South Africa to a slide in 'Third Worldism' as the rest of the world moves into a new post-industrial era. South Africa has a rudimentary post-Fordist infrastructure; sufficiently developed to offer a launching pad to propel South Africa into a Pacific-Rim type future. A failure to expand this infrastructure, or worse still to let it run down, will effectively remove South Africa from the map of the developed world.
and condemn South Africans to the status of second-class world citizens.

If South Africa's potential is to be realised, South Africa will need to be fully integrated into the global electronic grid of information. But, what is to be avoided, is integration into the network as a 'Third (South) World' multinational capitalist dependency where South Africans would be incorporated merely as passive uncritical 'takers' from a neo-colonial system. This is important in order that South Africans have the opportunity to be critical users of such a global system, and to be a media-trained population so as to be active contributors to such a system. Further, a serious challenge will be to demonstrate that being a part of the Information Age does not necessarily mean accepting the top-down and alienating relations of production associated with multinational capitalism (MNC). A left-democratic alternative mode of Information Age social organization can be built. This Habermas calls a, "radical democratic process for the formation of public opinion" (Habermas, 1990). For Habermas, the process of democratic communication should be more important to the Left than the actual content of the communication. He recognizes that democratic communication is the key means to, "re-distribute power". In the South African context specifically, 'participation', 'development' and 'media/communication' need to be worked into a single programme for building a post-apartheid society with democratic (and more equally distributed) power-relationships. The South African Left, because of its ascendancy in the 1990s, may be granted the historical opportunity to demonstrate that a practical leftist alternative does exist to both MNC and Marxist-Leninist vanguardism.

The challenge is not merely benefiting from the latest socio-technological developments derivative of the Information Age, but also potentially enhancing democracy in South Africa by creatively using the latest media technology. The challenge is to grasp the opportunities offered by the flux of the post-apartheid reconstruction of society to demonstrate that a left-popular democracy can be built by co-opting the media technologies developed by MNC.

The ascendancy of the South African Left, in the form of the ANC during the 1990s intercepted a specific form of MNC. The danger, however, exists that this Left might lose the struggle for meaning (to the Right and MNC) because of its 'marginalisation' of the importance of the super structures as sites of engagement. Communication and media policy are simply not priorities on the contemporary leftist agenda. The ANC, and the wider left-wing, have, simply not yet recognized the importance of the media within a development strategy for South Africa.
Rethinking 'Development'

A left-democratic public sphere requires, firstly, an infrastructure that facilitates active grassroots participation — i.e., constitutionally guaranteed 'access' to local and national communication processes. Such access should be more than a legal 'paper' right; it should be underpinned by guaranteed access to resources. The latter could be facilitated by a state media subsidy system (Louw, 1990). A nationwide network of Media Resource Centres (MRCs) would be one useful form. Creating MRCs need not entail building new infrastructures, and/or a massive resource outlay. Every school, college and university in the country already has some of the infrastructure required by an MRC. MRC development could occur through a re-arrangement of existing resources around such educational nodes. There already exists a massive countrywide network of churches, mosques, temples, synagogues, etc. which could provide a significant rudimentary shell for MRC construction. Secondly, the creation of a fully functioning 'public sphere' would be impossible without a 'media literate' population, intellectually equipped to use all the potential available in contemporary, and still to be developed, information technologies. So, for example, the (neo-Luddite) notion that some technologies are only appropriate for the 'First (North) World' can only serve to retard social progress in contexts like South Africa.

1 The argument that South Africa is a 'developing society' without the necessary funds to allocate to such a scheme in a post-apartheid media is often heard. Sections of left-liberal opinion argue that funding of basic housing is more important than media during the post-apartheid reconstruction. Housing is important, but so too is democracy. A participative media infrastructure (and the training to use it) represents, in the long run, a greater guarantee of housing for all: by empowering people with democratic communications, all would have access to make their demands heard on an on-going basis (for housing, jobs, schools, etc.). The key to development is to give people the means to decide for themselves what they want, and the channels to articulate their needs. Another argument against media development is that the masses are not 'ready' for such 'First Model' of development (Barratt-Brown, 1990). This is a strangely 'patronising' and 'colonial' mind set. It implies that Africans are not ready for so-called First World technology and that Africa needs 'appropriate technology' (Robinson, 1979). 'Appropriate' means 'less sophisticated' which, in a sense implies keeping Africa 'backward'. It is unlikely that South Africans would opt for the 'backward looking' route if given the choice. South Africa has the resources to integrate virtually all its citizens
into an urban-based Information society within a reasonable time-frame, if the will exists to do so. However this requires a significant rearrangement of existing resources via a, 'development scheme' to create the infrastructures and provide the necessary training. This is a short-sighted interpretation of 'development' and a condemnation of South Africa to the status of a 'Third (South) World' society disconnected from the global information economy. It need not mean massive additional outlays. Rather, it means a creative 'arrangement' of available 'development' funding. Infrastructures and training required for democratic communication would become part of overall reconstruction/development plans.

The challenge is to use the possibilities and spaces of the Information Age to construct a left-democracy. The Cape's Grassroots community media project (Louw, 1989a), in particular, demonstrated, on a micro-scale, that the concepts of a 'public sphere' (Habermas, 1974) and 'popular communication' (Mattelart & Siegelaub, 1983) are not merely utopian. If the ANC wins the first election, the Left may have the opportunity to demonstrate this on a much large scale. But to succeed, the Left will need to develop answers to the problems of social organisation and social struggle in an era during which the superstructures are dominant. The 'top down' MNC relations of production and communication do not have to form the basis of either media or social organisation in an information society. The Left must creatively use the democratic possibilities inherent in the Information Age to overcome the legacy of 'socialism-without-democracy' in Eastern Europe.

Towards a New Leftist Theorisation of Popular Media/Communication

During the 1980s, the South African 'alternative' media were influenced by both 'popular' and socialist-democratic principles; some from external sources, and some of local origin (Tomaselli & Louw, 1991). Lanigan & Strobl's (1981) summary of 'neo-Marxist' approaches to media offers points of departure for conceptualising a South African media/communication strategy:

i) Changing the content of mass media to eliminate consumerism which has permeated deeply into the consciousness of employees and wage earners. This notion also exists in the work of Jurgen Habermas, the Frankfurt School and Armand Mattelart.

ii) Dismantling the capitalist system and thereby the existing structures of mass communication, and the subsequent creation of a political
'proletarian publicity'. This notion underpinned Hans Enzensberger’s (1974) view of transforming media manipulation from a ‘minority’ to a ‘majority’ phenomenon. He, like Raymond Williams, (1977), recognises that subaltern groups are not a passive mass, but are active creative beings, who, therefore need ‘spaces’ for cultural expression.

iii) Creating worker participation in media production (editorial, technical, administrative), and liberating the workers from subjugation and dependence on the providers of capital. This notion can be found in all leftist writing on media work. Underlying this idea is a concern for ending the alienation caused by production-line methods.

iv) Transferring media control from private owners to producers; expropriating privately run media businesses; decentralising and demonopolising media companies and transforming them into socialised institutions (open to participation). This goal is concerned with a process of de-alienating media work, and removing top-down minority control.

v) Forming advertising and publicity cooperatives to distribute advertisements to all affiliated media on an equal basis, thereby preventing concentration of communication power. This goal ties into both a Mattelart- and Frankfurt School-type opposition and to the capitalist-organised culture industry.

vi) Politically activating the masses for communicative emancipation and developing “communicative competence” that is, action-oriented toward reaching ‘understanding’ in the spontaneous creation of media programmes by involving the public in the articulation of their perceived societal needs and interests. Besides being a central notion in Habermas’ work, this goal also links into the culturalist notion of activating popular participation in cultural production.

Leftist debates on democratising South African media fall into three sub-categories: Firstly, theoretical identification of participatory media structures, and how to create such structures. These editorially complement leftist ideals and societal structures (Lanigan & Strobl’s, 1981).

Secondly, the encouragement of society-wide democratic practices and the media’s role in them. How to generate democratic practices and dialogue that penetrate into every sector of society, through to the grassroots; and to what extent democratic practices will be assisted by a democratic media structure, are prime questions (Lanigan and Strobl’s, 1981).

Thirdly, how to prevent the emergence of a new (minority) ruling group accumulating power and wealth at the expense of the majority. Two possible South African distortions of leftist practice in this regard would be a nomenklatura system, or a co-option of sectors of the Left into comprador arrangements with MNC.
Various projects have attempted to institutionalise the above notions into a left-democratic media practice. Examples are Chile (Mattelart, 1983); Nicaragua (Mattelart, 1986; White, 1990); Mozambique (de Vasconcellos, 1990); community media projects in Britain (Nigg & Wade, 1980); resource centre projects in South Africa (Karlsson, 1989; Criticos, 1989); and the South African progressive alternative-media (Tomaseelli & Louw, 1991). The latter attempted to prevent the granting of a privileged position to media activists/workers; and to prevent uni-directional (top-down) communication which would turn the masses into mere passive recipients of media messages. As Matterlart (1983) states:

The Left, even if it goes along with the rules of the market, cannot allow its publications to remain passive objects. A new culture cannot be imposed. A new culture is created by the various revolutionary sectors; they create it by participating organisationally in its creation (Mattelart, 1983).

Participation is the key word in organising popular media (Mattelart & Siegelaub, 1983; White, 1980). Christians (1987) has argued the need to move away from the “negative freedom” of the inset enlightenment and towards the positive freedom of a participative culture. He draws on both Robert White and Paulo Freire (1972) to develop the notion of communication as “open spaces”. ‘Spaces’ are ‘public spheres’ within which positive freedom can be exercised. This notion is the very antithesis of the ‘culture industry’ (and the ‘Enlightenment culture’) described by Adorno & Horkheimer (1979) and Marcuse (1968). This kind of participative media offers a vehicle for counteracting the social anomie and alienation associated with being ‘controlled’, rather than being ‘in control’. It also opens up spaces for the full articulation and growth of popular culture.

Journalists as ‘facilitators’ of social communication replaces the idea of them as ‘originators’ of media messages (Richeri, 1983). The media should rather be operated as mechanisms to facilitate social dialogue/democracy and an on-going learning process. This is especially important in South Africa where decades of neo-fascist rule stunted the development of an indigenous ‘democratic culture’ (amongst both the ruling classes and most of the ruled). A mechanism for institutionalising dialogue is required so that an active grassroots political culture can directly impact on national policy. (The latter is a reasonable guarantee against the possible rise of a co-opted comprador class, and/or nomenklatura oligarchy). Mattelart (1983) argues in this regard that the media should be seen as:

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mechanisms allowing the workers to develop their level of awareness, and hence their ability to assess and give opinions about published products and thereby to avoid the risk of manipulation by those with longer experience.

Ideally, such participation should be implemented during the transition (negotiation) phase leading to democratic rule in South Africa. But it seems unlikely that this will occur because the other (rightist) parties to the negotiations will block such developments. Until the Left comes to power no funds will be allocated to the creation of the sort of communication infrastructure needed. Another impediment is the ‘top-down’ rhetorical posturing that is characteristic of transition periods. In addition, the ANC lacks sufficient resources to even develop an effective internal dialogical structure (able to make its own constituency effectively part of real decision-making) during this transition phase.

Towards a New Leftist Approach to Teaching Media

In examining all aspects of cultural production and consumption, including media and the teaching of media, two fundamental (and interrelated) questions are: who benefits? and who loses? At heart, these are questions of power and context; and questions of how power affects cultural meaning and practices (Boyd-Barrett & Braham, 1987; Punter, 1986).

If the objective is to develop a post-Fordist South African information economy in which all citizens are empowered through public spheres, then ‘critical’ and ‘aware’ media producers and users are required. This will require a degree of co-ordination between media policy and education policy formulators.

For Habermas, empowering citizens within Information Age relations of production gets to the heart of the leftist project in the contemporary world: to use the public sphere to ‘generate ferment’, and work for a redistribution of power (Habermas, 1990). A prerequisite for a functioning popular communication is a citizenry that is fully equipped to make use of the ‘democratic spaces’ provided by information technology. Both media producers and users need to be taught to be continually aware of the power relationships underpinning media messages (and media technology) (Tomaselli & Prinsloo, 1990). In this way, they will learn to understand the social implications of how they, and others, are relating to the media. Journalists, for example, should be taught to go beyond merely knowing how to produce a news story. They also need to consider: who benefits/who loses through their using a particular style of news gathering. Why have they been
taught to do their job in a particular way? Why are newsrooms and
the wider media-institutions configured the way they are? Why is
certain media technology developed (and by whom), while other areas
of research-and-development are left fallow?

Similarly, media users should be made aware and more questioning
of existing (and possible) patterns of media ownership, news selection,
television programming, etc. Both producers and users should be
educated on how existing media-relations (including the influence of
both State intervention and market forces) may be manipulating
them, and may be curtailing the possibilities inherent in communication
technology. Media can improve democracy through facilitating more
social interaction and by making information, entertainment and a
participative political culture more readily available for all. If Habermas
(1990) is correct, once people know the possibilities they will demand
access to this potential. Skewed power relationships will not be tolerated
once people know they are skewed.

This requires ‘teaching the media’ in a particular way: an
understanding of context needs to be incorporated into all media
training and media education. Linked to this is the notion of social
struggle. Media literacy alerts people to the nature of struggles
occurring; the way those involved in the struggles manipulate and/or
are manipulated by the media; and how certain players in the struggle
have advantages afforded them by their direct ownership of, or behind-
the-scenes influence over, media institutions. A public with such
knowledge (of media, context and struggle) would become critical
‘readers’ of media. A successful media education program would
make the very notion of ‘user’ and/or ‘consumer’ of media somewhat
redundant because a media-literate public would be less dependent
and/or more akin to active co-producers of media-messages.

Teaching present and future media producers and users about
the relationship between power and ideas would make for ‘rational’
use of media. Both would benefit from media-instruction that
contextualises media in these terms. The effect should be to help
human beings regain control of the media (and the social
communication process), and overcome the ‘culture industry’. This
would, in effect re-humanise’ the media, by potentially creating a
social dialogue, or public sphere. But an important pre-requisite is for
people to learn about the media in contextual settings. This knowledge
will enable people to become active co-manipulators of media variables
and thereby become co-creators of culture and hegemony. This
notion amounts to turning the Frankfurt School on its head: the
School’s members were (rightly) concerned at the way in which the
culture industry was able to co-opt even the most oppositional of
forces, thereby 'killing' the revolutionary 'dialectic'. By inverting the School's logic we can arrive at the notion of the Left attempting a counter-co-option: the opportunities and gaps offered by the superstructures developed by MNC should be co-opted for Leftist purposes. The need exists to educate both producers and receivers: firstly through media worker production. This requires media training; and secondly through the creation of widespread media literacy in the broader public. This will be termed Media Education. These two categories are ideally interchangeable within the communication process.

**Media Training: The Production of Media Workers**

By the end of the 1980s, South African media workers were generally of a low quality. Apartheid and social crisis it caused chased many of the best media workers out of the profession. They had become tired of media restrictions, censorship and the narrow conservative sycophancy of most of the 'mainstream' media. Over the last two decades media management (especially in the Press), through staffing and salary policies, discouraged the retention of good media workers. The effect on the circulation of information was catastrophic. The white South African ruling elite have, in particular, been the victims of a narrow culture industry. This significantly 'blinded' them throughout the 1980s by shielding them from the social dynamics of the anti-apartheid struggle. (A similar phenomenon (Frederikse, 1982) — occurred in Rhodesia in the 1970s). Because South Africa's media 'consumers' have been provided with minimal media education, they are seemingly unaware of the extent to which they have been 'short-changed'. This being the case, media managements in turn saw no need to upgrade their product and/or their media workers. A spiral of declining standards set in.

Media training should go beyond mere technical competence, the foundation of journalism practise. But training in 'technique' should also attempt to stretch the understanding of 'technique' to incorporate an awareness of the technological possibilities inherent in any medium for its use for improving democratic discourse, empowering people, etc. This means media workers who understand:

- the full range of media theories;
- their social context (and its mutability);
- the meshing of existing media institutions into the power relationships in society;
- possible alternative configurations of media organisation/media technology; and
• the relationship between existing media technology and research-development-funding. This requires an education in critical theory, where the connectedness of theory and practice is emphasized.

Although training should aim to produce critical, thinking media people, not technicists, it is equally important to recognise that it is also not enough to produce pure media (or communication) theorists. Media/communication theorising can too easily become an ivory tower theorethism and/or an intellectualism outside of a real organic concern with the social context within which media workers have to work.

Media trainees would ideally establish working relationships with community groups as a practical extension of the above training (Tomaselli, et al., 1988). This could be achieved through the proposed nation-wide MRC programme where trainees (and perhaps media workers themselves) could engage in 'community service'. In other words, in designing media syllabi, it is important that the training institution (and thereby the trainees) form some sort of 'organic relationship' to the energies of the social struggle taking place around them. This means learning to consult with community groups in a form which does not grant the media 'experts' a socially superior position by virtue of their skills.

Such direct interaction is also an excellent way of teaching media workers to distinguish which interest group wants what, and why. It helps develop an understanding of their relationship to different interests in society and to recognise the link between ideas and the real world. For example, media workers should be trained to recognise how any idea can be potentially co-opted by vested interests and used by them for their own narrow purposes unrelated to the original intention of the formulator of the idea.

Currently, our universities and technikons tend to rely on conventional methodologies and texts from Europe and North America. Teachers of media should first consider the extent to which training methods from the First World carry with them the ideological baggage of highly developed technicist societies. Such methods would fail to equip future media workers with knowledge appropriate for the South African context, which has very different social problems to those of Europe or America. The uncritical use of First World media-training methodologies represents another form of cultural colonialism. However, this problematic must not be allowed to develop into the extremist position of rejecting all European/American texts and techniques as necessarily 'imperialist/colonialist' and 'inappropriate' for a so-called Third World situation. Such an attitude can only serve to retard the development of South Africa into a full participant of the global post-Fordist information economy.
Educating For Media Literacy

Citizens need to be active participants in a multi-directional social dialogue. As Enzensberger (1974) argues, the electronic media offer the framework for such a discourse. People need to:

- understand the media;
- understand its possibilities and limitations;
- have access to the media;
- be able to critically 'read' media messages;
- be in a position to make an on-going input into a plural media system if they wish;
- recognise the importance of their participation as citizens if democracy is to work; and
- believe that their participation does make a difference (i.e. feel 'empowered').

Within such a democratic system, media workers will facilitate social dialogue, rather than be the 'experts' with sole access to the production of messages — in other words, the antithesis of 'top-down' (and manipulative) media systems in both Western Liberal-democracies and in the Marxist-Leninist state socialisms.

Educating people in 'how to read' media critically — to 'see through' the appearance of 'self-explanatoriness' is a starting point. Media literacy would seek to generate a recognition that all messages are 'constructs' and carry with them the hidden ideology of both their creator and of the creator's context. The South African Left have generally had little difficulty in 'seeing through' the ideological constructs of the National Party (as reflected in the South African Broadcasting Corporation and the Afrikaans Press) or of capital (e.g. the English conservative-liberal Press). But they have often been less successful in seeing through the ideology of white-owned 'black' newspapers like City Press or The Sowetan; and very uncritical when it comes to reading left-wing media texts. The latter are seen as 'truth'. In building a left-hegemony the danger exists of replacing one form of closed sycophantic media (seen during NP-rule) with another equally closed and sycophantic (but leftist) communication system. Such a 'flip-flop' occurred, for example, in Zimbabwe. A democracy based upon participative-citizens requires the capacity to read all media texts critically', even those with which one might 'agree'. Some argue the impossibility of educating everyone as critical media users. This argument, however, violates the very basis of the leftist-project.

Educating critical message-receivers is insufficient, however. This
is because even critical reception implies a second-class status; and/or a de facto acceptance of superior position of the message-producers. If an interactive-democratic (popular) communication system is to be constructed, then ultimately everybody has to be made a producer (or at least potential producer) of media messages. This should not be dismissed as utopian idea, not even in ‘developing societies’ (Nair & White, 1987). The information technologies through which society can solve the impediments in creating fully popular-democratic (dialogical) communication systems already exist. The task is to persuade policy makers to allocate the necessary resources to solve the problems and to create the popular communication infrastructures so as to realise latent possibilities. One way to nudge society into creating such a network and/or solving any impediments is to create a media literate population who knows what possibilities await in a hegemony re-ordered around a popular communication system.

But because creating a fully-interactive media network will take a long time and considerable resources, a start has to be made somewhere. It would be unrealistic to implement a ‘public sphere’ network that completely blanketed the country in day one. Rather, it would have to be built incrementally. Because of the growing impact of media on the ‘second hand’ world in which people now ‘live’, it may well be that in our contemporary post-Fordist world it is far more important to teach school pupils (and even those at tertiary level) how to critically read an everyday media text rather than how to critically read Shakespeare. Once one has learnt to be a critical receiver, one by definition ‘understands media’ (and how it is produced, and its possibilities). Thereafter, the transition to becoming an active co-producer of media messages is not such a big step.

A contemporary challenge for South Africa’s policy makers will be to utilize the social flux of deconstructing apartheid such that a ‘new’ South Africa emerges in which the full democratic and economic potential or post-Fordist relations of production is available for all South Africans. For such a new South Africa to emerge, concerted coordination between media, education and development policies will be required during the re-construction period.

Notes

3. This grading of the ‘ability/ inability’ of Leftists to ‘read’ media text is derived from a series of (‘Durban Media Trainers Group’) workshops run by this Eric Louw for various left-wing activists during 1990.

References


