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A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR SOUTH AFRICA

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In South Africa today there is much talk of a Bill of Rights within the context of 'reform' policies. Within the undemocratic framework of South Africa at present, the introduction of a Bill of Rights is likely to ensure 'built in' protections appearing in the forms of minority rights but which are intended to safeguard the position of whites. For example, the Buthelezi Commission favoured separate representation for culturally defined segments in the executive and block representation in the legislature as well as minority vetos in educational and cultural matters. Through such mechanisms, the black majority can be prevented from acting as a unified force in the struggle for tangible redistribution of power and the amelioration of socio-economic inequalities.

In general, consociational models seek to share, diffuse, separate, divide, decentralize and limit power and to ensure that there are areas from which the parliamentary majority is banned. 'Where there is minority rule over the minority itself in a specific area - either a geographical or functional area - that is the minority segments' exclusive concern' (Buthelezi Commission, vol II 1982:125).

For all these reasons a Bill of Rights in the present South African context can hardly be considered as a panacea for the undemocratic ills of the society. Instead constitutional instruments of this kind will probably assist in the development of a black middle class as well as the interests of white owned business. In addition it could prove a fundamental obstacle in changing the undemocratic structure of the society by providing whites with a sufficiently extensive veto power to prevent the kind of change needed to affect the substance of the South African social formation - for example, a property protection clause. Furthermore it is possible that the Bill of Rights could be coupled with an extension of first tier government in which all races are represented but by nomination and not election. The Bill of Rights would then constitute an additional control possessed by whites (Daryl Glaser Weekly Mail, 04.04.86). In effect this is what F W De Klerk said at the Federal Congress of the National Party when he called for the expansion of 'the concept of own affairs as well as an effective balance between the rights of individuals and groups in accordance with Christian values and civilised norms' (Daily News 13.06.86).

Some liberal voices like John Dugard have suggested that a limited Bill of Rights should be introduced immediately, followed at a later stage by a
more comprehensive Bill. ¹ The argument is that even a limited bill could be revolutionary in the legal sense within the context of our present constitution as it could allow successful court actions to be brought to abolish a) the Population Registration Act and the Group Areas Act on the grounds of racial discrimination (differentiation) and b) the security legislation system on the grounds of infringement of the freedom of the individual. Expressed in these terms it is highly unlikely that the government would even consider such a Bill of Rights as it would effect a complete change of the South African constitutional groundnorm.

Recently the KwaNatal Indaba has proposed the introduction of a Bill of Rights as part of a comprehensive constitutional programme for the area. When compared with the standards of the American Bill of Rights or the European Code of Human Rights, the Indaba Bill appears to be a very conservative instrument. Admittedly it safeguards equality before the law and prohibits torture and other forms of inhuman and degrading treatment and severely circumscribes the possibility of detention without trial. Thus, if implemented, it would prevent the operation of the present security system entrenched in the Internal Security Act. The provisions safeguarding freedom of movement and freedom to organise and/or occupy property anywhere in KwaNatal would be incompatible with the Group Areas Act and any form of influx control, even of the 1985 form, whilst political activity would become more democratic as a result of the right to enjoy freedom of opinion and expression. However, the Bill provides very few other fundamental rights that cannot be disturbed by legislative action. For example, detention of any person can take place ‘when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence’, which still affords wide powers to the detaining authority.

The provision that a person belonging to an ‘ethnic, religious or linguistic group’, terms which are not defined in the Bill, shall not be denied the right to enjoy his own culture is perfectly compatible with the present government’s concept of own affairs.¹ The clause safeguarding the right to public education ‘in an institution that will cater for his interests, aptitudes and abilities, subject to the important proviso that distinction on the grounds of sex, or language in education is permissible’ is likewise not in conflict with current government thinking.

In short, whilst ostensibly providing for fundamental rights and freedoms of a non-racial character the Indaba Bill of Rights contains sufficient qualifications for whites and their co-opted allies to protect the present status quo, by using their constitutionally entrenched rights to prevent a complete deracialisation of KwaNatal. More ominous perhaps is the entrenched right to property whereby expropriation can only take place
'if it is for the public benefit' and with provision for 'equitable compensation'. Any attempt at redistribution will doubtless be met with major legal actions before the Natal Supreme Courts.

The provision that groups which, by reason of their aims and behaviour of their adherents, seek to impair or abolish the free democratic order or endanger the security of the province can be prohibited, will afford little comfort to Buthelezi’s UDF and COSATU rivals, against whom this loosely drafted provision could easily be employed.

However a limited Bill of Rights should not be automatically dismissed as a tool of the ruling class. Previous arguments by radical theorists in South African law have tended to mistakenly adopt such an instrumentalist position. Illustrative of this approach was an article I published some years ago which attempted to evaluate the doctrine of human rights and its applicability within the South African context. The thrust of the argument was that law has no intrinsic value of its own. Irrespective of whether its content is denial of human rights on the one hand, or embraces all the human rights ... adumbrated, law remains a mechanism utilized by the power bloc in society for its own needs.... It is essential because the law is a tool of power, that the cry for human rights to be written into a legal system is so futile.... (Hence the) purpose of the entrenchment of human rights, far from being that of reducing conflict in society, is to contain and combine that conflict within acceptable boundaries (Davis, 1980).

In similar fashion Raymond Suttner suggested that law was a tool of the ruling class ‘in the sense that it is used only if it is suited to the purposes deemed necessary to fulfil at any time’ (Suttner, 1973). If unsuitable, as our constitution proved to the Nationalist Party, it is changed. Reflecting upon this argument, which caused a heated debate at the time (Forsyth, 1980), it is clear that the basis for these contentions was an instrumentalist view of law which conceived of law as a mere tool to be used by the dominant social actors to continue to promote their objectives (see Bankowski & Mungham, 1975).

In considering the question of a Bill of Rights for South Africa, it is necessary to develop legal theory beyond the limitations of instrumentalism as well as the other strand within radical legal theory, namely reductionism in which the law is examined as a part of the superstructure which in turn reflects the nature of the economic base.
All too often there has been a tendency to be over concerned with economic conditions, to overlook the historical specificities of the class struggle, and to ignore the actual social consciousness of people and classes because it is assumed that such consciousness would necessarily correspond to the development of material productive forces.

In attempting to develop a more accurate analysis of law, there is much to be gained from Poulantzas’ last work, *State, Power and Socialism*. His view of the state as a condensation of the power relationship between classes implies that the state apparatus becomes an intense site of political struggle. For the administration is caught between the hammer of the governmental apex and the anvil of social struggles. In every country with which we are now concerned we can see the exercise of direct, rank and file democracy. These struggles exhibit a characteristic anti-statism and express themselves in the mushrooming of self-management centres and networks of direct intervention by the masses in the decisions which affect them (Poulantzas, 1978:44).

Poulantzas succeeded in introducing the vital element of class struggle into an analysis of law and state. The state and law is shaped by the level and intensity of the political struggles within a social formation. Each state apparatus can be analysed in these terms to include the differential presence of class forms - each apparatus is subject to and influenced by political struggle. Such an analysis provides the potential for developing a critical theory of law which solves the problems of instrumentalist and reductionist explanations mentioned above.

The import of all this is to suggest that law possesses a strategic quality. Although a legal system might intend to repress a political opposition the effectiveness of law in cementing and protecting ruling class hegemony will depend upon the legal system encapsulating a consensus which is present in economic, cultural and political practices. Even a repressive state requires an ideological alliance between the ruling and subordinate classes without which law cannot be considered as anything more than naked power (Sumner, 1979:264-65).

It follows that law (as opposed to naked power) creates spaces and rights which cannot be dismissed as ‘bourgeois illusions’ created by the state to co-opt and emasculate ‘blind and stupid masses’. The major question for the purpose of this paper is whether the same holds true for a Bill of Rights if introduced in South Africa.

For the purposes of evaluating a Bill of Rights two implications flow
from this argument, namely i) the status of civil liberties and the rule of law depends on the impact of the struggles of the dominated classes upon the legal and political structures; ii) whilst law legitimates and mystifies class rule, the continued effectiveness of the legal system depends on its ability to guarantee some of the rights, powers and interests of subordinate classes.

In his typically direct manner E P Thompson expresses the point in the clearest fashion:

people are not so stupid as some structuralist philosophers suppose them to be. They will not be mystified by the first man who puts on a wig. It is inherent in the special character of law as a body of rules and procedures that it shall apply logical criteria with reference to standards of universality and equity. most men have a strong sense of justice, at least with regard to their own interests. If the law is evidently partial and unjust then it will mask nothing, it will legitimate nothing, contribute nothing to any class hegemony. The essential precondition for the effectiveness of law, in its function of ideology, is that it shall display an independence from gross manipulation and shall seem to be just. It cannot seem to be so without upholding its own logic and criteria of equity; indeed, on occasion by actually being just (Thompson, 1975:262).

Therefore if a Bill of Rights safeguarded some procedural rights, it could be used to protect spaces to further the political struggle for a truly democratic society. Notwithstanding the severe limitations inherent in the KwaNatal Bill of Rights, it is important not to ignore the advantages which even such a Bill can afford. At present there is a tendency amongst opposition groups to dismiss all rights as the cynical manipulations of a crumbling white hegemony. If this view comes to dominate the political thinking of the oppositional forces, we might well only succeed in replacing one repressive regime with another.

E P Thompson, particularly in Whigs and Hunters, was the first contemporary radical author to warn against this simplistic and crude view of law. Thompson can be criticised for his unqualified acceptance of the merits of civil liberties and his submission that the rule of law is a universal good. However, the point is neither to dismiss the rule of law nor to fetishise it but to develop a commitment to the importance of strategies which emphasise the importance of defending formal civil liberties along with a transformative commitment to the development of popular democratic
practices which emphasise new forms of direct and participatory democracy.

Ernesto Laclau summarises the point well when he writes:

The advance towards a real democracy is a long march which will only be completed with the elimination of class exploitation. But this elimination must run parallel with the rejection of such exploitation by the 'majority' of the population, that is by the creation of a historic subject in which both socialism and democracy would be condensed. The alternative lies in the bureaucratic socialism of Eastern Europe (Laclau, 1977:107).

Laclau's warning is particularly appropriate within the African context, hence the importance of the struggle to defend formal civil liberties and to simultaneously transform them, perhaps along the line of a more specific version of the Freedom Charter.

A procedural Bill of Rights will not transform the South African social formation but it might create a little more space for the extension of those forms of political struggle committed to the attainment of democracy.

A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR A MAJORITY RULED SOUTH AFRICA

What about a Bill of Rights for a future South Africa? The position of a Bill of Rights in this context is very different. As is implicit in Laclau's position, there is a need to develop a critical theory of legality which rejects the hopelessly inappropriate concept of the 'withering away of law' in a socialist society. Whilst it can be readily conceded that a preoccupation with human rights and justice may serve 'ideological purposes by blinding us to the possibility of changes in production that will dissolve them', there is a need to be cautious before accepting uncritically the notion of right and justice found under capitalism as themselves indications that society is characterised by pervasive conflict and scarcity which makes the call for justice necessary, and that under communism interpersonal relationships will be so harmonious that rights and concepts of justice will be 'obsolete verbal rubbish (Buchanan, 1982:156-57).

To suggest that a modern industrial society can be democratically organized by the control of a single political centre or conversely by the devolution of all power to popular democratic bodies is to contradict the reality of the Third World. It is also to ignore the need that there inevitably are numerous decision making centres which require co-ordination in a modern industrial society.

Interestingly Albie Sachs (1985) in a recent analysis of legal struggles in South Africa concludes by describing a broad framework for a Bill of
Rights in a democratic South Africa. He suggests, however, that the manner in which a democratic South Africa is established 'is a matter for the new sovereignty'. If this implies that the struggle for democracy can take place without any clearly stated democratic objectives including the protection of human freedoms and that all considerations of freedom are to be put aside until power is gained then I must disagree with Sachs.

My analysis of present South Africa hopefully makes it clear that an extensive Bill of Rights will not be introduced by the state at present. The only Bill which could conceivably secure a democratic society, is one which flows from the agenda of the mass based organisations opposing the state. This presupposes a complete change in power and a new and democratic constitution. However, for a democracy to emerge in South Africa in which the arbitrary excesses of central state power are curbed, and in which participation in the political process is extended to all 'capable of participating in it', a tradition which emphasises the importance of rights and democracy must be built and strengthened even before political power is gained.

To an extent the Freedom Charter represents a framework of rights deemed important by political organisations of the 1950s representing a tradition of almost half a century of struggle for majority rights. The Freedom Charter was, and still is, a progressive document but its many vague notions need to be clarified in order to reflect a clear vision of a future South Africa which is presently being built through struggle. Such classification can only assist to strengthen a democratic tradition. When power is gained by the majority of South Africans it is to be hoped that the tradition of democracy and consideration of rights is so deeply entrenched that it is deemed sufficiently important to protect such democracy by a clear statement contained in a Bill of Rights. For this reason there is a need to reject the notion of the Freedom Charter being an empty vessel into which one can pour a socialist content after the attainment of power.

In other words, a democratic future for South Africa will be dependent upon the nature of the political opposition and its traditions built up prior to taking power. To ensure that rights are deemed important in a future South Africa, there is a need to build a democratic 'hegemonic' project. This entails a political movement harnessing to its support popular discontent with apartheid, neutralising opposing political forces and simultaneously building a new democratic 'common sense'.

If such a project succeeds a transformed Bill of Rights could play an important role 'in promoting national reconstruction, in particular of harmonising the social programmes necessary for the restoration of the land, wealth, dignity and general social rights of the dispossessed, with the
legitimate personal needs and anxieties of all the individuals who make up the South African people' (Sachs, 1985:58). Such a charter of rights for the future can play an important role in unifying disparate opposition groups and ensuring that an alternative political hegemony is constructed.

This becomes important particularly if it is accepted that the transformation of South Africa will not be achieved primarily by military means but by the intensive struggle of a growing internal opposition. Commentators such as Gilmore, who have borrowed uncritically from Theda Scopcol's work on revolutions and argue that so long as the South African military apparatus remains cohesive the country will survive, adopt a short term view and ignore the causes of the political developments of the past ten years. Change will occur through struggle, mainly political and economic and it is to this struggle that one must turn to see the possibility of democracy in the future. If the change which occurs emerges out of a democratic tradition, it is possible that respect for democratic rights will be deeply embedded within the new common sense. In this event the reconciliation between extending power as widely as possible and curbing abuse of power can be achieved.

CONTENT OF A FUTURE BILL

Sachs (1985) has listed a number of rights which he considers should be contained in a Bill of Rights, including the following:

i) A Bill of Rights should declare all apartheid law and practices to be unlawful and punishable, so that citizens may freely claim their place in society irrespective of race or ethnic origin;

ii) it should commit the new state to a programme of social, cultural and economic reconstruction so that access to the benefits of society should be made equally available to all citizens;

iii) it should, in the context of respect for the principles of democracy and equality, affirm the general political rights of citizens, and guarantee processes designed to ensure that power is truly exercised by the people and not by some group usurping the name of the people;

iv) it should set out clearly what the rights of the person are which all are entitled to enjoy: the right to respect, to walk freely in the street and feel secure in one's home; the right and duty to work, to contribute one's skills and energies towards the re-building of the country and to be appropriately rewarded; the right to respect for one's family, or to live outside of a family; the right to equal treatment in all spheres of life, independently of sex, religion or social background;
v) one can envisage an important set of clauses dealing with group rights, such as the right to use one's language, the right to cultural expression and the right to worship. Stripped of its association with race and political dominance, cultural diversity becomes an enriching force, which merits constitutional protection, thereby enabling the specific contribution of each to become part of the patrimony of the whole.

These rights already reflect a political tradition of the opposition. Given the experience of the majority of this country it is unlikely that any document guaranteeing rights will be based on a classical liberal premise. Research indicates a growing acceptance of a more socialist vision within the ranks of the extra-parliamentary opposition. Even modern liberal theory itself has been critical of classic liberalism which advocates a system of natural liberty allowing a more or less unrestrained free market to operate. Rawls, for example, has contended that an unrestrained market mechanism permits distributive shares to be influenced by social contingencies which are arbitrary from a moral point of view.

From a different tradition, Marx in the *Critique of the Gotha Programme* condemned the bourgeois notion of equal rights on the basis that every right is a right of inequality. What Marx and Rawls from different perspectives are suggesting, is that unfettered equal rights recognise unequal endowment as natural privileges. There will not be much guarantee of social justice in South Africa if one set of arbitrary privileges based on race is replaced by a similar set entrenched through the market mechanism. The premise upon which a Bill of Rights must be based is on a closing of the distance between self and ends and which brings the self once more within the reach of politics(see Sandel (1982) and Simmonds (1985). As Sandel puts it:

> to imagine a person incapable of constitutive attachments... is not to conceive an ideally free and rational agent but to imagine a person wholly without character, without moral depth. For to have character is to know that I move in a history I neither summon nor command which carries consequences none the less for my choices and conduct (1982:179).

CONCLUSION

In South Africa a constitutional framework for the future cannot afford the luxury of ignoring the history of the society. A programme for a future South Africa has to understand and redress the past. For example, one cannot pretend to be ignorant of the fact that in 1980, income of
Africans per head represented 9.9% of Whites compared to 7.8% in 1970. Nor can one ignore that in 1984, for example, household incomes for Blacks was R272 per household compared to R1834 for Whites (SAIRR, 1984:241-42). As the comparative figures were R136 and R912 in 1980, the gap has remained fairly static even during the 'high years' of government reform. For a Bill of Rights to play a role in society, it has to be respected and supported by a substantial portion of the people, whether by genuine belief or ideological construct. What is clear is that the tradition of mass struggle in South Africa makes it more likely than not that some form of socialism will be essential for a Bill to have legitimacy. Whether a future Bill will reflect an overtly socialist programme or be based on the welfare democracy of John Rawls will depend on the manner in which the political struggles are waged in South Africa.

It follows that all talk of rights in a future South Africa could well be irrelevant if the political opposition does not succeed in extending democratic principles during the present struggle. The political success of a Bill of Rights will depend on whether popular organisations are themselves committed to the transforming of a tradition which the South African state and its white and black allies have destroyed in so determined a fashion over the past 25 years. In addition the manner in which hegemonic politics is taken seriously in South Africa at present will determine the form and content of any Bill that might emerge in the future.

A Bill of Rights which is grafted onto a constitution which emerges out of a non-democratic tradition will arguably be as limited as one introduced in the present context. That is why the express or implied commitment to a two stage theory of change in which the first stage challenges the anti-democratic State and only at the second stage the questions of economic and social equality, is potentially so dangerous a programme to the future of democracy in South Africa.

The nature of the South African struggle has been the subject of considerable recent debate, although even protagonists of a national democratic revolution have not denied the need to engage in immediate transformative politics. Thus Cronin (1986), in the midst of a vigorous attack on Hudson's (1986) criticisms of national democratic politics concedes that 'in order to ensure that the national democratic struggle also creates the sufficient conditions for substantial transformation, we need to build the correct balance of forces'(1986:76). For Cronin this involves, inter alia

a) the strengthening of working class mobilisation, organisation, participation and leadership on all fronts of the national democratic struggle;

b) the deepening and extension of mass based democracy, including trade
unions, shop stewards, street committees;
c) the popularisation and deepening of a scientific approach to struggle, and the ability to apply this approach to South African conditions;
d) the popularisation and deepening of an internationalist perspective within the national democratic struggle itself.

Cronin sees these series of requirements and their implementation in contemporary political struggle as crucial to the establishment of conditions for substantial transformation. The implication is clear - documents like the Freedom Charter or a Bill of Rights have to contain or have their socialist content underscored now. This can be contrasted with the conventional view exemplified in Slovo's position who argues for an approach to the Freedom Charter whereby 'the question as to which political road South Africa will take will be decided on the morning after the liberation flag is raised over the Union buildings' (Guardian Weekly, 17.08.86).

Let there be little doubt about it, the future of human rights in this country is dependent upon the preservation of a democratic tradition and the building of a democratic socialist position, even under the difficult circumstances of present South Africa. Given the State's record in this connection, a huge burden lies upon the extra-parliamentary opposition.

NOTES
* My thanks to Mike Morris for his assistance.
1. See the summary of the Pretoria Conference on a Bill of Rights by J Van der Westhuizen in De Rebus, 1986.
2. It could be argued that even the Freedom Charter calls for the protection of cultural rights so that these criticisms against the Indaba Bill of Rights are unfair. The point however is to evaluate a Bill of Rights in terms of the constitutional framework within which it will operate. Given the broader difficulties with the Indaba constitutional proposals, a cultural clause can be used to protect interests presently entrenched in the 1983 constitution. For a general criticism of the Indaba see Mare (1987).
3. See in particular Raymond Suttner (1984:23) where Suttner argues 'if the democratic organisations struggling for realisation of the Charter, develop a working-class leadership & they convince themselves and other classes that there is a place for all under socialism, then it is likely that the democratic gains will deepen into socialism. It will be a deepening of both the national & the democratic character of the struggle.' See in more general terms P Leeson (1981) where he argues 'An interpretation of what most socialists would hope for from
the socialist mode of production would say that on the basis of public property there would be the maximum development of the forces of production by technical advance and by education. The relations of production would be such as to require the thoroughgoing democratisation of all aspects of public life via the development of popular participation at all levels and in all aspects of economic and political affairs.'

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THE SOUTH AFRICAN STATE IN 1924

Robert Morrell

It has become quite clear over the last few years that the state in South Africa is the central institution of domination. While this has produced for those struggling to end white supremacy a policy of uncompromising opposition to the state, it has also tended to block serious, as opposed to rhetorical, discussion of the state.

The nature of the state and the balance of class forces reflected within it are important for they determine the possibilities of successful action by the dominated classes and their organic organisations and can also directly influence the outcome of struggles in neighbouring states (Davies 1987). In a recent article Dennis Davis and Robert Fine suggest that a failure to read correctly the position of the state in the fifteen years before South Africa became a republic lost the ANC real opportunities to gain the initiative (Davis and Fine 1985).

South Africa's white population has just voted. While some have declared the elections to be totally inconsequential and thus effectively called for a boycott - others have pointed out that the election can alter the balance of forces within the power bloc (Centro, 1987; Work In Progress, 1987). This will have important implications for the state's future political strategy -- either the continuation of some sort of negotiation/'reform' package (which allows the democratic movement more space to move) or outright repression, which is favoured by the far right.

This paper is designed to broaden the discussion of the state by returning to historical debates and allowing the past to inform present political discussion. It will focus on two interpretations, those of Robert Davies, David Kaplan, Mike Morris and Dan O'Meara on the one hand and of David Yudelman on the other (Davies et al, 1976; Yudelman, 1983). These interpretations differ particularly with regard to whether elections affect the nature of the state and how to interpret the state.

For a long time the study of the state in South Africa was poorly developed in English language scholarship. Liberals used to write about 'government' as an essentially neutral institution which changed at election times. Where governments were involved in injustices the guilt for such actions rested with the parliamentary party which held the reins of power, rather than with the government itself. For them, the 1948 election was the turning point in modern history. By contrast, in the early 1970s Marxist scholars (particularly Legassick and Wolpe) saw the state in almost
monolithic terms as the instrument of the ruling class. However, their successors were influenced by European writers, particularly Althusser and Poulantzas (Althusser, 1971; Miliband and Poulantzas; Poulantzas, 1973; 1978). Davies, Kaplan, Morris and O'Meara developed a new understanding of the state which they disaggregated from capital in general and placed centre-stage as a key institution in the maintenance of class hegemony.

Their 1976 article was important as it constituted the first systematic attempt to periodize South African history in terms both of class struggle and changes in the balance of class forces within the ruling class. Numerous studies had presented the election of 1924 putting into power a Pact government as a turning point, for example Johnstone, 1976. Davies et al went much further. The importance of 1924 was now seen in terms of a transition from imperial capital to national capital, which was embodied in the Pact and the incorporation of white labour.

Despite a defence by Kaplan in 1979 the approach adopted by Davies et al failed to win general support amongst South African scholars. Stan Greenberg, for example, argued that agriculture's role had been misperceived (Greenberg 1980:ch 5). Greenberg asserted that farmer interests were constantly assisted by the state even before 1924 and that their representative organisation, the South African Agricultural Union, in alliance with the state, managed the transition to capitalism.

The most recent contribution to the debate on 1924 has come from David Yudelman. Yudelman's *The Emergence of Modern South Africa* has excited a lot of interest, not least because of its acid style and ambitious claims. His analysis is centred on a symbiosis between capital and state. Yudelman gives the state a great deal more autonomy than other scholars and shows a disinclination to disaggregate capital. He argues that all governments in twentieth century South Africa faced similar problems of legitimation and accumulation and does not distinguish through study of distinctive class bases how they dealt with them.

Thus he sees no change in government policy after 1924. He shows that the protection of manufacturing industry has been exaggerated, that aid to white labour amounted to little, and that the supposed heavy taxation of gold mining (ie the attack on imperial capital's profits by national capital) was an illusion. The Pact government's policies did not, according to Yudelman, improve the fortunes of any of the three electoral struts of the Pact (agriculture, manufacturing and white labour) and therefore the claim that national capital had taken hegemony in 1924 was false.

Yudelman's mastery of evidence (particularly for mining) and his commitment to grappling with major historical problems are impressive. Nevertheless there are still gaping holes in his analysis. His evidence refers
largely to the Rand and to manufacturing and mining, yet he generalizes for the whole of the South African economy. We shall suggest that Yudelman's sweeping statements about agriculture and the white poor are incorrect.

Yudelman's approach highlights continuities 'Turning point' theorists constitute for Yudelman, a seriously mistaken group of scholars.

They correctly observe conflict, but they incorrectly assume that conflict to be fundamental. They look only for winners and losers, dominators and domoniated, and fail to grasp the mutual dependence of the state and capital (Yudelman, 1983:9-10).

For Marxist scholars, it is class struggle which provides the important dates of Marxist periodization.

At bottom the difference between this and Yudelman's approach is an ideological question. Liberals used to observe both cooperation and conflict in South African history (Wilson and Thompson, 1969-71, Chs 6, 8, 9). They believed that there was enough cooperation between races in South African history to warrant an optimistic projection for South Africa's future so long as anachronistic state policies (apartheid) did not prevent such cooperation. Yudelman is not a traditional South African liberal although he is highly critical of Marxist studies. He falls therefore between the two old ideological camps. Indeed his criticism of leftist scholarship has become more acerbic.

The argument here, however, is that Marxist scholarship cannot afford simply to reject Yudelman's views because they are ideologically uncongenial. The seriousness with which we must take our view of the state requires an empirical investigation which sheds light as well on other critiques of Davies et al.

1924 AND SOUTH AFRICAN AGRICULTURE

This article takes one facet of the question to argue that there are problems with Yudelman's description of South African agriculture in the 1920s. He contends, for example, that 'agriculture had always been heavily protected by all South African governments, including Smuts' SAP' (Yudelman, 1983:239). This echoes the findings of Greenberg that 'Government after government acted ... to ensure the profitability of commercial agriculture' (Greenberg, 1980:89). In previous scholarship an undifferentiated view of the development of South African agriculture prevailed and has been carried through into present literature. Jill Nattrass' recent addition to general economic textbooks in South Africa pays little attention to fluctuations and variations in agriculture, for instance. She limits herself to
stating that 'financial assistance to agriculture in SA is both significant in quantity and biased in terms of the race group of those receiving it' (Nattrass, 1981:119).

It is misleading to talk of 'agriculture' as though it was a homogenous entity. 'Agriculture' in 1924 was made up of big and small farmers. There were, broadly speaking, well-capitalized farmers with large farms and business orientation. On the other, there were thousands of small landowners, with little capital, little idea about marketing and constantly on the brink of bankruptcy. The difference is seen politically where small farmers generally voted for the National Party (NP) whereas big farmers voted South African Party (SAP). These political preferences were built on experiences of uneven state aid: big farmers received many more favours from Smuts than did the small farmers.

Both Yudelman and Greenberg correctly point out that the state supported 'labour repressive' policies which benefited agriculture in general (eg Greenberg, 1980:87). Neither however attempts a disaggregation of 'agriculture' and therefore both fail to see significant inflections in state policy which illustrate the class nature of the state.

Greenberg (1980:88) argues for enduring agricultural influence in government on the basis of the high incidence of agricultural representatives in Parliament. And Yudelman argues that the Pact was not more sympathetic to farmers than the SAP because it had no farmers in its cabinet (Yudelman 1983:23).

Thomas Smartt, Smuts' Minister of Agriculture may have been a 'farmer'. But he was a farmer only to the extent that he was Managing Director of a huge family enterprise, the Smartt Syndicate. He had little in common with the battling small-scale landowner who constituted the vast majority of South Africa's farmers. On the other hand, Jan Kemp, Hertzog's Minister of Agriculture, a soldier by profession though with a farming background, had sympathy and understanding for the small farmers of his Wolmaranstad constituency alongside whom he had fought in the South African War and the 1914 rebellion.

Between 1920 and 1924 developments in the beef industry clearly demonstrated the partiality of the Smuts government for big farmers and its hostility towards small farmers. In 1923 the Smuts government connived in the destruction of a body (The Meat Producers Exchange (MPE)), established by the latter in 1921 in order to capture a share of the market. Small farmers had challenged the grip on the market exercised by the mines and the giant Imperial Cold Storage Company (ICS). The mines and the ICS suppressed their mutual suspicions when they realized that the farmers threatened respectively to raise the price of meat supplied to the mine com-
pounds and to crack the national monopoly of cold storage facilities enjoyed by the ICS. The Smuts government assisted a combination of mining, the ICS and big farmers to smash the MPE.

The partisan involvement of the Smuts government was not an isolated case. From 1920-4, the Smuts government consistently assisted big farmers against small. South Africa had a large surplus of low grade cattle which could not be exported and could only be absorbed by canning companies. Unfortunately for the South African beef farmer, Rhodesian stock was cheaper, so that canning companies preferred to buy Rhodesian animals. The only protection the South African beef farmer could hope for was government intervention to force these companies to buy local South African stock. However, when opportunities presented themselves for the Smuts government to prove its loyalty to the South African beef farmers, it actually acted contrary to their interests. Liebigs, the giant international canning group for example, openly received favours from the Smuts government. In the first half of 1921 the Smuts government agreed to help Liebigs by extending the railway line over the Limpopo to allow them to transport their Rhodesian cattle cheaply to an already over-stocked South African market (Star, 07.06.21). The venture did not come off, but had it done so, the position of the South African beef farmer would have been further prejudiced by a decline in beef prices. Incredibly, three years later in February 1924, when calls for an embargo on all Rhodesian beef were most strident, the Smuts government lent its support to a project which openly intended using Rhodesian, as against local South African, cattle in a meat extract factory in Messina. By actually encouraging the import of Rhodesian cattle, the Smuts government severely damaged the interests of the small South African beef farmer. An eastern Transvaal farmer complained, for example, that, 'just at present cattle are simply given away. Of course the Government allowing outside cattle to come in, is responsible for the swamping of our only good market'. The same man went further to explain how the mines benefited from this policy by securing their compound contracts at close to half the price achieved under the MPE by buying Rhodesian stock:

so the Mines in our Union, just at present, are not helping our farmers at all, but really helping the outsiders to get rid of their surplus stock' (Farmers Weekly, 19.09.23).

On 1 March 1924, just before the general election of that year, Smuts implemented limited restrictions on Rhodesian cattle imports. This was no doubt an election strategy for the restrictions did not stop the flow of cheap Rhodesian cattle to the ICS beef processing factory at Messina. Apart
from this poorly veiled 'concession', the Smuts government did nothing to help the small beef farmer, and instead tried to pass an Agricultural Industries Advancement bill, which Die Burger (17.03.23) described as designed 'to give openings to trusts and monopolies'.

Finally, rail policy was biased in favour of the ICS. Sir David Graaff, the founder and force beyond the ICS, stressed the importance of assistance in this area. To succeed in the beef industry, he said, 'you must have sympathetic treatment from the Government in respect of Railway transportation facilities' (SC9-1922:94). These facilities were provided. In addition rail tariffs favoured the ICS. Beef producers described them as 'disastrous to the producer' (Star, 18.12.23). This schedule of rail tariffs was retained despite the recommendations of a departmental committee.

In South West Africa, the Smuts government was also at work promoting the interests of the ICS. In October 1922, the ICS concluded a secret monopoly agreement for beef export with the South West African administrator. The agreement provided for a 15 year monopoly on the export of beef from South West Africa (but did not include export to South Africa) and a three year monopoly on live cattle exports. Furthermore, the ICS would get a quarter of a million hectares of South West African territory, plus government aid to build a harbour and storage facilities at Walvis Bay. At the same time, Liebigs was given a monopoly over the meat extract industry. Not unnaturally, when South West African farmers and business concerns found out about these arrangements, they were dissatisfied. They demanded the rescission of the agreement, pointing out that the ICS was not bound to begin operations until the harbour facilities had been completed, which meant an effective stoppage of all exports for two years. During this time the ICS would be able to buy 'farmers' animals at ruinous prices and graze them on the quarter million hectares' (Burger, 1904:23).

By the end of 1923, the Smuts government had helped monopoly concerns to over-run the beef industry in southern Africa. In mid 1924 the National and Labour Party Pact coalition under General Hertzog won the election and set about reorientating state policy in the beef industry. An effective embargo on Rhodesian cattle, which the Smuts government had steadfastly refused to introduce, was implemented.

In November 1924, Major G C F Cholmley, assistant general manager of the BSAC, a company which had benefited a great deal from Smuts' agricultural policy, commented bitterly on Hertzog's measures which were particularly severe on Rhodesian cattle:

The present arrangement (750 lb cattle restriction) undoubtedly imposes a very serious hardship on farmers and small ranchers (of
Rhodesia) ... (For) the big ranches, like BSAC, Liebig's, and Willoghby's (however) I do not think that the present weight constitutes any serious handicap ... (but the weight restriction) is a serious disability (for) the Transvaal Mines and other large employers of native labour (Farmers Weekly, 05.11.24).

What we see in the beef industry is the power of the mines - they were the largest buyers in an oversupplied market. They used this position to pressurize beef producers and prevent them from raising prices. They also used their economic power to support large-scale producers and this created allies within agriculture itself. Finally, they spread their influence into cold storage. Although they did not have control of the ICS, they were certainly shareholders. What this meant was that the interests of agriculture (which I take to be the majority of farmers, who were undercapitalized, had small margins of profit and were threatened by monopoly concerns like the ICS) and the mines did not generally coincide. Although Stanley Trapido has presented the model of alliance of maize and gold, this was essentially an alliance that linked only big farmers in the western and eastern Transvaal to the mines excluding most farmers (Trapido, 1971). Nor did they receive the patronage afforded to the maize and gold alliance by the state.

Not all sections of agriculture experienced such a marked degree of change after 1924. In maize farming, for example, a very complex situation arose. During the Botha-Smuts period, the state hoped that the maize industry would organize itself and did not seek to rescue marginal farmers. A number of measures were introduced to encourage farmers to set their own industry on a stable footing. The cooperatives were major institutions on which the state placed its hopes. Cooperatives were designed to

give their members an insight into business methods and educate and stimulate them and help them to become better citizens.
the 1922 Act was to reduce its limited involvement by allowing cooperatives to become limited liability companies and to run their own affairs.

The State might with advantage retire from its somewhat too intimate association with cooperation ... (and the administration can now be taken over by) farmer co-operators (who) have a wealth of experience to draw upon and guide them. The establishment of societies through the energies of State offices creates or at least encourages a disposition to look to the State for capital funds. That is an unhealthy factor (Manager of Land Bank to Sec. for Finance, 02.12.20; Central Archives Depot, LEB, Box 7, CD45).

The 1922 Act was part of a general state strategy to make agriculture pay for itself and was epitomised by such legislation as the Agricultural Industries Advancement bill (1923). The name of this bill might suggest that it was designed to assist agriculture, yet it met with a torrent of criticism. NP members suggested it had been introduced at the request of the ICS and SA Milling (Farmer's Weekly, 11.04.23). The bill made provision for the imposition of levies to be used to improve marketing. The levy could only be imposed at the request of producers or middlemen which prompted the Farmer's Weekly to observe, 'It is not inconceivable that "any combination of persons" might on occasion include a super combination of middlemen which has cornered more than 50 per cent of the year's crop' (21.02.23). After a number of amendments were introduced - to prevent the possibility of the ICS or SA Milling forcing a levy onto farmers - the bill passed its second reading 52-40. It continued to excite attention however and was dropped before being read a third and final time (Farmer's Weekly, 20.06.23). The state's policies in this period were correctly construed by farmers as attempts to place 'a tax on the farmer' (Burger, 17.03.23).

At first sight the Pact seems to have done little more than carry on the Smuts cooperation policies. It demanded that members be 'financially responsible' and tried to use cooperatives to promote small farmers into the ranks of the big. On closer inspection, however, the Hertzog government had a different attitude to agriculture. Instead of hounding cooperatives to pay their debts, the Pact reduced tax on cooperatives in 1925 and formed a Division of Agricultural Economics, Marketing and Cooperatives to look after the interests of cooperatives. In addition influence was given to small producers rather than to big. Each farmer had a vote whereas under Smuts, voting was determined by the size of the crop which obviously favoured big farmers. The Pact also wrote off massive cooperative debts and funnelled grants more generously to farmers via the Land Bank. Increased
state involvement was crowned in 1937 with the passing of the Marketing Act. This established a permanent state presence in agriculture. While the state under both Smuts or Hertzog was committed to capitalist development and thus, in this very broad sense there was continuity in their policies, to fail to acknowledge the significance of this shift is to mask the class composition of the state itself.

1924 AND THE POOR WHITES

Apart from generalizing about agriculture, Yudelman also makes sweeping statements about the influence of the Pact government on the positions of the white unemployed and the white poor. His findings are for the most part the result of aggregated data on wage and employment rates which conceal the unquantifiable such as the experiences of the historical subjects themselves.

Yudelman is aware that in the case of Pact assistance to the white poor and unemployed things were more complicated. 'It is clear that the Pact made a far greater effort to apply that policy (white job creation) than it did actively to aid organised labor'. He also acknowledges that the Pact’s policy towards poor whites was characterized by 'somewhat more urgency' than that of the Smuts government. Nevertheless, on balance, Yudelman still believes that the Pact’s efforts were 'wholly consistent with the previous policy of the South African Party' (Yudelman, 1983:237). 'The Pact almost certainly did not achieve significantly more for those groups (the white worker, the small businessman, the Afrikaner nationalist, and the petit bourgeois) than other governments had done or would have done Yudelman, 1983:215-16).

According to Yudelman the two great challenges to the Smuts government - the 1914 Rebellion and the 1922 Revolt - were both crushed. This 'marked the defeat of both potential class revolutionaries and nationalist revolutionaries, a defeat from which they never recovered' (Yudelman, 1983:117). Yudelman spends a lot of time showing how the white miners 'never recovered'. He does not, however, expend the same amount of energy on explaining the defeat of the nationalist rural poor. While considering, for example, the fact that 'fellow Afrikaners in the countryside' did not join the white miners against the state in 1922, he offers no explanation for their quiescence other than poor communication, a state propaganda campaign and the support of 'a significant section of the burgher element' for the state (Yudelman, 1983:164).

In fact, the defeat of the 1914 Rebellion did not signal the end of poor white dissatisfaction with the Smuts government, only an end to armed resistance. The underlying causes that had resulted in the uprising were
still present. Forces within the economy were squeezing out small farmers. Only state assistance could effectively shield these people from gradual impoverishment and dispossession. Only government support could assist in the transformation of small, borderline farmers into viable farmers. Under the SAP government, aid was limited, sufficient only to prevent outright starvation. Few loans were granted to poor farmers and the Land Bank's demands for security excluded many applicants who were on the brink of poverty. The government's reluctance to provide assistance is well illustrated in the case of a poor white settlement in the eastern Transvaal, de Lagers Drift. In 1907 the Dutch Reformed Church established the settlement. Transvaal's Het Volk government hesitantly offered some assistance but did little beyond this. Only in 1913 when the state became startled by the increasing dimensions and implications of 'the poor white problem' did it write off some of the settlement's debt (Horrell, 1983:90-98). Desultory aid did little to forward the settlement. In January 1915 it was the population of this area (Hapochs Gronden) which marched on Middelburg with the Republican vierkleur. They protested military service in South West Africa, surrounded the police station and had to be dispersed by the town's police force.

Smuts government's assistance to poor whites did not improve after 1915, but war-time conditions helped alleviate the pressing economic conditions. Producer prices for agricultural goods improved as a result of war-time demand. Some poor whites were swept up by nationalistic slogans and war fever and joined the army. Those who remained disaffected were ensnared by, or themselves promoted, Afrikaner nationalism (the NP was founded in 1914, the Broederbond in 1918).

After the brief post-war boom, a deep recession set in which affected both white miners and farmers. As is well known this culminated in the 1922 Rand Revolt. Conditions in the countryside were still bad enough in this year to prompt some poor whites to consider joining the strikers. The defeat of the strikers was followed by a two year period of heightened government relief (Davies, 1979:161). This was a short-term policy to 'maintain social cohesion in the urban areas'. As Davies stresses it was marked by a conciliatory attitude towards those whose loyalty to the government was questionable (eg Tielman Roos). The SAP's gestures of reconciliation were inadequate and failed to prevent the election victory of Pact (the National and Labour parties) in 1924. One of the many constituencies which returned a National Party member was Middelburg where the disgruntled voters of de Lagers Drift and Hapochs Gronden voted solidly for Jan Heyns.

As far as the de Lagers Drift settlement was concerned, a radical change
occurred after 1924. The official historian of the settlement described the shift in the following terms:

The period which was characterized by imperious state action and haggling during which the government could only produce a few debt write-offs and small cash concessions, belonged to the past. We now see the growth of a totally different attitude in the government in respect of the settlement (Nilant, 1966:33).

In 1926 the settlement was placed under the provisions of the Relief Settlement Act, No 6 of 1926, whereby 1 per settler per month was paid to the settlement. This lifted a heavy financial burden from the shoulders of settlers, for rent was reduced, in addition to which, plot sizes were increased and title to the land issued. A road motor service to the settlement was also provided and a railway built.

While the Pact government had no desire to shelter or create a revolutionary class and troublesome elements were consequently evicted from the settlement, just as they would have been in the Smuts period (Nilant, 1966:38), nevertheless, it was pioneering a new policy. Smuts' policy towards agriculture was basically to assist big farmers and to allow the rest to look after themselves by, as far as possible, withdrawing from active involvement in farming affairs. Pact attempted not only to staunch the flow of whites from the land but tried to increase the number of viable farmers through active intervention.

The figures in the Table give some indication of changes in state policy:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE (Davies, 1979:Appendix 2)</th>
<th>Expenditure of Government Departments involved in the Assignment of Whites to places as landowners and/or with preventing the Proletarianization of White landowners (excluding the general subsidisation to farmers).</th>
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<td>544</td>
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* The high figures for 1919/20 indicate state attempts to resettle demobilized soldiers. This is not an indication of sudden concern by the SAP government for poor whites.
Insofar as marginal producers (byowners, small-holders or deeply mortgaged or indebted farmers) were concerned, these figures show that the Pact government was spending nearly double the amount that the Smuts government had spent. Rob Davies describes poor white policy from Smuts to Hertzog as one of 'extension, expansion and consolidation, rather than of major qualitative change' (Davies, 1979:52). This is partially correct but it obscures the fact that Pact had different goals: to reintegrate marginal farmers back into 'agriculture'. This is not the same as saying, as Davies does, that the Pact was concerned to create a supportive class by 'the assignment of "poor whites" to various places in the division of labour' (Davies, 1979:199). This may have been a critically important part of the Pact's urban/industrial programme, but it neglects the rural side of the Pact's operations. The importance of the Pact's rural policies with respect to the poor whites is to be found in the changing perceptions of the poor whites themselves. The records pertaining to de Lagers Drift, for example, show that inhabitants became more optimistic, less inclined to abandon farming and more inclined to embrace nationalist loyalties.

The evidence presented above places us in a position to judge Yudelman's claims. We find that a change in state policy (reflected quantitatively in the rising aid to poor whites) occurred in 1924. Certain (though by no means all) poor whites or those on the verge of destitution, were assisted to remain on the land as farmers while others felt encouraged to support the Pact and the state after 1924.

CONCLUSION

This paper shows that the change in government in 1924 was of deep consequence. It shows specifically that Smuts did not favour policies that assisted either small farmers or poor whites. In doing so, it challenges Yudelman's contention that the Pact government followed on logically from Smuts. It also tries to show that Greenberg's undifferentiated view of consistent state aid to agriculture is misleading largely because he fails to take account of the divisions within agriculture. My findings tend to confirm those of Kaplan and O'Heara who both see decisive changes in agricultural policy under Pact and support the Davies et al 'Periodization' thesis as well as its emphasis on investigating the specific interests or fractions behind the state.

The crucial question is, which sector/class/fraction of a class would lead the transition to capitalism and how? At a time in South Africa when the power bloc appears divided and confused there is a need once more to return to this approach. Clearly struggles by the dominated classes will be most effective if they are informed by a precise understanding of the
Transformation 4

NOTES

* I would like to thank Bill Freund, Dave Kaplan and Mike Morris for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.

1. Issues raised by Bozzoli, 1978; Innes and Plaut, 1978 and Wolpe, 1980, on, respectively: an exaggeration of changes in state policy at the expense of examining production relations, the need to disaggregate capital along international/national lines and the neglect of struggles taking place within the state are all worth serious attention but are not take up here. See also the defence by Kaplan, 1979.

2. See, for example, his review of O’Meara’s Volkskapitalisme in Social Dynamics, 9.1 (1981), 102-05. Most reviewers agree that Yudelman's own book in some important ways do not live up to its own advertising. Indeed Trapido (1971) anticipated many of Yudelman's findings by over ten years (eg 1971:315).

3. Yudelman (1975) is critical but not antagonistic.

4. Greenberg however is more sensitive in his handling of agriculture than Yudelman and correctly points out the importance of the Pact victory for agriculture.

5. An exception to the undifferentiated treatment of agriculture is Wilson (1971). Wilson, from a liberal perspective, argues that the Pact government's agricultural policies differed markedly from those of Smuts. This is indicated in the section heading, 'The State Takes Charge, 1924-37' (1971:136).

6. For fuller treatment of this subject, see Morrell (1986).

7. Calls for an embargo began as early as August 1921 (Star, 21.08.21) but reached a crescendo in 1924 (Annual Departmental Reports, U69-1924:377. Star, 23.01.24; 07.02.24; 12.02.24).

8. The bill made provision for a levy on agricultural products if 50 per cent of the industry called for one. ICS control of the MPE would probably have allowed it to demand a levy from the rest of the industry in terms of the bill. A select Committee set up to investigate this bill, found that loopholes existed which could be exploited by the ICS. Report of the Select Committee on subject matter of Agricultural Industries Promotion Bill, SC8-1923:5. All translations are my own.

9. See Agreement between the Administration of South West Africa and the Imperial Cold Storage and Supply Company, Ltd in connection with the erection and construction of Cold Storage and Refrigerating Works at
10. The agreement which was concluded with the ICS in October 1922, was only made public in April, 1923. With its publication, Smuts government claims that it fought monopolies, were exposed as untrue. In this same period the Smuts government permitted Anglo American to monopolise the diamond industry in South West Africa (Innes, 1984).

11. Cholmley's view is not entirely correct. Big Rhodesian ranches were prevented by Hertzog's measures from offloading poor quality stock on the Johannesburg market as they had done before. They were, however, able to continue exporting prime cattle for a while longer because there was a shortage of prime beef in South Africa. Restrictions were tightened up later on and the minimum size of beef carcass for import was raised to 1050 lbs which really did handicap the big ranches.


13. I have equated Yudelman's nationalist revolutionaries with the rural poor on the basis of my own research and on Bottomley (1982).

14. Davies suggests that poor whites actually had a part in the Revolt although evidence for this is hard to come by (Davies, 1979:79-80). Johnstone suggests that there was rural support for the strikers (in the form of food and other supplies) but this dried up when 'rumours about a "bolshievik plot"' began to circulate (Johnstone, 1976:135).

15. The NP increased its majority in Middelburg in 1921, 1924 and 1929. The interest in the 1924 election is reflected in a rise in voter participation from 76.1% (1921) to 86.3% (1924).


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