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Introduction

This paper is written in the context of an assumption that no existing institutions have an automatic right to continue in existence. Their actual performance and likely contribution to the future of the country will need to be evaluated, and this applies to universities as much as it does to parastatal research institutions like the HSRC. I offer some very general criteria according to which such an evaluation might be conducted, and apply it to the HSRC as a test case.

I am not unmindful that there will be strong opposition to the conclusion spelt out here, that the HSRC ought to be so thoroughly restructured that the outcome I propose would amount to its abolition. Opposition to this view will be articulated not only by those with an immediate interest in the continuing existence of the HSRC in its present form - mainly HSRC employees - but also from those on the left who feel that if a body with resources exists "we ought to capture it". The paper is written to provoke serious consideration of how research ought to be organised on a national basis in the future, and is not intended as an attack on the HSRC per se.

Previous assessments of the HSRC

Cloete, Muller and Orkin (1986) construct the recent history of the institution as consisting of changes designed to legitimate the reform initiatives of PW Botha, by "providing scientific knowledge or evidence in support of the social programme" (1986). They argue that this process also entailed the HSRC establishing its own legitimacy within the liberal, English-medium universities. This second objective was largely achieved, so that highly respected academics (who would not previously have done so) now serve on the disciplinary committees through which peer review is used to allocate funds to university-based researchers from the A (Agency) Budget.

As for legitimating the government's reform programme, Cloete et al argue that the HSRC did this using its own operating funds (the I (Internal) Budget) by: supplying "scientific evidence" to "prove" that the government's programme is "better" than any alternatives; withholding its own results when these run counter to government policy; and aiding government in postponing policy decisions "until the evidence (from HSRC research programmes) is in" (Cloete et al, 1986).

Cloete and Muller recently added to their earlier position the contention that the HSRC's new market orientation has not only had a negative effect on the quality of research done at the HSRC, but, because of the cost of large research programmes, it has driven researchers back into the arms of their traditional users, the government departments, who are now also their funders. Because the private sector cannot afford expensive research, instead of being "privatised", the HSRC is once again confined to serving its old masters: "the HSRC becomes a "super consultancy" to..."
the corporate state."

In this paper I shall not rehearse the history of the HSRC, that has been done more than adequately by Cloete et al. However, I shall be asking whether the HSRC can contribute to a future, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic South Africa, and what is its ability to adapt to a changed environment for research. In order to answer these questions one will have to make considered judgements on the basis of its existing record of adaptability and sensitivity to the needs of the people of South Africa.

The paper is divided into three sections: the first asks what ought to characterise social research in South Africa; the second argues that the history of the HSRC's response to changing demands suggests that it is unlikely to adapt; in the third part I make a series of proposals for the future conduct of social research.

Desiderata for social research in South Africa

Requirement A:

Those who conduct social research will need to be responsive, participatory and consultative both with those who want the research done and with those who are the subjects of research inquiries. Indeed, good research will bring these parties together in the formulation of research priorities and of actual projects. The dissemination of findings will need to be accessible in style of presentation and available to all who have an interest in them.

Requirement B:

In their selection and promotion of research, administrative and supporting staff, any institution conducting social research will have to be an equal opportunity employer. In order to provide all citizens with equal employment opportunities, it will need to have meaningful affirmative action policies for both black people and women of all races.

Requirement C:

Because of economic exigencies and the enormous demands that will be placed on government and private resources to provide equitable educational and social services and fair wages, there will be little money available for the comparative luxury of social research. Nonetheless, it will be necessary for social policy to be founded on adequate research. Research will have to be useful for policy makers and be cost-effective.

The record of the HSRC

Responsiveness to all 'stakeholders'.

The HSRC was created by Act of Parliament in 1968, bringing together a number of advisory and research bodies that had previously been attached to the departments of education and manpower.

The moneys voted by Parliament are divided in two. The A Budget contains the funds which are disseminated to university researchers, and allocated through the process of peer review, using the expertise of university academics sitting on Disciplinary Committees to make judgements on the grounds of quality alone.
‘Applications for such grants are evaluated strictly on the basis of scientific merit’ (HSRC, 1989a). The criteria do not include catering to the needs of stakeholders. For this we have to refer to the I Budget.

The I Budget provides the funds for the internal running of the HSRC and for the research conducted by its own full-time employees. The following table shows the division of moneys between the two budgets:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL GRANT</th>
<th>A BUDGET</th>
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<td>R million</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1983</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
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<td>14.7</td>
<td>20.8</td>
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<td>1985</td>
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<td>1986</td>
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<td>64.2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
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<td>54.7</td>
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</tbody>
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Source: HSRC Annual Reports

Although the percentage allocated to the I Budget has fluctuated over the years, it has always been the lion’s share. Even the administration of the grants to university researchers is paid for out of the A Budget. Moneys expended in the I Budget do, however, include grants made to academic researchers participating in what are called Cooperative Research Programmes for studies deemed to be ‘in the national interest’. It is the expenditure on these programmes and other work undertaken by HSRC staff which is not covered by client payments that one can reasonably expect to be publicly accountable in some way.

How accountable is the HSRC for the expenditure of this public money? Can the HSRC become accountable and accessible?

Let us start with how its official documents understand these concepts. It claims that its ‘major strength is that it conducts its research within an accountable scientific framework’ (HSRC, 1988 : 10). Since there is nowhere in this or other documents in the public domain that a wider accountability is envisaged, what the writers have in mind is the judgement of social scientists using the ‘scientific’ criteria of ‘objectivity, neutrality and independence’. The notion of ‘accessibility’ is similarly limited, it is elaborated as ‘dealing with its clients and the public in a friendly, helpful and businesslike manner’ (HSRC, 1988 : 9). It does not include involving the subjects of research in the formulation and conduct of research, nor devising innovative methods for the writing and dissemination of research findings to a wider
In 1988 it produced a Strategic Plan which is contained in a document outlining its vision for 'The HSRC 1993'. Amongst other things it states that it 'will strive to ensure that through its research and service, it will contribute towards the improvement of the quality of life of all the inhabitants of the country' (HSRC, 1988a:3). This is to be achieved by 'function[ing] in a pro-active and relevant manner as far as social problems are concerned, and will contribute towards the amelioration of the problems that are experienced'. It proposes to achieve this by 'promot[ing] "literacy in the social sciences"' and being 'a builder of bridges between the research community, government, private enterprise, and each individual ...' (HSRC, 1988a:4-5). These are fine sentiments as far as they go, but they fail to recognise any of the components of civil society other than private enterprise - where is the trade union movement, for example? By 1988 it was a key contributor to society itself and a major 'consumer' of social research. Nor does this document clarify how it is proposed to access 'the problems that are experienced' or to 'build bridges'. The fate of the First Strategic Plan does not give grounds for optimism nor does the fact that there has been almost no change in the leadership of the HSRC.

One way that these tasks it set itself could be achieved would be by representation of a broad constituency on its policy-making bodies and in the setting of research priorities. This would go some way to making the HSRC accountable and accessible to those it aims to serve, namely 'all the inhabitants of the country' (HSRC, 1988a:3).

The Council is the overriding policy-making body and its members are appointed by the Minister of National Education. Until 1986 the Council consisted entirely of white men, mainly but not exclusively Afrikaans-speaking. In 1984 the Minister of National Education appointed the first African, Prof AC Nkabinde (Vice Chancellor of the University of Zululand), who remained until 1987. Two appointments were made during 1986 (Prof WL Nkulu and Dr RL Van der Ross) of men who remain the only members of the council who are not white. For the last three years Adv FJ Bosman, a white woman, has been a member of the Council. This year, I am reliably informed, the executive of the HSRC plans to advise the Minister of names from a wider constituency, including well-known figures from ANC circles. It remains to be seen whether the Minister will invite them and whether they will agree to serve.

Another place where the public could be represented is where research priorities for the HSRC are decided, for example, what studies merit the status of Co-operative Research Programmes. In earlier times this was done by the Research Advisory Committee of the Department of National Education. A wider constituency than this was created by Johan Garbers. During his term of office there was a Research Priorities Committee consisting of: 7 HSRC employees, 7 members nominated by universities, 1 CSIR person, 2 people from the public sector and 2 from the private sector plus 3 Heads of Planning from government departments.

Since the most recent changes in funding and the creation of what is known as 'framework autonomy', the Research Advisory Committee has been abolished and mechanisms for decisions in this area have turned inwards rather than broadening the base of consultation on research priorities. Decisions about the expenditure of
RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS

the I Budget on ‘basic’ and ‘contract-generating’ research (i.e. not contract research which is paid for externally) are made by the seven executive managers of Groups plus the President in consultation with the 28 managers of Divisions, without any outside advice.

‘The HSRC 1993’ Strategic Plan was an attempt to orient the HSRC to different objectives and different ways of operating. It has not succeeded in its desire, articulated in that document, to engage new constituencies and become responsible to new stakeholders. At the last Council meeting of 1991 a second Strategic Plan for 1992 - 1994 was approved.

The Executive, which will devise and approve the details of the Strategic Plan, is led by the President of the HSRC, Tjaart van der Walt. In a speech to the HSRC staff association (1990) he described how, in the first phase of its existence (up to about 1984), the HSRC received all of its funding from the state and was ‘almost an extension of the state’. This was a good thing, he felt, because it meant that ‘government decisions were made on the basis of proper information’. Of course it is a good thing that policy decisions be made on the basis of sound information. Given the framework of white domination in which the government operated, the HSRC may well have provided sound information which was not always acted on by the government.

For van der Walt the ‘shadow side’ of this connectedness to the state was that it entailed a corresponding connectedness to the status quo and this is not, he felt, good for research, which requires ‘innovation, creativity, originality, risk-taking and not maintenance of the existing order.’ In other words, being tied to the state was bad only because it was bad for the quality of HSRC research. There was no recognition here of the widely held view that social science is inherently political and that being tied to the state might have had effects on the findings of research.

In its second, increasingly academic phase, the HSRC moved away from support for the status quo and even ‘criticised the state if its statements rested on scientific grounds’ (van der Walt, 1990). The South African Plan for Research in the Human Sciences (SAPRHS), formulated with the input of academics in all the universities, established the HSRC as ‘objective, neutral, independent’ (idem). There is no doubt that the SAPRHS was a path-breaking document for the HSRC in terms of consultation. But the ‘objectivity, neutrality and independence’ of the HSRC, on economic matters at least, must remain in question when its Annual Report for the same year noted that: ‘South African society is crying out for research into ..... a structurally deficient economy within which the free market system must be optimally propogated [sic]’ (1988:6).

In addition, its neutrality and independence have never brought the HSRC into confrontation with the state nor has its executive, even since February 1990, condemned the state policy of apartheid, despite worldwide condemnation over many years - years during which the HSRC was providing the state with ‘proper information.’

Its record and the views of its president on that record suggest that, even if they wish to change in line with new developments in the country, the executive of the
HSRC does not know how to lead it in that direction. If this is so, could a new government not have the HSRC do appropriate research by replacing its top management? In the next section I shall argue that the malaise goes deeper than that. The methods of recruitment and promotion and the constituencies from which the personnel are drawn has resulted in a staff who, with a few notable exceptions, are commonly committed to the status quo rather than to a transformed future.

Equal opportunity employer?

The HSRC has no black people or women amongst its executive (the president and the seven executive managers) and, until very recently, all but two were from Afrikaans backgrounds. Of the 30 people at manager level, five are women and none are black. The last occasion on which their degrees were detailed in the Annual Report was in 1988 when the Management Council, consisting of the President, Vice Presidents, managers, group heads, regional directors and directors of institutes, 30 in all, were all men. Of these men, one was a Wits graduate (head of the NIPR), one from Rhodes, four from UNISA and one from Amsterdam. All the rest were graduates of Afrikaans medium universities.

Of the 863 staff in January 1992, 146 (17%) are ‘non-white’ (123 or 14% African). All the Managers are white. Of the 316 Researchers 21 (7%) are African, none in the top 3 grades (out of 7 grades), and more than half (11) in the bottom grade of Assistant Researcher. Of the 124 Research Support Staff 18 (15%) are African, and they are clustered at the 3rd and 4th grades (out of 10 grades). Of the 389 members of the Administration, 84 (22%) are African, and they are to be found only in the bottom four grades, with the majority (57) at Grades 1 and 2, where there are almost no whites.

In addition to being a predominantly white organisation, it is also predominantly Afrikaans. Afrikaans is the lingua franca at the headquarters in Pretoria, and the majority of white employees show a preference for being addressed in Afrikaans in the March 1991 internal directory. Out of 928 staff listed, (by name with title, group and divisional affiliation) 102 (11%) had African surnames. Of the remainder, 124 (12%) were listed in English and 713 (76%) in Afrikaans.

There are two possible explanations for this preponderance of Afrikaans speakers: one is that English speakers and black people have not wanted to work at the HSRC and have not applied. This is a serious possibility since it had, for many years, an image of being an organisation exclusively serving the interests of the government. An alternative explanation is that the HSRC, like the Post Office and Railways, was an affirmative action employer for Afrikaners, that is, that Afrikaans speakers were given preference over English speakers with similar qualifications.

Whichever of these two explanations is the real one, and both factors are probably at work, one can state with certainty from observation of the present employee profile, that no serious attempt has been made to recruit from under-represented groups. Nor does the profile of the incumbents of high positions suggest that promotions have been dealt with any differently from recruitment. Indeed, English speakers (let alone blacks and women) are rare at manager level and higher.
Does the HSRC have the ability to become an equal opportunity employer? Will it embrace the only means for pious statements of intent to become reality, namely meaningful affirmative action? For this we need to look at its most recent statement of intent on staffing policy which is contained in the Objectives of the Strategic Plan 1992 - 1994:

3. To ensure that the staff composition of the HSRC will by 1994 reflect the population composition of the country to a significantly greater extent than it does at present. (HSRC, 1991)

Like the other components of the Strategic Plan, the details of how to implement this objective remain to be spelled out by a working group that is due to report by March. The wording was, it seems, left deliberately vague, but January 1994 is a mere 21 months from March 1992, not long for such an enormous task. It is not only that women and blacks will have to be recruited for and promoted into positions that they have never before occupied, but the existing senior staff will have to be trained in equal opportunity selection and promotion procedures. The rest of the staff will have to be prepared well and there will have to be a real threat of disciplinary procedures against those who continue to act in an antagonistic fashion towards the unfamiliar recruits.

One's confidence in the likelihood of this happening is not enhanced by recent events when a fairly senior new ‘coloured’ recruit resigned after only a fortnight. To its credit, the HSRC is taking disciplinary action against those who made his work environment untenable but it is also clear that its ‘corporate culture’ will have to undergo some profound modification if it is to hold onto staff from outside the familiar constituency of white, conservative, Afrikaners.

**Useful and cost effective?**

Judgements of usefulness are hard to make objectively, but taking the HSRC’s own mission, to be useful ‘to all the inhabitants of South Africa’, it is not hard to be critical of the Afrikaner-centric nature of a number of its projects, for example the genealogies of Afrikaans families, and research into Afrikaans language and dialects, Afrikaans literature and Afrikaans theatre.

Cost-effectiveness is also not easy to gauge, particularly as there are no direct comparisons to be drawn between the costs of the HSRC and other institutions performing research functions. The nearest comparison we have is with researchers in universities, but given the additional functions, and other funding sources, from fees for example, the comparison can only be a very rough one, based entirely on the amount of public money each consumes. What are costs to the public purse of having researchers in an institute which does nothing but research - rather than in a university where researchers also teach students? Looked at according to this measure, the HSRC in 1989 had about 350 researchers and a Parliamentary Grant of R54 million or a cost of roughly R154,000 per researcher in public money. The University of Stellenbosch in 1989 had 778 academic staff and a state subsidy of R108 million or R137,388 per researcher cum lecturer.

Despite absorbing more government funds per head, the HSRC researchers are
less productive, according to publication criteria, than the Stellenbosch ones:

Investigations have been conducted from which it transpires that, should one measure research in terms of publications in reputable international professional journals, the HSRC has not been performing spectacularly in comparison with some of our universities. (van der Walt, 1990)

An academic at Stellenbosch is thus more cost-effective as a researcher by ‘international’ standards, and does a full load of undergraduate teaching as well. To be fair, of course, much of an HSRC researcher’s output appears as reports to clients rather than journal publications.

One of the differences between academics and HSRC researchers is that most academics have to raise money to do research from outside funding bodies. If they fail to raise the money they cannot do research. Only a small proportion of research funds used by academics is made available to them from their university’s state subsidy. Academics wishing to do research (which they must do successfully to earn promotion) have to apply for funds in a competitive market, even from the university’s own research fund. HSRC researchers, because of poor management, were mostly not answerable for how they spent their time. Not a few seem to have spent their time pursuing their own interests. There is pressure now to give up ‘hobby’ research and seek out lucrative contracts, but if a researcher does not raise contract funds there appear to be no sanctions.

Although research staff complain about the pressure they are under to find contracts, plans to become self-financing are relatively modest:

4b. To endeavour to ensure that a minimum of 30% of the HSRC’s research income will by 1994 be derived from sources other than those in the public sector. (TEMPO 1991)

Some steps towards cost-effectiveness have nonetheless been made. A few of the less obviously social scientific enterprises which had found a home at the HSRC over many decades have been ‘decentralised’ to other institutions: SA Sport Information, the South African Centre for Arts Information, SA Literature Reviews and Contree, the journal on regional history. (TEMPO 1991) In addition, all posts which become vacant are frozen and have to be motivated for, and the imbalance between research and non-research staff (342 to 614 in 1990) is to be corrected through natural wastage of non-research staff. Overall, ‘staff is to be reduced by 5% a year over the next three years (mainly through utilizing vacancies and the staff turnover).’ (TEMPO 1991)

Can the HSRC become cost-effective in the future? We have seen that HSRC researchers are expensive in comparison with university ones even though they do not use expensive scientific equipment, other than computers. Those who are not good researchers are not retrained or redeployed, nor do they have some other useful task to get on with, as academics who are not good researchers do, namely undergraduate teaching. The HSRC has not utilized its recent restructuring to rid itself of ‘dead wood’ research staff nor superfluous administration and support staff through a fair and sensible redundancy programme. This does not bode well for its future responsiveness to demands that it be more cost-effective.
What is to be done?

Research institutions have a general tendency to ossify through lack of contact with the outside world. They do not even have the stimulus of having to teach sceptical and curious young students. Unlike universities which experience constant pressure from students and junior staff to change with the times and even to pre-empt the future, the staff of research institutes tend to be politically apathetic and supportive of the status quo. There is something to be said for scientific research institutions which do the expensive research at the public expense which no particular farmer or capitalist firm can afford to do for itself. Such institutes carry out particular research projects that will benefit the economy of the country as a whole, and they may do both basic and applied research. However, there are few parallels to be drawn between institutions which do research on mining, farming or factory production and those which do social scientific research.

South Africa cannot afford a pure research institution like the HSRC, especially once government monies are distributed more favourably towards the disadvantaged. Some other way must therefore be found to perform the essential functions of the HSRC, and the over-staffing must be dealt with as humanely as possible. The most radical way - and it is not the only way - in which this might be done is outlined below.

The original rationale for setting up a research institution outside of any government department was, according to the Minister of Education in his speech proposing the foundation of the HSRC, that ‘research can only be conducted with difficulty as part of a government department’ (Hansard, 21/2/68 cols 946 - 951). The Minister provided no supporting evidence for this assertion, and it is not self-evidently true. Indeed the contrary could arguably be the case. Having a research institute at its disposal which did not have to be paid for its services out of its own budget, might well have encouraged a department to run off a string of interesting research questions and have them attended to by the HSRC. The only case in which departments used to have to pay for research done by the HSRC was if they failed to submit the proposal in time for the HSRC to include it in its annual budget submission to the government. If the matter was urgent the department had to pay for it. This cannot have been conducive to a sense that research findings are costly and ought to be requested only when they are likely to be implemented.

The fact that departments now have to pay for HSRC research out of their own budgets probably makes for greater efficiency, but it still does not ensure that the results of research will be used. Indeed it is arguable that research will correspond more precisely to departmental requirements if the researchers are located within each department, and are thus in constant exchange with the policy makers. Being able to have the research brief adjusted on a weekly basis is more likely to ensure that policy makers get exactly what they want and that they will use the results.

HSRC research staff who work more or less directly supplying information to government departments, for example, on human resources requirements, should be re-employed in the relevant department. Where a department requires expertise that it does not have for a one-off project, there is no reason why this should not be
obtained by farming it out to academics or university-based research centres. These researchers are clearly in general just as good as HSRC ones, and they have the virtue of having to be employed by a department for only as long as their expertise is required. Of course the HSRC has some outstanding research workers who would readily find a place in the best of universities.

At present the HSRC budget is in two parts, the Agency budget ostensibly for ‘basic’ research and the Internal budget for ‘applied’. There is no inherent rationale for this division. Both basic and applied research could be done by, say, doubling the present A budget and removing the remainder of the HSRC budget. The A budget could then be distributed according to new national criteria appropriate to the country’s needs. This could include a defined proportion for basic research. Decisions about the distribution of the budget would be made by appropriate committees drawn from academics, the public and private sectors, trade unions and the wider community. The money could be used for a mix of national projects, which combine research skills country-wide, and the projects of individual academics.

The remaining role for the HSRC would be as a small and efficient secretariat servicing the committees.

Summary of future proposals:

• The HSRC to be scaled down to become a small secretariat servicing committees that make decisions about the distribution of the present A Budget.
• The A Budget to be increased, perhaps doubled, in size. The I Budget to be abolished.
• The committees distributing the budget to consist of social scientists plus representatives of all interested parties in the community. Moneys to be distributed according to a nationally agreed set of criteria.
• Those members of the HSRC staff whose skills are needed, to be transferred to relevant government departments to perform their research functions.
• Remaining HSRC staff to be offered fair and reasonable redundancy packages.

NOTES
1. A recent addition to the executive is Lawrence Schlemmer.
2. Information kindly supplied by Richard Dawson of the Personnel Dept of the HSRC.
3. Calculated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure on</th>
<th>less Income from</th>
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<tr>
<td>Academic activities</td>
<td>tuition fees</td>
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<td>143 million</td>
<td>29 million</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: University of Stellenbosch, Rector’s Report, 1989

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Cloete, N, Muller J and Orkin, M (1986) - ‘How We Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the HSRC’. Psychology in Society Number 6 pp 29-46
Garbers J (1981) - Address to the President’s Council, 18 May 1981
LAURIE SCHLEMMER: I am a senior executive of the HSRC. It appears to be a different organisation to the one that Caroline White works for. I believe that I can speak with some authority about changes taking place in the HSRC because I am in some measure responsible for those changes.

I think that it is very important for parastatal organisations like the HSRC to be supportive of research in universities and operate to the benefit of the community. This applies particularly to activities undertaken with funds derived from the state subsidy - the parliamentary grants. There is absolutely no sense in having the bureaucratic research function for its own self. The way one has to view this is to understand some of the difficulties of research. One has to realise that universities are to some degree atomised, in the sense that there are all sorts of struggling lecturers all over the place, teaching loads that are too heavy, who also want to do research. They're trying but very often it's difficult to acquire the money.

For this reason, I see that the kind of research that a parastatal organisation should do as being fundamentally supportive of the more specific, more particular kinds of interests that one finds at universities. Until recently the most visible contribution of the HSRC to universities has been the grants and bursaries made from the so-called A budget. The internal budget, however, must also make a substantial contribution to research stakeholders outside the HSRC. Our major co-operative programmes on ‘Affordable Social Security’ and ‘Affordable Personal Safety’ are very large. They have been established for some years and virtually all the research is undertaken by university academics or by people in welfare work in communities. From now on, in my own group, all research undertaken with state funds has to involve outside participants, either in universities, NGOs or communities. They may not do all the work but there will be substantial opportunities for joint participation. We have, in addition, defined a specific category of research which, for want of a better label, we call ‘social responsibility’ projects. All these projects must be addressed to disadvantaged community needs and must involve community participation.

I think that a major role for the HSRC is to emphasise data base activities. It must assemble information and make it available to everyone. It has the capacity in size in order to do it more effectively than isolated or atomised academics can do.
Secondly, the HSRC has started to develop various kinds of information bases on critical problems on a nationwide basis, which is incredibly expensive, and which once again the universities may not have the infrastructure to do. Thirdly, I think these organisations must do the duller, monotonous and time consuming but essential kinds of research that universities would not want to do. Fourthly, I think that we’ve got to offer platforms for cooperation between academics and ourselves. We already have such co-operative ventures established, at UCT, Natal and Wits, and it is this kind of ‘decentralised’ activity which is going to expand most rapidly in the future.

Obviously large parastatal organisations which functioned for so long under the past dispensation in South Africa are not likely to be able to change overnight as it were. In the case of the HSRC, however, fairly fundamental changes in goals and organisational commitments have been taking place since the mid eighties.

CAROLINE WHITE: I don’t see any conflict between doing the sort of research that Professor Schlemmer thinks needs to be done, and the way which I suggest. That is, having people who are doing the boring research and the data bases in government departments which do that research and have an on-going relationship with people who are doing that. And having academics sort of released - on the money that they get from the HSRC and perhaps working for a year or two years - released from their teaching to do full time research. My problem is with the organisation that I see not adapting to the future. Talking about allocation but actually not doing it.

DAVID LEWIS: I’d like to say something about the CSIR’s contribution, and his premise for the notion that says there is a fiscal and policy reality out in the world that forces an institution like the CSIR to orient itself towards the market and towards the private sector. I understand that reality. I must say that I’m a little bit alarmed at the view that makes the market not a constraint but a virtue. And your entire presentation is based on the fact that CSIR is going to really do something effective now; it’s going to become an effective institution, because it is oriented towards the market. I think if it does so, it will be in spite of its orientation towards the market, not because of an orientation towards the market.

GEOFF GARRETT: You need to broaden our definition of the market. So if I hear you saying, ‘The market is identified with industrial/commercial sector,’ then that is a very important part of our market. But our market is much broader than that. What we’re saying is that we are driven by needs in our environment, and not just the soccer field analogy of doing our own thing, having a good time, like the old days. Five years ago we were doing very little in developing communities. Now in the building division, we have five separate studies in low-cost housing.

DAVID LEWIS: Your entire presentation seems to me to be entrenched in the notion that out there in the real world are those who actually pay for research, who’ll get an effective scientific institution established. And I just think that that’s wrong. I don’t think that the alternative that I’m counterposing is appropriate technology for local communities. I’m saying that the mainstream industrial science and technology policy and hardware cannot be developed in the context of market relations only.

MOSES NGOASHENG: The question relates to Dr Garrett in relation to the fact
that the CSIR now is required to earn more money in terms of its budget. Looking at development of technology for communities that don’t have the money to pay. Because if you are required to earn more money in terms of your projects and policies, you’re going to be biased towards customers who can pay. And communities can’t pay. How do you in fact come to determine that certain communities need certain technology? How do you go about defining your projects and finding out about the requirements of communities? Is it an internal decision? If it is not internal, if it’s an outsider involved, what other forces are involved in determining those priorities?

**GEOFF GARRETT**: There is a pressure on earning more and more of our money through contracts. However, the name of the game is changing such that down the road, in two to three or five years time, obviously more money will become available for developing communities work. Therefore, it is appropriate in our environment for us to invest components of our parliamentary grants in developing communities work, with no money coming back in.

**MIKE MORRIS**: There is no particular virtue in the market; there’s no particular virtue in the state in itself as an institution funding research; and there’s no particular virtue in universities. Putting money into any one of these three institutions as they currently exist could just as much lead to cost ineffectiveness, useless kind of research. I’ve done research which is straight market-oriented, for example, and it produces a particular kind of telephone which is extremely useful for communities. What blocks it currently is the state’s inability to grasp the nettle and actually deal with it in an appropriate kind of a way. Universities are riddled with uselessness and inefficiency as well. There is no particular virtue in deciding to put the money into universities either. The issue is trying to set up a correct kind of relationship between the state research organisations and the markets in the sense of private sector community, trade unions, etc. Setting up the correct kind of relationships with them, and having a particular kind of social vision, a plan, a growth strategy, which will enable us to move forward.