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Article

Indians, Islam and the meaning of South African citizenship—A question of identities¹

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Durban's Indian Muslims are heirs to Islamic traditions and practices in India that became firmly established in South Africa. During the past decade they experienced rapid and dramatic changes. These reflect adjustments to the political changes that have taken place in South Africa, as well as the increasingly invasive role of global material culture in everyday life. This has caused unease and concern amongst many Muslims. This is not unique to Muslims or even to South Africa.

Crawford Young has pointed out that there is no justification for clinging to the belief that modernisation leads 'ineluctably to deepening levels of attachment to the nation defined by the state of residence or to the erosion of cultural ethnos, race or religion separate from the nation-state unit'. On the contrary, social change tends to produce 'stronger communal identities. In addition, the cultural segments themselves are subject to evolution and change in the crucible of social process and political competition' (Young 1998:3). This paper examines developments among Durban's Indian Muslims, especially after 1994. In particular it examines how they have reacted to these forces. There is a tendency on the part of many observers and commentators to lump them together with the Western Cape based Muslim group, People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (Pagad). For example, Chiara Carfer warned that:

South Africa's Muslim community is influenced by events abroad and a romanticisation of the international Islamic struggle.... Radical Islam has found fertile ground in the power vacuum.... Unease at the growth of American cultural and economic dominance, admiration for Libya and the early theocracy in Iran, and the formation of militias to fight in the Bosnian civil war have influenced local politics. This fuels youthful idealism, which, if not channelled constructively, might pose a problem to the state. (*Mail and Guardian*, February 5-11, 1999)

Such sweeping claims raise important questions. Are Durban's Muslims inclined to establish militias to mete out 'just' punishments or to take to the streets to protect Islamic values? Are they challenging the post-1994 state in the same way that Pagad seems to be doing? To what extent are their actions in conflict with 'loyalty' to the state in the ordinary sense of the word? Is Islam a political, militant identity amongst Indian Muslims in Durban? More broadly, how does the new South African state, faced with internal cleavages based on race, class, language, religion and ethnicity, accommodate difference in the context of the transnationalisation of economic and cultural processes, and fragmenting tensions from within? While it seems paradoxical to focus on the integrity of nation-states at the same time as we speak of transnationalism, as Basch et al point out, nation-states, as 'hegemonic representations of ... spatial identity remain primary in an 'increasingly postmodern world' (1994:8).

Conceptual Framework

According to Hall, identities are formed and transformed continuously in the 'interaction' between individual and society (1992:275). Identities are seen as relational, socially produced, situational, multiple and complex. Identity positions should consequently not be taken as given but interrogated and questioned (Phoenix 1998:9). Further, identities are conceived of as non-essentialist because individuals, who on the face of it, fit into categories such as Muslim, Indian, South African and so on are differentiated by ethnicity, language, race, gender, social class, etc. Identities are thus differently experienced by individual members (Phoenix 1998:9). This is not to suggest that each subject position has equal saliency for individuals and that in different contexts different identities do not become hegemonic. Individuals attain and sustain a continuous sense of self through constructing integrated and coherent autobiographical narratives in which the past is reconstructed in ways that help them to understand the present (Hall 1992:279). The new identities being constructed are not core identities waiting to be recognised but are constructed historically, politically and culturally from particular perspectives for particular purposes (Phoenix 1998:10). Collective identities rest on the interaction of various forces with one another in processes of collective self-definition. For Hall, while there are no fixed origins to which people can return 'it is no mere phantasm either. It is something – not a mere trick of the imagination. It has its histories – and histories have their real, material and symbolic effects' (in Loomba 1998:182). The past continues to speak to us. But it no longer

addresses us as a simple, factual 'past', since our relation to it, 'like the child's to the mother, is always-already "after the break"' (Loomba 1998:182).

Almost all theoretical traditions had advocated the demise of cultural localism and its replacement with a modern collective consciousness. Not only has this not happened but the politics of particularism, of local difference within global uniformity, has revived. Baumann suggests that the postmodern age is the age of 'neo-tribes': 'Postmodernity, the age of contingency for sich, of self-conscious contingency, is also the age of community: of the lust for community, search for community, invention of community, imagining community' (1991:246). For Baumann the desire to belong is largely a response to the disruption and disintegration of a familiar way of life. Religion is particularly attractive in such situations because it 'resides in the realm of hope' (Baumann 1991:249). Religious diversity involves 'for the faithful a comprehensive *Weltanschauung*, which can invest difference with sacred meanings' (Young 1998:7). For Mol, 'religious practices give special underpinning to particular conceptions of order and views of reality within a culture making the security of the individual less precarious'. Rituals, rites of passage, emotional commitment to a particular system of meaning, the repeated narration of myths and the sense of the transcendent 'sacrilise' religious identity. Certain patterns acquire a 'stable, eternal, taken-for-granted quality' and serve to position and reinforce the identities of a group, especially one in a minority situation (Mol 1976:5-9). This study is concerned with the way in which Islam provides meaning for Indian Muslims in Durban. It will argue that their identities are being reconstituted and that Islam is playing a key role in defining this shift.

Thirty semi-structured interviews were conducted between May and September 1999, from which an attempt was made to extract meanings held by Muslims. The core respondents were broadly representative of the gender, language, regional, age and class background of Indian Muslims in Durban. Core respondents varied in age between 18 and 63. There were 16 males and 14 females. Seven of the women were in formal employment. Though English was the first language of all, in terms of second language, 14 were from an Urdu-speaking background, nine from a Gujarati-speaking background and seven from a Memon-speaking background. In terms of class, amongst the males six were from a working-class background, five from professional backgrounds and five owned businesses. Qualitative

methods were used to avoid a clinical approach to issues of religion and identity. The questions focused mainly on how the respondents viewed political change, what impact change was having on their lives, the role of women in the new South Africa, meanings of nationhood and citizenship, and so on. Discussions were also held with religious leaders across the various traditions to gain insight into their aspirations for Muslims.

Durban's Indian Muslims

Islam is a minority religion in South Africa. According to the 1996 Population Census (hereafter census) there were 553,585 Muslims out of a total population of 40 million. Indian Muslims make up one of the two largest sub-groups, the other being 'Malay'.² There are 246,433 Malay and 236,315 Indian Muslims. The majority of Indian Muslims are confined to KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, while most Malay Muslims live in the Western Cape. There is thus very little contact and interaction between them; indeed there are deep differences of history, culture, class and tradition. There are 79,630 Indian, 3117 African, 3497 coloured and 269 white Muslims in Durban. The concentration of Muslims in specific areas has created a feeling of population density and numerical strength not reflected in census figures. Given the overwhelming numerical advantage of Indian Muslims and the impact of racial segregation, there is minimal contact between Indian and non-Indian Muslims. Indian Muslims are third and fourth generation, and far removed from the migration experience of their forefathers. An indication of the break with their cultural past is that 93 per cent consider English to be their first language. Around 59 per cent are from an Urdu-speaking background, 28 per cent are either Gujarati or Memon speakers, and there are a small number of Tamil and Kokney-speaking Muslims.³ Language distinctions coincide with class divisions. Indian Muslims arrived in Natal in two streams. Between 1860 and 1911, around 10,000 indentured workers arrived from India (Bhana 1991:7). They were followed by Gujarati and Memon-speaking traders from Gujarat on the west coast of India who began arriving in Natal from the mid-1870s. Descendants of indentured Muslims, mainly Urdu-speaking, have made enormous economic progress as a result of opportunities seized by Indians generally since the 1950s and the class gap between them and Gujarati/Memons has closed.

As a result of linguistic, regional, and social class differences, there is some variation in belief and practice amongst Indian Muslims. There are three broad traditions: Deobandi/Tablighi, Barelwi and Reformist. The

Deobandi school, established in India from the 1860s, is closely allied to Gujarati trading classes, and places emphasis on the central role of Ulama (religious leaders) in defining the correct practice of Islam. Closely allied is the Tabligh Jamaat, founded in India by Mawlana Muhammad Ilyas (1885-1944), whose followers go from mosque to mosque and Muslim house to house to preach a 'purified' form of Islam. The movement initially made inroads amongst Gujarati traders but later attracted support from Memon and Urdu-speakers (Moosa 1997:33). Institutionally this tradition is represented by the Jamiatul Ulama (hereafter Jamiat), which was established in 1955 to provide religious knowledge on all matters affecting Muslims.

The Barelwi school, founded in India by Ahmad Raza Khan (1856-1922), found expression in Natal through Soofie Sahib who died in 1910 (Dangor 1995). Its primary support base is amongst Urdu-speaking Muslims. This populist form of Islam involves the public celebration of occasions such as the birthday of the Prophet, the recitation of communal salutations, the use of Pirs (Guides) as intercessors between individuals and God, and visitation of shrines. The most popular shrine in Durban is that of Badsha Pir who came to Natal as an indentured labourer in the 1860s. Deobandis, in contrast, consider these practices *bid'ah* (innovation). These differences aroused deep passions that flared into open conflict during the 1980s. This tradition was given organisational expression through the Sunni Jamiatul Ulama of South Africa, established in 1978 (Mahida 1993).

There also exists what can be broadly called a 'reformist' tradition that draws inspiration from Mawlana Maududi, Sayyid Qutb and the Iranian Revolution. This tradition assumed institutional expression through the Muslim Youth Movement which was founded in 1970 (Tayob 1995). Generally, those who embrace this tradition are not part of the conventional Ulama, they acknowledge modernity and practice '*ijtihad*' (reasoning) in the religious field.

Muslims and Pre-Apartheid Politics, 1894-1994

Before 1994 Indian Muslims were officially classified 'Asian' and existed under this overarching identity. Although Islam has always been the centre of their life, exclusion from the political state compelled them to operate as Indians in protest politics and they made common cause with other excluded groups. After self-government in 1893, Natal's whites came to view town planning, public health, and trade arrangements in terms of racial distinctions (Swanson 1983:421). Indian merchants formed the

Natal Indian Congress (NIC) in 1894 to protect their trade, franchise and residence rights (Swan 1985). Merchants and indentured Indians were drawn together because the government promoted a pattern of stratification in which race shaped individual and communal life experiences. This neutralised the impact of class and religion and, politically, forced a 'made-in-Natal' Indian consciousness. Socially, they were divided along lines of caste, class, ancestry, and language. For example, marriage across these lines of stratification was opposed. Memon-speakers would oppose the marriage of their children to Gujarati-speakers, Gujarati-speakers would not want their children to marry Urdu-speakers and so on.⁴ However, as Habib points out, 'this conflictual relationship that they [Muslims] display to other categories of Muslims ... is not extended to the political realm. They do not demand a political identity, but rather are content to manifest this identity in their own personal lives' (1995:54).

The formation of the South African Indian Congress in 1923 by merchants extended this elite collaboration to a national level. Every activity that had the potential to divide Muslim and Hindu Indians was denounced. At a meeting to mark Indian Independence Day in 1943, AI Kajee, a Muslim, commented that they 'were not assembled as Hindus, Christians and Muslims but as Indians. The religious politics of India have not been imported into South Africa. Indians in this country must be Indians alone and not Mussulmans and Hindus' (*The Leader*, January 30, 1946). But Muslim merchants like Kajee also funded Jinnah in his attempt to create Pakistan (*The Leader*, January 5, 1946). Such affinity also extended to working class Indians. Recalling life in 1940s Durban, Harry Sewlall has written that 'what was remarkable was the camaraderie that existed between Muslims and Hindus, who lived cheek-by-jowl with one another. I was not aware of any differences between us. In my family, we referred to our elderly Muslim neighbours as "mausi" (aunt) and "mausa" (uncle)' (*Sunday Times Extra*, December 12, 1999). Indians were drawn together because they had the same legal status and the threat of repatriation hung over all until 1961. The upward mobility of ex-indentured workers from the 1950s reduced tensions between them and merchants (Freund 1995). When the National Party (NP) came to power in 1948 it was determined to entrench racial identities through its policy of apartheid. The NIC carried out joint campaigns with the African National Congress (ANC) during the 1950s against this policy, but the banning of the ANC in 1960 and silencing of NIC leaders ended an important link between Indians and Africans. The alliance between the NIC and ANC had failed to effect a transition to non-

racial politics at the level of the masses. In fact, the tendency of the NIC to mobilise Indians on issues that were race-specific perpetuated racial divisions of resistance and reinforced racial identities (Singh and Vawda 1987).

Apartheid had ambiguous consequences for Indians. There was a relative advantage in being Indian as certain restrictions, such as the pass laws and influx control, only applied to Africans. Further, the restructuring of urban space from the 1950s resulted in the provision of mass housing in two large culturally separate and geographically disparate Indian townships, Chatsworth and Phoenix, while areas like Reservoir Hills and Westville were made available for middle class housing (Davies 1991:79-83). As a result, boundaries between Indians and Africans became more fixed. The legal position of Indians changed in 1961 when they were granted status of permanent residents. The government attempted to incorporate Indians politically by creating advisory bodies that divided Indians from Africans and coloureds. A South African Indian Council was inaugurated in 1968 while Local Affairs Committees were established to advise local authorities on Indian matters (Pachai 1971:272-6). Considerable upward mobility after 1960 was due in large measure to expansion in secondary education, enlargement of ML Sultan Technical College, and establishment of the University of Durban-Westville (UD-W) (Naidoo 1989:120-3). In addition to the rise of the professional and artisan classes, working class Indians benefited from the emergence of a substantial number of Indian industrialists in the garment industry. With their higher standard of education and command of English, Indians dominated semi-skilled positions in industry. They became less radical and concentrated on improving their economic position (Freund 1995). Thus, by 1991, the average household income of Indians was R2476; three times that of Africans (South African Institute of Race Relations 1993:192), while the 1996 census revealed that 70 per cent of employed Indians earned more than R1500 per month while only 23 per cent of Africans did likewise.

The dominance of politics by Indian moderates was challenged from the mid 1970s as extra-parliamentary opposition bodies were re-established on several fronts. These included the Black Consciousness Movement, Congress of South African Trade Unions (1985), the United Democratic Front (1983) and a host of community organisations that concentrated on issues from housing and rent to transport and health. The protest of the majority of Indians, however, continued to centre on racially exclusive issues under the banner of the NIC (Singh and Vawda 1987). The programme

and discourse of the NIC reinforced exclusive Indian identities and countered attempts to construct Black and non-racial identities. The release of Nelson Mandela in February 1990, the unbanning of political organisations, multi-party negotiations and, ultimately, South Africa's first democratically elected government in 1994 created uncertainty, fear and insecurity amongst many South Africans. As Robert Thornton pointed out at the time, this was to be expected because South Africa was a country and not a nation. Indians, Africans, coloureds and whites were divided by the multiplicity of boundaries created by apartheid and South Africa found itself in a 'characteristically postmodern predicament,... There is no fundamental identity that any South African clings to in common with all, or even most other South Africans.... The logic of difference and differentiation itself should persist after the demise of Apartheid' (Thornton 1996:150).

Re-Traditionalising Islam

Under apartheid, Indian Muslims had lived in predominantly Indian areas. While some Muslims have adapted more easily to the new environment, it became very apparent during the course of my interviews that many others are challenged as they try to find a place for themselves in the midst of a number of religious, racial and ethnic groups in an environment that does not support an Islamic worldview. Essentially, respondents voiced three concerns. First, they pointed out that although the NP government had been secular, its strict Calvinist morality was consonant with many of their values. The behaviour and morality of individuals is no longer the responsibility of the new secular democracy but that of individuals. Most respondents found state acceptance of abortion, prostitution, pornography and so on unacceptable and expressed fears about 'appropriate' moral standards being maintained under an ANC government. Second, some respondents pointed to the threat posed by the changing global environment, particularly the communications revolution which is conceived as a further obstacle to their attempts to preserve Islamic values. Third, respondents also voiced a concern about the implications of affirmative action and the attempt to marry the renewal of South Africa to an African Renaissance for their culture and identity. While Farid Essack is critical of a Muslim morality that confined itself to sex, abortion, and is silent on issues of hunger and exploitation' (Essack 1999:166), the picture that emerged from the interviews is that this narrow moral-ethical worldview is shaping the behaviour of Muslims. This turn to Islam by Muslims is not taking place in a void. The rapid social, economic and political changes of the past decade

provide the social context in which change must be viewed. This change is apparent in a number of areas in the lives of Muslims, some of which will be discussed below.

Dress

The most obvious manifestation of change is in the staggering increase in the number of women who are fully veiled, that is, their dress covers their entire body including the face. The veil has spawned a wide body of literature, with very divergent views on what it signifies. For critics, the veil is the most tangible symbol of women's oppression in Islamic societies while proponents of the veil view it as the ultimate sign of the rebirth of Islam. Islam requires women to cover their entire body, including the hair, but the requirement to cover the face is contested within local Islamic tradition.⁵ The significant thing is that until about five or six years ago it was rare to find a woman covering her face. Muslim women in Durban have traditionally covered their heads, and sometimes the shoulders, with a headscarf. According to a local Mawlana the prescription for women to cover their faces has to do with changing lifestyles. He pointed out that 'our mothers did not go to gym, university, shopping malls, beachfront, discos and so on. They remained at home'. When the Ulama refer to the 'veil' they mean that women should only venture outside their homes in the event of an unavoidable need. As Peter Clarke has pointed out, in the contemporary period the family is 'Islam's most powerful weapon in its fight against Jahiliyya. The Muslim woman's space is on this battleground, in the home, for this is the only Islamic space available to her in Jahiliyya or the modern westernised world. It is the arena in which women can fulfil their divinely ordained role' (Clarke 1998:24). In practice, there are clear contradictions between the ideal and reality. For many women the veil has liberated them. Muslim women venture far more in public spaces than their predecessors of a generation ago. Mrs FD even commented on the contradiction of veiled women appearing in places where nudity and other un-Islamic practices are the norm. The veil is therefore seen by the Ulama as a significant part of the drive to prevent transgression of gender norms, given that Muslims are more visible in public spaces like shopping malls and restaurants.

Public Worship

Reform is also clear in the area of public religious spaces, which are increasingly being opened to women. Until recently mosques were closed to Muslim women in Durban. Most mosques now make provision for women though there is seclusion between them and men. Women also have

access to Islamic knowledge through taleem (adult education) classes held weekly in private homes, and attendance at mosques to listen to lectures or take part in dhikr (communal salutation to the Prophet). The result of this drive to re-establish gender norms will be a reversal of the trend in the 1970s and 1980s whereby Muslim women acquired education and went out to work.

Dietary Concerns

Another area where there is greater concern with observing religious 'regulations' concerns food consumption.⁶ Until a few years ago, individual Muslims, local mawlanas, as well as a number of Islamic bodies verified products as halaal randomly. At one stage there were 17 certifying authorities (*Sunday Tribune*, December 19, 1999). This changed in 1996 with the formation of the South African National Halaal Association (SANHA), which included both the Jamiat and Sunni Jamiat. According to Mawlana Navlakhi, SANHA's theological spokesman, SANHA was formed because the deregulation of the meat industry in post-apartheid South Africa and the wider variety of food products necessitated greater vigilance (*Sunday Tribune*, December 19, 1999). SANHA's view is that 'Muslims should only eat at Muslim-owned establishments' and should 'produce their own sources of Halaal ingredients in the food processing industry' (*Al-Jamiat*, August 1999). SANHA does not issue certificates to eating premises not owned by Muslims unless there is proper supervision at critical points of the franchise. McDonalds provides a good illustration of the fact that the issuing of certificates, and the very notion of what is halaal and what is not, is contested within local Islamic tradition. When SANHA refused to certify McDonalds as halaal, the latter obtained a certificate from the Islamic Council of South Africa (ICSA) which, together with the Cape-based Muslim Judicial Council (MJC), is not part of SANHA. SANHA responded by distributing pamphlets publicising that it had not certified McDonalds as halaal (*Sunday Tribune*, December 19, 1999). The majority of the respondents in Durban indicated that they abided by what SANHA decreed. The list of prohibited items appears includes diverse products like toothpaste, floss, soup, margarine, and ice cream and is published on the Jamiat's website. The Jamiat also published a Notice on June 22, 1999 that patients should not eat food served at State hospitals (Jamiat Website, July 1999). SANHA is trying to get the word 'halaal' declared a trademark so that it would be the only organisation empowered to issue such notices. However, given the vested interests of the MJC and ICSA it is unlikely that SANHA

will succeed.

Hajj (Pilgrimage)

The numbers of Muslims going annually to Saudi Arabia for pilgrimage has also increased significantly. Whereas around 4,000 Muslims went annually for Hajj, a compulsory pilgrimage, at the beginning of the 1990s just fewer than 7,000 Muslims went in 1996 and 8,758 in 1998. The same applies to Umrah, a voluntary pilgrimage. The number increased from an average of 5,000 in the early 1990s to 15,000 in 1998.⁷ As a result of this increase a South African Hajj and Umrah Council (SAHUC) was formed in 1995 to coordinate the pilgrimage. This body is part of the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is recognised by the Ministry of Hajj in Saudi Arabia. Hajj visas are only issued by Saudi Arabia if accompanied by SAHUC identity cards (*SAHUC Pamphlet*, December 14, 1998). The upward economic mobility of Muslims and the cheaper cost of travel in relative terms have contributed to this increase. But many Muslims who traditionally went to India, England or North America for vacations now go to the 'Holy Lands' instead of the West to strengthen religious vigour. Those respondents who have made several trips to Makkah also commented on the role of the pilgrimage in increasing cultural and religious homogeneity amongst Muslims from different parts of the world. Several respondents, however, felt that the nature of the pilgrimage has changed and that it has become a 'holiday' for many pilgrims more interested in shopping and other non-spiritual activities. Another criticism by working class respondents was that once rich Muslims had completed the pilgrimage, instead of revisiting Saudi Arabia regularly, they should use this money to see to the needs of the poorer members of the community.

Media

The destruction of television sets is a very symbolic milestone in the lives of Muslims. There has been a concerted effort on the part of religious leaders to root out televisions from Muslim homes. According to several respondents, when the Ulama began preaching against the negative impact of television, they gradually limited what they watched. Initially, they restricted their viewing to news broadcasts and sports programmes. However, as the Ulama intensified their campaign through lectures and pamphlets, and emphasised the negative impact that the music, singing, and dancing on television was having on Muslims families, many more Muslims have been getting rid of their television sets. Respondents did not sell the sets but destroyed them, as a symbolic gesture of conquering

worldly desires and because they did not want to pass on the 'vice' to others by selling their set. While this is a very defiant attempt to keep out the encroaching influences of the global environment, its long-term success is debatable given the plethora of avenues through which outside influences penetrate people's lives. Several of the affluent respondents and their families, for example, had access to internet in their homes even though they had got rid of their television sets.

Education

Education is another area where change is striking. From the 1960s large numbers of Muslim children attended government secular schools as education became free and compulsory. According to the 1996 census a total of 7419 Muslim males and 6811 females have completed matric. This includes 2521 males and 2105 females who have a higher qualification. These numbers indicate that girls were given relatively equal opportunity. The attitude towards secular schools has changed. As part of the gender counter-revolution, many parents no longer consider it necessary for girls to receive secular education. Parents also expressed the fear that because of the explosion of knowledge and ideas, their children will only remain virtuous if they are taught in an environment that has a strong element of religious training. Several parents opposed the inclusion of sex education, Aids, etc in the school syllabus and argued that the need for these would cease if children were taught correct morals from young. Parents also want to minimise contact with non-Muslim children, believing that by being with children who are not Muslim, Muslim children adopt un-Islamic practices to fit in with their peers. They also feared that the increased powers of governing bodies at individual schools might result in less tolerance for the needs of Muslim children, such as permission to pray on Fridays and for girls to wear head scarves. The result of these changing attitudes is an explosion in the growth of Muslim schools since 1994. These schools provide ancillary subjects in Islamic Studies and Arabic as well as secular subjects offered at government schools. The first Muslim private school in Durban was the Lockhat Islamia College, opened in 1985 with 130 pupils (Sheik 1990:16). There are currently 21 schools in Natal, nine in Durban, with a total student population of 5590. They have been organised into an 'Association of Muslim Schools' which is in the process of standardising and Islamising the syllabus.³ Islamic schools are also increasing in popularity. These are different to Muslims schools in that the bulk of the syllabus consists of Islamic knowledge. Children cannot

transfer to secular schools from Islamic schools.⁹ There are three Islamic schools in Overport, a suburb in Durban, for example, which cater for grades one to three, grades four to ten and older girls respectively. Together, they have an enrolment of approximately 250 and cater for girls only.

Secular and Muslim schools are supplemented by madrassahs. Until the 1980s untrained women conducted madrassahs in private households. This was supplemented by the input of mothers in an extended family situation where the elderly helped shape religious knowledge. As larger numbers of women entered the workforce and the extended family declined, there was greater concern with establishing formal madrassahs. Madrassahs consequently became much more organised and followed standard syllabuses. They are conducted by constituted bodies in state schools, mosques or especially built madrassahs. The Durban Islamic Educational Society was founded in 1985 to provide a unified madrassah system. By 1992 2386 pupils were attending its schools (Mahida 1993:141). Standardisation of the syllabus has meant that bodies controlling madrassahs are able to disseminate a rigorous knowledge of Islamic rituals, beliefs, values and practices to children from a young age. As a result of these changes in school and madrassah education, class will probably play a more important role in shaping Islamic identities than was the case in the past. It is the affluent members of the community who can afford to send their children to Islamic and Muslim schools, and whose children have access to more systematic and better-organised madrassahs and this is bound to inflect Muslim identities.

Leadership

An important factor shaping Islamic identity in Durban is the growing influence of religious leadership (Ulama). Until the 1970s most of the Ulama were Indian nationals. The first Darul Uloom, a 'theological' institute, was opened in Newcastle in 1973. Subsequently the Darul Uloom Aleemia Razvia in Chatsworth, Madrasah Ta'leemuddin in Isipingo and Madrasah In'aamiya in Camperdown have been opened (Mahida 1993:125). The focus of Darul Ulooms is on jurisprudence. Islamic Law is taught in its totality since it covers all aspects of a Muslim's existence, including family relationships, economics, worship, ritual and, generally, the minutiae of everyday life. Islamic tradition is mediated through Indian history, culture and languages since the Ulama at these institutions have mostly been trained in India and continue to have very strong links with the Indian sub-

continent. In addition, a large number of Imams in Durban are from India, all arrivals in the post-1994 period. Darul Uloom do not focus on developing an Islamic view to respond to the problems facing Muslims. There is, instead, a deep-seated belief that the current problems of Muslims lie squarely in their failure to follow the proper Islamic teachings and that once Muslims gain access to 'correct' knowledge through the Ulama, Muslim civilisation would be uplifted. The new Islamic lifestyle is largely behavioural in perspective as it is based on conduct and social action. Where Muslims do not practice aspects of their religion it is mostly because they see themselves as 'weak'. As one respondent, Mr FB, explained, 'If you follow all the rules you will be OK'. Another stated that abiding by the rules 'makes me avoid bad things like drugs and alcohol and I dress modestly. It influences how I behave towards and treat others'. Mrs ZM felt that 'if Islamic law is implemented it will stop crime, AIDS, child abuse and many other ills of our society'. The influence of the Ulama is growing. One of the ways in which a common message is disseminated is through mosques. According to the Jamiat it provides speakers to 22 mosques for the Friday Jumuah lecture, who address a common theme whenever possible. For example, on the Friday preceding 'Women's Day' the theme was 'Islamic perspective on Women', to counter the images projected by Western media. The Jamiat provides a summary of pertinent points around which speakers base their talk. There is an almost complete lack of theological debate. 'Truth' is synonymous with the Ulama and to question the Ulama means questioning the truth. Respondents clearly saw the Quran as timeless and unchangeable and unquestioningly accepted key tenets, even though there is diversity in practice and belief.

Sufism

Another conspicuous feature of the new Islam is the focus on self-reformation. The trend whereby individuals become attached to Shaykhs (Spiritual Mentors) is becoming extremely popular. Shaykhs are considered to have special spiritual qualities and trace a line of succession going back 14 centuries to the Prophet. Each Shaykh appoints one or more of his Mureeds (disciples) as a Khalifah (guide). Until the last few years, this practice was rare in Durban, being practiced only by a few descendants of the family of Soofie Saheb. It was certainly absent from Deobandi Islam. There has been an upsurge in the numbers of Muslims becoming Mureeds amongst both Deobandis and Barelwis. Many respondents felt that a Shaykh was indispensable in coping with contemporary problems. Mr FB

related an example to illustrate this. An Islamic newspaper, *Majlis*, has ruled that Muslims cannot drink Coca-Cola, the Jamiat ruled that it was permissible to drink Coke while several other Ulama ruled that it was 'doubtful'. In such a situation an individual would refer the matter to his/her Shaykh and abide by the ruling. A respondent compared a Shaykh to a specialist physician. According to Mrs SM, just as one would go to a heart specialist for a heart defect, a Shaykh treats a 'spiritually diseased heart'. Spiritual diseases include 'greed, lust, pride, arrogance, jealousy, passion, etc'. Respondents explained that making bay'at¹⁰ made life easier for Muslims: 'It is so easy. You hand yourself over to the Shaykh and get all direction from him. If he makes a mistake then it is his responsibility'. Respondents seek the advice of the Shaykh on all individual and social matters, including choice of marriage partner, opening of a business, purchase of a car, etc and accept the advice irrespective of whether it is to their liking. The pledge is a formal Agreement in which the Mureed reaffirms faith in God, repents for past sins, and vows not to sin intentionally in future. Part of this programme of a pacific and introspective Islam is dhikr (remembrance of God), a word heavily freighted with devotional meanings, and which is seen as a means of rooting Islam in the hearts and minds of individuals. A very large number of mosques in Durban now hold a regular dhikr session on Thursday evenings. According to Mr MV: 'I find the session spiritually uplifting. You take God's name all the time and you feel it in your body. I feel better and lighter at the end of it. I feel clean. I cannot do it alone. In the mosque there are many people. They all do the same thing. We feel as one, in one cause'. Dhikr includes recitation of verses from 'Mathnawi-e-Rumi', a famous masterpiece from Mawlana Jalaluddin Rumi, which comprises of 28,000 verses of poetry, which focus on characteristics like modesty, honesty, sincerity, and generosity, and are considered absolutely essential to create 'healthy love' of God. The turn to mysticism is not self-conscious as many respondents did not realise that these practices are part of Sufism. Like other aspects of the Islamic revival, these practices are a source of tension because some Ulama feel that they were not carried out by the Prophet and should therefore have no place in Islamic tradition.

There are tangible changes in many other areas as well. For example, Muslims are marrying younger, Mawlanas emphasise that lavish ceremonies are remnants from past Hindu culture and against the ethos of Islam. Hence, many Muslim marriage ceremonies have been simplified and often last just

a few minutes. There is a de-westernisation of dress and return to 'authentic' Islamic dress amongst many men who have taken to wearing Arab garb, short hair, shaved moustache and long beards. Many Muslims have given up all forms of insurance, including personal and car insurance, medical aid and have turned to Islamic banks such as the Al-Baraka Bank. A number of Muslims are also using the offices of the Jamiat to resolve disputes instead of these matters being resolved in secular courts. Change is thus evident in many areas in the lives of Muslims in contemporary Durban, running the gamut from adapting the school system to Islam, campaigning against pleasure activities like the television and cinema, following dietary regulations rigidly and attempting to incorporate aspects of sharia into law. It must be emphasised that while most Muslims, across the classes, expressed a desire to embrace change, it is the more affluent Muslims who are in a position to implement change. This related particularly to pilgrimage, education, domestication of women, embracing the veil, and Islamic banking. The next part of the paper will focus on the consequences of this, what Olivier Roy refers to as an attempt to 'create an authentically Muslim micro-society within the society at large' (1996:80-81), on relations amongst Muslims, between Muslims and non-Muslims, and Muslims and the state.

New Boundaries

It is clear from the discourse and changes in habits and practices, that the identities of Indian Muslims are being reconstructed. Islam is being revived and reformed, and is the basis of this new identity because it is seen as having historical continuity. Muslims are seeking theological authenticity with a past 'golden age' as if nothing exists in-between. In the process of redefining who they are, Muslims are constructing boundaries around various points of contact. These boundaries include contact between men and women, Muslims and non-Muslims, Muslims and the state, Islam and secularism, and so on.

At the same time boundaries related to ethnicity, language, and Islamic practices are becoming permeable amongst Muslims. The definition of the salient community is widening as traditional loyalties are declining. In marriage, for example, the criterion for suitable partners has widened. Most respondents opined that they did not care about ethnic, class and language considerations as long as the spouse was Muslim. Language, a very concrete building block of boundary, has lost significance as a factor in boundary construction since English is the first language of the overwhelming majority of Indian Muslims. Most respondents believed that

instead of reviving individual ethnic tongues, institutions should focus on making sure that children have access to Arabic which is seen as the lingua sacra because it is the language of the Quran and prayer, it will be the language of Paradise according to Islamic belief, and every Muslim learns at least part of the Quran by rote. Arabic is taught at Muslim schools and is emphasised as crucial for youth.

This shifting identity is both progressive and conservative. It is progressive because there is an attempt to break down identities based on caste and ancestry. On the other hand, the basis of the new identity, Islam, is far more watertight. When identity was based on language, caste and race, Muslim children went to the same schools as non-Muslims and mixed more freely with non-Muslim Indians. Under those circumstances there was greater opportunity for integration, albeit mainly with other Indians. The irony is that as South African society is becoming individualistic, and many of the barriers that had hindered integration are breaking down, the opposite is happening in the case of many Indian Muslims. The likelihood of contact with Muslims across race grounds is virtually non-existent because of the small number of non-Indian Muslims and historical barriers. The construction of Indian identity historically involved ignoring class and caste lines. These lines had a material existence that is coming to the fore in light of changes in South African society. This has created tension and brittleness in the broad category 'Indian'. The construction of an imagined Muslim community based on belief and practice is a way to counter this. While many Muslim intellectuals and professionals are concerned about the new conservatism, ordinary respondents seem to welcome the new group belonging to which they have access, and which is the result mainly of personal desire to belong. With the disintegration of traditional family, globalisation and greater individuality, many respondents saw the nascent 'Islamic Family' as a 'shelter' against a hostile, impersonal world. It is seen as providing them with a sense of community. The sanctity of marriage, the virtue of women, and respect for elders are emphasised in this patriarchal 'family'.

Several features of this nascent Islamic identity are apparent from the narratives. Respondents tend to think of themselves increasingly in the collective. This emerged during interviews where many responses began with 'We Muslims...' or 'We are...'. Respondents saw themselves as part of a positively defined collective. Further, there was a great deal of 'pride', 'satisfaction', and 'happiness' in being Muslim. There was a tendency

amongst respondents to focus on the distant past and consciously ignore the quagmire in which Muslims have been stuck since the decline of the Ottoman Empire from the nineteenth century. Little emphasis is placed on the political and economic failures of Muslim societies, particularly since World War II. Muslims are seen as having been a leading intellectual and military civilisation and there was a firm conviction among respondents that this civilisation can be regenerated. A strong positive group description also emerged in the course of the interviews. Muslims are seen as being the 'chosen people' and the only group destined for Paradise. Respondents readily compared themselves positively with non-Muslims: materialism/spiritualism, aggressor/victim, and immorality/morality. The attempt to forge a 'Muslim identity' is difficult and contested because of deep differences of tradition. In fact, there is visible tension in this process of revival over many issues, such as the covering of the face, dietary regulations, women attending mosques, sufi practices like dhikr, education, and so on. It would therefore be incorrect to suggest that a homogeneous Islam is emerging. But there is greater tolerance for the perspectives of others. A number of respondents emphasised that there was no alternative given that the threat of 'the other', the common threat of secularism, was greater. The violent altercations that were a feature of relations between Barelwis and Deobandis in the 1980s have subsided. Many of the respondents seemed to accept that their interpretations of Islam could not be imposed on others and that they should give voice to shared values and concerns. Many practices remain disputed but the rise of Sufi Islam is one example where middle ground has been found. This search for a 'Muslim' identity has taken definite organisational form. In 1994 a number of organisations formed the United Ulama Council of South Africa (UUCSA) to 'provide unified and competent leadership that will address the contemporary problems facing Muslims at all levels in South Africa'. UUCSA includes the Muslim Judicial Council of the Cape, the Natal and Transvaal Jamiatul Ulama, which represents the Deobandi School, as well as the Sunni Jamiatul Ulama, and Sunni Ulama Council, which represent the Barelwi School (UUCSA Pamphlet, 1998). The importance of this organisation is largely symbolic because it has not achieved anything concrete. Its importance lay in its sending a signal that Muslims are willing to work together in spite of deep differences. Several Mawlanas also indicated that there is informal contact between themselves and Ulama from other traditions.

Muslims and the South African State

When questioned, most respondents considered themselves adamantly 'Muslim': 'I am a Muslim first, then an Indian, then a South African'.¹¹ 'But this is my country. I have never been to India or Pakistan and never want to go'. 'I was born here and always lived here - I have nowhere else to go'. While there is acceptance of being South African citizens, this means, for most, that South Africa is the place where they were born and where they live. It did not entail a deep affective allegiance to the country and its institutions. The concept of 'nation' is not very clearly understood. Respondents used the word loosely to refer to 'Muslims', 'Hindus', 'Africans', 'whites', etc, rather than a broader collectivity embracing all South Africans. In fact, very few respondents have given thought to what it means to be living as a minority in a plural democracy. This is not to imply that Muslims display animosity and hostility to the state. Respondents were not unpatriotic but mainly indifferent. An absence of patriotism, after all, is impossible because, at this stage, the 'nation' is diffused through Muslim life through the law, economy, welfare system, health system and so on.¹² In fact, very few issues have mobilised Indian Muslims politically in post-apartheid South Africa. While Christian lobby groups, for example, have protested against abortion, Muslims have been silent on this and many other policies that respondents considered to be fundamentally against their beliefs. This lack of mobilisation is despite the fact that there was a degree of worry and anxiety among respondents that the ANC-government is discriminating against non-Africans, including Muslims, and general disillusionment that levels of unemployment, crime and corruption have rocketed out of control. However, Indian Muslims are relatively better off than the majority population, and the effects of affirmative action and neo-liberal economic policies have not yet diminished standards of living to unacceptable levels. Further, redistribution mechanisms amongst Muslims ensure minimum survival standards for most working class Muslims.¹³

This differs from the Cape where Muslims have rallied in large numbers around issues of crime, drugs, the US bombing of Iraq, and the visit by Tony Blair. Attempts by Pagad to form a chapter in Durban under Rashid Sulaman failed to muster support amongst Muslims. While there some initial support for Pagad amongst Durban's Muslims, as the violence associated with Pagad and gangs increased its support base began shrinking among the respondents in Durban. According to Mr MV:

We must not use violence. We will get a bad name. Instead, we must get involved in the existing parties and work our way to the top. Once

we have people in power we must try to use our influence to change the laws.... Pagad is not good in the Cape. We don't want bombing and fighting. We want peace to live our lives as good Muslims.

Most Muslims accept that they cannot establish an Islamic state in South Africa. Two Islamic parties contested the 1994 election, the Cape-based Islamic Party under Abdullah Gamielien and the Africa Muslim Party under Imtiaz Sooliman. Both failed to gain a seat. In 1999 the Africa Moral Party contested the election without success (*Al-Qalam*, May 1999). For Farid Essack, the formation of these parties was a 'negative response to fears of the unknown.... This position shows no understanding of the complexities of the problems facing our country, nor any appreciation of how Islam translates into tangible and practical policies for governing a modern state' (Essack 1999:165-166). Prior to the 1999 election the Islamic Unity Conference (IUC) under Achmat Cassiem, who claimed to represent 600 Muslim organisations, called on Muslims to boycott the election (*Al-Qalam*, May 1999). The IUC argued that to vote for an un-Islamic state would mean that Muslims would be partners to legalised abortion, gay rights, prostitution, and other practices that were contrary to Islam (*The Daily News*, May 20, 1999). However, the IUC was unable to name the organisations that it represented and remained a peripheral factor. On the contrary, widely supported organisations such as the Jamiat, Muslim Judicial Council and Muslim Youth Movement urged Muslims to vote (*Al-Qalam*, May 1999).

Overthrowing the state was not a priority amongst respondents. While they did not display affection and patriotism to the state, there was a degree of relative contentment and satisfaction among respondents at living in an environment that is not hostile to them. They focused on the advantages of living in South Africa, where they could live according to Islamic norms, as opposed to the negatives. Respondents recognised that they enjoyed full respect in South Africa as citizens and were not marginalised as is the case with Muslim minorities in places like France and Germany. According to Mr SH Muslims could not demand minority rights in a secular 'kufr' state. They had to be positive and offer Islam as a solution to the country's problems. According to Mrs RH since Muslims are living in a secular state that guarantees their right to worship, there was no need to 'challenge' the government: 'Only when we are prevented from practicing Islam, we'll make demands. We should concentrate on becoming true Muslims. Otherwise, if we get the state, what will we have? A corrupt Islamic country like so many in the world'. Mr FB responded: 'We have to see to our own

strength and capabilities, especially our moral and spiritual health. We do not have the numbers. But if we get our character right and set an example to others, who knows what might happen.... We don't know our "A, B, and C's" and we want X, Y, Z. We should use our rights given by the Constitution and propagate to the masses'. Oliver Roy refers to this process as the creation of 'liberated zones', that is, forming spaces where the ideals of a future society can prevail. Unlike 'liberated zones', he adds, 'no counterpower is established, no counterstate'. Instead, there prevails the 'idea of later spreading the principles on which it is founded to the whole of society' (1996:80). Respondents pointed out that a motto like 'Islamic State' was meaningless given that Muslims are a demographic minority. Muslim identity is thus being asserted and reconstructed along conservative lines and there is a noticeable absence of a political agenda. For the moment, the reconstituted identity of Indian Muslims does not involve violence or revolution.

Many Muslims are shunning active involvement in secular civil society and, especially, alignment with particular parties. When Mawlana Rashid Omar wrote that Muslims owed allegiance to Africa, the riposte was swift (*Sunday Independent*, January 24, 1999). A Patel wrote that the only allegiance of Muslims was 'to Allah'; the views of Omar 'served the vested interests of the ANC'. Omar had become 'President Mandela's fifth column' who 'stooped so low as to prostitute Islam to further the aims and objectives of political ideology' (*Sunday Independent*, January 31, 1999). For E Suliman intellectuals were not 'representatives of the religious community.... Islam and Muslims [cannot] be sacrificed at the altar of a newly created political order' (*Sunday Independent*, February 7, 1999). While Muslims have not displayed allegiance to the new state, this has not brought to the fore a counter-revolutionary force. Few Muslims in Durban can be termed 'radicals' in the sense that they constitute a threat to the state even though the press has attempted to link Muslims to international terrorism.¹⁴ Muslims, Mr AK felt, needed to move beyond living under the shadow of secularism and the protection of the Bill of Rights, and develop a consistent political strategy on issues such as the concept of democracy as the basis of society, the meaning of Darul Islam (Islamic State), the validity of using violence in a democratically elected state, areas in civil society where Muslims can contribute, and the most effective way for Muslims to participate in government. A coherent position will overcome the present tendency where some Muslims seek to wage war to get out of the morass while others seek refuge in mosques.

Muslim intellectuals and professionals are concerned that Muslims are distancing themselves from the state and the African majority. Two conferences were organized during 1999 to address this issue. In April 1999 the Organisation of the Islamic Conference hosted a symposium in Sandton, Johannesburg, to discuss 'Muslims and Political Development in Southern Africa',¹⁵ which brought together academics, professionals and the Ulama. While many constructive suggestions were tabled, there were two problems. First, the Ulama were conspicuous by their silence. With one or two exceptions, they did not present any of the formal public lectures, nor did they actively participate in discussions that followed formal presentations. Second, the timing of the conference just prior to South Africa's second democratic election and the manner in which President-elect Thabo Mbeki and the rest of the top brass of the ANC were feted, with Mbeki guest speaker at the banquet, suggests that the conference had political undertones. There was a clear message to Muslims that they should participate in the election, while the message to the ANC was that South African Muslims and the Arab world were behind the government, whatever the public posturing of Pagad. This was followed by another conference at UD-W in July 1999, organised by 'Muslim Vision 2020: working towards an exemplary community'. The Committee of Ten that organised the conference comprised of academics, professionals and members of welfare organisations but not a single member of the Ulama.¹⁶

Together, these conferences emphasised that participating in the wider society will advance rather than retard Islam. Muslims should interact with non-Muslims who might embrace Islam from the example set them by Muslims. Negative stereotypes (terrorists, racists, etc) of Muslims can only be challenged through involvement in the wider society. Withdrawal into a laager will marginalise Muslims whose needs will be ignored if they alienate the majority African population. On the contrary, Islamic tradition demanded that Muslims embrace social movements and civil society and become part of the struggle to reclaim the position of South Africans from globalisation. Muslims had to assist in reducing poverty, tackling environmental issues, achieving reconstruction and reconciliation. Ebrahim Rasool, keynote speaker at UD-W, criticised the Islam practiced by most Muslims who believed that following rituals was sufficient, and relied on slogans and emotionalism. Instead, he argued, Muslims had to 'intellectually engage with issues'. In similar vein Farid Essack has written that Muslims should be 'interventionist'; they should go around 'determinedly and consistently contributing to the creation of a new world.... In the garden of

humanity there are really no spectators; even the neutral ones are players...’ (Essack 1999:100). The problem with intellectuals is one of relevance to the wider Muslim community. Few of the respondents were aware of the conference, and none was particularly concerned with the outcome. The reality is that the shapers of Muslim opinion amongst the majority of Indian Muslims in Durban remain formally trained Ulama. As long as the Ulama are not an integral part of discussions, proposals emanating from conferences will have parochial relevance in the lives of ordinary Muslims. Intellectuals need to engage Ulama in constructive dialogue to convince them of the need for a paradigm shift. The influence of intellectuals is marginal because they are confined outside mosques. The Ulama and intellectuals inhabit different worlds. They do not engage constructively; exchanges usually end in polemics and are polemical. Writing of his exchange with a traditional scholar Farid Essack commented: ‘We were speaking different languages. I simply could not deal with their questions because they came from a mindset from which I feel completely alienated. Postmodern Islam was talking, not conversing, with traditional Islam’ (Essack 1999:123). At Sandton, Y Dadoo commented that the problem was that the Ulama were not prepared to contextualise the socio-economic problems of Muslims, while intellectuals lacked a proper knowledge of theology. He argued that this fragmented tradition inhibited creative and constructive interaction that could make up for the deficiencies of each.

Conclusion

Globalisation and modernity have translated into uncertain configurations in the new South Africa. This study has focused on how Durban’s Indian Muslims are grappling with the questions posed by modernity, social diversity and the destruction of old and respected traditions. It has shown that while many South African Muslims have been repositioning themselves, or feel the need to do so, in the context of an ANC-ruled democratic South Africa that has placed itself firmly on a secular foundation, they have been repositioning themselves in different ways. There is not one Muslim community but several. There are varying degrees of ‘fundamentalisms’ or ‘conservatisms’ among them. Apart from sharing Pagad’s unease about the growing influence of American cultural and economic influence, Durban’s Muslims are not inclined to establish militias to mete out ‘just’ punishments or to take to the streets to protect Islamic values. They are reluctant to challenge the post-1994 state in the same way that Pagad seems to be doing. As Hall (1992) has pointed out, identities are formed and transformed continuously in the ‘interaction’ between individual and society. The

identities of Muslims in post-apartheid South Africa are shifting. While they have access to a wide range of identities in the New South Africa, most respondents are turning nostalgically to an invented past of perfect Islamic sociality. The perception of being Muslim is strengthening and Islam is becoming an important component in self-description. Many Muslims are retreating to an Islamic identity that is perceived to be fixed and unchanging. For respondents this permanence allows them to belong to a social collectivity or 'community'. Many Muslims have also come to believe that public institutions, educational, cultural, and political, cannot safeguard Islamic values and that they should take the preservation of these into their own hands. The new Islam does not have a proselytising aspect to it. It is based largely on self-reformation while contact and integration with non-Indian African, white and coloured Muslims is largely non-existent.

In seeking to introduce new and tighter Islamic codes in the public and private domains, Indian Muslims in Durban are not necessarily seeking to undermine the state. Indeed, they are using the new freedoms of a secular state to create space for themselves and are thereby redefining for themselves the kind of Muslims they want to be. An inward-looking Indian Muslim community is developing, with an understanding that the constitution can be used to struggle for specific needs and rights. While respondents, generally, did not display national pride or affection for the new state, this does not signify disloyalty either. The nature of the state was not questioned, signifying de-politicisation. This phenomenon is not unique to Muslims. Cultural pluralism is a natural attribute of political societies (Young 1998:5), and nation-states all over are struggling to assert authority over their citizens. This is especially true of South Africa whose specific history has engendered deep differences of education, race, ethnicity, value orientations, individual needs and so on. The new South African state is in a difficult position. It has to balance the specific needs and demands of Muslims, Afrikaners, coloureds and other minorities, against the need to redress deep-seated inequalities, maintain public safety and order and create respect for human rights. As far as the demands of minorities are concerned, as Young reminds us, 'while the premise of a culturally homogenous national identity is flawed, neither does the state have an obligation to promote and enforce difference' (Young 1998:3). The new state is following a secular programme, and may or may not continue to tolerate Islamic institutions. This may loosen the loyalties of Muslims to the state in the future.

Notes

1. The financial assistance of the National Research Foundation towards this research is hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed in this paper and conclusions arrived at, are those of the author and are not necessarily to be attributed to the National Research Foundation
2. According to Jeppie (1987) there is no such thing as a 'Malay' community. While this term may not have a foundation in social science it is used here because it has been widely internalised by most South Africans to refer to the coloured Muslims of the Cape. This also explains use of the word coloured.
3. Population Census, 1996. This was calculated by examining 'second language' statistics.
4. An indication of the depth of caste feeling is that the trust deed of the Grey Street Mosque provides for nine trustees based on sectarian lines: five Memons, two Gujarati's, one Kokney and one colonial-born. The trust deed defines a 'colonial-born' as an urdu-speaking descendant of indentured labourers.
5. The Jamiat, for example, ruled that 'due to the immorality of the times ... it is compulsory for a female to cover her face which is the focus of her beauty'. This would accord a woman a 'degree of respect, honour and dignity and of being in charge of her body'. The Sunni Jamiat, on the other hand, whose support base is amongst working-class Muslims, does not compel women to cover their faces.
6. Muslims cannot consume pork or alcohol while other animals have to be slaughtered in a prescribed manner.
7. Figures supplied by Mr Farid Choonara, Chariman, Hajj and Umrah Council, August 19, 1999.
8. Figures supplied by S Ebrahim, Regional Director, Association of Muslim Schools, KZN.
9. While this is contrary to the law regarding compulsory education the government has not clamped down.
10. Ordinary individuals make a pledge to the Shaykh. This is referred to as Bay'at. The word 'Bay' means to sell. By bay'at a mureed 'sells' himself to his Shaykh and thus to God.
11. Given the contextual nature of identities, the seriousness of these claims have to be investigated. Were they for the benefit of the questioner? Would respondents have said something else at another time or to someone else? Perhaps they would have. But these claims and identities must be understood against the backdrop of material realities which can be assessed. My own impression is that respondents were serious and sincere about these assertions.
12. Many respondents were keen to emphasise that all the non-Africans who were killed in detention by the apartheid government were Muslim. They include

Imam Haroun, Ahmed Timol and Dr Haffejee. Ahmed Kathrada was imprisoned with Nelson Mandela while Yusuf Dadoo held important leadership positions within the ANC and CP.

13. Muslims are compelled to pay an annual tax amounting to 2.5 per cent of their wealth. Called Zakaat, this is a pillar of their faith and is redistributed to needy Muslims.
14. For example, the *Sunday Tribune* (November 15, 1998) tried to link the Islamic Propagation Centre in Durban with the 'international terrorist' Osama Bin Laden.
15. The conference was held on April 23-25, 1999. The Organisation of Islamic Conference is an Arab funded body that meets every two years to discuss problems faced by Muslims worldwide.
16. The organising committee was all-male. According to one of the organisers religious leaders and women were invited to be part of the Committee but did not attend. They did attend the conference, however.

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