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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
ABRON KINGDOM OF GYAMAN

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"Money is nothing, the name is what matters." -
Prince Kwame Adingra to his secretary, Mr. A.K.,
c. 1960.

In the present article we propose to analyse the political economy of the Abron kingdom of Gyaman during the precolonial period. After briefly describing Gyaman's population, history, and political and economic organization, we will describe the various means by which the kingdom obtained its revenues, and the manner in which it spent them. We will then examine the administration of "public finances" and its principal agents. Finally, we will describe the changes which were imposed on the entire economy by the coming of colonial rule.¹

I.

The territory occupied by the Abron kingdom of Gyaman lies in what is now the northeastern Ivory Coast and northwestern Ghana: it stretches between the Komoe and the Black Volta, on the border of the savannah and the forest.

Founded in about 1690 by the Gyamanhene ~~Tan~~ Date, the kingdom fell under Ashanti domination in 1740, and this was maintained for approximately 135 years, despite numerous revolts (1750, 1764, 1802-1804). Gyaman regained its independence only in 1875, after the Ashanti defeat by the English and the destruction of Kumasi by

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Sir Garnet Wolseley. Between 1875 and 1886, it underwent a period of serious internal troubles. Invaded by Samori's sofas in the spring of 1895, it was occupied by the end of 1897 by the French in the West and the British in the East.²

The first European travellers arrived in Gyaman during the 1880's. They attributed to it then a population of 80,000 inhabitants, an estimate that appears reasonable.³ This population was ethnically heterogenous. Gyaman is a political entity which assembles peoples of very different origins, language, and culture, and among whom the Abron themselves form only a small minority: according to the census made by Captain Benquey between 1901 and 1904 in the "French" part of the kingdom, these numbered only 11,500 out of a total population of 49,000.⁴

A rapid review of the main peoples living in Gyaman includes:

- Gur-speakers: the Nafana (relatives of the Senufo), the Lorho, the Degha, and especially the Kulango peasants, who are spread throughout the kingdom and compose half of its population.
- Mande-speakers: the Goro and the Gbin; then the Ligbi, and the Numu blacksmiths, whose language has been adopted by the indigenous Hwela; and finally the Dyula, traders, artisans, and "marabouts," some settled in the town of Bonduku, others in the western march of Barabo.
- Finally Akan-speakers: the Anyi, in the south, and the Abron, themselves the descendants of numerous Akan migrants who gathered around a nucleus that came from Akwamu, north of Accra.⁵

These populations arrived in several waves, and the Abron, who entered the region from about 1680, belong to the last of these, except for the Dyula of Barabo, invited into Gyaman by the first Gyamanhene during the eighteenth century. Although the Kulango dominate to the north and Anyi to the south, the different groups are enormously interwoven; divisions are by village or even, in the main agglomerations, by neighbourhood.

The Abron, a minority that arrived after the groups, installed their domination gradually, by means of a policy that shrewdly combined force and diplomacy.⁶ They monopolized political power. The institutions of their state developed in the course of the eighteenth century, and were basically similar to those of the other Akan states of the same period. Gyaman proper was divided into five provinces, of which the territories were intertwined. The most important of these was the royal domain (ahen efie, the "house" of the king), which the ruler governed directly; it accounted for 40 - 50% of the population. As regards daily administration, provincial autonomy was very great: the chiefs had a power similar to that of the king in his domain for all matters concerning internal politics, religion, the administration of justice, and the economy. It is true that the decisions of their courts could be appealed to the ruler, but he almost always confirmed them. However, as regards "foreign affairs," it was the council made up of the king and the chiefs that took the major decisions, such as a declaration of war or the formation of an alliance. At least formal unanimity was required in these cases. In short, the kingdom was a confederation, and this kind of structure strictly limited the king's power. This situation provoked severe conflict and at the end of the nineteenth century turmoil threatened the unity and indeed the very existence of the state.

Below the king and the chiefs were lesser dignitaries who took charge of the daily transactions of business. In the royal domain, one must distinguish between the office holders and the safohene (captains). Among the former, there were three adontenhene, who in wartime commanded the advance guard of the army, the kyeame (spokesman), the heads of the king's servants (Gyasehene), of the executioners (Brafohene), of the tambourine players, of the stool carriers, etc. Each of these officers belonged to a particular lineage - often a patrilineage - and was passed down within it: at least in theory, the king did not intervene in the choice of the

title-holder. As for the safohene, they were men to whom the king had granted, under his control, the "surveillance" of villages as a reward for their exploits in war or for a service rendered. The safohene presided over the lower courts, and led to war the men from those villages for which they were responsible. This position was hereditary, and was usually passed down through the father. In the provinces, organization was simpler: there were kyeame, a few court officials, and safohene. Finally, at the lowest rung of the hierarchy were village and neighbourhood chiefs: it was on this level only that the Kulango, Nafana, Anyi, etc. obtained any position of power.

Finally, in the course of the first decade of its existence, Gyaman established its hegemony over a number of neighbouring areas, and the kings of the period delegated the task of "supervising" them to various provincial chiefs: thus the three Anyi chieftaincies of Bona were under the Siengihene, Nasian, Bini, and Barabo under the Penangohene; only Asikasso was directly under the ruler. But these vassals also enjoyed great internal autonomy.

Such were the main characteristics of the political organization of the kingdom, briefly described.

II.

In Gyaman as elsewhere, the state drew the resources it needed to function from the economic activities of its people; so a few words must be said about them. Of course the most important was agriculture. The main crop was yam, to which was added maize in the north, plantains in the south. The area also produced tobacco, palm oil, and such "industrial" plants as cotton and indigo. However, little kôla was grown, and none exported. In the savannah area, the raising of sheep, goats, and cattle increased somewhat until the epidemic of 1892 and the invasion of Samori in 1895 brought losses from which the area never fully recovered.

In addition, Gyaman soon became known for the importance of its gold mines: in 1817 and 1820, Bowdich and Dupuis heard of its fame through their Kumasi informants, and in the same period the information spread as far as Fezzan.⁷ In Abron country, mining was done in two different ways. Gold dust was obtained from the sediment deposited by certain rivers, by a procedure analogous to the "lavage a la batée" used by gold seekers everywhere during the nineteenth century. Or gold was extracted by genuine mining. Here the method was to reach, follow, and exhaust the veins: hence pits were dug having roughly a yard in diameter, and a depth of as much as twenty five yards;⁹ the miner reached the bottom by means of rough steps dug into the sides; the ore, piled into calabashes, was hauled to the surface with vines; there, a group of workers washed the soil or broke up the quartz. In both cases, gold-seeking was seasonal work: for the rains swelled the rivers and flooded the pits, making extraction impossible. On the other hand, however, gold washing requires a great deal of water, which becomes increasingly rare as the dry season advances. Thus the most favourable period is that which immediately follows the rains. Allowing for the intermittent nature of the work, extracting gold in Gyaman meant the mobilization of a very great number of people; Dupuis states that during a two-month period eight to ten thousand slaves washed gold on the banks of the Ba river, which waters the south Abron country before flowing into the Komoe.¹⁰

As for processing industries, one must distinguish between local crafts - woodworking, basket-making, spinning - practised in all rural communities - and more specialized work: the Numu villages and neighbourhoods did the iron-working, the Degha women of Motiamo made pottery, Hausa settled in Bunduku from the early nineteenth century were the dyers. As for weaving, it was done by Abron and especially by Dyula specialists. The former remained in their villages. The latter moved about with their looms or settled in Bonduku.¹¹

had worked for yams. As for the captives, their fate depended on the amount of time they had spent within the court and the trust their master had in them. On his arrival, the captive had no plot of his own; he worked on the lands of the compound head from whom in exchange he received his food. But adolescents were treated in the same way. Later his master gave him a wife and, on condition of good behaviour, he was allocated a plot of land from which he drew food for himself and his family; the rest of the time he worked for his master. The latter might even permit him to do a bit of trading: one third of the profits then belonged to his. As we saw, the young men of the court were subject to similar rules. In fact the difference between the position of adolescents and that of captives was mainly that the latter were given the dirtiest and most disagreeable tasks, and that they had no matrilineage which could defend them and allow them to hope for a change in status. In this context, the captives may be seen as perpetual minors, and as the lowest among them: slavery was patriarchal and domestic, merely an extension of the lineage system.

The position of captives possessed by the king, the provincial chiefs, and the important dignitaries of the kingdom, and by the Dyula traders of Bonduku, was different: here we find a different mode of production, one that was actually based on slavery. It was not that the customs affecting slaves were fundamentally different: here too captives could, after a certain lapse of time, and if they had been docile, be granted a wife and a plot of land. But within the court they formed a much more numerous group: a single master could own several dozen, even, in the king's case, several hundred, entrusting their supervision to a son or to his free dependants. He did not work alongside them; moreover, few of them lived near him; they were installed in camps established near the fields they were to cultivate, or, if their master were Dyula, in the agricultural hamlets that encircled Bonduku. Hence that permanent cohabitation which, in

the peasant compound, created relatively strong bonds between masters and captives disappeared.

What role did these captives play in the Kingdom's economy? In the first place, it was they who cultivated the fields from which the Abron aristocracy drew its immediate livelihood: before the colonial era, the Abron chiefs and their relatives did no manual work and lived almost completely upon the agricultural labour of their captives; in the same way, it was the captives of the djongso - agricultural hamlets - who assured supplies for the inhabitants of Bonduku and for passing caravans. In the second place, the captives accomplished an important part of the work linked to the extraction of gold, insofar as that was undertaken largely on the initiative of the king, the chiefs, and the notables; and underground work in particular was reserved to the slaves, because of its danger and difficulty. Finally, the transport of merchandise was for the most part given over to captives; it is true that they had no monopoly of portage; free men could do it for themselves or for others. But here too, it was essentially the king and the chiefs who organised commercial expeditions to Kong, Salaga, and the coast, and they gave their captives the task of carrying the goods they wished to sell or buy there; in the same way, most Dyula caravans were composed of slaves.¹⁸

III.

Such was the economic base upon which the Abron built their state. The state itself procured its revenues in various ways, which may be divided into three categories. First, the king and the provincial chiefs had the legal right to demand tribute from the populations they governed; second, by the very exercise of their power, especially their judicial power, they were able to draw off a considerable part of the area's resources; finally, they enjoyed the

profits which their mining and commercial enterprises brought them. We will consider booty and duties separately.

Let us first describe direct taxes. These were levied in labour as well as in kind, and took different forms, which can be described briefly:

- The Kulango and Abron peasants furnished labour to the king and provincial chiefs at the time when agricultural activity was greatest, when yams (ignames) were planted: each year Kulango and Abron villages were convened one by one for a day. When the king ordered it, they also kept up the roads.

- The Kulango and Abron gave the king or Abron provincial chief one tusk, the tail, and the haunches of slaughtered elephants, as well as all lion and panther skins.

- All gold nuggets were given over to the king and the provincial chiefs, who could also order the search for gold over the whole extent of their respective domains without having to make the payment to the Kulango rulers of the soil, that would normally have been due. Moreover, when the lodes were exploited by prospectors who were strangers to the province - whether they came from another province or from neighbouring territories - they had to give over to the ruler or Abron chief concerned a set proportion - usually a third - of their findings, without this affecting the amount they also owed to the village chief.²¹

- During the Yam Festival, which only the Abron kept, Kulango villagers, and apparently only they, brought to the king and chiefs dues in kind (yams, sheep, chickens, game), though these were rather light: from six to one hundred yams, from one to twelve sheep per village.²²

- The king and chiefs appropriated all twins born on their territory, as well as all albinos. They could also marry whatever girls they pleased in a certain number of specially designated Kulango villages.²³

- Finally, when a region had special natural resources, its inhabitants had to allow king and chiefs to benefit from them: thus dwellers on the Komoe brought their fish, and the Anyi of Bona, snails.²⁴ However, the inhabitants of the border areas conquered by the Abron - Barabo, Nasian, Bini, Bona, Asikaso - were not subject as to any special tribute.²⁵

All these dues were levied mainly upon the Abron and specially the Kulango peasant communities, but it is clear that they were not very high: a day of work a year, a few dozen yams, and a few sheep per average Kulango village; otherwise, except for the gold nuggets, Abron and Kulango could freely search for gold, at least in their native provinces; finally vassals were not forced to pay any particular dues. How can one explain such relative moderation? Certainly, for more than a century, the Abron, as will be mentioned again below, were forced to pay tribute to the Ashanti, and they could hardly add their own demands to this already considerable load. But otherwise, what the king and chiefs demanded from their subjects above all, was not material wealth, but military support: in wartime the Kulango and Abron peasants formed the majority of the kingdom's army. Thus the exploitation from which they suffered had to be limited: it ceased when its excess might compromise their loyalty, by provoking discontent, defections, or revolts. Thus the significance of the dues just enumerated was political rather than economic; certainly, the rights of the chiefs to ivory and gold nuggets helped enrich them; however, most of the other dues - and notably the giving over of lion and leopard skins and the contributions during the Yam Festival - had and clearly symbolic function: their purpose was to show in a public and tangible way the subjection of the peasant communities and the supremacy of the Abron aristocracy.²⁶

Seen in this light, dues did not affect the populace only; the Abbron notables were equally concerned, in two ways. First, Tauxier mentions the taxing by king and provincial chiefs of the legacies of the safohene and of deceased village chiefs, and seems to think this consisted of a regular tax;²⁷ actually, although the result was similar, the intention was different: if the king or the provincial chief honoured the funeral of a subordinate with an envoy and a gift, he had to be thanked by means of a counter-gift of greater value, which according to informants was usually triple. Also, when a chief of inferior rank was enstooled, his superior - the king or provincial chief - received before enthroning him a quantity of gold dust that could go, according to the newly-promoted man's position, as high as eight kponta (the kponta, the Kulango equivalent of Abbron asia, is a weight of 8,8 grams: one kponta of gold dust was equal to £7). The provincial chiefs themselves could not escape this payment.²⁸ Here, too, the sum given was not very great, but in making the payment the notables publicly recognized the pre-eminence of the top office holders; for the same reason they brought them wood to burn at the time of the Yam Festival.

The king and chiefs obtained much more substantial revenues from what we have called "indirect tribute", and particularly from their right to judge cases. Here, minor affairs - adultery, theft - were judged by village chiefs, but their decision could be appealed to the king and the chiefs; moreover the latter directly judged serious cases - homicides, adultery with the wife of an important official.²⁹ Therein lay a major source of wealth, of which certain aspects should be emphasized.

In the first place, certain crimes - witchcraft, acts of high treason and of *lèse majesté* - were punished by death, but the executions were usually followed by confiscation of goods. Had the guilty party been a sorcerer, at least one of his children would be given over to the king or to the chief who had rendered the verdict.³⁰ For other offences the usual sanction was a fine, which was added

to the reparations due to the persons hurt and went to enlarge the royal treasure. Should one of the parties pronounce the royal oath, which recalled either a past defeat or an ancestor of the sovereign who had disappeared, and which forced the latter to try the offence in his court, the fine was considerably increased, which was supposed to make up for the unpleasantness caused him: these were the notorious "customs", which also benefitted the provincial chiefs.³¹ Finally, the winning party had to express its gratitude to the judges, by giving them presents, the importance of which varied according to what had been at stake in the trial and the rank of those involved.³² And fines, customs, and presents were all to be paid in gold: in this way, the king and the chiefs could drain off a not unimportant part of the gold that ordinary citizens collected.³³

The exercise of judicial power also permitted the chiefs to enlarge their reserves of captives: when an individual was constantly unruly and in debt, his relatives, tired of paying heavy fines for him, gave him over to the king or chief, who could either sell him out of the country, or retain him in his service.³⁴

Such procedure strongly affected the division of wealth among the Abron. Take a fortunate gold-seeker: his success would soon make the king and chiefs envious, and they would use all pretexts to fine him so heavily that his rise would be slowed down or even halted. "In the old days, one could be rich in secret only." say informants.³⁵ Here too the threat of defection or revolt was the most effective limit to arbitrary use of power; however, it could happen that the limit was reached: for example, the exactions of the king Kwadwo Adingra (c. 1795-1818) help explain his subjects' lack of enthusiasm in the unfortunate war which he fought against Ashanti in 1818.³⁶

In describing these practices Europeans spoke of systematic abuses, which they set down to the rapacity and unscrupulousness of the Abron aristocracy. This explanation is superficial; actually, the nouveau riche was not forced to choose between clandestinity and

spoliation; a third possibility was open to him: he could put his fortune at the service of the established political powers. For example, he could directly come to the help of the King and Chiefs' Treasuries, for they had heavy expenses and were often in serious financial trouble; he could also recruit and equip a company of warriors at his expense, which, in wartime, he would place under the ruler's command. As a reward, the latter would appoint him safchene and would give him the supervision of several villages; our man would exercise judiciary power over these and would thus collect fines; he would participate in tax collection and receive his share; in short, the recognized mechanisms of the concentration of wealth would now play in his favour; but that would be due to his having become part of the established political hierarchy: his fortune from now on would serve its interests and goals.³⁷

In other words, what the fining system prevented was the forming among the Abron of a class of "rich men", such as that which at the time existed in numerous coastal societies, that would have been independent of the aristocracy and that could challenge the latter's hegemony. The acquisition of wealth could be pursued as a "private" and autonomous activity within strict limits only: if the newly wealthy individual wished to avoid dispossession and to continue to enrich himself, he could do so only by offering his goods to the state. In any case the latter won out, since in one way or another the accumulation of wealth was carried on through its institutions.

V.

However, the king and the chiefs were obliged to share the income from fines and judicial charges with the dignitaries and elders who assisted them during the trials. Thus the only revenues which they could use exactly as they wished were those that came from what we have called their own "businesses." These were of various

kinds. As regards agriculture, the king and chiefs owned fields which their captives cultivated, but the harvest was used only to feed the court and its guests; it was not sold, and therefore brought no profit. In addition, the king maintained hunters, who pursued large game, particularly elephants; when one was killed, the king sent one of his dependants to Kumasi or the court to sell the tusks.³⁸ Third, as we saw, the king and the chiefs exploited the gold mines: early in the nineteenth century, Dupuis reported that the gold of Gyaman "is dug principally out of large pits, which belonged to the late king, in the neighbourhoods of Briuanti and Kontoosoo",³⁹ in 1893, Braulot met at Surmakuru, in Asikaso, "all the inhabitants of the village of Kandena, near Sapia," occupied in extracting gold;⁴⁰ now Kandena was then the residence of the Fumasehene Dua Yao: it was probably for his benefit that the work was done. Finally the king and chiefs organized commercial expeditions to Kong, to Salaga, or to the Gulf of Guinea: for example, at the end of 1888 the Siengihene Kwaku Diawusi sent his servants to buy a thousand guns in Krinjabo;⁴¹ in 1896 Glozel at Manzanua passed a caravan of twelve captives led by Kosi Druo, sword-bearer for the Gyamanhene Kwaku Agyeman.⁴² However, one must not misunderstand the object of these expeditions: for those who controlled them, the goal was not to obtain a commercial profit, but to realise on exterior markets the surplus product that had been extorted from their subjects and captives: in fact the merchandise brought back - slaves, arms, luxury goods - was not sold again and was added to the patrimony of the stool.

A separate description must be provided for the revenues obtained through war and foreign policy generally, because of their "extraordinary" character. In the first place, the rules concerning the sharing of booty, which was composed mainly of captives, were clearly to the advantage of the king and chiefs. Theoretically the booty belonged to them in its entirety, and after a battle all the enemies captured were handed over to them; but in practice, sharing was the rule, and this they immediately proceeded to do: had they

acted otherwise, they would have compromised the loyalty of their troops. But the original giving-over of the booty to the king and chiefs made its later distribution appear a gift due to generosity only. This distribution followed precise rules: the fate of prisoners taken in combat differed from that of captives - women, children, old people - who were taken after victory, during the invasion of enemy territory. The former were equally divided between the warriors responsible for their capture and the king or chief of their province. As for the latter, they belonged to whoever took them. Thus the king by no means appropriated all the captives taken in war, but the contingent attributed to him was the most important.¹³ The size of that contingent varied according to circumstances: in 1805 the unfortunate Abu Bekr al-Siddiq, captured in Buna by the army of Gyamanhene Kwadwo Adingra, was immediately marched to the coast and sold to Europeans;¹⁴ in 1825, on the contrary, the prisoners who were taken back from Buna by the Gyamanhene Kwasi Yeboa were settled, some in his capital of Tabagne, where they formed the Kilio quarter, others in Dadiase, where they were made to serve the spirit Tan Kwabena and his priests, to thank them for the "spiritual" support that the latter had given the Abbron troops during the conflict.¹⁵ In the same way, in 1882 the Kyidomhene Kwaku Kosonu Pape settled the captives he had taken in Benda in his village of origin, Gumere.¹⁶

To booty was added the indemnity demanded of the vanquished when peace was concluded, and the ransom which the Abbron sometimes accepted when their prisoners were of Akan origin. For example, in 1877 Abbron and Dormaa invaded Berekup, and the king and inhabitants took refuge in Nkwanta. Nine years later the victors agreed to negotiate, to allow their adversaries to return to their country, and to return the captives they held - the Gyamanhene alone owned one hundred - in exchange for a ransom of half a peredwan of gold dust, or a value of £4 ls. each.¹⁷ In a more general way, foreign policy was also a source of occasional gains for the king: among

these were the gold given him by foreign rulers to obtain his alliance; in 1876-77, the Gyamanhene Kwaku Agyeman received important amounts of gold from the kings of Dormaa, Takyiman, and Seikwa, who solicited his support against the Ashanti.⁴⁸ However, the sums obtained in this way had to be divided between the ruler and the provincial chiefs.

On the other hand, as was said earlier, the king and the chiefs levied no taxes or tolls upon long-distance trade; in particular the trade and profits of the Dyula were not taxed. This restraint can be explained first by economic reasons: to travel from Bobo Dyulaso to Kumasi, or from Kōng to Salaga, the Dyula caravans could go via Bonduku, but also via Buna. Under these circumstances, if the Abron attempted to establish tolls on their territory, their only effect would be to turn traffic through Buna. On several occasions, the Abron tried to obtain a monopoly by taking that town, but they were unable to hold it, and the permanent competition of Buna prevented them from levying on commerce any duties at all.⁴⁹ In a more general sense, the Abron governments were in a weak position as regards the Dyula; on the economic level, they needed them to "realize" the surplus acquired from the work of their subjects and especially from that of their slaves, and to acquire such valued goods as captives, cattle, Sudanic cloth, Saharan salt;⁵⁰ on the political level, the aristocracy constantly sought Dyula support, particularly that of the Watara of Kong, to resist Ashanti hegemony;⁵¹ finally, on the religious level, in time of scarcity as in time of war, the Dyula brought the king and chiefs the assistance of their prayers and amulets, and this assistance was considered indispensable to the kingdom's prosperity and grandeur.⁵² Given this situation, the Abron state could not allow itself to tap Dyula gains in any way; indeed the latter enjoyed almost complete judicial immunity through all Gyaman: in particular, no fines were levied upon them.⁵³ In short, for the king and chiefs the point was not to tax the Dyula, but to attract them and obtain their favour: this was the origin of the extraordinary privileges accorded them.

Up to a point, the Dyula, who controlled long-distance trade, were thus the equivalent of the "rich men" in the coastal societies. But the analogy is only partial: actually, in Gyaman, the Dyula were and remained strangers; if on occasion they exercised an important influence on state decisions, they were, on the other hand, excluded from all political office, since they could not accomplish the ritual tasks attached to these offices.⁵¹ Thus their presence allowed the Abbron aristocracy to resolve the difficult dilemma its ties with commerce presented: it needed the latter, but at the same time was afraid of the pernicious effects that could result. The aristocracy's power in fact rested on the one hand in its own cohesion, and on the other on the more or less voluntary support of the people for the military values it represented. Would not one and the other be undermined by the development of trade, which favoured individualism and presupposed the maintenance of peace? In giving the Dyula the status of privileged guests, the Abbron leaders overcame the contradiction: they might benefit from the advantages of trade, without having to tolerate the formation, within Abbron society, of a class of traders who might imperil their supremacy.

VI.

We have just described the resources of the Abbron state; now we must examine its expenses. These, in our opinion, can be divided into six main categories. We will pass rapidly over the first two, which need no special commentary: expenses linked to the support of the court - the purchase of supplies (meat), of salt, of alcohol, and of cloth for the wives, dependants, and servants of the ruler - and expenses of redistribution, those for example that were accepted at festival times, particularly at the Yam Festival. The four other categories are more significant, and were undoubtedly more important quantitatively.

First about what one might call expenses of ostentation. Indeed, the grandeur of a sovereign was not measured only by his equity and by his victories, but also by his efforts to enrich the heritage of the royal stool. All the precious objects acquired during his reign were added to this heritage, which would be transmitted to his successor: the more numerous they were and the greater was their value, the greater was his glory. Thus each king did his best to contribute to this enrichment, either by purchasing valuable cloths from abroad, or by patronising the most respected local craftsmen, weavers, and, especially, goldsmiths.⁵⁵ The latter melted down gold furnished by the king, and made from it figurines that were placed at the top of parasols used for formal occasions, canes with gold heads, sandals decorated with gold, jewels and ornaments of all kinds. Eventually these treasures were displayed at the festivities that accompanied the Yam Festival or the receptions given ambassadors. The fame of some of these objects even came to European ears. "The king of Gaman," reported Bowdich, "had steps of solid gold to ascend to his bed."⁵⁶ And Ginger describes the state sword carried by the servants of the Gyamanhene Kwaku Agyeman as follows: "The sword or rather the sabre of Arjoumani is a long blade shaped like a Yatagan of one meter twenty centimeters, equipped with teeth like a saw; it is topped a handle of melted gold, hollow, which includes a double knob, which weighs about two pounds. It has no designs, but is decorated with a rather well-drawn pattern of squares."⁵⁷ Other objects of the same kind played major role in Abbron history, such as the stool and ornament shaped liked an elephant, both in solid gold, which were produced at the command of the Gyamanhene Kwadwo Adingra: the Asantehene Osei Bonsu, feeling understably defied, demanded that it be given up to him, and Adingra's refusal became the immediate cause of the war of 1818 and the disaster of the Tain.⁵⁸

Next came religious expenses. Some were renewed each year; thus cattle and sheep were sacrificed to the spirit Tano at every Yam Festival; others occurred only when circumstances required them, in time of war, scarcity, or epidemic, for example. The beneficiaries of these extraordinary expenses included the spirit Tano and his priests once again, who were consulted before every important enterprise and who were richly rewarded in case of success,⁵⁹ and also the Dyula marabouts of Bonduku, Barabo, and Kong. The latter helped the sovereign with their prayers and peered into the future for him; they also furnished him with protective amulettes; in particular, they produced those which were sewn on the soldiers' war-dress, and which protected them against bullets and wounds. They were rewarded with sumptuous presents of gold dust and captives;⁶⁰ On the eve of Samori's invasion, the Gyamanhene Kwaku Agyeman thus sent al-hajj Bamoro Watara of Yerebodi seven guns with their barrels filled with gold dust, so that he would "prepare the battle;" but the messengers stole the gold, which was thought to have brought on the Abron defeat.⁶¹ One should emphasize that there was no question here of a fixed or regulated retribution; the king himself decided the value of his gifts, which was proportional to what was at stake or to the services rendered. Yet these expenses were extremely heavy, and, by this means, considerable wealth was transferred from the Abron to the Dyula.

In the third place, there were military expenses: it was the duty of the ruler and the provincial chiefs to own and equip their troops, and in particular to furnish them with guns and powder;⁶² it was for this reason, informants say, that they obtained the larger part of the booty: this advantage was supposed to defray the expenses they had had. But the result was that every defeat was followed among other things by a serious financial crisis: indeed, not only did the king and chiefs not recover the funds they had advanced, but in addition they had to pay to the victor enormous quantities of gold as an indemnity. Then they had to demand exceptional contributions

from their subjects and, if necessary, borrow from friendly rulers. All these means were used after the disaster of 1818: the Kulango of Sapia furnished fifty of the hundred hostages claimed by the Asantehene Osei Bonsu;⁶³ the Tufuhene Kwasi Sawiri paid from his own resources an important part of the fine inflicted by the Ashanti, for which in return he was given the command of the Sulemani region; but all this was not enough, and the Gyamanhene Kofi Fofie, Adingra's successor, in addition was forced to request a loan from the King of Mango Dian Watara.⁶⁵ To this indemnity were added heavy ransoms: thus the queen Ama Tania was taken in captivity to Kumasi, and the Abbron obtained her liberation only at the price of four hundred ounces of gold.⁶⁶

Finally, a last charge must be mentioned, that which was incurred, for 135 years of Abbron history, from 1740 to 1875, by the tribute in gold the Ashanti levied. European sources and tradition give differing accounts of its size: early in the nineteenth century, according to Bowdich, Gyaman had paid (besides all large pieces of rock gold) 100 pereguins annually;⁶⁷ but in 1882, the Gyamanhene Kwaku Agyeman told Captain Lonsdale that at the time of their domination the Ashanti took from him more than 18,000 ounces of gold dust annually.⁶⁸ According to our informants, the annual tribute was one hundred kponta during the reign of the Gyamanhene Kofi Sono (c.1750); but during that of Kwaku Agyeman, in the second half of the nineteenth century, it was raised to six hundred pefla (a Kulango weight equal to the Abbron asusasa, corresponding to six kponta, or 52.8 grams; at that time a pefla was worth £6).⁶⁹ It appears that the amount demanded was not fixed; it could change as did the financial needs of the Asantehene; for example, in the first years of the nineteenth century it was greatly raised, which accounts partly for the revolt of 1818.⁷⁰ But the long-term trend appears to have been an increase in the sum demanded, these attaining their maximum in the time of the Asantehene Kwaku Dua I (1834-1867). In the same way, tribute was not always demanded at the

same times: in some periods, the Asantehene's collectors visited Gyaman only once in four or five years; in others, and notably throughout most of the nineteenth century, they came every year after the Yam Festival;⁷¹ here too, it was in the reign of Kwaku Dua I that the levies were most frequent and most regular. In short, it would appear that between 1750 and 1850 tribute changed from being relatively light and serving mainly to "signify" the subordination of Gyaman to Ashanti, to a tribute that was much heavier, of which the economic and quantitative aspects had become of prime importance.

However, the way in which tribute was collected seems to have remained immutable. According to our informants, the Ashanti collectors - who were nhenkwa or servants of the Asantehene - came to the Gyamanhene and presented him with their master's demands. The ruler then assembled the provincial chiefs and together they paid the sum required, by dipping into their treasuries: then they recovered their funds by dividing the cost of the tribute among their villages, Abron as well as Kulango.⁷² Robertson describing in 1819 the "vice-royalty" of Soko, "of which Bontookoo is the capital", wrote: "Adingra and Mansa, two relatives of the Ossey, receive the consular direction and transmit the revenues and tributes to Akoomassy, as they are received by them from these states which are under their control"⁷³. The gold thus acquired was gathered together and sent to the Asantehene through the Bantamahene of Kumasi, who was charged with the surveillance of Gyaman affairs from within the Ashanti government.⁷⁴ In addition, our informants unanimously emphasized the exactions of the Asantehene's envoys: "After they had collected the king's gold, they demanded something for themselves, and one had to give them a child;"⁷⁵ these accusations are not unfounded, since during his stay in Kumasi in 1817 Bowdich witnessed the promulgation of an edict that severely regulated the behaviour of the collectors and penalized their abuses.⁷⁶

Brief as it is, this picture of the expenses of the Abron state explains a great deal about its nature and the way it functioned. The importance of expenditures for ostentation reveals the Abron aristocracy's idea of wealth and of its role in society: it was not abstract and dis-embodied as it is under capitalism, but was rather a concrete assemblage of specific prestige goods of which the main function was to emphasize the social superiority of those who possessed them. In that sense, but only in that sense, the search for wealth was indeed one of the essential motors of the Abron leaders' behaviour and activities. But in the economic and social context of precolonial West Africa, force remained the main means of conducting this search: military force made it possible to hold down subjects and to accumulate slaves, and "spiritual" force, without which the former was powerless, was found through local divinities and Dyula marabouts. Finally the presence of the Ashanti tribute reminds us that for a very long period the Abron had found their masters in this game.

VII.

Finally, what can be said of Abron financial administration? To analyze it precisely we must recall three facts: first, the kingdom's population was relatively sparse; also, direct levies and dues account for only a minor part of the resources of the state treasure; finally the Abron levied neither duties nor tolls. Under these circumstances, the state did not acquire an elaborate financial apparatus; one does not find in Gyaman that complex machinery that the Asantehenes had to establish in order to govern their empire and pressure their vassals; in short, Gyaman never had a "Kwadoan revolution."

Thus the Abron political and administrative hierarchy included no branch specialized in the collection and management of public funds. There were only two "offices" whose function particularly

concerned that domain: that of the gyasehene, steward of the king's "house"⁷⁷ and especially that of the sannahene or treasurer. The latter seems already to have existed before the Abron left Akwamu in the beginning of the seventeenth century, but the seat of the present sannahene was created in the second half of the eighteenth century by the Gyamanhene Kofi Agyeman, who was perhaps inspired by the corresponding Ashanti institutions. The first incumbent of this stool was Ahi Kwabena, who was killed at the battle of the Tain; the office was passed down through the paternal line; from its origins until our times, a total of eight people appear to have held it. Today residing in the village of Ahi, the sannahene formerly lived at the king's court; his function was to weigh the gold that went in and out of the royal treasury, by the use of weights in the dia-weighing box - that belonged to the sovereign. In his absence no one, not even the king, could use this dia, or open the coffers in which the gold was kept: thus he had the power to control withdrawals as well as receipts. In addition, the sannahene ruled the village of Ahi, where his relatives lived, a ward of Tanda and a ward of Tangamuru; and finally, he played an important role in the ceremonies that took place at the Yam festival.⁷⁸

Aside from these two personages, the tasks necessary to the smooth functioning of public finances - fine collecting, the pursuit of debtors - were undertaken by the safohene and the king's servants, messengers, sword-bearers, etc. Embezzlement was considered a crime of *lèse-majesté* and as such was punishable by death. One should emphasize also that the king and the provincial chiefs had separate funds, which might raise difficult problems when common resources had to be shared; for example, in 1879, when Smith, at Bonduku, questioned the chiefs on the reason for their anger with the king: "They replied that they had a grievance, and that the king had received several chiefs into the Gaman alliance who were formerly allies of the king of

Ashantee without consulting them, that he had also received several sums of money from these chiefs as alliance money, without apportioning their share to them as is customary."⁷⁹

VIII.

How did this system evolve in the colonial period? To answer this question, due to lack of space we will limit the discussion to the "French" part of the kingdom, where, as it happens, lived the king and the four provincial chiefs. The economic organization that has just been described did not lend itself easily to the colonisers' projects: land and the instruments of production were abundant; wage-work was also unknown; the peasants devoted their energies to the continuation of their communities, and the aristocracy to the accumulation of prestige goods. Given this context, it is difficult to see what could persuade the population to offer French entrepreneurs their labour, or to produce for their firms commodities marketable in Europe. Thus the French did their best to shatter this system; in their view, the first obstacle to overcome was the aristocracy's hold on the peasant communities; to undermine this hold, they did their utmost to deprive the king and the chiefs of most of their traditional resources.

First of all the mere fact of the French occupation meant the end of wars, and, simultaneously, of booty; in particular it meant that no new slaves could be obtained. In addition, the trade in slaves could no longer be carried on openly; it is true that for a few years it was pursued secretly, but gradually it flickered out, due to, if one may put it thus, lack of "fresh" merchandise. In addition, the French administration soon decided to liberate the slaves; it is true that many captives, particularly the oldest ones, who had been separated from their native lands for a very long period, chose to remain with their masters, so that this measure had no immediate economic repercussions; but combined with the impossibility

for king and chiefs to renew their pool of servile labour, it eventually dealt their "enterprises" a fatal blow. In short, the end of the production and trade of slaves, then the end of captivity itself, considerably weakened the aristocracy's economic potential, while at the same time it deeply upset society as a whole.⁸⁰

In the second place, the French authorities very quickly (1898) established a limit to the fines and "customs" inflicted by the ruler and the chiefs, then ordered their end (1901):⁸¹ another pillar of the Abbron state was shattered. The effect was not long in coming: in his monthly report of December 1907, the French administrator of the Bonduku area wrote: "In preventing the collection of funds which in former times composed the income of the kings and chiefs, we have so impoverished them that the people they administer no longer have the least respect for them. As for the parasites who surround them, they are leaving, for they are no longer able to commit their extortions."⁸² Let us ignore the prejudices which such language reveals; it clearly shows that the king and chiefs had to let go their courts and their dependants, for they were unable to support them any longer.

Despite the rather hypocritical proclamations of its instigators, this abolition of fines and "customs" by no means lightened the burdens that weighed on the peasants, for it coincided with the French introduction of new levies: a head tax, instituted in 1901,⁸³ and a peddling license which affected internal trade, both payable in French currency; duties on the "frontiers," that is, in the heart of the kingdom, since as early as 1893, even before being effectively occupied, the latter was divided between France and England; and finally forced labour, begun in 1898 for the construction of the French post at Bonduku,⁸⁴ and which became more general after 1904 when the construction of the Abidjan-Niger railway began. Of course, whereas the latter decisions aimed at creating the material infrastructure necessary to the occupation of the country and the exploitation

of its resources, the first had the object of forcing the population either to produce for the European market or to sell its labour to white entrepreneurs. But from the point of view presented here, two matters are important: first, these changes marked a complete rupture with the traditional system, since direct taxes had been kept to a minimum and commerce had been spared completely; also, only the colonial administration profited, since it was to it that the taxes went.

However, the French leaders soon discovered that their policy suffered from a serious contradiction, for it ruined and discredited the king and chiefs, whose help was essential for tax-collection and labour recruitment. To overcome this difficulty, a number of measures were taken; as early as 1901 the chiefs were given a refund of the taxes which they had helped collect; later this "bonus" was fixed at 5 per cent of the amount produced;⁸⁵ in the beginning of the 1930's, it was decided to give fixed salaries, which permitted them to regain a little of their lost lustre, but which made them deeply dependent upon the administration.⁸⁶

Faced with this situation, the chiefs reacted in two different ways. Some tried to maintain their former prerogatives, for example, continuing to inflict fines, and were severely punished by the French authorities. Others, on the contrary, tried to adapt to transformations which they soon realized were irreversible. Using both the prestige due to their rank in the traditional social hierarchy and the fraction of power with which the colonial government invested them, they mobilized their subjects' labour for their own use, first for collecting rubber, then for the development of plantations. Thanks to the first revenue which these activities brought them, they hired wage-labourers who came to replace the captives who now disappeared. Thus the shrewdest and most enterprising chiefs managed to reconstruct - on a base which was entirely new - at least a part of their former wealth, and to regain a certain influence.

But the individual influence of this or that chief is one thing, and the domination of the aristocracy as a class, another. Under colonial rule that class saw the very foundation of its supremacy crumble: there is no reason to believe that it will ever be restored.

NOTES

1. The oral informations I make use of in this paper - quote FN (Fieldnotes) with place and date of collection - have been gathered in Gyaman while I was staying there during fieldwork in 1967-8, 1970 and 1976. I wish to thank the Institute d'Ethnosociologie of Abidjan University which made this fieldwork possible.
2. Tauxier 1921: 79-125; Terray - forthcoming.
3. Clozel 1906: 63.
4. Benquey to Governor, Ivory Coast, 19 Aug. 1904, Archives AOF, 22G12.
5. Tauxier 1921: 39-78, 363-415; Goody 1964: 193-216.
6. On what follows, see Terray - forthcoming.
7. Bowdich 1819: 169; Dupuis 1824, Part II: LVI; Lyon 1821: 148-9.
8. Terray 1975a : 423-7.
9. Clozel 1906: 53-4.
10. Dupuis 1824, part II: LVII.
11. Nebout in Clozel 1906: 180-7; Benquey in Clozel 1906: 196-7.
12. Terray 1974: 320. On the distinction between expeditions and genuine commerce (French: megoce), see Meillassoux 1971: 26-7.
13. Lonsdale to Derby, 12 May 1883, Parliamentary Papers 1883, XLVIII, n. 53 in C.3687.
14. On Bonduku, see inter alia Binger 1892, II: 161-170; Freeman 1892: 130-134; 1898: 212-294; Monnier 1894: 171-188; Benquey in Clozel 1906: 185-250; Delafosse 1908: 224-234; Joseph 1917: 204-220.
15. On what follows, see Terray 1975b: 85-135.
16. Benquey, Rapport sur la captivite dans le cercle de Bondoukou, 15 May 1904, Archives AOF, K.21.
17. Freeman 1898: 319-320; Holden 1969: 67, 70-7, 78.
18. On what precedes, see Terray 1975a : 422-437.
19. F.N. Herebo 28 February and March 1967, and c.

20. Tauxier 1921: 308, 312. F.N. Herebo 17 March 1967; 146-7, 306-7, 337-8. F.N. Herebo 17 March 1967; Welekei, 6 Sept., 1970.
22. F.N. Herebo 17 March 1967 and c.
23. Benquey, in Clozel and Villamur 1902: 195, 198-9; Nebout in Clozel 1906: 172-3; Tauscier 1921: 338-9 F.N. Herebo 7 July 1967; March 15 1968; Sepia, 11 Aug. 1970.
24. J.P. Eschlimann, personal communication.
25. Sie Kofi 1976: 53-5. F.N. Kun-Aunzi and Ndakro 19th Aug. 1970.
26. Terray 1975a: 116-8; 1975b: 119-20.
27. Benquey, in Clozel and Villamur 1902: 211; Tauscier 1921: 338.
28. F.N. Kikereni, 7 Sept. 1970.
29. Benquey, in Clozel and Villamur 1902: 200-203; Tauscier 1921: 340-352. F.N. Herebo 17 March 1967; Bonduku 6 May 1967; Welekei 10 May 1967; Gumere, 9 July 1967; Tiedio 18 Jan. 1968.
30. Benquey, in Clozel and Villamur 1902: 214-5; Tauscier 1921: 328 note F.N. see note 29.
31. Tauscier 1921: 351, F.N. see note 29, and Atuna 26 Aug. 1970; Kekereni 7 Sept. 1970; Tangamuru 31 July 1976; Amurufikro 10 Aug. 1976.
32. Benquey, in Clozel and Villamur 1902: 231.
33. F.N. Ahi 8 Aug 1970; Welekei 6 Sept. 1970; Kikereni 28 July, 1976.
34. Benquey, in Clozel and Villamur 1902: 221.
35. F.N. Kikereni 28 July 1976.
36. F.N. Bonduku 22 Aug. 1970; Welekei 6 Sept. 1970; Kikereni 27 July 1976; Tangamuru 1st August, 1976; Bonduku 9 Sept. 1976.
37. Terray 1975a: 415-6.
38. F.N. Herebo 2 March 1967; Kekereni 28 July 1976.
39. Dupuis 1824, Part II: LVI.
40. Braulot, Rapport de Mission, m.d. (1893), ANSOM Cote d'Ivoire III, 3.

41. Lethbridge to Governor Gold Coast, 11 March 1889, PRO. C.C. 879, Afr. W. 354.
42. Clozel to Governor Ivory Coast, 20 Sept., 1896, ANCI X, 10, 221.
43. F.N. Kikereni 21 March 1967; Bonduku 6 May 1967; Welekei 11 May 1967; Gumere 10 July 1967; Tiedio 19 Jan. 1968; Yerebodi 6 Aug. 1970; Lamoli 7 Aug. 1970; Teko 9 Aug. 1970.
44. Abu Bakr al-Siddig, quoted by Wilks in Curtin 1967: 162-3.
45. F.N. Kikereni. 21 March 1967; Dadiase 5 Aug. 1976.
46. F.N. Kikereni 12 Sept. 1976.
47. Interview between Governor Hodgson and Kwaku Wusu, linguist of the King Pong Yaw of Nam, 8th June 1893, encl. 24 in Hodgson to Ripon 12 Oct. 1893 P.R.O.C.O. 96/237.
48. Smith to Private Secretary 25 Oct. 1879, P.R.O.C.O. 96/128.
49. Terray 1974: 321-2.
50. Ibid.: 335-6.
51. See for instance Dupuis 1824: 98, 104, 165, 241, 245, Part II, CXXX, Reindorf 1895, 2nd ed. 1966: 164-5.
52. Martry 1922: 224. F.N. Bonduku 6 May 1967; Welekei 11 May 1967 and 11 Sept. 1976; Bandakani-Sokura, 5 Aug. 1970, Bondo, 20 and 21 Aug. 1976; Bandakani-Tomura 4 Sept. 1976; Kikereni 12 Sept., 1976; Tangamuru, 14 Sept. 1976.
53. F.N. Welekei 11 May 1967; Bondo 20 Aug., 1976.
54. Terray 1974: 322; 1975b: 132.
55. F.N. Amanvi 8 Sept., 1976; Welekei 11 Sept. 1976.
56. Bowdich 1819 : 307.
57. Binger 1892, II: 174.
58. Bowdich 1819: 244-5 F.N. Tabagne 11 May 1968; Kikereni 27 July 1976 Tangamuru 1st Aug., 1976.
59. See note 52.
60. F.N. Bandakani Sokura 5 Aug. 1970.

61. F.N. Bandakani Sokura 5 Aug. 1970.
62. F.N. Welekei 11 May 1967; Tiedio 19 Jan. 1968;
Adania 16 February 1968; Ahi 8 Aug. 1970; Kanton 2 Aug.
1976; Kinkwa 11 Aug. 1976.
63. F.N. Sapia, 11 Aug. 1970.
64. F.N. Sulemani 18 Aug., 1970.
65. F.N. Tabagne 14 May 1968; Asuefri 21st Aug., 1970;
Atuna 26 Aug. 1970; Kikereni 27 July 1976; Tangamuru 1st
1st Aug. 1976; Apimanim 12 Aug. 1976.
66. Fuller 1921, second ed. 1968: 85.
67. Bowdich 1819: 321.
68. Lonsdale to Derby, 12 May 1883, Parliamentary Papers 1853,
XLVIII, n. 53 in c. 3687.
69. F.N. Songore 12 Aug. 1970; Kikereni 21 Aug. 1970 and
27 July 1976.
70. Royal Gold Coast Gazette, Vol. 1 No.30, 27 May 1823.
71. F.N. Bandakani-Sokura 4 Aug 1970; Songore 21 Aug. 1970;
Asuefri 21 Aug. 1970; Kikereni 29 July 1976; Welekei 11
Sept. 1976; Bonduku 14 Sept., 1976.
72. F.N. Welekei 6 Sept. 1970 and 11 Sept., 1976; Kikereni 28
July 1976.
73. Robertson 1819: 182.
74. Arhin 1966: 30-31, F.N. Suma Ahenkro 23 Aug. 1970.
75. F.N. Kikereni, 21 Aug. 1972.
76. Bowdich, 1819: 255-6.
77. F.N. Kwasi Kuma 2 Aug. 1970.
78. F.N. Ahi 8 Aug. 1970; Turian 3 Aug. 1976.
79. Smith to Private Secretary, 25 Oct. 1879, P.R.O.C.O. 96/128.
80. Benquey, Rapport sur la captivite dans le cercle de Bondoukou,
15 May 1904, Archives AOF, K21.
81. Tauscier 1921: 124-5, 351-2 and note.

82. Administrator Cercle de Bondoukou to Governor, Ivory Coast, monthly report, Dec. 1907, ANCI.
83. Arrête du 14 Mai 1901; see Michelet and Clement 1906:97.
84. Clozel 1906: 63.
85. Tauscier 1921: 125 and note.
86. Suret-Canale 1964: 409.

ABREVIATIONS

- ANCI - Archives Nationale de la Cote d'Ivoire, Abidjan.
- ARCHIVES AOF - Archives du Gouvernement General de l'AOF, Dakar.
- ANSOM - Archives Nationales fransaises, Section Outre mer, Paris.

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ORAL SOURCES

VILLAGES:

INFORMANTS:

Adania	Nana Tan Kwadwo, Nana Yaa Menzan.
Amanri	Nana Kwasi Akoua, <u>Samahene</u> . Kwadwo Agyeman.
Apimanim	Nana Kwasi Bimi and elders
Asuefri	Nana Kwame Twea and elders
Atuna	Nana Kwaku Kereme, <u>Safohene</u> .
Bandakani-Sokwa	Fela Kamarate, <u>Bandakari-masa</u> , al Haj Ali Tidjane Kamarate, imam.
Bandakari-Tomwura	Asiekum Kamarate <u>imam</u> .
Bondo	Bamba, <u>imam</u> , Abu Bamba, al Haj- Ali Bamba.
Bondoukou	Nana Dua Kobena <u>Fumasahene</u> Al Haj Mahamma Timite, <u>imam</u> (22 Aug. 1970) Nana Kofi Yeboa, <u>Gyamanhene</u> (14 Sept. 1976)
Gumere	Nana Kobena Prao, <u>Okyeame</u> of Tan
Herebo	Nana Kofi Kosonu, <u>Kyidomhene</u> . Nana Kofi Yeboa, <u>Gyamanhene</u> , Nana Afua Saye, <u>ahemma</u> , Nana Kofi Kosonu, <u>Abekomahene</u> .
Kanton	Nana Kobena Ba, <u>Safohene</u> .

Kikereni	Nana Kobena Gboko, <u>okyeame</u> .
Kikwa	Nana Dian Kofi, <u>Safohene</u> .
Kun Amzi	Nana Kwadwo Ngetia, Chief of <u>Bona Asuadie</u> .
Kwasi Kuma	Nana Kwabena Adom, <u>Gyasehene</u> .
Lamoli	Nana Kwasi Adingra <u>Safohene</u>
Ndakro	Nana Tan Kwame <u>chief of Bona Abiade</u> .
Sapia	Nana Kofi Foromo and elders.
Sangore	Nana Essin Kwam, <u>Adontenhene</u> .
Sulemani	Nana Kwasi Nketia, <u>Tufuhene</u> .
Suma Ahenkro	Nana Ohene Twene II, <u>Sumahene</u> .
S. Tabagne	Nana Atta Kwadwo, <u>Cheneba</u> , Nana Kobena Dongo, <u>Safohene</u> , Nana Adu Yao.
Tangamuru	Nana Kofi Kreme.
Teko	Nana Kwame Agyeman, <u>Safohene</u> .
Tiedio	Nana Yao Agyeman, <u>Siengihene</u> .
Twian	Nana Kwasi Akora, <u>Sannahene</u> . (same as Ahi)
Welekei	Nana Kobena Tah, <u>Penangohene</u> , Nana Papa Sian.
Yerebodi	Ali Watara, <u>Yerebodi masa</u> .