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Political Change, Regime Legitimation and Zimbabwe Broadcasting: Lessons for a Post-Apartheid South Africa? ¹

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Introduction

This study explores the politics of regime transition in broadcasting, with emphasis on policy implications for new leaders coming into power using radio and television for legitimation. It takes the position that lessons from Zimbabwe's post-1980 experience with national broadcasting, and the political history of radio and television in the territory from Southern Rhodesia days onward, are relevant to current developments in South Africa, as that country moves towards a new constitutional and social order within the next few years.²

A brief comparative analysis of the first decade of changes at the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) under the ZANU (PF) regime of President Robert Mugabe and possibilities for change at the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) under a majority-rule, coalition government in a future democratic, non-racial South Africa, is offered.³ Indeed, given the wave of democratization movements currently sweeping across the continent, these same issues and challenges may soon be faced by media organizations and managers attached to incoming regimes elsewhere in Africa.⁴

As was recently pointed out in a study of media policy in Ghana, one cannot escape addressing the larger issues of who rules and the economic and political framework.⁵

Towards a Framework for a National Media Policy:

All governments use broadcasting to help build or reinforce value consensus among key support groups, as well as to promote cooperation from integral state institutions in service of policy goals. Regime broadcast uses reflect and propel wider processes of political change and legitimacy construction. Media policy illuminates crucial intersections of conflict, opposition, and power across the political system and wider society.

For all regimes, broadcasting has proven to be one useful instrument of political reality definition and self-promotion, through its capacity to collect, articulate, select, and disseminate political information state-wide, while controlling access and terms of use. Elites use broadcasting to unite followers and disseminate images of national political reality which encourage the citizenry to derive particular political meanings from media content.

Ideological and policy differences between regimes and leaders over time might be expected to radically alter proclaimed missions for broadcasting, transforming services and output to reflect new realities of the political environment in which they exist. The case of broadcasting and regime change in the transition decade of 1980 to 1990, from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, however, tends to support the opposite position, namely that there does seem to be common ground in regime media use strategies which transcends ideology.

Comparative examination of changing patterns of media-government relations, particularly during the years immediately before and following national independence, has much to offer as an approach for understanding foundations of mass media legitimacy and political change.

By examining major political changes within a context of historical patterns of:

- 1 Regime influence over broadcasting;
- 2 Nature and extent of broadcast and racial partisanship;
- 3 Regime-party-media elite integration, and
- 4 Character and core values of the regime legitimizing creed as applied to broadcasting, it will be easier to formulate and propose a workable and widely accepted mission and goals for broadcasting in the emerging South African polity.

Regime control of broadcasting is defined here as assertion of the right of government and parties acting on its behalf, to intervene directly in the day to day affairs of broadcasting, so as to regulate

their performance.⁶ Control and influence are measured along three major dimensions, including appointments to senior posts in broadcasting, control over finance, and evidence of partisanship of government influence in broadcast content, particularly news and current affairs.

To date, the various political party and task group reports on the future of South African broadcasting have failed to effectively tap academic existing research on the subject.⁷ There is a considerable body of work extending back to the 1940's, including some particularly relevant recent studies.⁸ *SABC Annual Reports* should also be consulted.

Broadcasting in a majority-ruled South Africa will form an integral part of a precarious political balance of forces. It is time to begin asking some of the difficult questions which will determine the character of that balance, at least initially. How are political out-groups in South Africa today trying to gain access to broadcasting, and through it, to the wider political arena? How are entrenched groups using broadcasting to slow or retard their advance? Do political parties and factions with greater perceived legitimacy threats propose to keep a tighter lid on broadcasting than more secure ones?

As a major contender for political power, where specifically is the ANC on these questions? What about ANC's own media structures and policies? What media strategy has the ANC employed and how has it evolved over the decades of struggle? How successful, in terms of its own goals and objectives, has this strategy been?

It is one thing to assert that "freedom of speech and press will be enshrined" in the new constitution but quite another to say how. Questions of access, goals, funding, management and organization must be specifically addressed. Media institutions, not only in their organizational structures and policies but in content as well, are windows onto the political intentions of the regime in power. They are also display windows for the regime. In other words, political messages can be sent both by what is and is not being broadcast, as well as what the news itself consists of.

Avoiding Zimbabwe's Mistakes

Without arguing that national media developments in Zimbabwe during the 1980's offer a perfect blueprint for South Africa in the 1990's, it is clear that there are certain significant similarities in the

two cases which merit analysis and careful consideration by interested citizens, government officials, and especially media policy-makers in South Africa.

In both cases, there are politically-charged tradeoffs between adopting—or maintaining from the previous political order—a set of direct regime media controls, loss of audience credibility, and overall system legitimacy. To fully appreciate the significance of media transition in Zimbabwe one must first attempt to understand the political consolidation which took place there during the decade of the 1980's.⁹ To the extent people judge Zimbabwe's media policy as falling short of self-proclaimed goals, they must acknowledge the possibility that such failings reflect deeper political and economic disappointments.¹⁰

Despite its own criticisms of Rhodesian broadcasting during the period of struggle and its self-admonitions to build a media for the masses,¹¹ the Mugabe government instead self-consciously chose to emphasize regime self-interest in national media policy development, frequently at the cost of lost audience credibility and system legitimacy, in the name of eliminating dependence on South Africa.¹² Despite a full decade of external criticism of Zimbabwe broadcasting, shortcomings have only rarely been acknowledged from the media sector or government itself.¹³

With a few noteworthy exceptions, particularly a serious commitment to develop community and educational radio,¹⁴ ZANU (PF) broadcast policy remained, to a large extent, the maintenance of the status quo, albeit in new ideological clothes.¹⁵ In what amounted to a partisan obsession, ZANU (PF) systematically went about gaining control of key media institutions in Zimbabwe, in the name of the people responsible for bringing it to power.¹⁶ Will a future South African regime make similar choices?

RBC to ZBC: From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe

The most important variables in any comparison of the two states are race, ethnicity, class, and ideology. Of these, the most salient similarity is the presence of significant but divided white minority communities in positions of political and economic power.¹⁷ Race is a starting point for negotiations and public policy shifts leading towards majority-rule political systems and majority-serving media systems. Ethnic and cultural diversity are a close second and third, followed by ideological differences.¹⁸

An early but significant test for a new, non-racial, national broadcasting policy and infrastructure is the first election under a new constitution. Here the Zimbabwe experience, in particular ZBC reporting and election coverage, is relevant for SABC today. The final report of the Commonwealth Observer Group following the February 1980 elections included this telling final paragraph:

*Much that happened during the national election campaign arose out of an irrational fear harboured over many years by one group of the population towards another. We believe the public media should have attempted to allay these fears instead of heightening them further. If the election was itself a step towards national reconciliation the media should have seen itself as an integral part of the process. Quite apart from professional questions of balance, an important national opportunity was lost.*¹⁹

A similar dynamic was present with SWABC involvement in the Namibian elections, and during the crucial months leading up to it, as parties vied for electoral advantage.²⁰

Many of the lingering problems at ZBC stem from the abrupt and overtly partisan nature of personnel shifts, as experienced people were forced out and relations with those who remained were tense to the point that normal working relationships proved impossible. The result was a wave of resignations, firings and replacement by inexperienced but politically loyal ZANU (PF) cadres.²¹

Quality of services, as might be expected, declined markedly, accelerating delegitimation of ZBC output among audiences, some of whom already objected to the abrupt ideological change of course in ZBC news and current affairs content. Allegations of corruption also cast a shadow over ZBC, in the wake of the Willogate scandal which surfaced in 1989. Among those charged and convicted of fraud was the former ZBC Director of News and Current Affairs, Charles Ndhlovu.²²

Learning from ZBC Under ZANU(PF)

For South Africa today, as was true for Zimbabwe a decade ago, a political change amidst conflict scenario applies. To some extent, a regime intransigence dynamic is present. The presence of contending racial and ethnic groups is salient. Pressure from external as well as domestic sources is also part of each case. There is no shortage of recommendations and suggested strategies for media restructuring.

The ANC, like ZANU(PF), is in many respects the front-runner but most certainly not the only important player.

Given the political history of broadcasting in Africa, it is reasonable to expect that for a period following majority rule, national broadcasting will remain primarily, if not exclusively, a state-controlled operation. It would be unrealistic to assume otherwise. Regardless of its condition at the moment of political transition and onset of some form of majority rule, the SABC, like ZBC, remains the prize. The sooner all parties with an expectation of participation in a new regime gain access to SABC and begin to lobby for desired changes, the more valuable and more immediately useful the state broadcasting network will be to post-transition social, economic, and political policy efforts.

In some ways it is to the benefit of the ANC, as the most broadly-based, representative political faction in South Africa today, to keep existing workers in the media sector. This will help keep its competitors out and get more of their own people inside SABC.²³ ZANU(PF) succeeded amazingly well in doing this vis-a-vis ZAPU, its main contender for political power. Once in control, elements of the broadcasting old guard can always be put out to pasture.

The Transformed South African Political Context

A key factor in the decision by the Ian Smith government in Rhodesia to begin serious negotiations leading to a new political arrangement in the country in 1978 was a sense that white Rhodesians would no longer support a military strategy. Subsequent changes in broadcast policy were the first significant, visible evidence that this fundamental point of no return had been reached.

Following the release of Nelson Mandela from jail in February 1990, notable changes in the South African media scene started to emerge. One was increased international media exposure to the South African situation, not just the violence in the townships but also the emergence of someone who could negotiate with popular legitimacy on behalf of the African majority, over the political future of the country. Along with President DeKlerk, two top media figures were now vying for attention.

Issues of race, class, and ethnicity frame questions of power and privilege. In terms of broadcasting, these are reflected in the issue of media access. It is reasonable to assume that the time frame for political transition may prove more difficult to agree upon than the

character of a transformed system. SABC's new look over the next few years will serve as a window onto government's thinking and a partial predictor of its negotiation strategy. It will also be a window onto the fortunes of the other major factions, to the extent they succeed in gaining access.

Ultimately, a consideration of political change and its negotiation at the elite level encompasses a discussion of the future of the SABC. In broadcasting, as in government generally, the changing character and shape of institutions and processes over the next few years will reflect a measure of mixed success of efforts to reconcile, merge, or dictate media priorities among competing elite groups.

Broadcast policy is primarily a political outcome. Questions of political and economic control are primary. National media policy, and broadcast policy in particular, will flow logically from the outcome of the political debate and the language of a new national constitution. To begin with questions of broadcasting technology and regulation is to put the cart before the horse. It is also an invitation to hardware vendors to transform the media policy debate into a technology-as-solution to policy dilemmas garage sale. Hardware does not equal policy.

The frustrating decade of the 1980's in Zimbabwe broadcasting graphically demonstrates that modern media hardware does not guarantee access and democracy. Technology is no substitute for a painful thrashing out of political conflicts and economic inequalities, nor a substitute for a coherent national education policy. Zimbabwe leaders and media managers are still in the process of learning such lessons the hard way, by painful and expensive trial and error.

The Mugabe government and the new managers of ZBC fell prey, even before independence, to the temptation to call in external consultants, who prescribed a predictable cure of expensive imported hardware and then fell short with promises to finance it and train its local implementors.²⁴

Designs for "public access broadcasting" and "commercial broadcasting" are meaningless without a well-defined political context to root them in actual practice and local conditions. National media policy, like a new constitution, begins at home.

Decentralization, localization, privatization, are not necessarily better. Undoubtedly, national unity will be a major political goal for any new South African regime. National media can help.

South Africa now faces a period of media policy transition,

unfolding in tandem with political transition. What is needed now is not a self-contained, water-tight plan, but flexible rules for dealing with what will probably be a fluid, changeable situation.

Opposition politicians will complain about access no matter what sort of system is worked out. This too is an African universal, in those few states where opposition survived the post-independence decade. Adjustments can be made and some regimes (ie. Botswana, Namibia) have proven very amenable to extending meaningful rather than simply token access to loyal opposition. Perceptions of self-legitimation and a willingness to do this, run hand-in-hand.

Broadcasting, Political Change and Legitimacy

The key factor for understanding media transition is the structure of media-government relations. This must first be described, historically and structurally. Key explanatory variables are regime type, nature and extent of regime legitimation (self-perception), media uses by the regime, including: 1) gaining and maintaining (self) legitimation (political development); 2) fostering national unity; and 3) promoting a particular long-term plan-vision of development, economic and social. A primary assumption is that media, including press and broadcasting, especially government media, exist as both agent and index of change (political, economic, social).

Regime legitimacy is understood here as based strongly upon popular emotional attachment to political leaders, combined with general acceptance or acquiescence in methods used by the regime to implement policies and pursue objectives, including via elections, coercion, and media uses.

Legitimacy itself may be thought of as a floating hierarchy of mass acceptances, ranging from: 1) outward appearance of public order and stability; 2) state-structural compliance, where key state institutions function regularly and most directives meet with compliance; 3) leadership support, where party and government leaders operate based on the belief that a working majority of their constituency supports them personally; 4) policy legitimacy, where a majority of those affected by key regime policies comply, based on legal-rational acceptance of the utility and fairness of the policy; 5) acceptance of fundamental regime values, such as majority rule, or market-based economic organization.²⁶

Political system legitimacy and regime legitimacy are the keys to design and survival of legitimate, effective national media institutions

and policies. Failure to come to grips with this difficult truth has been the undoing of many African media systems over the post-independence decades.

Broadcasting in the New South Africa

What might a transformed national broadcasting sector look like under a majority-ruled, quasi-federal, South African political system? A transition regime would most likely attempt to use the existing SABC framework, already undergoing at least surface-level changes, in preparation for more sweeping political changes following a national common-role election.

It is useful for SABC executives, current political leaders, and media officials from all perspectives to study and learn from some of the experiences and decisions made by ZANU(PF) media cadres and politicians as they began to take control of the ex-Rhodesian information infrastructure, while at the same time folding-in their own revolutionary media institutions and cadres from the Chimurenga years.²⁶

Until January 1992, no official ANC media policy existed. The size and diversity of the organization, ideologically and as a result of generational differences, have made for considerable confusion and difficulty in reaching consensus on a unified information policy, although considerable progress has been made in the short time since the organization was unbanned.²⁷ Only in late 1990, as a host of public and private media study groups began their work on the future of broadcasting, did the ANC begin to address the question more directly.²⁸

Over the years of exile struggle, the ANC developed an extensive worldwide information network, which included external broadcasts beamed into South Africa as early as 1963 from Tanzania, Zambia, and elsewhere.²⁹ It has experienced cadres in publishing, newspaper production, broadcasting, information, and public relations but lacks technically trained media specialists. Media and information work have been managed by a Department of Information and Publicity (DIP) headed at one time by Thabo Mbeki, a top ANC official.

In addition to Zimbabwe, a critical examination of Namibia's political and media transition should be undertaken.³⁰ The New Director of the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation has stated that the transition from SWABC to NBC is a case of "a new organization taking over existing infrastructure".³¹ His advice to South Africans is political:

Rather than a policy document regarding how the media can operate, you should try and establish representation in people who are going to design the constitution and pressurise them to put clauses in which protect the rights and freedoms of speech, press, and broadcasting. Direct your energies towards the architects of the Constitution.³²

His assessment also suggests the value of examining existing Namibian media research for significant similarities with a future SABC transition.³³ South African media representatives should fully and immediately begin to integrate themselves into the regional and continent-wide media infrastructure, through such bodies as PANA, placing of observers and trainees at national news agencies in the region, participation in regional and international conferences, and locally, via regular liaison across South African media bodies, research institutes, and other organizations to the full extent legally possible.

Conclusion

This is a politically important moment to examine the politics of broadcasting in South Africa, as external and internal forces press upon CODESA process. Significant variations in political awareness, identification, and mobilization among different groups remain superimposed atop longstanding racial and ethnic divisions. The stakes are high, as negotiations intensify. National media bodies will both reflect and propel political, social, and economic changes in the months and years ahead. The contending factions presently involved in constitutional talks which will soon determine South Africa's future need to find a way to reconcile competing media policy goals in a more representative and effective way than their brothers and sisters across the border to the north. Failure to do so will result in a replay of aspects of the decline of the Zimbabwe broadcasting experience, at a moment in the nation's history when a democratic, effective, credible media is needed most.

Amidst a recent regime turnabout towards a more market and export-oriented economic policy,³⁴ combined with growing pressure for political pluralism and more open mass media as events in Zambia and South Africa unfold, Zimbabwe broadcasting may soon be embroiled in another turbulent period of transition. Should this come to pass, it may be media policy-makers in Harare looking south for lessons.

Footnotes

1. I wish to thank Professor Keyan Tomaselli, Director of the Centre for Cultural and Media Studies of the University of Natal, for his support and encouragement with this project while I was a Visiting Scholar in August-September 1991. Any views expressed here are those of the author alone.
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3. For a detailed examination of the politics of Zimbabwe broadcasting, see: James J. Zaffiro, "Broadcasting and Political Change in Zimbabwe", (Unpublished Ph.D thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin Madison, 1984); and "Political Legitimacy and Broadcasting: The Case of Zimbabwe", *Gazette*, Vol. 37, No.3, 1986, pp127-38.
4. See Carol Lancaster, "Democracy in Africa", *Foreign Policy*, No. 85, Winter 1991-92, p 156, which suggests that radio and television are likely to remain in government hands, albeit less authoritarian ones.
5. Kwame Karikari, "Media Policy: A Factor in the Search for Democracy", *Africa Media Review*, Nairobi, Vol.4, no.1, 1990, p27,39: "The choice of media policy ought to take the future political system as its framework", see also Herbert I Schiller, *Communication and Cultural Domination*, 1976, p 76.
6. Jay G. Blumler and Michael Guervitch, "Towards a Comparative Framework for Communications Research", in Steven H. Chaffee, ed, *Political Communication*, Beverly Hills, Sage, 1972, p.172.
7. Tomaselli et al, 1989 reference no fewer than 62 studies on South African broadcasting in their bibliography; see: *Currents of Power: State Broadcasting in South Africa*, Bellville, Anthropos, 1989, pp223-27.
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9. See Virginia Curtin Knight, "Political Consolidation in Zimbabwe", **Current History**, Vol. 83, No. 491, March 1984, pp. 109-112, 135; and Masipula Sithole, "State Power Consolidation in Zimbabwe: Party and Ideological Development", in Edmond J. Keller and Donald R. Rothchild, eds., **Afro-Marxist Regimes: Ideology and Public Policy**, Boulder, Lynne Reinner, 1987, pp85-106; Roger Martin, "Zimbabwe: A Status Report", CSIS Africa Notes, Washington D.C., No.92, November 16 1988; Hasu H. Patel and HHK Bhila, "The Last Become the First: The Transfer of Power in Zimbabwe", in Prosser Gifford, **Decolonisation and African Independence**, New Haven, Yale, 1988, pp445-60.
10. See "Media Wars Highlight Credibility and Crisis", Mmegi wa Dikang, Gaborone, 30 March - 5 April, 1990, pp.6-7; Some of the better political analyses include: Michael Bratton and Stephen Burgess, "Afro-Marxism in a Market Economy: Public Policy in Zimbabwe", in Edmond J. Keller and Donald R. Rothchild, eds, **Afro-Marxist Regimes**, Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1987, pp119-222; Colin Stoneman and Lionel Cliffe, **Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society**, London: Pinter, 1989; Tidings Ndhlovu, **Zimbabwe: A Decade of Development**, London, Zed Books, 1990.
11. See Elain Windrich, **The Mass Media in the Struggle for Zimbabwe**, Gweru, Mambo Press, 1981; and Julie Fredrickse, **None But Ourselves: Masses vs Media in the Making of Zimbabwe**, Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1982, which explore the pre-1980 history of the Ian Smith regime and ZANU media strategies in the context of the liberation struggle.
12. For examples of this argument, see: Tirivafi Kangai, "The voice of Zimbabwe during and after the War of Liberation", Lusaka, 1980; Eliaas T. Rusike, "Mass Media has a Key Role to Play in the Future of the Nation", **Sunday Mail**, Harare, May 17, 1981; Gerald Kmanga, "Rhodesian Press Served Racists", **Daily News**, Gaborone, February 14, 1986, p2; and remarks by former Zimbabwe Labour Minister Ernest Kadungure in "Communications Training for Self-Reliance in Black Africa", **Gazette**, Vol. 40, No.8, 1987, p180.
13. See Rafael Suarez Jr., "Reality and Rhetoric in a New Nation: The Promise of Zimbabwe", **Worldview**, Vol. 27, No.2, February 1984, pp. 9-12; Simba Muzuva, "Communication Through the Media?", **Social Change and Development**, No. 1, 1984, pp.15-16; James Roberts, "More Programmes About us is What we Need", **Sunday Mail**, Harare, May 22, 1988, p.3; "Senator Slams TV News", **Herald**, July 13, 1988, p3; "Minister Defends ZBC", **Herald**, August 17, 1988, p5; "1988: Looking Back in Frustration", **Moto**, Gweru, January/February, 1990; Colleen Lowe Morna, "Zimbabwe's Ruling Party Tightens Grip on Power", **Christian Science Monitor**, February 6, 1991, p6.
14. See: "Radio and Community Development: A Radio 4 Seminar",

- Proceedings of a ZBC Seminar, Harare, December, 1983); Tim Chigodo, "ZBC Seminar draws up Radio Plan", **World Broadcast News**, London, May 1986; AC Kashambwa, "Educational Radio: The Zimbabwean Perspective", Unpublished paper presented to the Interactive Radio Workshop, Harare, September 1990; Jessie Howlett, "Secondary Education and the Pattern of Secondary School Broadcasts in Zimbabwe", Unpublished paper presented to the African Conference on Radio Education, Harare, January 1990; and "Income Earners on the Air", **Sustainable Development**, 1990, pp25-26.
15. See "PM Outlines Media's Revolutionary Role", **The Herald**, January 6, 1984; Nathan Shamuyarira, "Zimbabwe's Revolutionary Path", **World Marxist Review**, Vol 30, No. 1, 1987, p.97; Dr Nathan Shamuyarira, "Transforming the Mass Media", Interview with Mozambique News Agency (AIM), Maputo, 1981; "More Problems at the ZBC", **Parade**, Harare, September 1990; and "Defensive Psychology and the Free Media", **Moto**, Gweru, February 1991.
 16. For an example of the prevailing justification of this at times heavy handed approach, in this case as espoused by a sympathetic North American journalist, see Julie Frederickse, "Who Controls the Media?", **Journal of Social Change and Development**, No. 8, 1984, pp. 12-14. Frederickse has recently begun crusading for a similar takeover of South African by dominant African political forces. For an example of the official argument, see Dr Natan Shauyarira, "Development of Broadcasting in Africa", **Combroad**, No. 64, July 1984, p28. Shamuyarira was Zimbabwe's first Minister of Information.
 17. See Richard Hodder-Williams, "Fission and Fusion in Zimbabwe", **Civilizations**, Brussels, Vols 32-33, 1983, 181-207; Richard Harwood, "Whites in Zimbabwe's Gilded Cage are Living Well", **Washington Post**, National Weekly Edition, December 7, 1987, p17; "Zimbabwe: Black and White, Poor and Rich", **New African**, London, No.256, January 1989, pp51-53; Tony Hawkins, "Zimbabwe Whites Lose Special Political Status", **Christian Science Monitor**, August 25, 1987, p5; Roger Thurow, "Zimbabwe's Whites Discover Life Goes on After Black Liberation, A Lesson for South Africa?", **Wall Street Journal**, August 2, 1988, pp 1,6.
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 22. See Gift Siphosiso, "*Top Men Face Inquiry*", **New African** No. 258, March 1989, p22; "*Minister Guilty of Fraud*", **Daily News**, Gaborone, March 1, 1989, p1.
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 24. See Austin Kark, **Report on the Future of Broadcasting in Zimbabwe**, London, BBC, 1980, which became a major basis for post-independence media policy in Zimbabwe after it was presented to the newly-elected Zimbabwe Parliament; "*Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation: Overseas Study Team*", **Combroad**, No 52, September 1981, pp. 60-61; "*Conversion to Colour TV*", **Combroad**, No 56, July 1982, p 70.
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29. See Francis Meli, *South Africa Belongs to Us: A History of the ANC*, Harare, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1988, p172, for a brief discussion of Radio Freedom; and Ad Hoc Media Trainers' Forum, Durban 1991, Appendix 2, "ANC Department of Information and Publicity", p4, which raises the possibility of a DIP FM radio station inside South Africa, "...which will probably not be an ANC organ, but will be broadly based and cater for all sectors of society."
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31. Fax letter to the author from Mr Nahum J Gorelick, Director General, Namibian Broadcasting Corporation, August 28, 1991.
32. Nahum Gorelick, "Namibia's Experience Can Offer Some Lessons", *Rhodes Journalism Review*, Grahamstown, Vol. 1, No. 1, November 1990, p54.
33. See Ngila RL Mwase, "The Media and the Namibian Liberation Struggle", *Media Culture and Society*, London, Vol 10, 1988, pp225-37; ITU, Report on Proposals for Telecommunications and Broadcasting Organisations for Namibia, Part I, Geneva, March 1983, NAM/79/010; "Mass Media in Occupied Namibia", SWAPO Information Bulletin, Luanda, June 1985; Charles Riddle, "A Profile of Namibian Media: The Censored Debate", *Gazette*, Amsterdam, No. 44, 1989, pp45-55; for analysis of the recent political transition, see John A Marcum, "Namibia's Independence and the Transition of Africa", *SAIS Review*, Washington, Vol 10, No2, Summer/Fall 1990, pp153-165.
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