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ESSAY REVIEW

**TIME SUSPENDED: THE QUENET REPORT
AND WHITE RACIAL DOMINANCE IN RHODESIA.**

IN FEBRUARY 1979 Rhodesia officially became a 'non-racial' society. Legislation, enacted earlier by the Rhodesian Parliament, went into effect at that date which abolished the Land Tenure Act and prohibited segregation and discrimination in public schools, hospitals, housing and public places. Many of these changes were recommended earlier in June 1976 by the Commission of Inquiry into Racial Discrimination, but others went beyond the Commission's proposals.¹

Although it might appear that the Commission's proposals provided the impetus for these changes, such a conclusion is largely unwarranted. Initially the Commission's major recommendations were rejected by the Government; and the recent changes, along with the new Constitution that provides for Black majority rule, are the consequence of three other factors: the changing power relationship of Black and White groups within Rhodesia; the continued escalation of the civil war; and the 'internationalization' of the Rhodesian conflict.

The Quenet Report, however, does have a historical significance in at least two ways: firstly, it forced the Government and White population to recognize that racial discrimination was the basis for African opposition; and, secondly, as a document it vividly illustrates how White racial beliefs, reflected in the Commission members and their recommendations, prevented their recognition or acknowledgement of the necessity for abolishing White privilege and accepting a constitutional restructuring that would lead to Black majority rule. Some of these changes have now occurred, but they have been precipitated by the factors noted above and not because of a change in White beliefs. Indeed, the tenacity of White racial beliefs, translated subtly in terms of White power and privilege, persist even in the recent 'non-racial' legislation and new Constitution. It is for this reason that the Quenet Report — and the responses to it — merit closer scrutiny.

Established in 1975 under the chairmanship of Sir Vincent Quenet, the Commission was instructed by Parliament to investigate racial practices in Rhodesia and 'advise Government of those cases or aspects of discrimination which are no longer considered desirable and necessary'. In its final Report, the Commission proposed changes in land tenure and franchise policies and the abolition of several discriminatory practices, noting most specifically that the Land Tenure Act was 'the main cause of friction between the races'.²

¹ Rhodesia, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Racial Discrimination* (Sessional Papers, Cmd. R.R.6, 1976) [Chairman: Sir Vincent Quenet; hereafter cited as Quenet, *Report*].

² *Ibid.*, 9.

Opposition to the Quenet Report surfaced immediately, and both African nationalists and right-wing Whites (including some members of the ruling Rhodesian Front) opposed the Commission's recommendations. The nationalists, who had earlier refused to give testimony before the Commission, rejected the proposals as irrelevant. The only significant issue, they claimed, was that of majority rule, and the Commission had ignored that. White critics opposed the recommendations as a 'sell-out' to Black rule and as a repudiation of the Rhodesian Front's founding principle: namely, the preservation of White power.

There was an irony — as well as a historical truth — to the criticism that the R.F. would be discarding its basic principles if it accepted the recommendations. For, in 1962 the Rhodesian Front won the election by adamantly opposing virtually identical proposals put forward by the ruling United Federal Party. In that election the U.F.P. proposed 'the repeal of existing racially discriminatory laws which are either unnecessary or are unfair' and called for the abolition of the Land Apportionment Act because of its discriminatory nature.³ The White electorate rejected the incumbent party and supported (as they have done since) a party dedicated to the principle of continued White rule — 'in perpetuity' as some Rhodesian Front members later promised.

Thus the White critics of the Quenet Report (including, among others, R.F. parliamentary backbenchers who subsequently split with the party over proposed changes to the Land Tenure Act) were historically correct: acceptance of the Quenet recommendations by the R.F. placed it squarely in line (though for different reasons) with U.F.P. policy in 1962. Thus, it could be argued that history was repeating itself or had gone full circle. What seems most evident, however, is that the Rhodesian Front (and the White electorate), opposed to Black majority rule, attempted from 1962 onwards to arrest or suspend time and thereby preserve White supremacy and privilege. In this effort they were successful for a period of time. Black nationalism was briefly contained, but events since 1974, commencing especially with the Portuguese withdrawal from Mozambique and Angola, forced the Rhodesian Front to adopt new strategies in an effort to curtail the nationalist movement and preserve White rule.⁴ The establishment of the Quenet Commission was a part of that strategy. However, some of the proposals for change, minor as they were, threatened White power and were, as a consequence, initially rejected by the Government.⁵ More significantly, what is evident in the Quenet proposals is that they clearly reflected White racial beliefs, and even if fully implemented would lead to continued White dominance and privilege.

Rhodesian Front strategies since 1962, including its support for a few of the Quenet recommendations, had as their intent the preservation of White power and privilege. Even if credence were given to the Government's contention that preservation of 'civilized standards' and 'merit' were

³ Quoted in L. Bowman, *Politics in Rhodesia: White Power in an African State* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 1973), 34.

⁴ D. G. Baker, 'The impact of regional events on Whites in Rhodesia and South Africa', *Plural Societies* (Spring 1979, in press), X; and R. W. Johnson, *How Long Will South Africa Survive?* (London, Macmillan, 1977), ch. 1, 5-8.

⁵ The proposals that the Rhodesian Front accepted and rejected are discussed later in the essay.

its primary objective, the cultural and racial values implicit in its policies and the Quenet Report are those of the dominant White minority culture. The fundamental issue is and always has been that of power, of who should control government and thereby determine the character of the society and the allocation of power, resources and privilege. Power in Rhodesia has remained in the hands of Whites who, even though they constitute less than five per cent of the total population, have historically developed and controlled the political, economic and social structures as a means of preserving White rule.⁶

Through their control of these structures Whites preserved their pre-eminent position of power and privilege, modifying and adapting structures and policies at different periods whenever necessary to keep Africans powerless and dependent. At most, Whites occasionally made minor concessions to Blacks as a way of muting discontent. But the concessions never endangered White power, and the result was a society based on White cultural (including racial) beliefs. Following the Second World War, the rise of African nationalism prompted Southern Rhodesia to embrace the Central African Federation as one device for preserving White power both there and in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. But when African nationalist pressures intensified and the British Government acceded to Black majority rule in the two territories, Southern Rhodesian Whites responded by rejecting the U.F.P. 'middle-class strategy' for incorporating 'civilized' Blacks (itself a tactic for thwarting Black majority rule) and embraced an R.F. party dedicated to preserving White rule.⁷

Rhodesian Front policy, though termed non-racial, moved slowly toward the racially encapsulated society found in South Africa. To prevent intervention by a British Government that supported Black rule, Southern Rhodesia opted for secession from the Commonwealth and U.D.I. to protect its system of racial dominance. The policies of the ruling party thereafter had as their rationale the preservation of White power and privilege. But pressures, both external and internal, later forced the Government to cope with rising nationalist opposition and a civil war. As one means of placating racial discontent, the Prime Minister in 1975 appointed the Quenet Commission to investigate and propose to the Government policies for the elimination of 'unnecessary' racially-discriminatory measures.

The rationale for the Quenet Commission appears evident. Established to make recommendations for the removal of discriminatory practices 'no longer considered desirable and necessary', the appointment of the Commission was the Government's technique for muting mounting criticism of racial practices and for arresting the movement toward Black nationalist groups. Changes, it believed, might lessen both external and internal criticism of R.F. policy; and Government spokesmen even suggested that these changes might prompt the removal of international economic and political sanctions against Rhodesia.

⁶ M. W. Murphree, 'Race and power in Rhodesia', in D. G. Baker (ed.), *Politics of Race: Comparative Studies* (Westmead, D.C. Heath, 1975), 245-76; M. W. Murphree and D. G. Baker, 'Racial Discrimination in Rhodesia', in W. Veenhoven (ed.), *Case Studies on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Vol. 5.* (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), 377-413; and D. G. Baker, 'Race and power: Comparative approaches to the analysis of race relations', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (1978), I, 317-35.

⁷ Bowman, *Politics in Rhodesia*, ch. 2-3.

An evaluation of the Commission's recommendations readily reveals the White cultural, racial and political biases of that group. The Commission membership included Blacks and Whites, but its composition was not representative. Most of the Commission's Black members, especially the Senator Chiefs, were, if not supporters, at least not outspoken critics of the Government. Although the Government was attempting to resolve its constitutional problems through negotiations with various members of the African nationalist groups, it named none of the nationalists to the Commission. This fact, along with the Government's stipulation that the Commission look only at areas where discriminatory measures were expendable and not at the more fundamental issue of majority rule, led nationalist groups to boycott the Commission.

The Commission's emphasis, i.e. on the removal of discriminatory measures no longer considered desirable or necessary, was itself an example of discrimination, for that notion contradicted the principle of 'merit' which the R.F. claimed as its guiding principle (along with 'civilized standards'). 'Merit' means achievement, and achievement is based on opportunity. Hence practices or legislation that limits opportunity or an equal chance for any individual or group, Black or White, is a repudiation of the merit principle. Moreover, the fact that some forms of discrimination were deemed 'necessary and desirable' in the past as a 'historical necessity' cannot be justified in the late twentieth century.

In terms of its hearings and recommendations, the Commission focused on some of the factors that contributed to White dominance: economic (land, labour, and education as its affected employment opportunities); political (franchise and the Declaration of Rights); and social (land and housing policies, and social arrangements). But it ignored the fundamental ways in which political, economic and social structures have been used to deny or deprive Africans of resources and mobilization capabilities, thereby leaving them powerless. Hence the Commission excluded from its purview the fundamental issue of dominance and discrimination.

Rather than confront the above issues directly, the Commission persistently deferred to 'White opinion', rejecting the more basic (or structural) changes that it thought Whites would not accept. This is evident from even a cursory appraisal of the Report. For instance, the Commission opposed the opening of European residential areas to Africans who could afford such purchases 'because we consider there are many Europeans who would not accept a departure from the existing position'.⁸ It opposed the creation of Government multi-racial schools because 'we do not think it is [a proposal] which would be acceptable to the majority of either of the major races'.⁹ Even though the Commission acknowledged that in educational opportunities 'there is unequal treatment of European and African pupils', it did not think that 'different treatment amounts to unfair dealing'.¹⁰ It also dismissed the idea of re-allocating education funds from European to African schools, thereby providing a more equitable allocation. Rather, it thought

⁸ Quenet, *Report*, 15.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 19. But it did conclude that private schools should be able to take in more than the limited number of non-Europeans allowed under existing regulations.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 25.

that African education should be left alone because it was 'completely beyond the country's [financial] resources at present' to do otherwise.¹¹ The result was to leave in existence the nearly insurmountable disadvantages suffered by Africans in getting an education.

Acknowledging that there was discrimination against Africans in employment, the Commission stated that 'there are some employers who openly declare a preference for European employees', but it concluded that 'that is not an attitude which, in our view, should be controlled by legislation'.¹² The Commission thereby rejected legislation as a basis for removing discriminatory practices. It maintained that change should come through 'example' and suggested that 'Government can itself project an image which will influence the public at large'.¹³ But this recommendation was inconsistent with the Commission's own investigation which showed that the Government, as an employer, was more discriminatory than others. Recognizing the presence of discriminatory and hostile treatment towards Africans, Coloureds and Asians in social amenities, the Commission nevertheless concluded: 'One can only hope for greater understanding . . .'.¹⁴ The above examples are simply illustrative of the attitudes that permeate the Report, attitudes that are deferential toward Whites and paternalistic toward Blacks. It envisioned behavioural change as coming through 'greater understanding' and a change in attitudes. The extent of the Commission's concern about discrimination was, thus, suspect because of its proposal that the Government set an example, even though, as the Commission recognized, it was the Government which over the years had set the tone and pattern of racial discrimination.

An assessment of the major recommendations of the Commission readily reveals how, even were its proposals implemented, Whites would still retain power and privilege. The major recommendations within the economic sector fell under three categories: land, employment and education as it affected employment. Concluding that the Land Tenure Act was the 'main cause of friction between the races' and had 'led to widespread discontent and deep-seated resentment',¹⁵ the Commission proposed its replacement by new legislation that established two categories of land, 'Private Land' and 'State Land'. Private Lands would include the European residential, urban and agricultural lands, African Purchase Land, African townships and multi-racial areas. State Land would include the Tribal Trust Land, the national areas of parks, wild-life and forest land as well as existing unalienated or unreserved lands.

The Commission proposed that no new lands be added to the T.T.L.s, but it did recommend that the State 'in its capacity as trustee' assume responsibility for directing development within the T.T.L.s. The Report also opposed the opening up of T.T.L.s to European business or land purchase.¹⁶ The paternalistic character of these recommendations is reflected in the proposal that the State serve as 'trustee'.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 23.

¹² *Ibid.*, 62.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 18.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 12.

The Commission did recommend that Africans be allowed to purchase what were European agricultural (but not residential) lands and, conversely, that African Purchase Land be opened to European purchase. But it also recommended that safeguards be established to assure that Africans purchasing such lands be sufficiently experienced or qualified for properly using the lands, that Africans pursue acceptable standards of husbandry, and that the land not be subdivided or have excessive numbers of people living on it.¹⁷ All of this again suggests a paternalistic attitude toward Africans even though the Commission hastened to add that such safeguards should similarly apply to Europeans purchasing agricultural lands. Beyond this, the Commission recommended that Africans be allowed to own or lease land in European commercial areas so that they could compete on an equal economic basis with Europeans.

However, if groups are to compete on an equal footing with each other it is obligatory that they have equal access to education and skill-obtaining opportunities. This aspect was ignored in the Report, and the Commission's negative attitude towards providing Africans with equal educational opportunities, as previously noted, meant that Whites would retain their privileged position. For, by dismissing equal educational opportunity as 'beyond the country's resources at present', the existing disparity would persist. As indicated above, the Commission did not see the incongruity between statements such as 'there is unequal treatment of European and African pupils' and 'different treatment amounts to unfair dealing'¹⁸ and its dismissal of these disparities with the statement: 'One hopes it will be possible in the future to provide additional finance to improve the present situation'.¹⁹ Moreover, the Commission opposed the opening of Government European schools to African entry, on the ground that multi-racial schools would not be acceptable 'to the majority of either of the major races'.²⁰ The consequences are obvious: existing constraints upon and impediments to African education would continue, and Africans would remain at a competitive disadvantage in the economic sector. In cases, then, where disadvantaged Africans did compete with Europeans and fail, the latter would dismiss it as simply another example of their own presumed superiority.²¹

The competitive disadvantage of Africans was not resolved by the Report's appraisal of Africans' employment opportunities. Probing first the public sector (including Public Service, Ministries of Justice, Law and Order, Internal Affairs, Agriculture and others), the Commission acknowledged that, among other things, virtually no Africans held middle-level positions

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 16.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 25.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 19.

²¹ This attitude carried over into the Commission's recommendations concerning teachers. Africans were paid less than Europeans, and the Commission noted the inequality. But it again pleaded financial problems and claimed that it could not foresee European teachers giving up part of their salaries to 'put African teachers on an equal footing'. Consequently, implied the Commission, the inequities must persist, noting that 'we see the inequity of the present situation . . . It is with great regret that we cannot advance any suggestion' for solving the problem', *ibid.*, 28. Again, then, the proposals lead to different standards for different racial groups.

and none could be found in upper-level positions. Moreover, African employees were designated by titles different from those of Europeans in respect of what were essentially identical jobs and were paid much lower salaries. In response to these structural inequalities, the Commission counselled: 'On this topic we simply express the hope that persons of promise and ability will be given every chance for improving themselves'.²² This same attitude prevailed in the Commission's assessment of the British South Africa Police. Again their investigations disclosed that Africans were retained at only the lowest ranks and that departmental attitudes, based on numerous rationalizations, were either indifferent to or openly hostile towards African advancement.²³ Despite the glaring inequities, the Commission surmised that 'although, ideally, all ranks should from the outset be open to European and African alike', it thought that such a step 'would, at present, be too drastic a change'.²⁴

Even though there existed considerable evidence indicating widespread discriminatory treatment toward Africans employed in commerce and industry (including apprenticeship training, employment and promotion), the Commission concluded that there was no outright 'evidence of racial discrimination'. But it did express its concern over the attitudes of White employers towards hiring Blacks: 'We accept, however, there are some employers who openly declare a preference for European employees. That is not an attitude which, in our view, should be controlled by legislation'.²⁵ The Commission argued that 'legislation cannot adequately correct prejudiced attitudes',²⁶ but what it ignored was that employers' attitudes when translated into behaviour result in discriminatory practices toward African labour. Without legislation, these attitudes persist and racially discriminatory practices continue. The result was that the Commission totally disregarded what was openly structural discrimination in employment.

Attributing the shortage of adequate job opportunities to the high population growth rate among Africans, the Commission cajoled: 'It is, then, a case of supply exceeding the demand and, unpalatable though the suggestion might be to some Africans the exercise of birth control is the only way if a proper balance is to be achieved. Until that stage is reached there will be intense competition for available posts...'.²⁷ But the fundamental problem was the present: no jobs or few jobs existed for Africans in an economy that emphasized capital rather than labour-intensive types of industry and commerce. And the jobs that were available were geared towards those with education and skills, meaning, in this instance, Europeans because of their greater educational opportunities. Moreover, discrimination was occurring at that moment in time; it was not babies yet unborn who were competing for the prevailing scarce jobs and thereby creating the problem. The Commission's attitudes, as evident in its assessments and statements, reflects a cultural and callous myopia.

²² *Ibid.*, 50.

²³ *Ibid.*, 53.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 56. They also investigated the Rhodesian Railways and found similar patterns of discrimination.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 62.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 61.

The Commission recommended that European agricultural and commercial lands be opened for purchase by Africans, but there were few Africans who had the capital necessary for such purchases. In terms of structural disadvantages to Africans that give rise to racial friction (such as the lack of educational opportunities, discrimination in employment, and White attitudes and discriminatory practices in general), the Quenet recommendations would not solve these problems. What is obvious is that the Commission ignored the structural forms of discrimination: namely, the denial to Africans of chances or opportunities to advance within economic sectors. There were a few exceptions, but the composite picture is evident. Denied the opportunity to develop economic resources the African was locked into his subordinate position in Rhodesian society.

The Commission's recommendations for removing sources of racial discrimination and discontent within political structures again illustrate the political near-sightedness of the group. Their two concerns were the electoral law and the Declaration of Rights. As the Commission noted, the Legislative Assembly was drawn from three main sources: voters on the European roll, the African roll, and Africans elected by Electoral Colleges. The Commission only briefly discussed the franchise issue, but it did conclude that racial friction could be alleviated if there was a return to the common roll.²⁸ But the return to a common roll would not in itself remove racial friction, for what is important is who determines the franchise requirements for the common roll. The qualifications, especially educational and financial, were so structured that few Africans, given their limited economic and educational opportunities, could meet the qualifications for acquiring the vote. This, then, was the fundamental issue, but it was ignored by the Commission, because it did not wish to threaten the structural bases of White dominance. Even so, the Commission's proposal for a return to the common roll was immediately rejected by the Prime Minister and the Rhodesian Front. Their rejection is understandable. For, even though Parliament could structure franchise requirements to curtail African participation in a common roll, future African pressure could possibly intensify and necessitate a lowering of franchise requirements. And that would threaten White power.

The other recommendation of the Commission concerning political structures was its proposal to repeal section 84 of the Constitution.²⁹ That section stipulated that the Declaration of Rights, which included provisions for protection from discrimination, was not enforceable in the courts: 'No court shall inquire into or pronounce upon the validity of any law on the ground that it is inconsistent with the Declaration of Rights.' Given that section, the Government if it wished, could enact racially discriminatory legislation. Were section 84 repealed, however, Africans who believed that they had been discriminated against could resort in some instances to the courts. There was, however, a limitation to that right, for the Declaration permitted a type of discrimination: 'a law shall not be construed to discriminate unjustly to the extent that it permits different treatment of persons

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 22.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 82.

or communities if such treatment is fair and will promote harmonious relations between such persons and communities . . . ' Thus, even if the Declaration were made justiciable by repeal of section 84, the stipulation noted above still allowed for the enactment of discriminatory legislation.³⁰ Both recommendations (the return to a common roll and repeal of section 84) were rejected by the Rhodesian Front. Neither of the recommendations, if approved, would have fundamentally altered the power capabilities of White and Black groups; but the R.F., wary of even potential threats to its power, ignored the Quenet proposals.

The Quenet recommendations regarding social structures (and social relations) again reflect the White cultural values and the Commission's limited awareness of the sources of racial discontent. For instance, in terms of the Land Tenure Act, the Commission rejected the opening of European residential areas to Africans. It based its decision on the principle that there were 'many Europeans who would not accept a departure from the existing position',³¹ i.e. of racially segregated areas. The Commission acknowledged that some people believed that Africans with necessary financial and educational resources should be allowed to purchase homes in European areas, but the Commission rebuffed this notion: 'No doubt, that would be an ideal situation but we think the movement should be gradual and unhurried.'³² Given the fact that such a 'movement' could not be even 'gradual' because it was prohibited under existing legislation, both the Commission's understanding of the racial issue and its own honesty are suspect. The Report did propose that additional residential lands for Africans be set aside, and it recommended that existing designated multi-racial areas (open only to 'parties of a mixed union') be opened to anyone who desired to live there. But it put a racial curtain around European residential areas.³³

The Commission also recommended that Africans be given limited access to public amenities (such as hotels and restaurants) but only within those urban areas zoned for commercial use and not 'within residential areas' that were European. All of this, however, would have little meaning unless supporting legislation was enacted to prohibit discriminatory treatment against Africans and other non-White groups. Yet here, as with employment, the Commission offered little of substance. As previously noted, the Report recognized that some employers 'openly declared a preference for European employees', but the Commission's response was: 'That is not an attitude which, in our view, should be controlled by legislation'.³⁴ That stance clearly left an employer free to discriminate if he so wished. The Commission held similar views concerning the social sector. Responding to complaints by Africans, Asians and Coloureds that they suffered discriminatory treatment in public amenities, the Commission responded: 'One can only hope for greater understanding on the part of the owners of such establishments'³⁵ — an attitude that suffused the Commission's views. Appealing to people to change their attitudes does not end their discriminatory behaviour.

³⁰ The Commission also recommended the establishment of a Race Relations Board that would be charged with hearing complaints concerning alleged discrimination.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 15

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*, 17.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 62.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 18.

What is most significant is the Commission's ameliorative attitude or pious belief that people would open their hearts and embrace those against whom they persistently discriminated. Unless legislation was enacted that specifically prohibited discriminatory treatment or behaviour, existing White racial attitudes, as reflected in their discriminatory behaviour, would simply persist. The Commission also discussed other aspects of social relationships, but those cited above reflect its prevailing views.³⁶ The Commission's precept appeared to be: 'If we would only love one another, we could get along better.' However, when groups contest for power and the benefits that flow therefrom, such moral admonitions go unheeded. And where one group (in this instance Whites) held and enjoyed the fruits of power, there was little willingness to give either of them up, as the history of Rhodesia readily illustrates. The basic problem was that the Commission, given its racial attitudes, was blind to the structural realities of dominance.

The Quenet recommendations logically flow from the Commission's cultural and racial beliefs and (whether it recognized it or not) its desire to preserve White power and privilege. These White racial notions serve numerous functions. Most fundamentally these beliefs have served (for Whites) to justify racial stratification and discrimination; and European policy has, historically, never deviated from its commitment to the preservation of White culture, power and privilege. The Quenet Commission, though it conducted its investigation at a time of increasing racial confrontation, could not break through its racial biases and concentrate on the fundamental structural bases of White dominance and exploitation. Racial beliefs are not simply a rationalization for exploitation, and both factors (racial beliefs and privilege) can be detected as bases for the Commission's analyses and recommendations.

From this perspective, the Quenet Report can be viewed as but another effort by the Rhodesian Front and White society to suspend time and thereby preserve White power and privilege by granting concessions to Blacks, concessions which, however, did not threaten White power. A number of Quenet proposals were implemented between 1976 and 1978, including, among others: amendments to the Land Tenure Act; the gradual incorporation of some Blacks into middle-echelon positions in public service areas, including the military and police; the incorporation of more Blacks at higher levels within commerce and industry (although this was already occurring because of the shortage of Whites who had been called up for military service); and the partial suspension of Parliament and establishment of a Government composed of Rhodesian Front and Black leaders participating in the 'internal settlement'. But the impetus for these concessions was not the Quenet report but the imperative need of the Government to gain Black support in the civil war against the Patriotic Front.

Moreover, but again because of pressure from South Africa and the United States, the Government did accede to the principle of Black majority rule in September 1976; and in January 1979 the White electorate, confronted by an escalating civil war and few other alternatives, did vote to

³⁶ Among other topics taken up by the Commission were disabilities suffered by African women as a consequence of the African social system, the Urban Areas Act and miscellaneous other areas of contact between European and African that led to discriminatory practices.

accept a new Constitution with Black rule. Almost simultaneously, legislation was enacted that abolished the earlier Land Tenure Act and prohibited discrimination in education, housing, hospitals and public amenities. On the surface, this legislation goes much further than the Quenet proposals. However, given the structural forms of discrimination noted previously, the reality is that Whites still retain major positions of power and privilege.

New legislation or loopholes in legislation still allow for discrimination. New and higher school fees, for instance, were introduced that make it difficult for low-income Africans to attend previously all-White schools; Whites who discriminate against Blacks in public places are liable to civil action, not criminal, and that entails prolonged and expensive litigation which few Blacks can afford; few Blacks, given their limited economic opportunities, can afford what was previously White housing; and under the new April 1979 Constitution 'entrenched clauses' to 'preserve standards' assure that Whites will preserve a considerable degree of power and privilege. Indeed, even though the Rhodesian Front could not suspend time forever, it shrewdly manipulated the new structures in such a way that, despite the appearance of Black majority rule, White power and privilege is not significantly diminished. What this suggests is that the White racial attitudes which permeate the Quenet Report have not significantly changed; only the power relationships have.

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