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# Botswana's Beef Cattle Exports: Establishment of a Reserve Industry c. 1900 - 1924

*by Michael Hubbard*

## Introduction

During the first two decades of this century, beef cattle became the chief export of the Bechuanaland Protectorate. This occurred as a result of colonial consolidation (levying taxes, establishing 'native reserves' and 'European' freehold farming blocks and trading stores) and of the growth of the Johannesburg market on the one hand, and as a result of the decline of earlier exports (hunting products and gold) on the other. In short, during this period the Protectorate became 'locked in' to a role within southern African accumulation as both a labour reserve and a supplier of cheap meat.

The beef cattle export industry so established was a 'reserve industry' - its product exported in its crudest form, its fortunes wholly vulnerable to the vagaries of external events and to manipulation by opposing interest groups in the South African meat industry, its own interests unprotected by any effective political power, its formal status 'outside' the state to which it was effectively subject.

Section I discusses the reasons for the rise of the trade and section II the nature of the crisis it faced in the slump following World War I, which led to South African protectionism and the entry of the Imperial Cold Storage and Supply Co. (ICS) into the Protectorate - the two dominant features of the next period in the industry's history, which culminated in its collapse in the mid-1930s. Section III concludes.

### I.

Cattle supplies were the reason for the earliest European interest in the territory of the Tswana<sup>1</sup>. But until the late 19th century they were only one of a number of traded goods and less important than hunting products.<sup>2</sup> It was the establishment and rapid expansion of mining in South Africa from the 1870s, with its urban concentrations of mining and industrial workers of Kimberley and on the Witwatersrand, which created a demand for cheap sources of protein - with meat being a most convenient form given its abundance, acceptability and ease of transport on the hoof.

The trade from north of the Molopo before 1900 was probably small, intermittent and confined to breeding and draught stock for farming areas in the Cape and Transvaal lying closer to the still small mines and towns.<sup>3</sup> Moreover the Rinderpest epidemic of 1896 and Boer war of 1899-1902 must have been severe disruptions; they also resulted in substantial imports of meat from Australia and South America.

A number of factors underlie the rise of cattle exports from the Bechuanaland Protectorate during the first twenty years of the new century. Firstly the expansion of the mines; secondly the location of South Africa's cattle production; thirdly the nature of the meat demanded for the labour compounds; fourthly colonial consolidation in the Protectorate.

The main concentrations of cattle in South Africa were situated remotely from the expanding Witwatersrand behind the eastern escarpment in Zululand, Natal and the Transvaal.<sup>4</sup> They were also more prone to tropical cattle diseases (particularly East Coast fever) than cattle on the highveld. By comparison Southern Rhodesia and Bechuanaland Protectorate were well situated to supply the Witwatersrand. The nature of the market also favoured drawing supplies of cattle from 'native reserves' (of which the Protectorate largely consisted): the mine and industrial compounds demanded cheap meat above all and the reserves (owing to their numerous cattle<sup>5</sup>, lack of alternative markets and absence of land rent) were the cheapest source.

With meat supplies being drawn from increasing distances to the Witwatersrand specialised intermediaries (dealers and speculators) emerged to organise the buying of livestock, linking to commission agents at the main markets. These commission agents saw to the transactions with buyers and provided the dealers and speculators with finance for livestock buying<sup>6</sup>. Cold storage facilities at the main centres became an important link in the marketing chain. Owing mainly perhaps to the economies of sale in cold storage it was here that the largest agglomeration of capital in the meat industry was centred. Briefly, by 1905 the Imperial Cold Storage and Supply Company had emerged as the dominant force in South African meat wholesaling, formed through a merger of De Beers Cold Storage and Combrink and Company which had held the meat import supply contracts for the British troops during the Boer war.<sup>7</sup>

While the burgeoning export market would no doubt have given rise to African entrepreneurship in the Protectorate's cattle trade<sup>8</sup> it occurred at the same time as the consolidation of colonial administration in the territory, which favoured the formation of a predominantly white-owned trading system. The concession of white farming 'blocks' in the early 1900s brought settlers. Best asserts that they "were ranchers first and traders second, but they quickly realised the close relationship of the two pursuits. They built up their herds with African livestock exchanged for clothing, hardware and other general merchandise"<sup>9</sup>. Whatever the settlers' priority may have been, a network of mainly European-owned trading stores arose which linked in easily with the highveld cattle buying chain drawing finance from agents and dealers on the Witwatersrand. White traders also enjoyed the favour of the Government in excluding both Asians and Africans from commerce.<sup>10</sup> In the reserves traders were allocated, or were rented, grazing rights by the chiefs and trekked cattle out - either directly for export (by rail or on the hoof) or first to the white farming 'blocks' for holding or growing out. Cattle trading and holding became and remained for the next half century, the basic operation of these 'blocks' (henceforth referred to as the freehold farms as they are commonly known, although Ghanzi was leasehold until the late 1950s)<sup>11</sup>. "The life of the native does, it is true, still offer little scope for European enterprise apart from the operations of traders" remarked Pim<sup>12</sup>. Imposition of the 'Native taxes' (payable in cash), to pay the costs of colonial administration, provided an important incentive to cattle owners to sell.

Three major geographical components of the cattle trade in the Protectorate began to emerge. Firstly, the bulk of the trade emanated from the Ngwato reserve - the largest reserve, containing the most people, some two-thirds of the cattle population and the largest herds<sup>13</sup> - forming the hub of the export trade to the south, with the cattle exported directly or held in the Tati, Tuli and Gaborones blocks. Secondly, a trade from Ngamiland to the Katanga mines began from 1914 owing to a disastrous epidemic of bovine

pleuro-pneumonia in Barotseland from where the mines' meat supplies had previously been drawn.<sup>14</sup> Though uneven and intermittent this trade to the Copperbelt was to remain the main market for Ngamiland cattle until 1967. The third component centred on the Ghanzi farms in the western Kgalagadi, buying immature stock from Ngamiland and the surrounding Kgalagadi villages and trekking them south.<sup>15</sup>

The rise of the cattle export trade coincided with the gradual decline of other commodity exports, principally hunting products and gold from the Tati.<sup>16</sup> Although in a good rainfall year grain exports could be substantial (e.g. £ 21,000 in 1909)<sup>17</sup> they were intermittent and increasingly less frequent.

Cattle exports escalated unevenly. Between 1905 and 1910 they were fairly stagnant (averaging about 3000 head per annum according to official figures, though unrecorded exports might have been much higher). Superficially this reflected the appearance of bovine pleuro-pneumonia ('lung sickness') in the Protectorate with resulting South African import restrictions. But Pim noted that an earlier outbreak of East Coast fever "... not in the Protectorate itself but in the adjacent areas of Rhodesia and the Transvaal, had already led to the imposition of restrictions on exports to the Cape Colony, then the best market, and the appearance of lung sickness (in 1905) led to these restrictions being intensified. Following on the Act of Union in 1909 the restrictions were extended to the other three provinces.<sup>18</sup> Coincidentally, the 1905 - 10 period seems to have been one of slack demand and domestic oversupply of meat in South Africa.<sup>19</sup> Thus this episode may be the first instance of what was to become a recurring pattern of veterinary restrictions against imports being imposed or tightened by South Africa whenever domestic prices weakened.

Exports were boosted after 1910 both by the recovered South African market and by the opening of the Johannesburg municipal abattoirs in 1910 with their adjoining quarantine market.<sup>20</sup> This "...enabled, for the first time, farmers from the buffer and quarantine areas, and the surrounding countries of Rhodesia, Bechuanaland, Swaziland and South West Africa, to forward their stock in sealed trucks for sale on the Johannesburg markets, which were otherwise closed to them"<sup>21</sup>. The Johannesburg quarantine market was to provide the main official outlet for Bechuanaland cattle sales until mid-century. Cattle sent to the quarantine market had to be sold and slaughtered immediately, with the meat passing directly to the consumers; i.e. it was forbidden from entering the retail trade. Whatever veterinary grounds may have motivated these restrictions they caused quarantine market meat to be sold at a discount below the open market price by preventing the "quarantine cattle" from being held over when prices were low and by limiting buyers to those wholesalers who could dispose of it quickly and directly to consumers; in effect, this meant the few wholesalers holding supply contracts for mine, industrial and other institutional compounds.

Export volume from Bechuanaland increased substantially to over 12 000 head per annum and the Protectorate government noted in 1914 that cattle exports to Johannesburg had become "by far the principal export of the country"<sup>22</sup>

The rise of the export trade had brought with it the need for regulation of veterinary conditions, stock theft and fraud. The Veterinary Services Department was started in 1905, cattle brands were registered and penalties fixed for stock theft (Proclamation 7 of 1907). Cattle buyers for export

were obliged to take out expensive licences (£100 deposit), since "... it was felt that the natives required protection against possibly unscrupulous or fraudulent dealing on the part of some of them who were merely birds of passage with no stake or interests in the country, and who in the event of proceedings being instituted against them would probably disappear as suddenly as they had come"<sup>13</sup> (Proc. 39 of 1911). This measure also had the effect, intentional or not, of confining cattle exporting to larger dealers.

The Bechuanaland Protectorate government also moved, rather belatedly, to extract revenue directly from the increasingly valuable cattle export trade through a cattle export tax (Proc. 12 of 1916), the proceeds of which were meant to cover expenditure by the Veterinary Services Department,<sup>24</sup> Cattle Exports already contributed substantially to government revenue in an indirect manner through being the major source (at this time) of cash income for payment of the "Native taxes"<sup>25</sup>

The greatest boost to cattle imports into South Africa during this period came with the First World War, during which imports of cattle for other than immediate slaughter were permitted for the first time (and only time - since they were cut off again in 1923, never to be reinstated) since 1905. South African government sources cited veterinary improvements as the reason in the case of the Protectorate : in 1979 "... the Union government recognising that the Southern Protectorate was a clean cattle district, decided to allow the introduction therefore of breeding animals as well as slaughter cattle, and subsequently extended this concession to animals from Ngamiland." Quarantine camps were established at Ramatlabama and Sikwane on the southern border, "the conditions of export being that the animals should serve a fourteen days quarantine in a fenced camp...."<sup>26</sup> Exports to South Africa then escalated rapidly to 19 000 head in 1916-17 and 31 000 in 1920-21, by which stage 94% of Bechuanaland's cattle exports went to South Africa.<sup>21</sup>

But the actual reason for South Africa permitting the unrestricted import of cattle into the open markets was the shortage of meat during war time - not any sudden attainment of new standards of veterinary hygiene in Bechuanaland, S. Rhodesia and Swaziland! "On the outbreak of war in 1914 South Africa became an exporting country practically overnight...."<sup>28</sup> supplying its generally low grade meat<sup>29</sup> (not otherwise in demand in the world beef trade at the time to the warring armies. Exports of beef increased from 1 million lbs in 1910-14 to 143 million lbs in 1915-19<sup>30</sup> From 1917 to 1919 slaughter stock prices in South Africa rose almost 70% (in line with prices of most other agricultural commodities). Ready sources of meat were needed to cover the deficit created by imports and to satisfy the expanding urban demand during the war-time boom, for which investment in domestic manufacturing production (moving into the gap left by reduced imports) was partly responsible.

The war also proved extremely profitable for the Imperial Cold Storage and Supply Company (ICS). After surviving liquidation proceedings in 1911 it entered a period of prosperity and expansion (into fruit, dairy and fish storage and meat export), achieving its greatest successes through its near monopoly of war-time meat exports (secured through controlling all the major coastal meat plants, except for the Union Fresh Meat Company at Durban).<sup>32</sup>

II.

As dramatic as the onset of war-time boom conditions which accelerated the Protectorate's entry into South Africa's markets was the post-war collapse after 1920 (summarised in Table 1 below) which heralded her re-exclusion. By 1924 slaughter stock prices had fallen to half of their 1920 level, export volumes had dwindled and export prices had crashed.

TABLE 1			
<u>THE POST-WAR SLUMP OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN BEEF INDUSTRY:</u>			
<u>A STATISTICAL PICTURE</u>			
Cattle slaughtered in South African abattoirs			
1918-19	350 000		
1922-23	381 000		
1923-24	445 000		
South African beef exports, export prices and values			
	Volume (lbs)	Prices (pence per lb)	Value (£)
1919	46 363 000	5.89	1 138 000
1922	1 741 000	4.81	35 000
1924	9 601 000	2.57	119 000
South African meat prices (pence per lb)			
	Beef	Mutton	Pork
1920	6.80	10.68	11.54
1924	3.91	7.68	7.48
Sources: Union office of Census and Statistics: <u>Official Yearbook of the Union of South Africa</u> Nos. 8 and 17 "Union Statistics for 50 years."			

The post-war slump ushered in a period of instability culminating in the depression of the early 1930s. Since the strategies adopted by South African farmers, meat traders and government in the early 1920s to try to restore profitability were to have an enormous impact on the Protectorate during the next twenty years, it is necessary to dwell on them briefly.

Firstly, the dominant feature of the South African meat industry during the market collapse of the early 1920s was the sharp conflict which arose between farmers and meat packing and wholesaling interests - predominantly the ICS. The conflict was no doubt provoked by ICS's relatively monopolistic position in meat wholesaling and retailing at a time of steeply falling

prices. Within ICS itself J.G. Van der Horst (architect of the company's post-1911 reconstruction) was ousted as managing director by Sir David Graaf in 1921 - an associate of Jan Smuts and a man with the ambitions of Rhodes. Graaf resumed control of the company at a time when its popularity was as low as its market control was high. Such unpopularity, argued the Board of Trade and Industry in 1925, "... may in general be attributed to the chequered career and, at times, singular methods of cold storage enterprise. In the trade there have been too many commercial adventures, too many combines, over-capitalisation, too many reconstructions, too many attempts at market control, and too great use of political influence." (p.10).

Secondly, the different strategies adopted by white farmers' organisations, ICS and the State reflected this conflict.

Farmers' Reactions: South African white cattle farmers' reactions to the crisis were threefold.

- (a) Agitation for embargo of cattle imports, from Southern Rhodesia and Bechuanaland Protectorate, was the most concerted response of farmers' associations from 1922 to 1924.<sup>33</sup>
- (b) Agitation for regulation of monopolistic activities of middlemen (specifically the ICS), alleged to be manipulating the trade to the disadvantage of farmers.<sup>34</sup>
- (c) Initiation of cooperative marketing agencies designed to secure a better return for the former. The Meat Producers' Exchange was formed in Johannesburg in 1921 with the object of stabilising prices and eliminating unnecessary middlemen from the meat trade.<sup>35</sup> The Farmers Cooperative Meat Industries Ltd (FCMI), formed at about the same time, had similar ambitions for Natal.

Of these three reactions to the crisis by white beef farmers the first was to achieve the most immediate success - especially after dissatisfied white farmers and industrial workers (following the 'Rand revolt' of 1922) had replaced the South African party government of J.C. Smuts with the Nationalist - Labour coalition under J.B.M. Herzog in 1924. Smut's party was seen as representing 'big business,' and one political charge made was that Smuts had made special concessions to favour the ICS.<sup>36</sup> The new government moved quickly to raise the rather token import restrictions imposed by its predecessor and initiated a period of severe agricultural protectionism which was to endure until World War II.

At the same time (October 1924) the new government ordered a full commission of enquiry<sup>37</sup> by the Board of Trade and Industries into the affairs of the ICS and meat marketing in South Africa. The recommendations of the commission (unified cooperative societies controlling cold storage facilities in all major urban areas, under a statutory board of control) foreshadowed even events of the mid-1930s, but were not immediately acted upon.

The third reaction by farmers (attempting to form independent marketing cooperatives) was a total failure - owing to mismanagement and intervention by the ICS.

ICS's Reactions: The reaction of ICS and its associated companies to the market collapse was also threefold.

- (a) Export Expansion: In 1923 the Smuts government passed a Beef Export Bounties Act, paying one quarter penny per lb. of beef exported as a subsidy, with the object of relieving the market of excess cattle.

Finding foreign markets was a problem, South Africa being unable to compete in both cost and quality with South American countries on the British market. But in 1924 the first shipments of beef to Italy took place, Mussolini having embarked on a policy of importing frozen beef to keep urban living costs down. South Africa had managed to secure a quota in Italy by subsidising the Italian shipping lines<sup>38</sup>

The Beef Bounties Act was heavily geared to the benefit of ICS Section 3 limited firms and societies to whom the bounty was payable to those which furnished the Minister within one month with "a written undertaking that it would also act as agent for producers of slaughter cattle for the slaughtering, preparing and disposal at the producers' risk overseas of any beef...."<sup>39</sup> Only ICS and the FCMI (by then an ICS subsidiary) and the independent (but defunct by 1925) Union Fresh Meat Works, supplied the undertaking. "When authority was given to the three firms to draw the bounty, nothing was done to lower their charges to the producer, nor did the bounty go to the producer in the shape of a higher price for his export quality beef, it was actually lower than what he realised for the same article in the local market... It seems to be the general view that any benefits to the producer under this Act will be indirect."<sup>40</sup>

- (b) Controlling the cheapest sources of beef: Although the general stagnation of world beef markets limited the initial operation of the beef export bounties act (from £72 000 budgeted for bounties in 1923-24 only £1 225 was paid out), the opening of the new market for low grade frozen beef in Italy,<sup>41</sup> together with the availability of export bounties from neighbouring countries<sup>44</sup> clearly encouraged ICS in the pursuit of its second strategy against the slump - a strategy which suited Graaff's business style. This was to secure monopoly control over large supplies of cheap beef, by entering into investment contracts with the administrations of South West Africa (under South African mandatory control), Southern Rhodesia and Bechuanaland Protectorate, for the setting up of meat works in return for a monopoly on meat exports from the territories. In South West Africa, the very favourable terms granted by the Smuts government to the ICS were a major focus of Nationalist-Labour criticism of ICS. They included a fifteen year monopoly of export overseas and 500 000 morgen of land for a nominal rental.<sup>43</sup> The ICS presence was to become the dominant issue in the beef industries of these territories during the later 1920s and 1930s.
- (c) Coopting the cooperatives: The third strategy also related to controlling the cheap sources of meat. The Cooperative Meat Producers' Exchange set up in 1921 represented potentially powerful competition in the making - reinforced by what Sir David Graaff of ICS saw as "...the moral support of the whole government of the day and the sympathy and goodwill of the mining people...."<sup>44</sup> In 1921 Prime Minister Smuts suggested to Graaff that the crisis in the meat trade owing to the price collapse might be countered by ICS teaming up with the meat producers' exchange to handle the marketing of its members' meat. He made similar overtures to the Exchange itself and to the Farmers' Cooperative Meat Industries Ltd. (FCMI).

### Notes

1. The earliest recorded visit is that of the Commissioners Trüter and Somerville "who had been sent to the interior by the Government of the Cape colony to procure draught oxen to replace local stocks depleted by drought." A. Sillery "Botswana: A Short Political History, p.1
2. N. Parsons "The Economic History of Khama's country in Botswana 1844-1930" p.118. In Palmer, R. and Parsons, N. (eds.) The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa. Heinemann 1979.
3. The trade of the Rolong with the Ovambo is one of the earliest documented cases of long distance cattle trading in the region. "Between 1885 and 1895 regular trading caravans backed by the chief men of the Rolong reserves set out ... across the desert with horses, saddlery, clothing and firearms to exchange for Ovambo cattle" (Shillington 1981: 278). This trade across the Kgalagadi through Lehututu still took place in the early 20th century (Stals 1962 : 75-76).
4. Official Yearbook of the Union of South Africa. No.8 1925. Union Office of Census and Statistics. Map of cattle distribution in South Africa 1925.
5. By the 1920s Africans owned about half of South Africa's nine million cattle, despite being confined officially to only 13% of the land (Union Statistics for 50 years" Table 1.4). Much white-owned land was at the time occupied by African "squatters" and employees.
6. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Abattoirs and Related Facilities. Government Printer, Pretoria, 1964, p.10.
7. These firms had even gone to the lengths of purchasing an Argentinian frigorifico to supply South African imports: "La Plata," the subsequent sale of which to the U.S. firm Swift and Co. is of historical significance since it signalled the entry of U.S. firms into the Argentine-UK meat trade. Hanson "Argentine Meat and the British Market," Stanford, 1938 Ch.V and S.A. Board of Trade and Industries "Meat, Fish and Other Foodstuffs. An Enquiry into trade combinations, supplies, distribution and prices." Report No.54, 1925, provide material on the early history of the Imperial Cold Storage and Supply Co.
8. As it had earlier in the case of the Rolong Cattle traders (see note 3 above.)
9. A. Best, "General Trading in Botswana 1890-1968", Economic Geography, October 1970, p.601.
10. *Ibid.* Best discusses discrimination against Asian and African applicants for trading licences.
11. This was still the case in the 1940s. "Facts tend to show that the majority of European farmers still give more attention to acquiring livestock for export than to rearing livestock. This has been the case for some years past and there seems little doubt that the farming of smaller farms today provides insufficient income and consequently the exchange of purchase of livestock with the native community constitutes the mainstay of European cattle farming operations in this country" (Source: Annual Report of the Department of Veterinary Services, undated but from period 1940-47. BNA. S.261/9/1).

12. A. Pim. Report
13. I am grateful to Mr Tom Kays of Maun (who started farming and trading in Ghanzi in 1912) for this information on the early Ghanzi trade. See also M. Russell and M. Russell "Afrikaners of the Kalahari: White Minority in a Black State." Cambridge 1979.
14. Van Horn, L. "The Agricultural History of Barotseland" in Palmer, R. and Parsons, N. (eds.)
15. The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa, London, 1977.
16. Gold exports were as much as £56 000 worth in 1909 but were on a declining trend thereafter. Colonial Annual Reports, Bechuanaland Protectorate.
17. Ibid
18. Pim, op.cit. 14.
19. As reflected in the poor profits made by ICS in this period, which were also partly due to temporarily sharp competition (S.A. Board of Trade and Industries, Report No.54 1925 p.7).
20. Meat slaughtering and handling conditions in Johannesburg prior to the opening of the municipal abattoir were primitive consisting of ".... a number of insanitary and filthy ramshackle wood and iron slaughter poles ... dotted around the city." With the advent of the abattoir".... all the old slaughter poles were closed down" and a by-products plant was opened - converting waste material into commercial fats, fertilizers and other farm foods. Source: Col. I. Smith "Transforming a City's meat industry: the growth of the Johannesburg Livestock market" in "Municipal Magazine" Johannesburg 1938.
21. Ibid
22. Colonial Annual Report for Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1913-1914, p.6
23. Ibid
24. Ibid
25. "Native taxes" totalled 25s per adult male per annum in 1923. These taxes provided almost half of the B.P. government domestic revenue in the early 1920s.
26. "Official Yearbook of the Union of South Africa" No.8 1925 page 1063. Even so the Union did suspend briefly imports other than for immediate slaughter in March 1919 owing to a feared southward spread of "lung-sickness" (Res. Magistrate to Chief Linchwe, 20 March 1919. Linchwe I papers, Phutadikobo Museum, Mochudi).
27. Figure for 1916/17 from Colonial Annual Report for Bechuanaland Protectorate 1916-17; figure for 1920/21 from BNA S.274/1.

28. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Abattoirs and Related Facilities, Government Printer, Pretoria, 1964. Para 43.
29. The bulk of beef marketed in South Africa at the time came from retired trek oxen and was therefore lean, hence low-grade. See Board of Trade and Industries, Report No.54 1925, p.38, and Cape Times Editorial 19th August 1924: "What is chiefly wrong with our cattle trade is not that it suffers from unfair competition but that it produces so much bad beef. It will never get good (export) markets until it grows better beef."
30. Official Yearbook of the Union of South Africa. No.8 1925, p.1063
31. "Union Statistics for Fifty Years" Table H9.
32. S.A. Board of Trade and Industries, Report No.54, 1925 pp. 7-8
33. Reports of farmers' meetings, Cape Times 18/8/22, 23/3/23. Rand Daily Mail 22/8/24, Star 19/8/24.
34. Rand Daily Mail 22/8/24
35. S.A. Board of Trade and Industries. Report No.54 page 10.
36. Parliamentary debate, reported in Cape Times 19/8/24
37. S.A. Board of Trade and Industries. Report No.54 page 10.
38. Van Biljon, F. State Interference in South Africa, London 1938
39. Ibid., page 41.
40. Ibid., page 42.
41. Italy became the major market for Southern African beef exports until U.K. market quotas for chilled beef were obtained by the Ottawa concessions of 1932.
42. South African bounties were payable on exports from South West Africa, and South Africa had reached agreement with the British High Commissioner that bounties paid on cattle slaughtered for overseas export originating in the High Commission territories (Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland) were recoverable from the territorial governments. A similar arrangement seems to have existed with Southern Rhodesia. BNA File S.18/4. The bounties were payable even on lean third grade meat.
43. Parliamentary debate. Cape Times 18/8/24, and Board of Trade and Industries, Report No.54 Page 47.
44. Statement by Graaff to the Board of Trade and Industries enquiry. Report No.54 page 11. The support of the mining companies was crucial owing to the magnitude of their meat requirements.

45. Union of S.A. "Findings of the Board of Control in an Enquiry into the Meat Trade." UG 21 of 1922 p.6
46. Cape Times 18/8/22
47. Board of Trade and Industries, Report No.54 page 13. The manner of take-over of FCMI repeated ICS's much earlier experience with the formerly state-owned Transvaal Koelkamers Beperkt. Ibid page 15.
48. Petition prepared by Isang Pilane, Chief of the Bakgatla, to be presented to Prince Arthur of Connaught on the occasion of the opening of Mochudi National School in August 1923. (Source: Isang Pilane papers, Phutadikobo Museum, Mochudi. I am grateful to Sandy Grant for bringing this petition to my attention).

