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ANNEX 1

IIIrd Year of the Congolese Revolution: Analysis of experiences and perspectives of the Congolese Revolution 3 October 1966.

**By the Political Commissariat of the Western
Front**

(Document written by

Thomas Mukwidi,

one of the Colleagues of P. Mulele)

It is now three years since the Congolese people, oppressed, exploited and humiliated by North-American imperialism, three years since the Congolese people faced with fascism, corruption, treason, brutality and violence of the reactionary regime subordinated to yankee imperialism, it is finally three years today since the Congolese people, having used and exhausted all peaceful and legal methods of struggle to restore its national sovereignty and actualize its profound aspirations of freedom and peace; took before the whole world and history the firm resolution to launch an armed struggle as the sole means for the accomplishment of those aspirations.

It was in fact, on the 3rd October 1963, after the puppet Kasa-Vubu had consummated his treason of September 29th by illegally closing the Parliament, that our people, through the voice of its vanguard organizations, namely, the Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA) and the Movement National Congolais (MNC); and by a general statement to the public opinion, re-affirmed with audacity and determination its resolute will to raise high the flag of freedom and decolonization by the creation of the Conseil National de Liberation (CNL).

The CNL launched, right away, an appeal to all active forces of the nation for the creation of a broad popular front and constituted itself into a conscious vanguard for our revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of the corrupted and American enslaved regime.

The Heroic Struggle of the Congolese people

Following the CNL's historical appeal, the broad popular masses of our country, resolute and united as one from the East to the West, from the South to the North, under the schrewd and dynamic leadership of comrade Mulele, rose up with arms in their hands to definitively break down the chains of oppression, exploitation and humiliation imposed on them for 80 years by imperialism, colonialism and their Congolese puppets. Armed with the burning desire for freedom and peace, our People under the war cry "Mayi Mulele" inflicted heavy blows on imperialism and its agents. This heroic and revolutionary struggle, in a short period of time, had had a great development and momentum. More than 2/3 of the national territory fell under the authority of the popular forces, thus shaking in a serious manner, the very foundation of the puppet power and its submission to the USA. Profound internal contradictions undermined the anti-popular and pro-imperialist regime of our country, and we thus saw a vertiginous succession of puppets in power in so far as they proved, one by one, unable to provide any guarantee to their masters' interests.

At the international plane, our struggle benefitted from an active and fraternal solidarity of all peace and freedom loving people and all revolutionary organizations of the world. The CNL was recognized as the legitimate representative and the vanguard of the movement of liberation of the Congo. Conscious of the danger for their interests, constituted by the victory of a people's revolution in the Congo, imperialists formed a solid coalition and intervened scandalously and openly in the internal affairs of our country by the barbarous aggression in Stanleyville on the 24th of September 1964, which brought forth a general indignation from the peoples of the whole world. Such an aggression, in which about 20,000 of our compatriots died, is a material proof of the ferocious and criminal nature of imperialism. It proves that imperialism does not retreat before any force to defend its dirty interests. It was a strong blow that our people will never forget and a debt of blood which will be paid at a high price.

But despite that heavy tribute of blood, despite all the ups and downs of our revolutionary struggle, our people, following

the example of the valiant people of Vietnam, have proven that despite the numerical superiority and the military equipment of imperialists and their Congolese puppets, the latter can be defeated.

On this occasion of the third anniversary of the launching of our struggle, it is for us a duty to make a self-critical analysis of our experiences.

Experience and Lessons to Draw

Imperialist oppression and exploitation, on the one hand, sharp contradictions undermining our country, on the other, have produced objective and subjective conditions leading to the determination of the broad popular masses of the country to firmly persist in the anti-imperialist national liberation struggle. Since 1959, our people have always responded to the appeal launched by its leaders. But, at each stage, our people, responding to those appeals, have known difficulties and faced serious setbacks. They have made heavy sacrifices, suffered great privations and paid dearly with the blood of thousands of their sons their tribute for freedom from imperialism. In many regions of our country, several villages have been completely destroyed by bombs launched by racist mercenaries. Hundreds of thousands of our patriots and compatriots have been mutilated, ripped open, shot, burned alive; hundreds of thousands of others have been arrested, tortured, deported or reduced to a slow death in Congolese jails (Luzumu, Makala). Many more have seen their houses burned, their mothers, their wives and their daughters raped in their presence or kicked out of their homes, deprived of their property, forced to enrol in Mobutu's army or recruited for diverse forced labour. So many families have been reduced to misery, and many other households broken by the neocolonialist politics of force and corruption.

Mobilization and Organization of the people

The first fundamental cause of the successive setbacks that we have known lies in the fact that we have not sufficiently mobilized and organized the people. The enemy is better organized than us and benefiting from a considerable support of imperial-

ists on all planes, only our power of organization and mobilization of the people will allow us to transform the relations of forces between us and the enemy. We must consider the mobilization and organization of popular forces as the sole guarantee we have for our victory. The problem of the mobilization and organization of the masses is thus of extreme strategic and ideological importance for the victory of our revolution.

Nevertheless, many compatriots, strongly influenced by a bourgeois ideology — due to lack of sufficient political preparation and being victims of subjectivism — obstinately refuse to pay a slight attention to that problem.

Experiences of other people's revolutionary struggles have proven that a people, no matter how small, when politically and ideologically trained, mobilized and led by a conscious, shrewd and just leadership, can struggle, confront and win against an all powerful enemy, despite difficulties and horrors of war.

To accomplish the difficult task of mobilization and organization of the masses, it is crucial to use correct methods. We had believed that to do a work of mass mobilization, it was enough to launch political slogans (*mots d'ordre politiques*) and to formulate a programme containing anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist phrases — including the slogan "Scientific Socialism" — to attract the broad popular masses. Practical experience has convinced us that this method is meaningless and lacks any mobilizing power for the masses. Does this mean that we must no longer formulate programme and launch political slogans? That is not the issue. The issue concerns, on the contrary, our methods of work.

We think therefore, that before we write a programme and formulate, a political slogan, we must go to the masses, live with them and struggle on their side to know their problems, their difficulties, their demands and proceed to a serious investigation of their life. It is only after that work is done that we can formulate a programme and launch political slogans which reflect the objective realities of our country and the profound aspirations of our people.

In the present phase of our revolution, the content of such a programme must be essentially rooted in the realization of the national and democratic revolution. In its formulation, we must start from the understanding of the broad popular masses of peasants, workers and intellectuals. We must use a language that is

understandable to the people. It is only on this basis that we will be able to mobilize, organize and unify our whole people to participate in the revolution.

Necessity of a Leading Core and of a Vanguard Party

The second fundamental cause of our setbacks is the lack of a united and homogenous organization and a leading core; a real vanguard of our liberation struggle characterized by a complete attachment to the cause of the revolution and interests of the people. It is high time to think of the foundation of that party and that core.

The conditions of that party and that core must be:

- Complete political unity and identity on the liberation struggle of the Congolese people by means of armed struggle as principal form of that struggle. That core must not use an anti-imperialist language to enrich and satisfy insatiable egoistic personal ambitions, the permanent origin of our quarrels and intensive struggles.
- rigorous and strict discipline. The core must be essentially revolutionary and composed of serious and competent; capable of linking revolutionary theory to practice and words to actions. By discipline is meant the radical transformation and complete loyalty to the revolutionary cause.
- the core must have, as task, the foundation of a vanguard party of a strict discipline and authentically revolutionary vocation.

The foundation of such a party must not be the product of individual imagination, but the result of objective work. That is to say, that Party must be erected on a basis, that is, inside the country and in the process of the revolutionary practice. It is neither in the process of revolutionary tourism nor in exile, thousands of kilometres away from one's country, outside of every objective reality, that a vanguard party is founded.

The Congolese People's Struggle is a Protracted Struggle

We have shown, on many occasions, that the strategic position of the Congo — in the very heart of Africa — is a question of life and death for imperialists. Immense natural resources and economic potentiality of the Congo in general have not just attracted the interests of one imperialist power, but of a whole coalition

USA, Belgium, France, Great Britain, West Germany, etc. Imperialists are highly conscious that the victory of the Congolese revolution is an assault to their sordid interests in the Congo and would certainly undermine the last bastion of colonialism and racism in Africa.

Those reasons thus form our conviction that it is not possible for us to win an easy and quick victory, it is important that we have a clear point of view on that problem, otherwise we may fall into strategical and tactical errors of great consequences. We can not just light a simple flash in the pan. Imperialists and reactionaries have to be compared to great mountains which cannot be displaced in one day.

We must thus resolutely oppose every tendency towards impatience, blind and complacent opportunism that is manifested in some of our comrades, who, power-thirsty or moved by motives which are incompatible with the interests of the revolution, dream of an easy and quick victory. Hence, the adventurism and putschist tendency that have caused irreparable losses to the revolution and demobilized the revolutionary consciousness of many combatants.

Problem of Cadres

The problem of cadres, posed in a sharp manner, constitutes the third fundamental cause of our provisional failure. This imposes on us the duty to consider the problem of cadres as one of the important conditions of the development and success of the revolution. We refuse to understand that the victory of the revolution does not depend on pious resolutions adopted in international conferences nor on declarations and we persist on making revolutionary tourism by visiting all capitals of the world. The victory of the revolution depends entirely on practical work of cadres inside the country in mobilising and organizing the people.

Our urgent preoccupation must therefore be focused on that problem — to train cadres completely committed to the revolution.

Political Struggle in Cities

Given the need to generate the unity of the broad popular masses for the revolution, it is important to give importance to

the mobilization and the organization of the masses in the cities because the enemy is politically and militarily powerful. To be able to develop a great mass movement and create a system of political organization in cities and in areas occupied by the enemy, we must pay a very serious attention to workers' and students' organizations which constitute the vanguard of mass struggles in cities. Mass struggles in cities and in regions controlled by the enemy must essentially start from economic and social bases which are important sections of mass mobilization.

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That problem, must be viewed as the fourth fundamental cause of our setbacks, for historical and revolutionary experiences of other peoples have proven in a very convincing way, that an armed struggle which is not supported and combined with the political struggle in cities and regions occupied by the enemy is bound to fail.

Our Attitude Toward external Aid

We still meet in our ranks many comrades who still have a blind faith in external aid and even consider it as an imperative condition of the victory of our revolution.. That is precisely the fifth fundamental cause of our errors. Despite the true fact that socialist countries have an internationalist duty to help every people struggling for its liberation, we must, however, know that revolution and liberation of a country have always been the work of the people of that country and not of a foreign people. Revolution is neither to be imported nor exported.

To liberate our country, we must essentially count on our people. It is our people alone who are the guarantee and the sure

aid and who will persists to the end to assure the freedom of our nation.

Our attitude towards foreign aid is that we express our gratitude towards every friendly country which offers it, but it should be viewed as a secondary and limited contribution. And, while receiving that aid, we must firmly exercise great vigilance and safeguard our independence.

Our New Preoccupations

The critical examination of everything that has been done since October 3, 1963 allows us to recognize our errors. Only those who do nothing are immune to mistakes. But, far from being ashamed and therefore erase by one blow everything made on the blood of thousands of compatriots, as certain opportunist and arrivists seem to do, we must on the contrary learn through those mistakes, be able to draw lessons and teachings from them. Those errors were due, as far as we are concerned, to our lack of experience in the organization of the insurrectional movement and we do have a firm conviction that despite those errors and present vicissitudes — that in fact constitute the normal process of our action the last word belongs to our people. Perhaps it won't be tomorrow or in ten years, but the last word belongs essentially to our people and the wheel of history is irreversible.

The most important and essential thing for us is our resolute will and our intangible determination to succeed.

The correct understanding of fundamental causes of our errors is the sole sure path towards new strategy and tactics, to stimulate new and victorious momentum to the Congolese revolution.

Consequently, three urgent and interlinked tasks summon us: the creation of a vanguard leading core; the foundation of an authentically revolutionary party; the winning of the masses and the intensification of the armed struggle.

(a) Formation of a Vanguard Leading Core

If a revolution and an armed struggle are not led by a conscious, just, shrewd leadership composed of elements with complete commitment to the revolution and the people's cause, then it is impossible to lead that revolution and that armed struggle to vi-

ctory: That is why, taking into account our experience and past errors, it becomes urgent to safeguard the revolution, to create a real vanguard leading core.

The conditions for such a core, as we have already said, are:

- unity and complete political identity on the liberation of the Congolese people by means of armed struggle as the principal form of that struggle;
- that core must be composed of honest, serious elements capable of linking revolutionary theory to practice and words to actions, and who accept difficulties and sacrifices, who renounce their egotistical and personal interests, and finally who may give their life for our people.
- that core must not use an anti-imperialist language for self-enrichment and to satisfy personal ambitions, the permanent cause of our quarrels and our divisions;
- that core must have, for a fundamental task of the foundation of a vanguard party, strict discipline and an authentically revolutionary vocation. There must be as well, the training inside the country, of numerous cadres of the revolution. To avoid the infiltration in our ranks of bad elements and agents of imperialism, a series of criteria will be imposed on the selection of cadres. Cadres will come from elements that are determined to firmly persist in the revolution and view it as a question of life and death, and know very well that only the victory of the revolution can bring about salvation and happiness to their parents, brothers and sisters.

(b) Foundation of a Revolutionary Party

Since old political parties and organizations of united fronts became inoperative, a new appeal for unity, without exception and sectarianism, of all democratic and patriotic forces must be launched to create a real Revolutionary Party and a Revolutionary United Front. The second task we must take up is the foundation of a Vanguard Revolutionary Party, that is, a Party that will reflect the profound aspirations of our people, correctly express their needs and defend their interests.

To accomplish such a historical mission, such a Party must be

born from within the masses. That is, it must be founded inside the country and in the process of the struggle itself. This important requirement will allow us to reduce the ambitions and craving desires of those who confuse the revolution with their own interests and conceive of it as a means for their self-enrichment. In addition, such a Party will fix a clear demarcation between true, and pseudo-revolutionaries and will put in the direction of the Party leaders and officers who have graduated from the ordeals of the struggle and who have the esteem, the confidence and resolute support of our people.

In that Party, we must fight against personal ambitions and impose vigorous criteria for the admission of its members. No Party a la "Bantoue". The best members must also come out of the revolutionary practice.

(c) The Conquest of the Masses and the Intensification of the Armed Struggle.

The third urgent task for the glorious development of the revolution of our people is the winning over of the masses and the intensification of the armed struggle under the absolute leadership of the leading core and the vanguard party. In fact, the mobilization and organization of the masses and the armed struggle under the shrewd and centralized leadership of the vanguard party with an iron discipline, are the two principal weapons for the revolutionary people to achieve victory over its enemies.

That is why it is indispensable that the vanguard party, the promoter, the organizer, the initiator and the leader of those two arms come out from the burning fire of the struggle.

Those, in our view, are the three essential tasks for the process of development of our revolution in our present circumstances. Those three, tasks, we repeat, although distinct, are in fact indissolubly linked.

Formation of a Broad United Popular Front

The third arm of the revolutionary people is the United Front. That is why, while struggling to realize the three first preceding tasks, we must simultaneously deploy our efforts for the conjunctural creation of a broad popular united front, regrouping all

patriotic and democratic social strata, all progressive organizations and political parties which are opposed to imperialism. We must, as a basic principle, isolate the enemy to the maximum.

The problem of the united front constitutes one of the strategic and fundamental problems of the Congolese revolution and we must give it the importance it deserves.

On this day of October 3, 1966, we must bow to the memory of all our martyrs who, heroically fell for the cause of the liberation of our people, and make an appeal to the unity of all democratic and popular forces of our country. Let us forget what divides us up to now, and what has considerably undermined our unity and retarded our victory. Let us realize a solid and authentic revolutionary unity.

Let us never betray our martyrs and let us remain committed to the Historical Testament that our National Hero Lumumba had bequeathed our people and the world when, a few days before his death, he wrote:

I know, and I feel in my heart, that sooner or later my people will shake off all their enemies, inside and outside our land, and that they will rise as one man to say 'no' to the shame and degradation of colonialism, and to assume once again their dignity under clear skies.

We are not alone. Africa, Asia and the free and freed peoples all over the world will always stand beside those millions of Congolese who will not give up the struggle until the day when no colonizers and no mercenaries are left on our soil. I would like my children, whom I am leaving and may perhaps never see again, to be told that the Congo has a great future, and that it is up to them, as to every other Congolese, to carry out the sacred task of rebuilding our independence and our sovereignty; for where there is no dignity there is no freedom, and where there is no justice there is no dignity, and where there is no independence there is no free men.

No brutality, no agony, no torture has ever driven me to beg for mercy, for I would rather die with my head high, my faith unshaken, and a profound trust in the destiny of our country, than live in subjection, seeing principles that are sacred to me laughed to scorn. History will have its say one day — not the history they teach in Brussels, Paris, Washington or the United Nations, but the history taught in the countries set free from colonialism and its

puppet rulers. Africa will write her own history, and both north and south of the Sahara it will be a history of glory and dignity....

The road of honor, dignity and glory for our people has not been better incarnated by another but Patrice Lumumba.

ANNEX 2

On may 11th 1968, Pierre Mulele described to Ndabala who came to the maquis from Brazzaville, the problems they were facing in the maquis in the following way:

1. The Lumumbists are abroad since 1963, I think of those in Brazzaville especially. They have never taken the trouble to be in contact with us in the maquis.
2. The Lumumbists outside the country have had the privilege to send people abroad for training. They have never felt the need to send those trained cadres inside the country where we lack them in a very dramatic manner.
3. The arms we have, have been taken from the enemy in combats. They are not enough. You have, outside, the possibility of obtaining arms but we have never received arms through Brazzaville.
4. Before a man can fight, reflect, act, he must be in good health. How can you keep a whole people in the forest for years, without any medicine to treat the sick and wounded?
5. The massive departure of combattants has been caused by the lack of medical services, malnutrition and the barbaric oppression by the enemy.
6. Most of the intellectuals who have never had any political education are carried away by opportunism; they cannot be taken as authentic cadres of the revolution:

Despite the fact that we count on you who are outside we never forget that the revolution must take place on our own soil. In this struggle, our strength, without which nothing is possible, is constituted by the popular masses of people. Without them, we cannot speak of revolution. I can categorically state that our revolution has the confidence of the masses who remain strongly attached to it. Traditional chiefs have given us, for five years, their moral and material support.

Our enemy is powerfully armed. To destroy him, we need unity in our struggle. We must realize genuine and sincere unity of all outside Lumumbist around one sole leadership. We must stop every struggle among ourselves which just reinforces the enemy and weakens our ranks. All prejudices against comrades in struggle must be put aside as well as the habit of putting the blame on others. We all know the present position of Gizenga, but we are against anybody trying to undermine his prestige.

After the regrouping of all Lumumbists without exception, all must return inside the country to pursue the struggle. By staying away from the masses too long, you risk creating a big gap between you and the people.

The creation of those numerous parties is the work of enemies who are using Congolese to divide our forces. A vanguard party cannot be created unless all leaders have been contacted.

I insist that you send here right away cadres trained in China and Cuba who are in Brazzaville. Even if the material we are asking arrives late, the cadres must come: people above all."


—Ludo Martens, *Pierre Mulele ou la Seconde vie de Patrice Lumumba* (Anvers: Editions EPO asbl, 1975), pp. 302 — 303.

ANNEX 3

Levels

A

ORGANIZATION



Around Commandant in Chief, Pierre Mulele, responsible for the overall leadership (political and military) of the whole movement.

Oct. 1963-March 1964: decentralization: 3 general headquarters. (Nov. 64-March 65)

Structure: Central Camp — Zones (up to 7), Leading Cadres: Mulele and Bengila (Fundamental questions) military and political supervision.

Kafungu, Chief of military staff (beg. May 64) Laurentin Ngolo and Pascal Munde lengole, principal assistants to Mulele and Bengila for political matters.

Martine Madina, Thetime Ntsolo, Pierre Ngwentsungu and Commanders of zones, office heads.

REGIONAL H.

REGIONAL H.

Teams sent reports to the GH monthly on:

- | | |
|----------------------------|--|
| political situation | — education/organization of popular masses
— activity of the enemy |
| situation of partisans | — combats
— performances in battles, deficiencies, casualties, etc. |
| Relations masses/partisans | |
| Economic situation | — agriculture, quantity of food received from villagers, etc.
— finance |

VILLAGE COMMITTEES (up to 10 people)

- | | | | |
|-----------|---|-------------------------|---|
| great | { | Committee chairman | often traditional chiefs, |
| political | | Committee Vice-chairman | many were patriotic |
| question | | A secretary | nationalists; when reactionary, the chief kept his title, but committee chairman was somebody else elected. |

military leader of the Committee

- mobilization of villagers in combat against ANC soliders.

agriculture officer

- makes sure people continue to cultivate their shambas

elections of judges organized in each village

protocol officers

information officer

intendence officer

intelligence/security/officer

Close relation — Partisan team — village committee as long as village existed

when villagers forced to go to the forest, no separation.

Twice per week: political lessons given to villagers.

DAILY ACTIVITIES

6 00 a.m. everybody up

7 00 a.m. flag salute (red flag)

Morning activities — manual labour:
cut trees, make bivouacs, look for food in the
forest and wood for cooking, carry water,
wash clothes.

- military training
- missions — attack on ANC soldiers
- ambushes, — road blocks.

12.00 — 14.00 rest

1400 pm flag salute

Afternoon activities

- political education open to nearby villagers
- continuation of morning activities up to 1730 pm.
- collective cooking — dinner: 1830 p.m.
- leaders, Mulele, Bengila and Kafungu, others eating only after everybody else has eaten sometime 2200 p.m. If not enough food leaders did not eat.

Military Zones: up to 7 or 8

starting Feb. — March 1964.

1st: Centre zone, Kalaganda area zone
South-West zone, Northern zone, Kandale-
Kahemba zone, Kilembe-Ngudi zone, Zone
(Commanders and assistants)

Commanders nominated according to merits
by Mulele and Bengila.

Capacity for military leadership.

Partisans teams.

Military

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

Central Camp/Pierre Mulele

- Offices
- Secretariat
- Communications
- Company Commanders

Military headquarters (Kafungu)

H. personnel, women Battalion commander elite troops.

military zones

military zones

Political

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

Pierre Mulele and Th. Bengila

Protocol office
(relations with masses)

Collective cooking
serving 2000 people,
week shift

Health Office

Dr. Ankawu
(Jerome Mutumbulu)

Daniel Wafula

Leonie Abo

— women/children

— pharmacy

Studies and Documentation
Office — **L. Ngolo**

Elaboration of the political and ideological
line. Production of texts serving as a basis
for political education, high theoretical
competency required. *Ngolo, Bengila.*

information/press office "Voice of the
Revolution"

security service

Central Depot every
material taken from the
enemy etc.

accounting
office

Technical office

Production of weapons
explosives

Internal politics

office. (**P. Munde-
lengole**) in charge of the
formation of cadres
of the whole movement.

Martine Madinga

— training of cadres to
become political commissars.
heads of teams workshops

Justice and "Contentienx"

PARTISAN TEAMS

