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SOUTH AFRICAN STRATEGY TOWARDS MOZAMBIQUE SINCE NKOMATI

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On 28 August 1985, a combined Zimbabwean-Mozambican assault force captured the headquarters at Gorongosa in Sofala province of the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR or ReNaMo) bandit movement. Although a morale booster, the capture of Gorongosa was, in military terms, a fairly modest victory. Relatively few bandits were killed or captured, and the MNR's capacity to continue the war was only marginally affected. Despite this the capture of Gorongosa was an event of utmost importance in the ongoing regional struggle.

At a press conference at the end of September 1985, it was revealed that among the material abandoned was a diary and notebook kept by the secretary of the MNR leader, Aphonso Dlakama. These 'Gorongosa documents'¹, as they became known, proved beyond any possible doubt that the South African Defence Force (SADF) had continued to support the MNR bandits in the period up to and including June 1985, despite the Nkomati Accord of 'Non-Aggression and Good Neighbourliness' signed between the Mozambican government and the Pretoria regime on 16 March 1984. The documents recorded instances where the SADF had supplied arms, communications equipment, medical supplies, and material to produce propaganda. They described how the SADF organised transport and travel documents for MNR leaders. They showed conclusively that SADF officers played a leadership role in the MNR in the sense of determining the military strategy it should follow. SADF officers were quoted in diary entries telling them that in order to conserve ammunition they should avoid contacts with the Mozambican armed forces and concentrate on economic (soft) targets. Perhaps most damning of all, the documents revealed that the involvement of the SADF in these activities reached right to the top. The immediate liaison officer was a Colonel Charles van Niekerk, but the extracts mention meetings with, and/or messages from both the former and current Chiefs of the SADF, Generals Constandt Viljoen and J J Geldenhuys; Lt Gen P J van der Westhuizen, the then Chief of Staff, Intelligence and current Secretary of the State Security Council; and Lt Gen A J Liebenberg, then General Officer Commanding Special Forces and now Chief of the Army.

The Gorgongosa documents totally belied the image which the Botha regime had tried to project of its intentions in the region at the time of the signing of the Nkomati Accord. Amid the pomp of the signing ceremony,

PW Botha had declared.

We have signalled to the world our belief that states with different socio-economic and social system can live together in peace and harmony, and work together in the pursuit of common interests.²

However, as the Mozambican Security Minister pointed out during the press conference of 30 September, the Gorongosa documents revealed evidence of much more than 'violations' of the Accord. They pointed to a decision taken ... at the moment of signing the Agreement: 'not to observe it, but to maintain a climate of instability and war in the area.'³

The publication of these documents was one of the events which marked the end of what may be described as the 'accord phase' of regional relations in general and Pretoria's regional strategy in particular. In fact, the Nkomati Accord had been under strain for some time before Gorongosa as increasing evidence of continued South African support for the MNR accumulated.⁴ Moreover, the Pretoria regime had itself signalled nearly three months before the capture of the base that it no longer considered it worthwhile to maintain even a facade of willingness to abide by agreements made with independent regional states. In May it had launched an ill-fated commando raid against Angolan oil installations in Cabinda province in flagrant violation of the Lusaka 'cease fire' agreement with Angola, signed in February 1984. The escalating cycle of aggressive acts against regional states in the weeks and months which followed confirmed that the abortive Cabinda raid was no 'one off' occurrence but the beginning of a new phase of regional relations which has seen intensified South African military intervention.

Nevertheless the publication of the Gorongosa documents may be regarded as having finally set the seal on the 'accord phase' of regional relations. Although the Nkomati Accord has not been formally renounced by either party, South Africa's clearly exposed duplicity has undermined the Accord's credibility to the point where it is no longer looked to by either side as a major policy instrument. The Joint Security Commission was suspended at Mozambique's insistence after the Gorongosa material was captured. Although a new Joint Liaison Committee was reportedly set up after meetings between President Machel and P W Botha at the Swazi coronation in April 1986, it is clear that this is a much more low key affair.⁵ Meanwhile, the hollowness of Pretoria's claims about the economic benefits that would accrue through improved relations seemed to be symbolised when the South African manager of the hotel on Inhaca island (managed by a South African-Mozambican joint

company set up after Nkomati) ran away in April 1986 with a large sum of money belonging to the hotel. This led to the suspension of the management agreement with almost the only South African concern actually to have been invested in Mozambique in the post-Nkomati period (*Noticias*, 07.09.86).

Despite the fact that it now no longer dominates regional relations, the Nkomati experience is of great significance in analysing and understanding Pretoria's regional strategy with implications at the following levels of struggle:

1. Bilateral South African-Mozambican relations;
2. South Africa's relations with the independent states of the region as a whole;
3. South Africa's position in the wider international community;
4. The struggle within South Africa itself.

The Nkomati Accord, and South African-Mozambican relations in general, became a laboratory for the South African ruling class to test and apply a range of tactics which had not been as prominent in earlier phases when destabilisation tactics dominated Pretoria's actions in the region. In the original formulations of the Botha's regime regional policy, however, such measures were always seen as an essential complement to destabilisation tactics within a 'Total Strategy' aiming at asserting South Africa's position as a 'regional power' and establishing a 'constellation of states' under its tutelage.

The experience of Nkomati has thus revealed much about the objectives and tactics of South African regional policy, as well as about its strengths and weaknesses, limits and possibilities and contradictions.

FACTORS LEADING TO THE SIGNING OF THE NKOMATI ACCORD

The Nkomati Accord was signed in the wake of, and in direct response to, Pretoria's regional destabilisation tactics. This assault on the region followed Pretoria's failure to gain support among independent regional states for its 'Constellation of Southern African States' initiative launched in the late 1970s. Although destabilisation measures - embracing both military action and economic sanctions - had been applied since the late 1970s, 1982 and 1983 saw a significant escalation. Mozambique had from the start been one of the principal targets of this assault. It provided political support to the ANC and allowed ANC members to reside in the country. The country was an influential member of the Front Line States alliance, and one of the prime movers of SADCC. Its ports and railways offered the only realistic alternative to continued dependence on South African transport facilities for many of the SADCC countries and was itself ruled by a Marxist-Leninist party committed to bringing about a process of socialist

transformation. It thus represented a barrier to a number of Pretoria's immediate regional policy objectives as well as posing a direct ideological challenge and potential alternative to apartheid capitalism. During 1982 and 1983, there was a considerable escalation of MNR attacks, causing great damage to the Mozambican economy. Official sources estimated that by January 1984, 140 villages had been destroyed, together with 840 schools, 900 rural shops and over 200 public health installations. The total cost of MNR destruction was put at US\$3.8 billion.⁶

At the same time, some of Pretoria's strategists were becoming concerned about the apparent absence of formative action by South Africa in the region. Destabilisation was seen as having successfully 'softened up' a number of neighbouring states, but some initiative to make possible the application of economic 'incentive levers' as envisaged in the original constellation formulation was seen as essential if Pretoria was to succeed in ruling, as opposed to simply throwing its weight around the region. Moreover, the costs of destabilisation rose steadily at a time when the South African economy was plunging into its worst recession since the 1930s. At the same time the major Western powers, and particularly the USA, who had through the 'constructive engagement' policy created the conditions for Pretoria to embark on its destabilisation policies in the first place, began to display doubts. Particularly worrying to the major western powers was the possibility that victims of destabilisation might seek further support from the socialist countries. They therefore began to urge Pretoria to seek some 'settlement' within the framework of the Reagan administration's 'regional security' doctrine.

On the Mozambique side, by the end of 1983 it was clear that the economy was in tatters - ravaged by drought and then a flood, on top of the effects of sustained destabilisation. At the beginning of 1984 the government was forced to petition its creditors for renegotiation of the country's US\$4.5 billion debt to the West. At the same time MNR bandits were causing enormous social and political, as well as economic damage. All of these factors congealed to dispose both the South African and Mozambican governments to negotiate an accommodation with each other. The result was the Nkomati Accord between Pretoria and Maputo signed on 16 March 1984.

PRETORIA'S VIEW OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ACCORD

The Nkomati Accord of itself dealt only with security issues. It bound each of the 'high contracting parties' to refrain from the use of force against each other and to prevent the use of their respective territories by any other 'state, government, foreign military forces, organisations or individuals which plan or prepare to commit acts of violence ...' directed

against the other party. However, the Nkomati Accord was also understood to be part of a wider package which would include the renegotiation of various aspects of economic relations between the two countries.

Mozambique's objectives in signing the Nkomati Accord and entering into renegotiations on economic questions were clearly to end the war and to bring about some measure of economic recovery. It was anticipated that if Pretoria fulfilled its obligations under the Accord and ceased giving logistical and other support to the MNR, the level of bandit activity would rapidly decline. At the same time the lifting of the undeclared South African boycott and the prospects of an increased volume of foreign investment would permit a programme of economic recuperation to be initiated. Alternatively, if Pretoria failed to abide by its obligations under the Accord, it would stand exposed as the regional aggressor.

At the same time Pretoria clearly regarded Nkomati as a breakthrough for its regional policies. In an 'authorised' biography of P W Botha published a few months after Nkomati, the Accord is described both as a 'miracle' and as one of the two pinnacles of Botha's career (the other being the large Yes vote in the November 1983 referendum among white voters on the new constitutional proposals). It is also seen as a vindication of the application in previous periods both of the Total Strategy in general and, implicitly, of destabilisation tactics in particular. Botha himself is quoted as follows:

Just as with the result of the referendum on 2 November 1983, the Nkomati Accord was the result of a process which began years ago in accordance with our philosophy of Total Strategy. It was a process in which the image of South Africa and all it had to offer economically and technologically, was firmly made known. The belief was built up in our capacity to maintain internal peace and safeguard our borders, i.e. in our military strength. We could then undertake our diplomacy with self-confidence born of strength - economic and military strength - and make standing room for ourselves in Southern Africa.

But perhaps even more importantly it is clear that apartheid strategists saw Nkomati as having created favourable conditions for the resurrection of the stalled constellation of states initiative. Indeed in his address at the signing ceremony, Botha pointedly referred to his 'vision of a veritable constellation of states in Southern Africa.' More precisely, at the level of bilateral South Africa-Mozambique relations. Nkomati was seen as the green light to initiate a series of actions aimed at generating a

'common approach' on both the security and economic fronts in accordance with the original formulations of the constellation approach. At the regional level it was followed by the application of intensified pressure aimed at forcing other states into signing security agreements. One objective here was clearly to try to isolate the liberation movements - ANC and Swapo - from the Front Line States. Another was to weaken the cohesion of regional alliances and institutions - the Front Line States and SADC in particular. At the same time the apartheid regime attempted to capitalise on the prestige generated by Nkomati in the western world, to advance its claim for de facto recognition as the 'regional power' in Southern Africa and thereby to begin to break out of its international isolation.

ACTION ON THE SECURITY FRONT

On the security front the principal feature of the entire 'accord phase' was the glaring disparity in the degree to which the two parties implemented their obligations under the Accord. The Mozambican government immediately took a number of steps against ANC members in the country. Residences were searched a few days after the signing ceremony and within a few weeks large number of ANC members were required to leave the country. The movement has since been permitted to maintain only a diplomatic representation in Mozambique with a maximum staff of ten.

The Pretoria regime by contrast manifestly failed to take anything approaching corresponding measures against the MNR. MNR armed bands continued to be supplied with arms and equipment from within South Africa as well as other countries such as Malawi, the Comoro islands and, to a lesser extent, Swaziland. Indeed MNR activities escalated in the immediate post-Nkomati period. By September 1984 all ten provinces were affected by bandit activity, including Maputo province which, until Nkomati, had been relatively unscathed (*Rand Daily Mail*, 20.05.84).

Whatever internal dynamic the MNR may or may not have acquired, it is clear, as the Gorongosa documents have proved beyond any reasonable doubt, that continued access to external logistical support was decisive in enabling them to maintain this level of activity. One of the key questions of this phase is thus the extent to which this continued external support was the result of deliberate South African policy.

To approach this question it is necessary to analyse some of the complexities of the MNR as an organisation and of the modus operandi of South African support for its activities during the period prior to Nkomati. In particular, it is important at the outset to break from the type of simplistic view which presents the MNR as an unproblematic instrument of South African policy. In fact, far from creating from scratch a vehicle for its

destabilisation intervention in Mozambique, Pretoria took over from Rhodesian Intelligence the sponsorship of an organisation with a base among sections of the former colonial ruling class, drawing support from elements dissatisfied with various aspects of the Frelimo government's policies. The movement recruited up to 20 000 Mozambicans who formed the major component of the armed bands responsible for acts of sabotage, terror and disruption. Its roots in certain contradictions of Mozambican society made it more effective as a destabilising force. Sponsorship of it corresponded with Pretoria's emerging policy of basing its interventions in neighbouring states on domestic contradictions in the societies concerned. However, it also meant that both the structure of the MNR itself and its relations with Pretoria were complex and replete with potential contradictions.

South African support for the MNR took a number of forms. It is generally known that MNR bases were established in the Transvaal and that SADF members, together with some Israelis and other foreigners, provided a rudimentary training in the use of arms and explosives. Details also emerged over the years of cases¹⁰ in which SADF personnel took direct charge of certain field operations. There were incidents in which SADF officers flew into Mozambique to MNR camps, and the communications system was operated by Military Intelligence from a base in Phalaborwa. However, it now seems that all this was only part of the story. In addition to these forms of direct support it is believed that Military Intelligence (which was responsible for supporting the MNR) also set up a number of front companies through which to supply the movement. Most of the arms supplies, and, in particular, those passing through third countries such as Malawi, are now thought to have been channeled through these companies. Mozambican researchers believe that an 'export-import firm' Framo, organised air drops using a Dakota aircraft supplied to it by the SADF, for example.

The effectiveness of the MNR operations depended to a considerable extent on maintaining a relative degree of autonomy at the different levels of the organisation. The fighters on the ground and potential recruits needed to be persuaded that they were part of a Mozambican organisation representing a political alternative to Frelimo, not the tools of former Portuguese colonialists or South Africa. Hence a formal 'leadership' consisting of black Mozambicans, including a number of former members of Frelimo, was created around the movement's president, Afonso Dhlakama. However, it has long been clear to a number of observers that Dhlakama has never been the dominant figure in the movement.

Behind Dhlakama was the network of former Portuguese colonialists, whose public spokesmen were people like Evo Fernandes, the Secretary General, and Jorge Correia, Information Officer. Some evidence has now emerged that

these had links with prominent former settler capitalists such as Antonio Champilmaud, Manuel Bulhosa and, before his death in 1982, Jorge Jardim.¹¹ The power of this 'Portuguese component' was partly enhanced by the fact that it was they who operated the front companies from which the MNR received most of its supplies through their South African subsidiaries and associates.

This relative indirectness of links between the SADF and the MNR membership well suited Pretoria's strategists. It enabled them to conceal, if not the fact of South African support as such, at least details of the degree of dependence of the MNR on South Africa both from the outside world and from the MNR members themselves. However, while it should be stressed that ultimate control rested with the SADF, through its Special Forces Command and Directorate of Military Intelligence, the clandestine support network also had the effect of giving the 'Portuguese component' a substantial degree of influence within the organisation which was to become of importance later.

The signing of the Nkomati Accord clearly raised a key strategic question for the apartheid regime - to what extent should it cease supporting the MNR and/or act to restrict the activities of the MNR's external network?

It is now known, from the evidence of the Gorongosa documents that the SADF did almost nothing to restrict or even limit its support for the MNR. The bandits continued to be supplied with arms and equipment and continued to be advised and directed by SADF officers - who indeed encouraged them to step up their attacks particularly against civilian targets. No steps were taken to demobilise MNR members in camps in South Africa, and indeed evidence emerged even before the publication of the Gorongosa documents that 'illegal' Mozambican migrant workers detained by the South African Police were being 'press ganged' into the MNR (*Sunday Times*, 07.07.85).¹² Even communications traffic from the Phalaborwa base was continued. All that changed after Nkomati was that some attempt was made to conceal direct South African involvement. The MNR's radio station, the 'Voice of Free Africa', went off the air (although for a while it transmitted from Bophuthatswana). SADF raids of the type conducted against residences in Matola in January 1981 were stopped, and it appears that SADF officers working with the MNR assumed more of a behind the scenes role rather than directly participating in combat operations as they had on numerous occasions previously. One consequence of this was that support through front companies etc, operating both out of South Africa and third countries such as Malawi, was stepped up.

Continued support for MNR operations from South African territory were

discussed during this phase at a number of meetings of the Joint Security Commission set up after the Nkomati Accord as well as at several higher level meetings between Mozambican and South African state officials. Although details of these discussions were not made public, from the reports which emerged it appears that South African officials made strenuous efforts to persuade the Mozambican government that these clear violations of the Nkomati Accord had not been authorised, and were indeed expressly forbidden by top decision makers in the South African state. It appears that South African officials argued that elements within the clandestine support network were acting autonomously and illegally. This led to much speculation about shadowy 'new forces' based in the large Portuguese business community resident in South Africa which had allegedly taken over control of the MNR from the SADF. Some versions also referred to these continuing to receive a measure of unauthorised support from within the South African Military Intelligence, which was said to be reluctant to see the 'deactivation' of the MNR. Sometimes it was even suggested that the position of the Bothas (P W and R F), or more generally those forces within the South African ruling class favouring 'peace', was so precarious in a highly militarised society that their capacity to act decisively against such clandestine and illegal 'new forces' was severely constrained (*Noticias*, 17.07.84). Such speculations were fuelled by revelations in the Gorongosa documents of the deep distrust which apparently existed between military officers and Foreign Minister R F Botha. The documents record occasions on which SADF officers variously described him as a 'traitor', a 'Soviet nark' and an ally of Chester Crocker. It is also indicated that the SADF bugged Botha's conversations with the Mozambican government delegation in the period prior to the October Pretoria Declaration. Furthermore, Botha was excluded from all preparations for the secret visits to Gorongosa of his own deputy Minister, Louis Nel, in early 1985.

The question of the alleged divisions between military 'hawks' and Foreign Affairs 'doves' will not be fully discussed here.¹³ However, it should be noted that the Gorongosa documents provide clear evidence that involvement in supporting the MNR went far beyond certain 'rogue elements' in the military acting on their own. It reached to the very top of the SADF embracing members of the State Security Council (SSC) - since 1978 the highest decision-making body in South Africa. Those named in the documents continued to serve in key positions. Thus, the fact that he was named as one of those accompanying Louis Nel on his unauthorised visit to Gorongosa did not prevent J J Geldenhuys assuming the post of Chief of the Defence Force on 1 November 1985. A J (Kat) Liebenberg, whose name appeared in several entries, and who indeed as the then General Officer commanding Special

Forces Command would have been directly responsible for supplying the MNR, became Chief of the Army on the same date. This is a post, which if past precedent is followed, makes Liebenberg heir apparent to the Chief of the SADF. P I van der Westhuizen, the then Chief of Staff Intelligence, is now Secretary of the SSC. This move to head the powerful Secretariat of the principal decision-making body in the state has considerably enhanced his influence on policy formulation. Finally, although the then head of the SADF Constandt Viljoen has now retired and although there are good reasons to doubt that the retirement of a fit 54 year old committed soldier was purely for personal reasons, his departure was announced after the May 1985 raid against Cabinda and some time before the capture of Gorongosa (*Star*, 30.05.85). Moreover, P W Botha explicitly expressed his 'full confidence' in Viljoen and effectively endorsed the latter's 'explanation' of the Gorongosa evidence proffered at a press conference in October 1985 (*Financial Mail*, 11.10.85).

This last point leads to a further related observation. Although the documents indicate differences between the military and R F Botha (though not with then Deputy Foreign Minister Louis Nel and not, therefore, necessarily with the Department of Foreign Affairs as such), there is no mention of any criticism of P W Botha. Botha's whole comportment in the period since - his defence of military personnel named and unwillingness to express any criticism of their actions - reinforces one key point which was sometimes overlooked, namely, that one of P W Botha's key 'constituencies' was the military and that he presided over a process of militarisation of the apartheid state. As one commentator wrote after Viljoen's press conference in October 1985:

The deep trust which binds President Botha with General Viljoen and the Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, can be fairly compared with the relationship that bound Mr John Vorster with General Hendrik van den Bergh... Military Intelligence has assumed under President Botha at least the same behind-the-scenes influence on policy, and has, therefore, acquired something of the same sinister reputation that BOSS had under Vorster (Ken Owen in *Sunday Times*, 13.10.85).

It is precisely through the national security management system, established in terms of the Botha regime's 'total strategy' and coordinated by the SSC, that the military would have played its behind-the-scenes role, and it is in the SSC that officers like those named in the diaries would have influenced policy formulation.

The above leads in our view to the following deductions: the decision not to observe the Nkomati Accord was in all probability taken in the State Security Council, with P W Botha as SSC Chairman and head of the regime complicit in that decision. It is possible that other members of the cabinet and indeed of the SSC itself may have been excluded or not given all the facts. The Gorongosa documents indicate that on some occasions at least it was the practice not to inform all parties even about decisions affecting their own departments. The obvious example here is the case of Louis Mel's visits to Gorongosa, where his own Minister, R F Botha, was not informed. Such instances clearly point to differences within the regime, but it is necessary in my view to specify with more rigour than is often the case the limits within which such differences existed. What seems to have been at issue was the precise mix of military and economic action to deploy, and not whether there should be both military and economic action. Certainly, there is no confirmation of the hypothesis that Nkomati led to the effective disintegration of the national security management system into a number of distinct competing power centres, one of which unilaterally decided to continue supporting the MNR bandits. All indications suggest that SSC remained (and remains) the principal structure through which decisions on such questions would have been taken.

This immediately raises the question, why should the regime have agreed to sign the Accord, if at the same time it was planning not to abide by it? No hard information is available. Yet it is eminently possible to think of a number of reasons why the most senior officials within the highest decision making body of the apartheid state (the State Security Council) might themselves have favoured the continuation of a certain level of MNR activity against the Frelimo government. Firstly, it is unlikely that Pretoria fully 'trusted' Frelimo or regarded the measures taken during the period to 'improve the climate' for South African economic involvement as a sufficient retreat from either domestic socialist policies or alignment with socialist countries. There are even indications that Pretoria did not regard the measures taken by Mozambique to restrict the ANC as sufficient. Thus, R F Botha told parliament in May,

We are persuading Mozambique, that was initially unwilling to do so, to accept that we should have the right of access to Mozambique so as to combine with them in clamping down further on the ANC.¹⁴

Secondly, as indicated earlier, MNR activity was one of Pretoria's key levers and bargaining counters against Mozambique. There is no doubt that

Pretoria's strategists considered the MNR as the principal factor leading Mozambique to seek rapprochement. It is thus unlikely that they would have wanted to completely abandon one of their trump cards in favour of an approach which relied exclusively on economic action, at least until they felt sure about Frelimo's intentions - particularly since the Total Strategy doctrine which they espouse envisages the coordinated mobilisation of all resources available to the South African ruling class - military as well as economic, political socio-psychological. For these reasons it would have been logical from Pretoria's standpoint to have wanted during these months to be able to deploy a mixture of both 'incentives' and 'disincentives' against Mozambique. In this respect it can be appreciated why a certain level of continued MNR activity might have been considered a 'useful' complement to economic action in the initial months of the emerging 'new relationship'.

Thirdly, strategists saw Nkomati as a mere step in an ongoing process which would force the Frelimo government to reach a 'political accommodation' with the MNR bandits. Through such a 'settlement' Pretoria hoped to place the MNR bandits in a subordinate position in a 'power sharing' government with Frelimo, but one in which they would have sufficient influence to block any 'radical' programmes. The brokering of such a solution would have the advantage of allowing Pretoria to exert influence (as well as present itself as a 'peacemaker') while at the same time enabling it to capitalise on the Frelimo government's international recognition and prestige. The Gorongosa documents and other evidence point to a high level of agreement within the regime over this central objective of achieving a South African-led 'political settlement' between Frelimo and the MNR. Thus the Gorongosa documents record R F Botha telling the MNR delegation at a meeting preceding the signing of the October Pretoria Declaration - a meeting also attended by Defence Minister Magnus Malan and Chief of the SADF Constandt Viljoen - that:

The fundamental objective of the RSA (is to) move the Soviets far from Southern Africa now the RSA is taking steps to know how to promote the distancing of Machel from Moscow, it seems that it is Renamo which holds the key to peace in Mozambique ... in recognising Machel as President of Mozambique, I am not demanding that you recognise the Mozambican government, but only Machel as President because it is he that is recognised internationally and you are not. The RSA does not have money to help Renamo recuperate the economy if it wins the war ... a cease-fire would benefit us (the MNR). Renamo would strengthen its

position as a whole while that of Frelimo would weaken. A cease-fire would mean the following for Renamo: They would not be armed bandits. The international community would see you (Renamo) in a good light ... the investments being made would change the policies of Machel.¹⁵

Similarly, in his press conference after the publication of the Gorongosa documents General Viljoen said,

The purpose of Incomati (sic) was to bring about peace in Mozambique and produce certain important results Our advice to the government was that the purpose of Incomati, the real benefits to Mozambique and South Africa, would not be realised unless there was a halt to the war within Mozambique ... I personally advised the government very firmly that they should press for a cease-fire, during which period negotiations could proceed¹⁶

Whatever the differences within the regime over the precise tactical mix of 'incentives' and 'disincentives' to deploy, the high level of agreement over such an objective itself implied acceptance by all of the need for some level of continued support for the MNR. Continued MNR activity was clearly a sine qua non for the Pretoria regime's attempt to promote a 'political settlement' with the bandits. Without it Frelimo would have had no incentive to reach any settlement and Pretoria's efforts to set itself up as a 'peacemaker' between two 'contending factions' in Mozambique would have come to naught.

POST-NKOMATI NEGOTIATIONS IMPASSE

The next dramatic development began at the end of September. Shortly after the celebrations of the twentieth anniversary of the launching of the armed struggle by Frelimo on 25 September 1964, a senior Mozambican delegation left for Pretoria for yet another round of negotiations. It was acknowledged that an MNR delegation would be in Pretoria at the same time and that South African officials would act as a go-between in discussions about the process of 'reintegrating' MNR members into Mozambican society. Mozambican officials described these discussions as 'decisive'.¹⁷

Nearly five full days of discussions followed although at one point the Mozambican government delegation threatened to withdraw. On 3 October P W Botha, flanked by members of both the Mozambican government and MNR delegations, announced that 'a cessation of armed activity and conflict in Mozam-

bique had been assented to' by both parties. A four point Declaration comprising the following was released:

1. Samora Moises Machel is acknowledged as the President of the Peoples Republic of Mozambique.
2. Armed activity and conflict within Mozambique from whatever quarter or source must stop.
3. The South African government is requested to consider playing a role in the implementation of this declaration.
4. A commission will be established immediately to work towards an early implementation of this declaration'.

The October Declaration perhaps marked the high point of Pretoria's influence, opening up expectations of a potential new level of involvement on the security front. It was announced that Louis Nel would chair a commission on which both the Mozambican government and MNR would be represented. R F Botha told a press conference that the commission would be discussing, inter alia, a possible role for the SADF, which 'apart from monitoring the ceasefire ... might include civil action programmes to help with agriculture, medical care, schooling and technical training' (*Rand Daily Mail*, 04.10.84).

Almost from the moment of the signing of the Pretoria Declaration it became clear that the Frelimo government and MNR had vastly different interpretations both of the meaning of the Declaration and of the role of the commission on which they would for the first time engage in face to face discussions. Frelimo spokesmen interpreted the acknowledgement of President Machel as an implicit recognition of the 'legitimate-authority of our state and government'. The MNR for its part argued that this was merely 'a recognition of a current fact' and that they had 'not surrendered (their) political demands' which they would be putting to the commission. The Frelimo government, however, said that these would not be discussed as the commission was only empowered to consider technical questions relating to the mechanics of a ceasefire (*Noticias*, 04.10.84). The sole point of agreement was that the Declaration itself did not constitute a ceasefire: the fighting would continue.

In the event, after two rounds of discussions, the tri-partite negotiations finally collapsed on 16 October. There were two main reasons for this. First, the Frelimo government, while prepared to discuss the terms of an offer of amnesty and reintegration programme for MNR bandits, was not prepared to discuss political power sharing. Secondly, the MNR were not prepared to accept the subordinate role in a 'power sharing' government, which their Pretoria masters were mapping out for them. It became increasingly apparent that Pretoria had lost much of its earlier initiative and

influence over the evolving situation. This manifested itself, on the one hand, in an increasingly evident strain both in relation with the Frelimo government and the MNR.

With the breakdown of the negotiations, the MNR and Frelimo committed themselves to seeking a relative advantage if not a 'solution' on the battlefield. Each side launched a number of new military offensives. It has now been established beyond a doubt that the MNR continued to receive support from within South Africa during this phase. Cases of MNR members being recruited, trained in South Africa and sent on missions in Mozambique after the October Declaration came to light even before the publication of the Gorongosa documents (*Noticias*, 24.12.84). It has also been established that Mozambican 'illegal' work seekers, detained in South African police cells, continued to be press-ganged into the MNR until April 1985 at least (*Sunday Times*, 07.07.85). Moreover, there were a number of incidents of sabotage launched by what appear to be specialist 'hit and run' teams which returned to South Africa after operating in Mozambique (*Noticias*, 18.01.85). At the same time Military Intelligence was actively involved in creating alternative supply routes for the MNR involving a network of agents and allies in certain countries in the Middle East as well as Somalia, the Comoros and Malawi (see *Domingo*, 30.12.84; *Noticias*, 31.12.84).

The objective of these continued violations of the Accord appear to have been twofold - firstly, to signal to Frelimo that seeking a military solution over the MNR would be costly. Secondly, it had been suggested that the State Security Council had, at the time of the October Declaration, opted for a compromise position which would have implied acting differently in different areas of the country. In terms of this the MNR would have been 'deactivated' in the area south of the Save River thus allowing the initiation of some form of 'ceasefire' as well as creating conditions for a number of projects of interest to South African capital to go ahead. At the same time, however, the MNR would have been kept operating in the north from bases in other neighbouring countries thus meeting Military Intelligence's concern that the armed bands be kept in reserve for a future eventuality (see *Africa Journal* (Lisbon), 17.10.84).

These continued violations led to an increasingly evident strain in Maputo-Pretoria relations over the period. From November 1984 onwards Mozambican leaders began speaking publicly of Pretoria's duplicity. Initially complaints were confined to 'certain forces and individuals' within South Africa, but as time went on the Botha regime itself was accused, first, of failing to live up to its general responsibility as creator of the bandit force, and later, of directly violating the Nkomati Accord - at least by

not taking effective steps to stop armed action from its territory.

At the same time clear signs emerged of serious contradictions between Pretoria and the MNR leadership which, partly thanks to Military Intelligence's efforts to set up alternative supply lines, had for the first time some capacity to take positions relatively distinct from those of its South African patrons. With the exception of a short period immediately around Nkomati, little hostility had previously been expressed by the MNR to Pretoria's policies towards Maputo - thus apparently confirming the view that it was to a large extent 'business as usual' in the months after Nkomati. After October, however, MNR spokesmen adopted an almost hysterical tone, accusing the Botha regime of 'betrayal' and of 'being in league with the Marxists of Maputo' (*Rand Daily Mail*, 03.11.84; *Noticias*, 08.11.85). The cause was Pretoria's failure fully to support the MNR's political demands. Pretoria had made it clear in the tripartite negotiations that it favoured a 'compromise' solution in which the MNR would be 'integrated' into a coalition government in a subordinate position. This evidently derived from concerns, openly expressed by important forces within the South African capitalist ruling class, both about the administrative capacity of the MNR leadership and about the costs to South Africa of becoming embroiled in trying to sustain an unpopular MNR regime in power. An unnamed 'top South African industrialist' was quoted in November 1984 as follows:

It is in no one's interest that the MNR takes over the government. They have very weak leadership, no clear ideological direction and absolutely no administration. With them in power and Frelimo in opposition, Mozambique will be in greater chaos than ever before. And we will be the first to feel it (*Financial Mail*, 30.11.84).

In consequence there was a general concern that the Nkomati Accord, and all it represented in terms of Pretoria's credibility in the region and at the wider international level, might be jeopardised. A second issue was that the 'security situation' in Mozambique had both placed severe constraints on the effective application of 'economic levers', and stalled projects in the country in which South African capitalist interests wanted to become involved:

(I)f the security situation does not improve within the next six months, Nkomati will be out of the window and all these opportunities ... in the way of exports and imports ... will be lost.

And Africa will never trust us again (*Financial Mail*, 30.11.84).

Those forces emphasising such concerns tended to be advocates of 'dovish' positions. They favoured an approach which involved pressurising the MNR and its backers to adopt a 'more moderate' position. There were, however, also powerful forces favouring a more 'hawkish' line. According to the *Financial Mail* these consisted of certain elements within the SADF who believed that the Mozambican government should be 'pushed for further concessions' by stepping up support to the bandits (25.01.85). However, these differences existed within clear limits. There was not, and in my view still is not, any force which favoured unilaterally demobilising the armed MNR members in camps in South Africa without further concessions from the Mozambican government (in other words rigidly abiding by the letter and spirit of the obligations accepted by the Botha Regime at Nkomati). The most 'dovish' position insisted on political concessions by the Mozambican government as the price for demobilisation of bandit camps.

After some months of indecision, in January 1985, it was announced that Foreign Minister Botha had paid visits to Somalia and the Comoros and held discussions with Manuel Bulhosa, Franz Josef Strauss and members of the Portuguese and Malawian governments. The publicly stated purpose of these discussions was to inform these states and individuals that Mozambique had proof of their involvement in supporting MNR activity and ask them to refrain from such actions (*Financial Mail*, 25.01.85; *Sunday Times*, 27.01.85). According to the *Financial Mail*, Botha's discussions were part of a broader initiative aimed at reviving the stalled tripartite negotiations between the Mozambican government, Pretoria and the MNR. The direct objective of Botha's talks was to persuade external backers to pressurize the MNR to return to the negotiating table. P W Botha held separate talks with representatives of the Mozambican government and the MNR. US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Frank Wisner, was also said to have played some role. However, again according to the *Financial Mail*, the initiative collapsed principally because the MNR refused to abandon its 'hard line' (25.01.85).

THE PARA-MILITARY JOINT FORCES INITIATIVE

By the time of the anniversary of Nkomati, Pretoria-Maputo relations had reached a lower ebb than at any time since the signing of the Accord. The Pretoria regime was being more or less publicly denounced by Maputo for its duplicity and an increasing volume of irrefutable proof was being amassed of treaty violations.

Pretoria decided to launch yet another initiative - this time, however, involving a tactical shift. Up to this point, Pretoria had looked to a 'negotiated settlement' with its protege, the MNR, as the means to generating a 'common approach' on the security front. From the time of the failure of the January 1985 diplomatic flurry, it appeared to be looking for a new means to achieve the same end.

The first signs of the new approach emerged in February, when the *Sunday Times* reported that 'a clampdown on MNR activities' in South Africa was 'imminent' (10.02.85). On 17 March it was announced that members of a gang of forgers and smugglers with links to the MNR had been arrested in Johannesburg (*Noticias*, 18.03.85). On 21 March a 'restricted air zone' was declared in the area along the Mozambican border from the Limpopo River to Swaziland. All aircraft entering and leaving the zone would require authorisation from a special air traffic control centre (*Noticias*, 22.03.85). At about the same time certain individuals in the SADF of Mozambican or Portuguese origin were transferred to areas away from the Mozambican border, and a small number of these were arrested on charges of 'illegally' assisting the MNR. The 32 Battalion, notorious for its atrocities in Angola, was moved into the area, ostensibly to form a barrier against MNR incursions.

None of these measures had much significance from the standpoint of Mozambican security. It was pointed out in the Mozambican press that the existence of the gang of forgers and smugglers had been known for months, and that their leaders had in any case already fled to Europe. Armed bands continued to 'benefit from the tolerance and complicity of the countries from which they act' as evidenced by the fact that only hours before the announcement of the capture of members of the gang, power lines to Maputo were sabotaged only 2 kms from the South African border (*Noticias*, 19.03.85). The restricted air zone did not cover the southern border with Natal from which a number of air drops had been made, and in any case the general tightening of controls along the border could be viewed as at least as much aimed at restricting the inflow of 'illegal' Mozambican work seekers and refugees from the war, whom the Pretoria authorities had been anxious to limit for some time.

These gestures were followed in April by a number of explicit statements from officials of the apartheid regime intended to create the impression that Pretoria had abandoned the MNR. At the beginning of the month, Louis Nel was quoted as saying that Pretoria had given up attempts to try to arrange a peace agreement between the Frelimo government and the MNR. Instead, he said, South Africa was now seeking ways to cooperate with Frelimo to eliminate the MNR threat to Mozambique. 'Our priority is to

help get rid of the MNR and to work with the international community to block their supplies.¹⁸ Shortly after making this statement, Nel made the first of several clandestine visits to MNR headquarters at Gorongosa. When this was revealed after the capture of Gorongosa, Nel lamely tried to 'explain' that he had been trying to arrange further 'peace negotiations' (*Sunday Times*, 01.09.85; 13.10.85). R F Botha admitted for the first time in public that South Africa had in the past assisted the MNR but claimed that Pretoria had since abandoned them (reported *Noticias*, 27.04.85).

At the end of April it was announced that a 'Joint Operational Centre' would be established at the Lebombo-Ressano Garcia border post. This would include officials from the two countries' departments of foreign affairs, police, transport, water affairs, agriculture, electricity supply and customs, who would meet daily to 'sort out' any problems of 'mutual concern' (*Rand Daily Mail*, 25.04.85).

Pretoria's new initiative sought to generate a 'common approach' on the security front through bringing about a limited improvement in the security situation in Mozambique in such a way that the Mozambican government would become dependent on Pretoria's goodwill and active involvement. The key agency was to be the establishment of joint para-military forces to protect key economic installations, the Cahora Bassa and Maputo powerlines, and the railway line to Maputo. This proposal was first floated in public by R F Botha during a parliamentary speech at the end of April (*Noticias*, 27.04.85). Over the next six weeks Mozambique came under intense pressure to accept it. It was pushed at meetings of the Joint Security Commission in May and June - the first attended by R F Botha and Magnus Malan (*Noticias*, 11.05.85; 06.06.85). It was reported in May that the South African Electricity Supply Commission (Escom) and South African Transport Services (SATS) had been given permission to contact private security concerns in South Africa to raise the necessary forces, and that the South African government would provide the necessary finance (*African Economic Digest*, 10.05.85; *The Star*, 11.05.85).

Pressure on this point apparently also included an element of 'stick'. At the end of April, a railway bridge on the line to South Africa was sabotaged shortly before SATS finally agreed to despatch a cargo of 30 wagons of coal destined for the Maputo power station (supplying an emergency service following the destruction of electricity towers on the line from South Africa in a freak storm in March) (*Noticias*, 01.05.85). Later, when they finally agreed to help repair the bridge, SATS sent the wrong type of crane causing further delay. Sources in Maputo privately expressed the view that this action was nothing other than an attempt by Pretoria to demonstrate to Mozambique the urgent necessity of accepting its proposals.

By mid-June, however, the South African press was reporting that the idea of joint para-military forces had become a mere 'political pipedream'. Sources in Escom were quoted as saying that the corporation would not be recruiting any such forces. Whatever reasons may have led Pretoria to shelve the idea, it is clear that the main factor underlying its final scuppering was the unacceptability of such proposals to Mozambique. The same report cited an official 'close to the Mozambican government' as saying it was 'a non-starter' (*Sunday Star*, 16.06.85).

Repeated flagrant violations by Pretoria of the Nkomati Accord had by mid-1985 strained its credibility with the Mozambican government almost to the point of rupture. Negotiations with Pretoria were no longer being looked to as a major instrument in Frelimo's struggle to end bandit activity. Instead, the Mozambican government saw itself compelled to look elsewhere for support for its hard pressed forces in the war. In early June 1985 a summit was held in Harare between Presidents Machel and Nyerere and Prime Minister Mugabe which discussed the question of military support for Mozambique (*Guardian* (London), 13.06. 85). A month earlier, President Nyerere had said, 'We want our enemies, particularly racist South Africa, to understand that we will not permit the Frelimo government to be overthrown' (*Noticias*, 09.05.85). These meetings led to the deployment of Zimbabwean troops in operations against MNR bases. One of the first such operations was that against MNR headquarters in Gorongosa in August 1985, which led to the capture of the Gorongosa documents. As indicated at the beginning of this paper, the discovery of irrefutable proof of Pretoria's duplicity led to a final break from the strategy which Mozambique had attempted during the 'accord phase'. Although the Nkomati Accord has not been formally renounced, the mechanisms established by it - the Joint Security Commission in particular - have been inactive since that time.

Where all this leaves Pretoria's policy towards Mozambique is not wholly clear. All that is really certain is that support for MNR activity, either direct or via third countries, particularly Malawi, has continued and indeed been stepped up. In early 1986, specialist units of the SADF were even implicated in such acts of 'state terrorism' as the placing of landmines on Maputo beaches and the detonation of a car bomb in a residential area of the capital (*Noticias*, 10.02.86; 11.02.86; 02.05.86; *Sunday Star*, 11.05.86). However, while the apartheid regime's involvement in destabilising activity has thus increased, it appears now to lack any strategic vision of how to proceed in its bilateral relations with Mozambique. Indeed its objectives appear to be little more than an attempt to maintain Mozambique in a state of crisis and ensure that no peace comes to the country without its mediation.

ACTION ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT

Although Nkomati itself only dealt directly with security issues, the signing of the Accord was followed by the launching of a South African economic offensive. The immediate objective of this appeared to be to demonstrate that 'economic cooperation' with Pretoria held out greater advantages for Mozambique than socialism, whilst at the same time laying the basis for a deepening of economic links with South African capitalism envisaged in the original constellation conception.

The post-accord phase saw a number of state-to-state agreements on important economic questions. In May 1984 a tripartite agreement between South Africa, Mozambique and Portugal was reached on the supply of power from the Cahora Bassa hydro-electric scheme. This agreement represented a concession to Mozambique in that tariffs were considerably increased and calculated on the basis of the amount of power leaving the turbines, rather than that received in South Africa. This was followed in August by the signing of an agreement between the Transport Ministers of the two countries under which SATS undertook to provide various forms of assistance to implement a 'ten point plan to develop Maputo harbour'. Although this agreement did not in itself involve additional finance, mention was made at the signing of a R10 million South African loan to Mozambique's transport authorities which had already been approved (*The Citizen*, 03.05.84). In early November 1984 the South African Minister of Manpower Utilization visited Maputo and signed a partial agreement to 'legalise' the position of the estimated 150 000 Mozambicans working as farm labourers in the Transvaal Lowveld. It was also agreed that the Chamber of Mines would spend R750 000 to refurbish its recruitment centres in Mozambique and that two working committees - one for mining and one for agriculture - would be set up to work out proposals for future ministerial level talks. These met on several occasions during 1985 although no new labour agreement was ultimately signed (*Rand Daily Mail*, 14.08.84). Finally, at the end of November 1984 a fisheries agreement was signed. This provided for South African firms to be given fishing rights in Mozambican waters in return for the payment of licence fees; for cooperation in fisheries research; and the granting of a R2 million credit line for the purchase by Mozambique of fishing equipment (*Rand Daily Mail*, 06.11.84; *Noticias*, 09.05.85; *Financial Mail*, 24.05.85).

The South African regime also attempted in various ways, in accordance with one of the basic premises of the constellation approach, to persuade the 'private sector' to involve itself in Mozambique.

Much of the initial interest in Mozambique centred around the prospects of opening up a potential market for South African commodities. Mozambican

state departments were flooded with proposals to supply a range of producer and consumer goods - several coming from 'fly by night' companies formed shortly before or after Nkomati specially to hawk goods to Mozambique. Most of these proposals took little account of Mozambique's capacity to pay, particularly in view of the country's acute foreign exchange crisis. When Mozambican officials indicated that they were more interested in proposals for investment, the flood of interest became a trickle. The initial phase of expectation and euphoria gave way to a new phase in which, following investigations and discussions with Mozambican officials, capitalist enterprises began to make known the form, level and conditions upon which they were prepared to become involved in Mozambique. The broad outlines of a proposed pattern of South African capitalist involvement in Mozambique began to emerge.

Although there was a high level of agreement with the regional political objectives of the Botha regime, very little willingness to make purely politically motivated investment emerged in practice. The determinant of South African private sector involvement in Mozambique would, even in the short term, be the traditional capitalist criterion of profit.

It became clear also that South African capital was interested only in specific sectors of the economy and particular areas of the country. It would not be entering Mozambique because it wished to alleviate the plight of a war ravaged country and its hungry people. It would therefore head for those sectors and areas where the prospects for making profits appeared to be best regardless of whether or not these were priority sectors in terms of the social needs of the people. From the indications which emerged, it appears that potential South African investors held some interest in the following sectors:

1. The Maputo port complex;
2. Tourism;
3. A small number of agricultural and fisheries projects;
4. To a limited extent, mineral exploitation.

By the end of 1984 any illusions which may have existed about South African Capital 'rescuing' the Mozambican economy had been thoroughly discredited. The volume of investment had been derisory, confined to sectors which would tend to deepen the overall dependence of Mozambique on the South African market and make the country more vulnerable to the 'strategic application of economic levers', as well as tinged with conditions and demands which implied Mozambique abandoning socialist policies. Equally important it became clear that the overall level of 'interest' in Mozambique on the part of South African capital was minimal.

Apart from the continuing negotiations on migrant labour, only one

significant concrete project was initiated in the period between the formation of the first South African-Mozambican joint company - Mozatur - in November 1984 and September 1985. This was a takeover of a private pig farm in Matola by a small South African concern in August 1985 (*Rand Daily Mail*, 02.11.84). The proposed scheme envisaged producing ducks, whose limbs and livers would be exported. One of the few projects involving monopoly capital - the Krupp/Hochtief construction scheme - was cancelled in February 1985. This was due to a combination of a withdrawal by foreign bankers, and the inability or unwillingness by the Pretoria regime and Krupps of West Germany to step in and guarantee the necessary finance (*Noticias*, 28.08.85).

A number of factors explain the low level of interest of South African capital in Mozambique. One was undoubtedly the security situation. However, there were also, in addition, the effects of the crisis in South Africa, which deepened significantly in 1985.

Such investment as was available was earmarked for the industrial capitalist countries, where South African monopolies have been making significant investments in recent years,¹⁹ rather than the Southern African region. A related factor was the decline in the value of the Rand on the foreign exchanges. The official value of the Mozambican currency, in Metical, is set in relation to a basket of currencies in which the US Dollar has a preponderant influence. With the collapse of the value of the Rand against the Dollar, the Rand also lost half its value against the Metical - crashing to around the 15 Mt mark at the official rate by September 1985. Thus the cost of investment in Mozambique by South African capital correspondingly doubled. Finally, the whole sorry saga of capital investment in Mozambique is symbolised by the suspension of the management contract awarded to Mozatur, following the embezzlement of funds belonging to the Inhaca hotel in April 1986, as mentioned above. Such developments have without doubt seriously affected the capacity of the regime to mobilise 'economic incentive levers' in the foreseeable future.

CONCLUSIONS

By mid-1985 it had become apparent that the apartheid regime had failed to achieve the most important objectives it had sought to advance through Nkomati. Its position at the various levels of struggle it thought would be improved by the Accord had in more respects deteriorated.²⁰ Nkomati was expected to severely impair the armed struggle inside South Africa, and thereby contribute significantly to a dampening down of the popular struggle on all fronts. It was also supposed to inaugurate a process in which South Africa would emerge as the de facto "regional power" with whom

all other "interested parties", including the superpowers, would have to come to terms. Foreign investment was to flow into the region via South Africa, and Pretoria was to begin to break out of its international isolation. In the event, the liberation struggle in South Africa advanced on all fronts. South Africa was recognised by no one other than itself as the 'regional power', foreign capital did not join in a new scramble for Southern Africa, and the Pretoria regime became more isolated internationally than ever.

These reversals profoundly influenced the way Pretoria's strategists came to view regional relations. They seem to have concluded that they have little to gain any longer by being seen to be 'good neighbours'. The Gorongosa documents and other evidence show clearly that Pretoria never at any time - even at the moment of signing the Nkomati Accord - had any serious intention of living in 'peaceful co-existence' with its neighbours. Nevertheless it suited Pretoria at that time to present a facade of 'good neighbourliness' and to try to conceal its continued destabilisation activities. Now the regime appears to have concluded that it has little to gain by presenting even such a facade. It loses little by acting conspicuously more aggressively in the region. It seems to believe that the level of sanctions will be determined more by the outside world's perceptions of developments at the domestic level - and in the case of its traditional Western allies by the extent to which it is seen to be in control at home - than by any actions it takes at the regional level. The period since mid-1985 has accordingly seen a return to the application of all the old familiar destabilisation tactics in a new cycle of escalating regional militarism.

Nonetheless, although it is now in the past, the experience of the post-Nkomati Accord phase is rich with lessons about the strengths and weaknesses, limits and contradictions of Pretoria's regional policy. One of the principal points to have emerged - is that the regime has extreme difficulty in effectively deploying the diplomatic or economic 'incentive levers' which the theorists of 'total strategy' considered essential if Pretoria was to establish a stable basis on which to assert hegemony in the region. Pretoria evidently desires to maintain regional states in a position of weakness. It certainly does not wish to see economically strong independent states and much of its activities over the past eight years have been explicitly designed to undermine the economic viability of other Southern African states. However, the effective deployment of 'economic incentive levers' depends on being able to demonstrate that 'cooperation with South Africa' works. The economic crisis has placed severe limits on South Africa's capacity to fund projects. Botha cancelled a proposed tour

of a number of countries in West and Central Africa in late 1984 because even then South Africa did not have sufficient funds at its disposal to offer anything worthwhile to these states.²¹

Yet the key role assigned to the 'private sector' in the establishment of economic links means that non-strategic factors enter into the equation. The earlier experience of the bantustans, where the state has for years placed great political pressure and offered extraordinarily attractive incentives to businessmen to invest in Pretoria's political projects, is likely to be repeated in Mozambique and elsewhere. Hardheaded South African capitalists are not likely to furnish large amounts of capital to support Pretoria's political schemes unless it is profitable for them to do so, however. While some prospects for profitable investment in Mozambique exist, the overall prospects are extremely limited.

Finally, the ultimate limit on the apartheid regime's capacity to act at any level - domestic, regional or international - is the apartheid system itself. The regime's inability to accede to the basic democratic demands of the people of South Africa without destroying itself, has led it into its greatest crisis ever, in which for the first time an end to its rule in the foreseeable future is now a real prospect. This crisis has severely constrained the regime's capacity to assert itself on the regional or wider international levels and deterred regional states from cooperating with what seems to be a doomed regime.

While the current escalating cycle of increasing aggression has the capacity to inflict much further damage on already ravaged regional states, it is at the same time a reflection of the inability of the apartheid regime to come up with a formula which will enable it to 'rule' as distinct from 'throw its weight around' the region. Meanwhile, from the standpoint of independent regional states, latest developments once again underline the conclusion reached at the meeting of the Front Line States at the end of April 1984 - real peace in Southern Africa is impossible while the apartheid system continues to exist.

NOTES AND REFERENCES^{**}

- * For previous discussion of the issues contained in this paper, see Rob Davies' 'South African strategy towards Mozambique in the "Accord Phase", March 1984 - September 1985'; and 'South African policy towards Mozambique in the post-Nkomati period: a critical analysis of effects and implications', published as Scandinavian Institute for African Affairs, Research Report 73, Uppsala, 1985, and in Canada by CIDMAA, Montreal, also in 1985.*

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All translations from Portuguese and Afrikaans are by the author.

1. *Gorongosa Documents (Extracts)*, released at a press conference Maputo, 30/9/1986.
2. 'Remarks by the Honourable P W Botha DMS MP, Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa, on the Occasion of the Signing of the Accord of Nkomati : Friday, 16 March, 1984' p 1.
3. *Press Conference on Gorongosa Documents*, Maputo, 30/9/1986.
4. December 1984 saw the first of a number of public statements by Mozambican officials complaining about continued bandit activity from South African territory. Initially, however, these refrained from directly accusing the Botha regime of violating the Accord.
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7. See Dirk and Johanna de Villiers (1984) - *PH* (Cape Town: Tafelberg) part 1 chapter 1, part 6 chapter 7.
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12. See Interviews with Mozambican Information Minister Cabaco in *Sunday Mail* (Harare) 17/10/1984; see also interview with captured former MNR member, Constantino Reis, in *Domingo* 16/12/1984 and the *Sunday Star* of the same date. Reis who worked as a radio operator for the MNR said that communications were maintained with Phalaborwa until the time of his desertion in June 1984 at least.
13. See R Davies (1986) - 'South African regional policy in the emerging conjuncture: an analysis of the trend towards regional militarism' (paper presented to EHESS Workshop on Security and Development in Southern Africa, Paris).
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19. *Financial Times* (London) 28/8/1985 and 29/8/1985; and see D Kaplan, 'The Internationalisation of South African Capital: South African Direct Foreign Investment in the Contemporary Period', *African Affairs*, 82,329, October 1983.
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