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CONTRADICTIONS OF INDEPENDENCE: NAMIBIA IN TRANSITION

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Almost 30 years after other African countries, Namibia finally became free of colonial rule in March 1990. The attainment of formal independence was a momentous occasion, particularly for those who had suffered from the harshness of first German then South African control and who had taken part in the bitter struggle for liberation. For a time, Namibia's independence regenerated the momentum stalled after the liberation of Angola and Mozambique in 1975 and of Zimbabwe in 1980, and gave hope to black South Africans struggling with the same intransigent regime.

However, a series of formidable problems have limited the options open to the new SWAPO government. Indeed, at independence Namibia's future was so tightly constrained that its room for manoeuvre, real independence and development was minimal. Few countries have started in such a heavily determined context. The legacy of South African rule included a severe fiscal crisis, a dependent economy, uneven development, and inadequate social services for the black population. While negotiations are underway over the status of Walvis Bay, Namibia's main port, remains under formal South African control. Not surprisingly, the new government has moved cautiously at first, emphasizing national reconciliation and adopting conservative economic policies.

This study explores the contradictions posed by the internal and international context within which the Namibian state must operate. Specifically it examines the difficulties posed by the lack of resources available for the present government which must nevertheless demonstrate that it is serious about its promises to transform the legacy of South African rule. It will argue that, barring rapid change in the region, the discovery and rapid exploitation of new natural resources or major Western assistance, the government's inability to meet mass expectations will pose major problems for the unity and stability of Namibia, not to mention its growth and development.

While South Africa's role has been crucial, other external factors also place severe constraints on the autonomy of the new Namibian government. The second part of the study assesses the limits on state policy posed by the structure

of the Namibian economy - especially its dependence on international capital in the mineral sector.

Finally, the paper examines the effect of these cross pressures on Namibian politics. While the government's policy of racial and ethnic reconciliation has provided Namibia with a peaceful start as an independent state, it has not been achieved without cost and compromises that may eventually create problems for the preservation of SWAPO's political base. At the moment, the state lacks both the resources to engineer a rapid transformation of the economy of its people in Ovamboland and the bargaining power to win a major change in the working conditions of migrant labour in the mines and industries of the south. Yet these two groups, particularly the people of Ovamboland, were responsible for bringing SWAPO to power. The question remains as to how long SWAPO will retain their support and tolerance, especially given the expectations which independence has aroused.

Theoretical Framework

To begin this analysis of the early period of Namibian independence, three fundamental factors must be kept in mind: the structural constraints on Namibia's autonomy, the nature of class politics and the temporal conjuncture in which the new government is operating.

In terms of the first factor, key influences on the nature of Namibian policy have been its structural relations with the South African state, international capital and the international aid community. Development in Namibia before independence had been that of a periphery of a periphery, a virtual fifth province of South Africa. Therefore, to establish the most rudimentary aspects of autonomy, the new government had to bring under its control monetary flows, trade and transportation. Yet the South African administration had departed leaving state coffers virtually empty. At the same time, the nature of Namibia's incorporation into the global economy placed limits on both the development of a more balanced economy and the redistribution of wealth. Still part of the old international division of labour, Namibia, like much of sub-Saharan Africa, is vulnerable to fluctuating and lately declining commodity prices and to the whims of foreign capital. The need for capital from the private sector, international financial institutions and the bilateral donor community places severe restrictions on the ability of the government to implement policies that will quickly remedy severe regional, racial and gender inequalities.

Beyond these structural constraints, a second aspect of the legacy of the past is the nature of the class that has come to power. Historically, the politics of Namibia has been the characteristic politics of the petty bourgeoisie, with personal and ethnic differences leading to the proliferation and fracturing of

political parties. Notwithstanding the prestige of the liberation struggle, the significance of SWAPO's election victory in 1989, and its post-independence policy of national reconciliation, it remains to be seen whether the government can transcend this pattern in the long term.

While these structural and class factors are central to an understanding of the context which conditions Namibian independence, other conjunctural factors have softened the harshness of some of these constraints. Senior Namibian officials are hopeful now that negotiations will lead to the formal reincorporation of Walvis Bay into Namibia. As well, a change in the attitude of South Africa towards Namibia has eased some of the concern that before independence had made security a central issue for the new state.

Other factors have worked against an easy start, most notably the diversion of international attention, capital investment and foreign assistance towards Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Also, a plethora of catastrophes in 1991 - the Gulf War, the devastation of Bangladesh, the extensive famine in the Horn of Africa and the destitution in Mozambique and Angola - shifted attention from Namibia very quickly, leaving its aid prospects very slim.

Therefore, the options open to the Namibian state remain very limited. In the medium and long-term, it seems likely that the pressures facing Namibia from all levels make national unity problematic, political liberalism fragile, economic growth difficult and egalitarian development almost impossible. In the short-term, however, the record has been much brighter. Let us turn first briefly to the historical process through which Namibia became independent.

The Legacy of the Past

In the short period since 1989, Namibia managed successfully the difficult and, at times, painful process of freeing itself from South African rule. Following an agreement reached by the United States, South Africa, Angola and Cuba in December 1988, the United Nations agreed to participate in a transition process based loosely on a peace plan set out in UN Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978. A United Nations Transition Advisory Group (UNTAG) under Martti Ahtisaari was sent to Namibia to oversee and ensure the fairness of the registration of voters, the election of a constituent assembly, and the drafting of a new constitution by that assembly. However, the South African administration under the Administrator General (AG) Louis Pienaar continued to control the administration and the security forces and, indeed, to run the entire election process.

After a shaky start in April 1989 when South African Defence Forces killed 400 SWAPO cadres and supporters in northern Namibia, UNTAG faced the difficult task of making its presence felt. The South African AG and his officials continued their attempts to control the outcome of the transition through dubious

registration procedures and electoral laws and, initially, through a proclamation for a Constituent Assembly which denied the intent of the whole election process. According to Gottfried Wellmer, manipulation of the registration process alone cost SWAPO at least 12.2% of total potential voters (1990:5). Right to the end, forces in South Africa which were unhappy with the advent of independence in Namibia concocted a series of hoaxes designed to scuttle the transition process by suggesting that an invasion of Namibia by SWAPO guerrillas was imminent. South Africa's retreat was grudging in the extreme. At the end, it retained one hope - that a provision that the constitution must be passed by two-thirds of the Assembly would prevent the emergence of SWAPO as the dominant party in an independent Namibia.

Despite what at times seemed a formidable array of opposing forces, SWAPO was able to rebound from South Africa's military and propaganda victory of April 1989 and, after only a few short months back in Namibia, to organize an election campaign which brought the party to victory. After the elections, SWAPO and other political parties were able to agree quickly on a liberal constitution and to bring Namibia to independence. In the context of Namibia's history, these achievements were substantial.

In the end, the presence of numerous UNTAG and other international observers did ensure that voting for the constituent assembly proceeded in a straightforward manner. The fact that, on average, 97% of registered voters cast their ballots, often in intimidating or difficult conditions, was moving testimony to the determination of Namibian people to exercise their democratic right.

The election for the constituent assembly under a system of proportional representation (with 9,317 votes required for one seat) produced the following results: SWAPO with 57% of the vote, obtained 41 seats; the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) with 28% of the votes, 21 seats; the United Democratic Front (UDF) with 6% of the vote, 4 seats; Action Christian National (ACN), with 4%, 3 seats; and three smaller parties (the Federal Convention of Namibia, the Namibia National Front and the National Patriotic Front of Namibia) each had one seat.

SWAPO owed its victory to overwhelming support in the north (225,000 votes compared to 11,000 for DTA in Ovamboland), and, to a lesser extent, support from migrant workers and the main city and towns - Windhoek, Swakopmund and Luderitz. In the south, two-thirds of the vote went to parties other than SWAPO. Here, the results were related to ethnic rivalries created by the apartheid system and to SWAPO's lack of access during the campaign to 30,000 workers on settler farms.

The runner-up party, the DTA, was in fact a multi-racial coalition of 12 smaller parties that had worked for over a decade with South Africa in earlier attempts

to reach an internal settlement. Composed of non-SWAPO black Namibians and whites who did not agree with the Namibian National Party's commitment to hard line apartheid, the DTA's campaign was heavily backed by German and South African capital.²

Given the intense propaganda from white farmers, South African officials and a biased national media, the DTA did especially well in white commercial farming areas all over the country and in other areas (Kaokoland) where the government had been heavily involved in programmes of drought relief. Chiefs and headmen in Hereroland were able to deliver their people's votes to the DTA by appealing to ethnic loyalties. The Bushmen population who had been used by the South Africans in their war against SWAPO, also tended to vote DTA.

However, one other important factor which contributed to the anti-SWAPO vote was the detainee issue. Many people voted against SWAPO, because they feared that it would not be able to abandon its heavy handed and intolerant behaviour of the past, particularly the torture and killing of SWAPO members suspected of being South African spies in external SWAPO camps.³ The third largest party, the United Democratic Front (UDF) was a coalition of eight parties formed in early 1989, largely as a result of the detainee issue. While the UDF topped the polls only in Damaraland, its showing was still very strong for a new party.

The only other party among the ten contesting the election to achieve a significant number of votes was the Action Christian National, a party representing the diehard views of the supporters of apartheid in the German and Boer communities in Namibia.

For those who had anticipated a sweeping victory for SWAPO, the results were chastening. However, the outcome was not unhealthy; it meant that SWAPO had to work together with other Namibian parties to overcome their mutual distrust. Despite widespread anticipation of difficulties and deadlock, all parties co-operated and the new constitution was tabled only 80 days after the election. Moreover, the constitution's liberal democratic qualities have been widely praised. It provides for multi-parties, an entrenched bill of fundamental rights and freedoms, and an independent judiciary. Proportional representation will continue to be the basis for national elections. The Assembly is to be led by an executive President elected for a five year term by a simple majority of the Assembly for this government and then directly elected hereafter. Significantly, no individual may hold this office for more than two terms. An upper house, the National Council, with the power to review all legislation, will be elected directly in 1992, with two members from each region. This constitution brought Namibia to formal independence on 21 March 1990.

Structural Constraints: South Africa's Levers of Control

While the speed of the transition process was an unexpected asset, the independent government began in a situation still tightly controlled by South Africa. Politically, the government was free, but economically it was not. Not only had the Namibian economy been developed as a part of the larger South African economy, but also the previous South African administration had left the government virtually bankrupt. In addition, the South African government refused to give up control of Namibia's only deep water port at Walvis Bay, thus maintaining a stranglehold over Namibia's external trade. By controlling Namibia's money supply and trade flows, the South African state retains substantial power in Namibia.

The legacy of bankruptcy and plunder:

While in the past colonial powers regularly attempted to soften their record of neglect and exploitation by programmes of development assistance at independence, South Africa's approach to Namibia was decidedly punitive. It left Namibia with a debt of R726.5-million (or about 20% of the GDP).⁴ Servicing this debt has taken an estimated 11.5% of government expenditure in the first full financial year after independence, and it will continue to constrain resources for the next three to five years.⁵ In effect, the SWAPO government will be paying the costs which the colonial administration had incurred in conducting the war against it.

In the last decade before independence, the South African administration had sharply increased expenditures on transport, communications and other infrastructure to meet the needs of South Africa's army and occupation. There were also administrative costs from the creation of a multiplicity of ethnic bantustan governments. Thus, in the period from 1977 to 1986 when economic growth and state revenues were stagnant or declining, the South African administration increased Namibian state expenditures more than five-fold (Wellmer, 1990:9). Moreover, once it became clear that Namibia was going to be independent, South Africa cut back its contributions to the Namibian administration by 75% in the final year of its trusteeship (from R308-million in 1988/1989 to R80-million in 1989/1990) (Waldmeir, 1989) and offered nothing further after independence. In consequence, in its first year of operation, the Namibian government faced a budget deficit of R556-million.⁶

In addition, before independence the South African administration had vigorously pursued a privatization strategy which had the effect of denying the new government control over significant local investment capital. A month before the elections, the South African administration allowed civil servants in Namibia to invest their pension funds in retirement annuities in South Africa

through three major South African insurance firms, Sanlam, Old Mutual and Southern Life. Thus, the new Namibian government lost about R500-million to South Africa, a result which Namibia's first Finance Minister was to describe as 'plunder and rape'.⁷ For years, most individual savings or foreign exchange earnings deposited in banks,⁸ retirement funds, building societies and insurance companies in Namibia had been transferred routinely without record to South African firms. One labour researcher estimated that as much as \$46-million passed from Namibia to South Africa each month, an amount equal to almost 40% of Namibia's GDP (Collins, 1990:24).

South Africa's financial control of Namibia was assured following independence as the South African rand continued to serve as Namibia's currency until 1992. Even the new currency, the dollar, will be tied to the rand for an initial period. Also, Namibia has decided to stay in the Southern Africa Customs Union for at least three years. While Namibia established a National Reserve Bank in August 1990, it is still unable to control the movement of capital in and out of the country.

Walvis Bay:

Another powerful element in the maintenance of South Africa's control over Namibia was its initial decision to hold on to Walvis Bay, Namibia's only deep water port and main channel for its external sea trade. The grounds for South Africa's claim were historical: that Britain had gained control of Walvis Bay in 1878 and had transferred the territory to Cape Colony in 1884, thus making it part of the present Republic of South Africa. Although the United Nations did not accept these arguments and Security Council Resolution 432 of 1978 declared Walvis Bay (an area of 434 square miles, and 12 offshore islands) to be an integral part of Namibia, an international consensus emerged that the resolution of the matter should be left until after independence, lest the overall independence process come to grief on this issue.

In the post-independence period, South Africa has continued to claim Walvis Bay as 'sovereign territory' but has embarked on a negotiating process with the Namibian government over its status. To date, the most that has been agreed has been joint administration of the territory until the question of sovereignty is resolved. However, South Africa has conceded that Namibia's southern border runs down the middle of the Orange River and not on its Namibian bank, thus giving Namibia access to water for irrigation and to the Kudu natural gas fields offshore.

The strategic importance of Walvis Bay for Namibia's economy cannot be overstated. At least 95% of Namibia's sea borne trade (mainly mineral exports and virtually all of its non-South African trade) passes through the port which is

also the terminus of Namibia's rail lines. Thus Walvis Bay provides the only high-volume alternative to the overland railway through South Africa for Namibia's heavier exports and imports. At the moment, South Africa, not Namibia, collects the revenue from customs and excise duties, and Namibia lacks the statistical base to support its claims for a larger share of duties from the regional Customs Union.

What remains of Namibia's fish processing industry is also based at Walvis Bay, and its future (together with future investment in the port) is related to a settlement of the dispute over status. As South Africa's jurisdiction over Namibia was considered illegal by the United Nations, boats from all over the world as well as South Africa had taken advantage of the uncertainty about Namibia's future. In the 1970s and 1980s, uncontrolled fishing severely depleted what had once been a rich resource. Stocks of whitefish fell in 1991 to about one-fifth of what they had been in 1969 (from 2.4 million tonnes to only 486,000 tonnes).⁹ Recently, the Department of Fisheries drastically scaled down fishing quotas after surveys revealed that stocks of pilchards, anchovies, hake and mackerel were at 'potentially disastrous levels'.¹⁰

Moreover, before independence, Namibia had received only minimal benefits from foreign fishing of one of its richest natural resources. In 1988, fisheries provided only 2.5% of Namibia's GDP and 4.4% of its exports.¹¹ Yet one World Bank report has suggested that its potential is so great that, if properly managed, fisheries alone could double Namibia's GDP in five to six years.¹² In 1990/1991, the contribution of the fishery to the GDP increased to 5.6% at a time when the economy itself grew at the lesser rate of only 2.7%.¹³ Estimates of the sector's potential annual contribution to the Namibian economy range as high as R2 billion.

Not surprisingly, the government is keenly interested in rebuilding coastal fish stocks and ensuring that Namibia benefits from them. One of its first acts was to extend Namibia's territorial waters to 200 nautical miles and to ask foreign fishing trawlers to leave Namibian waters. The government has agreed to abide by the seven-year concessions granted to foreign fleets by the South African administration, but otherwise gives priority to Namibian companies and to the employment and training of Namibians by foreign companies fishing in Namibian waters.

In the first years of independence, the Namibian government had to wage a major battle against foreign, particularly Spanish,¹⁴ boats that gambled on Namibia's inability to enforce its rules within its exclusive economic zone. Namibia enlisted support from the United States, Norway and Iceland to patrol the zone and to conduct research on acceptable harvests. In addition it went on the offensive, seizing and ultimately confiscating eight Spanish boats and their catch, and levying heavy fines on their owners.

Patterns of economic dependence:

A third aspect of South African influence which will continue to affect Namibia for some time arises from the historical shaping of the Namibian economy. As South Africa expected that Namibia would eventually be incorporated into the Republic, its economic development, particularly its patterns of trade and land ownership, were designed to serve South African and particularly white interests. Namibia bought 90% of its imports from South Africa and sold 70% to 80% of its exports there as well.¹⁵ About 45% of the total land area and 74% of the potentially arable land belongs to 4,000 white farmers whose farms are situated below the red line (Tapscott, 1991:38)¹⁶ in the centre and south of the country. Only 15% of the land was left for 90% of Namibia's people (Waldmeir, 1989).

With this virtual integration of the Namibian and South African economies, there was no attempt to make Namibia self-sufficient in food production, and it imported over half its food needs from South Africa. Local cultivation of cereals, fruit and vegetables had been discouraged not only by harsh environmental conditions but also as a deliberate policy of the South African administration. Not only did Namibia export 90% of its beef, primarily to South Africa at lower than world prices,¹⁷ but only 28% of these exports were in slaughtered form. Thus, two of Namibia's five abattoirs were closed in the 1980s, including the newest and most modern one at Gobabis. Karakul sheep pelts were also exported untreated. Eighty per cent of Namibian lamb and mutton was exported exclusively to South Africa (Adams, 1990:11).

After independence, Namibian officials worked hard to get preferential access to the European market through the Lomé Convention. In December 1990, Namibia was granted the right to export 10,500 tonnes of beef annually for two years, followed by 13,500 tonnes for each of three more years at only 10% of the normal Community import levy.¹⁸ Thus Namibia is beginning to diversify its trade in the agricultural sector and hopes to increase local processing of primary products.

Structural Constraints: The Old International Division of Labour

Beyond the dislocations and limitations posed by South African control, Namibia also suffers from the very open and dependent nature of its relationship with the global market. Eighty per cent of Namibia's output is exported and 60% of the goods consumed within the country are imported (Waldmeir, 1989). Namibia produces what it does not consume and consumes what it does not produce. Moreover, the pattern of its trade, with the export of primary materials and the import of manufactured goods, leaves Namibia highly vulnerable to

volatile and uncertain international market prices.¹⁹

This exposed position can be seen in both the agricultural and mining sectors. In the case of agriculture, the industry suffers from its dependence on export markets for a narrow range of agricultural products (Adams, 1990:26). The extreme volatility of prices for karakul pelts, for example, meant that output in 1990 was only about 21% of its production in 1980.²⁰

In the mining sector, the implications of Namibia's dependence are of fundamental importance for the economy as a whole. Indeed, mining constitutes the central focus for Namibia's involvement in the world economy. It is the fifth largest mining country in Africa and seventeenth in the world (Collins, 1990:25). In 1988, mining accounted for 73% of the total value of Namibian exports and contributed about one-third of its GDP (Tapscott, 1991:37).²¹ Its major mineral products are diamonds and uranium, but Namibia also has reserves of copper, lead, zinc, silver, tin and gold, in that order of importance. Deposits of marble, graphite and titanium have been found, and prospecting for oil under Etosha Pan and for natural gas off the coast offers hope for the future.

In company with much of Africa, Namibia experienced real reverses in the terms of trade for its major exports in the early 1980s (Wellmer, 1990:9). At the moment there is a world oversupply of diamonds, even though monopoly regulation has kept the price relatively high. There is also an oversupply of uranium (which Namibia sells primarily to Japan, France and West Germany), a problem which is exacerbated by competition from other energy sources. In the last few years, this situation has been aggravated by the sale of Russian and East German stockpiles at prices below production costs. Thus in 1990 the price for uranium was only about one-tenth in real terms of what it had been in 1979.²² Given that uranium contributed 38% of Namibia's exports, the impact on the economy has been severe.²³ The current price slump in the industry, has led to the closure of mines and the retrenchment of mine workers.

The enclave nature of development in the mineral sector by large South African, British and American transnational corporations has meant that the majority of Namibians have benefited minimally, if at all, from the mineral wealth of their country. Exclusive rights to diamond mining are held by Consolidated Diamond Mining, a wholly-owned subsidiary of De Beers of South Africa. The majority shareholder in Rossing Corporation, the country's sole miner of uranium, is the British based transnational, Rio Tinto Zinc.²⁴ Copper mining is undertaken by Tsumeb Corporation which is owned by Goldfields of South Africa through its subsidiary Goldfields Namibia.

As a result of the predominantly foreign control of this key productive sector of the economy, much of the wealth produced in Namibia is exported rather than reinvested in productive activities in Namibia. Almost all of Namibia's mineral

exports are channelled through South Africa for processing, before being re-exported. Not surprisingly, management strategies are designed to suit transnational corporate interests and only correspond to national interests from time to time. In the past 40 years, these corporations have created few new mines and hardly any manufacturing enterprises.

Concern has been expressed about what some have called a political economy of theft - the plundering of these non-renewable resources as independence loomed, most notably through the payment of unusually high dividends to shareholders (Wellmer, 1990:10).²⁵ There was also clear evidence of acceleration in the exploitation of resources and the undervaluing of production and exports by transnational corporations to avoid taxation. Several years earlier, the Thirion Commission's investigation of the diamond industry had found that the administration's control of the diamond industry was 'a sham'. Consolidated Diamond had overmined diamonds and evaded taxation by transfer pricing through a network of internal companies. The Commission also showed that Rossing had produced cheap uranium for South Africa's nuclear needs, and helped evade international sanctions (Walker, 1990). At independence, estimates of potential reserves ranged from ten years for Namibia's diamond mines on land to about 35 years for uranium (Walker, 1990).

The Social Structure of Inequality

With this pattern of foreign ownership of most of Namibia's productive resources and the application of South Africa's apartheid policy, Namibia at independence had one of the most dramatically unequal distributions of income in the world. Structural inequalities were manifest in extreme differences in income levels between Namibia's impoverished black majority and the tiny white community, and in unequal access to productive resources, markets and social services.

At independence, whites, who constituted about 5% of the population, had an annual average per capita income of \$14,560, and were estimated to command no less than 71% of the GDP (Tapscott, 1991:36). By contrast, the bottom 55% of the population controlled a mere 3% of the GDP. The annual average per capita income of urban blacks who constituted 30% of the population was only \$663.²⁶ The vast majority of rural blacks earned a mere \$63 (including subsistence income) which was lower than the average annual per capita income of Mozambique, the world's poorest country in 1988.

In the spheres of education, health and housing, the provision of services varied widely between regions and different racial groups. Although about one half of Namibia's population lived in the 'homelands', only one-fifth of Namibia's doctors practised in these areas and less than 15% of the country's overall

expenditures on health were directed to them.²⁷ Moreover, the emphasis was on curative rather than preventive health care. About 40% of the children in the north were malnourished. Resources were concentrated in the urban areas, and decision making in the health sector was monopolized by whites. Thus the life expectancy for whites was 69 years, while for blacks it was only 40.²⁸ In the first six months of independence, the new government was faced with the worst malaria epidemic on record, caused by the failure of the South African administration to continue a spraying programme in the transition period.

Institutionally, the education system was also fragmented, on ethnic as well as racial lines, leading to a great waste of resources through duplication as well as extreme inter-racial inequalities. The Ovambo educational authority, with jurisdiction over almost half of Namibia's total population, had only \$US 122 to spend per pupil compared with the \$US 1,450 per pupil spent by the white authority. In 1989, the former had a pupil/teacher ratio of 37/1 compared to 13/1 for the white schools (Tapscott, 1991:37). The pass rate for Standard 8 students in the Ovambo and Kavango regions was below 7%. The illiteracy rate for the country as a whole was 65% and almost one third of eligible students did not have access to primary schools.²⁹

Despite a massive influx into the urban areas of people fleeing the north for security and/or economic reasons in the final years of occupation, South Africa neglected black urban housing needs. An estimated 45,000 urban Namibians lacked housing, including at least 10% of the residents of Katutura township outside of Windhoek.

The Conjuncture at Independence

These structural factors - the mis-shaping of Namibian social services along apartheid lines, foreign dominance of the key productive sectors of the economy and, above all, continuing South African control - constituted a formidable legacy for the new Namibian government. Namibia's different communities still remain segregated geographically, economically and socially. In addition, the new government had to cope with the devastation caused by the war, particularly in the north, and with adverse economic and social trends. For some time, Namibia's economy has been under a severe strain. Economic growth had declined for most of the 1980s (real GDP in 1988 was less than it had been in 1977), while its rate of population growth was over three per cent (Wellmer, 1990:10). Half the population of Namibia is under 18. The social effects of these trends have been alarming. Between 1980 and 1990, GDP per capita fell 23% (Tapscott, 1991:37).

Unemployment has been above 33%³⁰ and underemployment substantial. Neither of Namibia's two main productive sectors - mining and commercial

agriculture - is labour intensive. Mining provides only 5% of formal sector jobs, while fishing and farming together supply only 20% more. Fully 57% of the labour force is in the informal sector (Tapscott, 1991:37).

The employment problem has been exacerbated by the constitutional commitment that those holding positions in the civil service on the date of independence could continue to hold their jobs until they resigned, retired, or were removed from their positions in accordance with the law. The leaders of SWAPO had expected that at least half the whites in the civil service would voluntarily return to South Africa, thus opening up spaces for their cadres returning from exile. However, the turmoil in South Africa in the early 1990s meant that almost all of the white civil servants opted to stay in Namibia.

Therefore, the government inherited a civil service which was 47,000 strong, mostly white, and largely male; much of it was also anti-SWAPO. Some were appointed to senior posts at inflated salaries just before independence. Those in the service lost none of their employment benefits, including generous housing, pension, medical and car allowances, benefits which were extended to incoming civil servants. Thus, Namibia has one of the highest civil service salary structures in sub-Saharan Africa. The result was that fully 42% of government expenditure in the new government's first budget went to running the civil service.³¹ By November 1991, there were 64,000 people on the government payroll.³²

The Politics of Independence

The newly formed SWAPO government that came to power was composed largely of exiles seasoned in the struggle against South African rule. Its most immediate challenge was how to bring the economy out of a decade of stagnation in a way that would also allow a more egalitarian distribution of wealth, employment and services. While radical rhetoric had characterized SWAPO's existence as a liberation movement and also its election manifesto, its performance in power has been much milder, with an emphasis on national unity, economic conservatism, and the expansion of social services.

National Reconciliation:

The difficult circumstances at independence encouraged an early emphasis on policies of racial and ethnic reconciliation. Although loosely comprising a petty bourgeoisie, the class that came to power has not been torn apart by the fractious divisions which usually characterize petty bourgeois politics and had been typical of Namibian politics in the past.³³ The government has included opposition leaders in its first Cabinet, and appointed whites to key Cabinet portfolios including Attorney General, Auditor General and the Ministers of Finance, Agriculture, Justice and Transport. It has combined its defence forces into one

unit and worked out a smooth transition in the civil service and police force.

In a remarkable effort to unite enemies who had faced each other on the battlefield only a year earlier, Namibia has built a national defence force combining equal numbers from SWAPO's former armed wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), and the colonial army of the South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF) (Nathan, 1991a:31-34). The government ruled out war trials or prosecutions for past human rights offenses, and has not excluded any person from the defence force (or the police) because of their prior affiliation or conduct. With the assistance of the British military, the government has placed a high priority on retraining its security forces to build a greater sense of discipline and commitment. In fact, Namibia's first years of independence were surprisingly peaceful, given the recent history of brutal conflict and the availability of vast quantities of weapons. The presence of former members of Koevoet, a brutal paramilitary counter insurgency group that had terrorized northern Namibia, and of some SWATF battalions at bases just over the border in South Africa, led to fears of South African sponsored destabilization. However, these concerns have not materialized. Residents of northern Namibia did suffer in 1990 from a spill-over from the Angolan war, with sporadic incidents of bombing, kidnapping or harassment, but these have declined. In August 1990, the government quietly put down a coup attempt sponsored by the extreme right of the white community with links to UNITA and former members of South Africa's security forces. The government was also able to resolve peacefully a Baster bid for the autonomy of their homeland in Rehoboth. Stockpiles of weapons continue to be found and the offices of the *Namibian* newspaper was bombed, but, generally, post-independence life in Namibia has been quieter than expected.

The pattern of transition chosen for the civil service and police force has been quite different than for the defence force. In these cases, the government opted for a smooth transition which kept both institutions intact, with virtually the same personnel. Unlike the colonial army, SWAPOL was not disbanded during the transition to independence and its leadership and structure became the basis of the Namibian Police (NAMPOL) (Nathan 1991b:34-6). To try and gain the confidence of the public, the police force has established public relations committees and an effort has been made to civilianize NAMPOL. However, in the north, people still mistrust the police force, and, in the country as a whole, the police have been regarded as ineffectual in dealing with ordinary crime.³⁴

Economic conservatism and social reform:

A preference for moving cautiously has also been demonstrated in the government's approach to economic policy. Its strategy has centered on attract-

ing local and international capital, while relying on the patience of those who constitute its political base and who expect a rapid improvement in their living standards. Above all, its watchword has been slow change with a major emphasis on preventing a precipitate exodus of Namibia's white community.

While SWAPO's election manifesto talked about 'the moral superiority of socialism', the team that came to power has taken note of the events in the former Soviet bloc and the difficulties arising from attempts to introduce socialism in Africa. Its approach has been sober and conservative, eschewing nationalization and propounding the neo-classical vision of the free market system, albeit with some preference for a mixed economy. Namibia moved rapidly to join the IMF and World Bank - bastions of orthodoxy at the international level.

At the same time, the new government showed that it was not prepared to abandon all aspects of its reformist policy. In the first budget it allocated no less than 41% of its total expenditure to health, education and housing. Compared with the last colonial budget, allocations for health and education doubled and tripled respectively, without counting capital spending.³⁵ Given the long-term payoff involved in social expenditures and the opportunity cost in foregoing productive investments at this time, this approach is economically risky if politically popular.

Therefore, the government has been extremely cautious in other aspects of social and economic policy. The watchword of the Minister of Finance Otto Herrigel has been fiscal discipline which has translated into tight controls on spending, small deficits, and a disinclination to accept loans except those offered on very soft terms.³⁶ As Namibia lacks control over capital flows with South Africa, Herrigel has sought to create the economic and business conditions that would provide a natural incentive for local and foreign private capital to invest in Namibia.

This general approach is a moderation of SWAPO's earlier stand. During the independence election, its manifesto called, among other things, for a share of public control in the mining industry, mandatory reinvestment of mining profits in the national economy, the curbing of transfer pricing, and the imposition of higher taxes. As recently as April 1990, the Minister of Mines and Energy, Toivo ya Toivo, told senior mining executives in Windhoek that,

Over the years, through the mining industry, Namibia has developed an abnormal degree of dependency on foreign countries. Such an economic dependency threatens the political aspirations of a sovereign state and cannot be allowed to continue.³⁷

However, while Namibia's taxes on mining are regarded as tough,³⁸ the government has made a major effort to reassure the private sector that it has no plans for wide-scale nationalization. Indeed, it has gone out of its way to promote

local and foreign private investment, organizing an investors conference in Windhoek in February 1991. At the moment, the government is talking much more in terms of acquiring equity and forming joint ventures than taking control. It is also prepared to offer incentives to foreign investors, including an investment code which allows repatriation of profits.

So far, the fruits of the government's wooing of the private sector and in particular foreign capital has been slim. Lounrho has announced plans to invest \$150 million in a sugar project in the Caprivi area. Considerable interest has been expressed in exploration for petroleum and natural gas. France's Citroen has become involved through a 10% share in a plant in Gobabis intended to assemble luxury vehicles for export to the region. A South Korean company has agreed to set up a \$US100 million oil refinery at Usakos. However, barring major new discoveries of natural resources, the response of foreign investors to Namibia's efforts seems likely to remain quite cool.

Foreign assistance has also been significantly less than was expected before independence. In part, Namibia has been caught in the shift of interest towards the former Soviet bloc by Western donors and investors. In part, it has suffered from the general drop in Western aid to Africa (in both real and absolute terms) arising from disenchantment with the development performance of sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. Aid to a SWAPO government from erstwhile supporters in Eastern Europe has collapsed. Potential donors unfamiliar with Namibia are influenced by the gross average per capita GDP of \$1,044 (Tapscott, 1991:36) - a figure which disguises the dramatic inequalities in Namibian society and which places Namibia in the category of lower middle or middle income countries. As a result of this average, for example, Namibia is not designated a least developed country and is ineligible for membership and loans from the International Development Association (IDA)- the 'soft-loan' agency of the World Bank.

The prospect that Namibia's high international profile and strategic significance in Southern Africa might have earned it strong early pledges of assistance has not been realized. At a first donor conference in June 1990, Namibia sought grants and concessionary aid of \$810 million over three years.³⁹ In fact, only \$360 million was pledged, and, with delays in aid pipelines, less than 25% of this has been disbursed.⁴⁰

Contradictions with Swapo's Base of Support

The lack of resources in the context of Namibia's structural inequalities and historical constraints has imposed some difficult choices on the new government. Given its priorities, particularly in serving the interests of the private sector, the white community and a new privileged class of black Namibian administrators and politicians, other crucial sections of Namibian society will inevitably get short shrift.

At least in the short and medium-term, there are simply not enough resources to meet the enormous needs of the north, land reform in the south, and an improvement in wages and working conditions for farm labourers or the working class, let alone assistance for the unemployed and very poor. Gender inequalities remain the norm. Yet it was from these sectors that SWAPO drew much of its support and, without Ovamboland in particular, SWAPO would have lost the first election. This gap between the policies and priorities of the SWAPO government and the nature of its political base provides the central contradiction of the early independence period.

SWAPO's difficulties in effecting a rapid transformation of its political heartland in the north in the short term demonstrates the enduring nature of the legacy of the past. During the colonial period, development of the north had been ignored even though half of the population was located there. State support in the form of financing, agricultural extension, research and marketing had been concentrated on white commercial farmers in the south (Adams, 1990:15-23). Yet settler farming in Namibia as in colonial Kenya and Rhodesia, though critically dependent on the state for financial aid and subsidies, entered the independence period with a high level of indebtedness, owing almost R100 million to the state (Adams, 1990:17). For most of the pre-independence period, black farmers wanting to develop the communal areas in the south were denied access to the state and private credit facilities open to whites.

Historically, the north was treated as a labour reserve for white farms and mines in the south. Ninety per cent of the population in the north depended on subsistence agriculture on impoverished land. The area lacked adequate water, and had never been given the most rudimentary marketing or extension services, not even vaccination programmes for their cattle. Since the early twentieth century, cattle from Ovamboland had been excluded from the national and export beef market to keep out disease. Most of SWAPO's cadres came from this area, and the war had turned the region into a killing field.

In the last decade of the war, the north and in particular a 'bottle store bourgeoisie' had benefited economically from the presence of the South African Defence Forces and then the UNTAG observers. With independence and their withdrawal, the region went into a slump. No less than 25,000 workers in the northern provinces lost their livelihood when South Africa's occupying army left.⁴¹ The total monthly turnover of the formal business sector in northern Namibia declined by an average of 34% in the first five months after independence.⁴² Added to this was the return of Namibians from exile - 85% of whom came from the north. Yet by June 1990, a year after many had come home, less than 10% of the potentially economically active 'returnees' had managed to find wage employment (Tapscott, 1991:38).

Obviously, transforming the communal subsistence economy of the north is no easy matter. Yet, although rural development in the north was ostensibly selected by the Cabinet as a priority, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development received only R76 million or just over 3% of the total expenditure in the first budget and R61 million or 2% in the second.⁴³

Perhaps in partial recompense, almost all foreign aid projects have been channelled to the north for better infrastructure - in the form of roads, water, electricity and telecommunications - and for improvements in health and educational services to make up for neglect during the colonial period. A programme establishing development brigades launched in July 1991 is attempting to resettle and retrain former exiles and combatants. Finally, there is hope that a second hydro-electric project on the Cunene river will provide some counter-stimulus to the post independence depression in the north.

Nevertheless, as 70% of Namibia's farmers are based in the north, the small allocation to agriculture and rural development is striking. Improvement for them will take some time, and in the short term there is some disillusionment in Ovamboland with the pace and form of economic reconstruction. In particular, the lack of jobs for SWAPO's ex-combatants has provoked bitter resentment.

In the area south of the red line, contradictions also exist at an environmental, economic and social level. The central issue is the difficult question of land reform. During the colonial period, black farmers were shunted on to reserves or worked as farm labourers on white farms in conditions of extreme exploitation. A national conference on land reform in 1991 produced a series of proposals to redress the severe maldistribution of land, including the expropriation of absentee and foreign-owned farms. These proposals also support changes in the labour code to include minimum wages, better working conditions and social services for farm workers.

However, any changes in the distribution of land are likely to be severely limited. As a study by Fiona Adams shows, significantly less land may be available for redistribution through the expropriation of foreign owned commercial farms than is commonly assumed - only 5.6% of farms (7.3% of surface area) as compared to the presumed 48% (Adams, 1990:30-35). Moreover, redistributing land to peasant farmers by subdividing commercial farms into small plots for cultivation or for stock farming is simply not a feasible option as the land cannot support intensive agriculture (Adams, 1990:40). Indeed, stock farming in large units will continue to be the dominant agricultural activity in commercial areas. Finally, any inroads on the white commercial sector will have to be weighed carefully against the need to retain the productive capacity of white farms and to encourage new agricultural investment. These considerations make it difficult for the SWAPO government to do enough for the black rural popula-

tion in the south in the short term to reverse the trend of the first elections which saw this group voting mainly for the opposition DTA.⁴⁴

Labour and Gender:

SWAPO's interest in maintaining the white farming community in place in the short-term has produced one set of constraints. Similarly, its desire to keep white and foreign capital happy in the urban sector has translated into a certain diffidence in its approach to Namibian trade unions and the urban working class. In the early period after independence, the government ignored or attempted to co-opt the labour movement. On its return from exile, SWAPO brushed aside the internationally respected General Secretary of the Mineworkers Union of Namibia, Ben Ulenga, and placed a SWAPO official, John ya Otto, at the head of Namibia's unions. Early in 1991, the government moved to neutralize Ulenga further by appointing him Deputy Minister of Wildlife, Conservation and Tourism. At the same time, Ya Otto resigned his post to become the Namibian Ambassador to Angola, thus completing the removal of the original top echelon of the labour leadership. His successor, Bernard Esau, (and Ulenga) were chosen to sit on SWAPO's central committee at its party congress in December 1991.

Labour representatives were not included in the discussions which produced the constitution, and they were not entirely happy about the protection afforded them by that constitution. The government has delayed presenting its labour code, and it has done little on affirmative action or a minimum wage. Thus in the diamond and copper mines, workers still live in single-sex hostels without their families in conditions akin to harsh labour camps. Unions have been frustrated over the lack of protection afforded their officials, farm workers or domestics. Since labour - and in particular mine workers from Ovamboland - constitutes the second major component of SWAPO's political support, this approach provides a second example of the decision to choose economic conservatism in the short-term over the interests of a key constituency. In short, the continuing support of workers has been taken for granted.

SWAPO has also been rather cavalier in its approach to the 52% of the voting population who are women. At its worst, the attitude of SWAPO can be seen in President Sam Nujoma's assessment that women's past contribution was primarily 'cooking' for the liberation struggle. For the 5,000 women who fought in the war, many in active combat, the experience has been disheartening.

After independence, the government excluded women from the new national defence forces; many are now unemployed. Only seven women were elected to the Assembly, only two are Cabinet Ministers and only one acts in a deputy position. At SWAPO's December 1991 party congress, only eight of the 62 members of the central committee were women. Only about 75,000 of the

250,000 black wage earners in the formal sector are women;⁴⁵ most work as domestics for wages of \$20-30 a month.⁴⁶ Most have more than one child and a large proportion are single parents. At present, married women pay twice the income tax of married men.

The Cruel Conjecture

The policies which the SWAPO government has chosen indicate that, so far, the government has opted for wealth creation through foreign capital and the white community in Namibia, along with as rapid an expansion of social services as a policy of fiscal conservatism will permit. Namibia's predicament is to be a country marginal to the interests of the great powers and, with the exception of some mining interests, to international capital. Despite its abundant natural riches, Namibia is underdeveloped, poor and vulnerable. All the struggles to industrialize lie ahead. Yet Namibia has not yet established a Fordist regime of accumulation in a world which is moving on to post-Fordism.

What the case of Namibia illustrates so far is the overdetermining power of its structural incorporation into the regional and world economy and the uneven development of its forces and relations of production. Enclaves using the most sophisticated techniques of modern mining employ migrant labour; commercialized agriculture on a vast scale retains quasi-feudal relations with farm labourers; and the vast majority of the country live in traditional communities on subsistence agriculture. Add to this the distorting effects of apartheid and the legacy of a harsh colonialism, and the path towards economic and social transformation seems even more remote.

Against these structures, the class that has come to power has a slender social base and a political base which it could easily alienate. While it may be able to ensure formal racial equality and human dignity, it will have great difficulty reducing Namibia's economic dependence on South Africa or attaining sufficient resources from the form of its dependent incorporation into the world economy to provide the health care, education, skills training and housing which it must deliver to retain popular support in the long-term. Already, it is spending a disproportionate share of the budget on social services in the early attempts to mitigate the legacy of neglect in these areas.

These contradictions pose the central challenge for the SWAPO government. Sooner rather than later, consent to its rule will have to be secured through another election. Yet in the short-term, the SWAPO government will have difficulty redressing Namibia's inherited inequalities or meeting the heightened expectations for an improvement in living standards. It seems prepared to risk stretching the patience of its supporters in the calculation that, in the short-term at any rate, its constituency has nowhere else to go and that, in the medium-term,

some of these contradictions can be softened. Of course, the alternative to a legitimate government is a coercive government. In the past in the middle of a war, neither the colonial state nor the liberation movement allowed democratic controls or democratic debate (Wellmer, 1990:23). However, so far there seems to be a serious commitment to the process of democracy within the new administration (Tapscott, 1991:38). Although a tradition of open debate within ruling SWAPO circles remains weak, the government has tolerated fairly strident criticism from its opponents and the opposition press.

At the same time, given the competing pressures within the state and the context of structural constraints, it is hard to see how Namibia will evolve into a benevolent social democracy and not an unsteady state riven by social tensions and unstable government (Saul, 1976:12-38). Without an easing of these contradictions, it will be very difficult for Namibia's first government to avoid the slide into slow or negative growth, the persistence of severe inequalities, the emergence of an exploitative ruling class, and the descent into authoritarian government. It is a drama that has been played out often in Africa, a pattern in which the West, with its combination of formal political neglect and coercive economic relationships, also bears responsibility. Yet a future with brighter alternatives is vitally important for Namibia. If nothing else, its progress will be watched by all those fearful of change in South Africa itself.

NOTES

1. Namibian Council of Churches, 'Final Election Results', 15.11.89.
2. In fact, disclosures in 1991 reveal that the South African government provided no less than R100 million to the DTA during the campaign. 'Millions to oppose SWAPO', *Natal Witness*, 26.07.91.
3. The outcry over the appointment of Simon (Jesus) Hawala as the Commander of Namibia's defence forces in October 1990, an officer heavily implicated in torture in the camps, suggests a continuing sensitivity over this issue.
4. Theo Ben Gurirab in a speech at a conference on African economic issues in New York. *The Namibian*, 24.04.90.
5. 'A budget for the bankers', *Market SE* (Britain), 02.08.90.
6. Budget speech by Otto Herrigel, Minister of Finance, July 1990.
7. 'R500 million sent out to S.Africa by civil servants', *SouthScan*, 01.06.90.
8. Only one of Namibia's seven banks is owned locally.
9. 'EC team returns after inconclusive talks on fisheries', *Southscan*, 22.03.91.
10. 'Namibia fights to save fish', *The New African* (Durban), 05.06.91.
11. Robert Anderson, 'Namibia gets tough to defend its fishing grounds', *Financial Times*, 30.04.91.
12. Cited in Philip Gawith, 'Swapo government pressed to deliver fruits of revolution', *Financial Times*, 29-30.12.90.
13. 'State of Nation address', *The Namibian*, 11.06.91.
14. Two-thirds of Spain's entire white fish catch from overseas came from Namibia. The ban has affected 200 boats, 6,000 fishermen and 40,000 Spaniards in the processing industry. It is estimated that the total loss to Spain could amount to Ecu 6.2 billion. Not surprisingly from 30 to 50 Spanish vessels continued to fish within Namibia's EEZ. 'Spain, hit hard by Namibia fishing ban, seeks deal', *SouthScan*, 08.06.90.
15. Susan Brown, 'Life in the shadow of the Big Banana', *Work in Progress*, 65. See also Joe Putz and Roy Laishley, 'Independent Namibia sets agenda', *Africa Recovery*, April-June 1990.

16. The red line was a boundary established by the German administration which separated the northern part of Namibia from the area of white settlement in the south. The north served as a labour reserve for the south and the boundary was fenced to prevent the southward movement of livestock.
17. Adams, 1990:10.
18. The price for Namibian beef under this agreement is 40% higher than the world market price. Namibia was also granted \$US 63 million under the Lomé IV European Development Fund.
19. Namibia's manufacturing sector contributes only 4% to its GDP. 'The Namibian Economy - Some Highlights', *Southern Africa Dossier*, Centro de Estudos Africanos, Maputo, October 1989.
20. 'New profits for Namibian beef', *SouthScan*, 23.11.90.
21. See also Mike Hall, 'Exports vulnerable', and Nicholas Woodsworth, 'Riches in the desert sands', *Financial Times*, 22.03.90.
22. 'Rossing indicates it may cut uranium production', *SouthScan*, 09.11.90.
23. SWA/Namibia Information Service, Statistical Economic Review 1988. Namibia's main producer of uranium, Rossing, already operating at 20% below capacity, decided in March 1991 on a 20% production cutback for the next three years, and cut its work force by over 200 workers. 'Rossing axes workers', *The Namibian*, 25.01.91; 'Namibian uranium output cut', *Financial Times*, 20.03.91; and 'Rossing to slash over 200 jobs', *The Namibian*, 13.03.91.
24. Major shareholders include Rio Algom of Canada, Total of France, Germany's Urangesellschaft and South Africa's Industrial Development Corporation. The Namibian government has the majority of votes at a general meeting of Rossing shareholders but can appoint only one of the company's 20 directors.
25. Payments of dividends to foreign shareholders in all sectors remained high at about 29% of operating surplus in the period from 1970 to 1987, even when the growth rate of Namibia's economy fell to only about 1% per annum.
26. Ben Amathila, Namibia's Minister for Trade and Industry cited in 'Namibia lobbies Brussels on Lomé Convention terms', *SouthScan*, 01.06.90, and for the next sentence.
27. CIDMAA, 'Namibia's Reconstruction - Report on Development Prospects', September 1989:37.
28. Ruth Ansah Ayisi, 'Namibia: reforming the health system', AIA, 17.05.90. Before leaving Namibia, the South African administration provided a \$20 million loan for a private white hospital, and sold the formerly all white hospital in Karasburg to private interests for R100. 'Hospital sold for R100 by the AG', *The Namibian*, 06.07.90.
29. 'Nujoma pleads for international aid', *The Star* (South Africa), 20.12.90.
30. Otto Herrigel cited in Tom Minney, 'Namibia: financial system takes shape', AIA, 31.07.91.
31. 'Namibia - new nation left to fight economic war in South Africa's wake', *The Ottawa Citizen*, 17.04.91.
32. Hage Geingob cited in 'Excess in civil service', *SouthScan*, 01.11.91.
33. However, classical petty bourgeois politics continue to be staple fare in Namibian politics, particularly among the opposition parties. When the DTA decided to transform itself into a single political party, DTA of Namibia, members of its former coalition from the NNF and SWANU left and instigated court actions to prevent the change. Other parties continued to suffer defections, to be disbanded, and to reform into new alignments.
34. Colin Leys, 'Police story - a tough transition', *Southern Africa Report*, VII(2) November 1991.
35. 'A budget for the bankers'. In 1990, hospitals and schools formerly reserved for whites were opened to all races. Rural children were immunized for the first time.
36. Thus, Herrigel kept Namibia's deficit in the first year of independence to R212 million on a total budget of R2.7 billion. 'Spending too high and income down after failure of foreign support', *SouthScan*, 01.03.91.
37. Cited in *The Namibian*, 24.04.90.
38. Rossing and Tsumeb now pay 50% to 60% tax on profits and CDM pays 75%. Woodsworth, 'Riches in the desert sands'. New legislation on petroleum taxes in April 1991 calls for 12% royalties and cumulative company and windfall profits of 56.5%. 'Questions over Namibia oil royalty levels', *African Analysis* (Britain), 22.03.91.
39. 'Donor aid less than requested', *Namibian Report* (Britain), July 1990.
40. 'Development co-operation with Namibia', *AWIPA Bulletin*, March/April 1991. The largest donors in order are the Nordic countries, West Germany, the USA, South Africa, Britain, France, Italy, Canada and India. In June 1991, President Nujoma reported that only about \$US 85 million in donor contributions had been finalized in 1990/1991. 'State of Nation address', *The Namibian*, 11.06.91.
41. 'Namibia - beauty v beast', *The Economist*, 16.02.91.
42. 'Economic plunge after SADF left', *SouthScan*, 14.09.90.

43. 'A Budget for the bankers', and 'Herrigel unveils budget', *The Namibian*, 24.05.91. 'Capital spending', loc cit.
44. Significantly, at SWAPO's party congress in December 1991, Prime Minister Hage Geingob stood down from the race for SWAPO Vice President in favour of a southerner, the incumbent Rev Hendrik Witbooi.
45. Oxfam Canada, 'Namibian women: the long march', *The Birth of a Nation - Namibia*, 1990.
46. See 'Union for domestic workers launched', in Lauren Dobell, *Namibia Reports*, 07.05.90.

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