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INTRODUCTION: INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND THE LAW IN THE FIRST DECADE OF ZIMBABWE’S INDEPENDENCE

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NINETEEN EIGHTY-NINE was the year in which the Zimbabwean government, in its economic policies, voluntarily turned away from its earlier profession of socialism and embarked on a policy of trade liberalization. In the longer term, therefore, the first decade of Zimbabwe’s independence may prove to be anomalous — an ephemeral hiccup in its essentially ‘capitalist’ history. From another perspective, however, the impact of labour policies during this period may prove to have more lasting effects than even the government dreamed of. The altered legal framework during the first decade of independence has given both labour and capital practice in forms of confrontation and manipulation that are unlikely to be forgotten in a hurry by either side of this production relationship. The politicization of work and the workplace in Zimbabwe may not easily be eradicated, even by the massive unemployment currently being experienced by youthful school-leavers, which is likely to continue irrespective of what economic policies are adopted in the future. The replacement of racial discrimination during the colonial era by the problems of class differentiation among Blacks after Independence has clearly had an important (and thus far negative) impact on production output in many enterprises. These and many other experiences of Zimbabwe’s temporary flirtation with socialism can be expected to influence both her immediate adjustment to ‘liberal’ economic policies, which will tilt the balance once again in favour of capital and its management, and any equilibrium which may be established in the longer term.

It is important, therefore, that we understand in some detail exactly what did happen during the 1980s in Zimbabwe’s industrial sector, rather than run the risk that, as political ideologies, together with what counts as legitimate history, change, these experiences will be expunged from our collective memory as being history incompatible with contemporary reality in the future. It is important to record in accessible, published form the shop-floor findings of industrial sociology during the 1980s, so that they will be available to future generations of researchers and teachers in this field.

THE ENTERPRISES STUDIED

Although all of the workshop participants’ research interests were defined individually, their choices have, fortunately, enabled this collection to
cover most of the major forms of enterprise ownership in Zimbabwe. State-owned companies are represented by ‘Parastatal’, a single enterprise studied successively by both Shadur and Mutizwa-Mangiza. Within the private sector, the local subsidiaries of different transnationals were investigated by Maphosa and Gaidzanwa. ‘Zimcor’, discussed by Cheater, straddled this divide, with a majority state shareholding and participation by both transnationals and local companies, while ‘Zintex’ is an example of a wholly local company quoted on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, with some individual shareholders resident overseas. Our examples therefore cover a wide range of ownership variation, with the exception of the handful of recently formed co-operatives. These companies, with a minimum of 500 employees, also represent the large-firm sector of the Zimbabwean economy. They have all been made anonymous.

Given the diverse nature of the enterprises studied, the congruence of the research findings by the different authors is striking, attesting to the significance of structural processes in widely differing contexts. Their interpretations of their data, however, sometimes differ. In particular, readers may be struck by the divergent interpretations offered by Shadur and Mutizwa-Mangiza of what was happening in the management of the same enterprise. Perhaps their differences confirm Karl Mannheim’s (1936) assertion that there is no ‘God’s-eye view’ of social reality, merely a series of different perspectives, even among scientific observers who, like the social actors observed, may be differently-placed in respect of their gender, nationality and other social attributes. In this respect, though, one might note the shared interpretations of the Zimbabwean industrial scene by the four Zimbabwean contributors, irrespective of their differences of race and gender. It is, therefore, especially useful to have this shared insiders’ perspective leavened by that of Shadur as an outsider.

**RESEARCH THEMES**

The articles collected here deal with a number of substantial themes, on some of which we do not have as much hard data as we would like. For others, however, more detailed information has already been published: the bibliography on industrial sociology in Zimbabwe at the end of this collection is, we hope, comprehensive and will allow interested readers to pursue specific issues in more detail should they so wish.

Among the many issues raised in these articles, some recur in many different contexts, indicating their structural importance in the system of industrial relations in Zimbabwe. These recurrently important themes include: the changing legal framework of labour relations; the limited extent of de facto workers’ participation in the different enterprises and the causes of these limitations; the inverse relationship between democra-
tization and bureaucratization in the workplace, which is related to differential education; the importance of the informal structure of social relations in the workplace; the links of urban workers to the countryside; the growing impact of class differentials among Zimbabwean Blacks and their impact on production relations; the impact of its non-productive welfare functions (housing, etc.) on production relations within an enterprise; the impact of race on production relations; the role and problems of supervisors on the shop-floor; and the politicization not only of production relations but also of the relationships of workers' dependants to employing companies and of the role of the 'workers' representative'.

It may be helpful to consider, in the necessary comparative detail, at least some of these themes as they are reflected in the different articles, and to provide additional background information which the papers often assume in their own arguments.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF LABOUR RELATIONS

Classically, newly established socialist states have begun their transformation with new laws governing land tenure and marriage. Zimbabwe, however, gave early attention to legalizing the state control of remuneration (in the Minimum Wages Act, No. 4 of 1980) and of the relations between employer and employee (in the Employment Act, No. 13 of 1980). Contrary to popular belief, however, as reflected, for example, in Sachikonye (1990, 3-4), the Minimum Wages Act did not establish for the first time the principle of a minimum wage: for certain categories of industrial worker that principle was established by the Industrial Conciliation Act (No. 21 of 1945, section 27(1)) and the Native Labour Boards Act (No. 26 of 1947, section 21(2)) and made non-racial by the Industrial Conciliation Act (No. 29 of 1959), while its generalization to agricultural workers dates from 1979 (S. I. 917 of 1979).

The Minimum Wages and Employment Acts were 'holding operations', establishing a measure of central control while the state prepared a more coherent legal framework to restructure the triangular interface between industrial capital, labour and itself. This exercise took longer than expected: the Labour Relations Act (No. 16 of 1985) was promulgated at the very end of 1985, after extensive criticism of early draft bills by both labour and capital, and became effective at the beginning of 1986. The Labour Relations Act incorporated the core provisions of both of the earlier Acts.

There is considerable misunderstanding of the intentions of both the Industrial Conciliation and Labour Relations Acts, perhaps because both are sufficiently long (89 and 80 pages, respectively) to deter all but the most determined reader. A detailed comparison of their provisions, however, is necessary to cut through misinformed popular and state discourses on the subject of labour relations in Independent Zimbabwe. Even before
such a comparison, though, one needs to note the background context — to both pieces of legislation — of the development of a new state (dating from 1890) and the strengthening of its powers. The original Industrial Conciliation Act (No. 10 of 1934) was the first attempt by this new state to exert any measure of control over a fledgling, but growing, industrial base. Earlier statutes attempting to control labour, such as the Masters and Servants Act (No. 5 of 1901) did not apply to skilled workers. The Industrial Conciliation Act exempted certain categories of employee from its provisions: those working in agriculture, domestic service, the civil service, education (including universities) and those working free for charities. The Labour Relations Act extended considerably the theoretical reach of the state into employment, exempting only those whose conditions of employment are provided for in the Constitution of Zimbabwe.

Before comparing the content of the Industrial Conciliation and Labour Relations Acts, one should first note their different intentions. It is clear that the Industrial Conciliation Act assumed conflict between capital and labour (or at least between employers and employees) to be endemic, requiring a system of bureaucratized adjudication to resolve such disputes. Laying down the rules for entering into and adjudicating such conflicts was considered to be the responsibility of the state, but the ensuing negotiations and their outcome were the responsibility of the conflicting parties. To this end, the Act established two two-tier adjudication hierarchies, one concerned with matters of registration and membership of trade unions and employers’ associations (an industrial court to which decisions of industrial boards could be appealed), and the other concerned with the resolution of industrial conflict through bureaucratized procedures (industrial tribunal(s) plus industrial councils/conciliation boards, both of the latter composed of both employers and employees). The Act thus brought under the bureaucratic control of the state the recognition of both trade unions and employers’ organizations as part of the system of regulating industrial conflict and its resolution. Finally, it dealt with ancillary matters, including the status of unregistered trade unions and employers’ organizations, procedures of mediation and arbitration, the control of savings and other funds owned by trade unions and employers’ associations, and matters of publication. The objectives of the Industrial Conciliation Act were thus very limited and based on the pattern of labour relations which had emerged in the United Kingdom, Europe and North America before the Second World War.

With two important exceptions, the colonial state regarded matters of employment and dispute resolution connected with employment as strictly private affairs. These exceptions included the state’s outlawing after 1959, firstly, of the differentiation or discrimination of work or work conditions on the basis of ‘race, colour or religion’ (Chapter 267 [1974], sections 36(2), 40(1)(e), 57(1)h, 78(2), and, secondly, of victimization of employees
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giving information to the state's industrial-conciliation machinery against their employers (section 136). For the rest, the Act specifically stated that 'This Act shall not bind the State' (section 3) and severely restricted the capacity of the Minister of Labour to intervene in industrial matters. The colonial bureaucratization of labour relations involved state control exercised through civil servants, not politicians.

The role of the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, as it then was, under this legislation was restricted to: statutorily receiving a copy of all agreements negotiated by industrial councils or conciliation boards (section 86); declaring — at the request of the industrial council or conciliation board concerned — and publishing such agreements to be binding on all parties in a particular area or sector of industry, taking into account also the interests of consumers and 'the public as a whole' (sections 113, 114, 116); having the right to make a final determination to refuse to make an agreement binding if he considered it to be contrary to the interests of consumers or the general public, but being subject to the adjudication of the industrial tribunal if he refused to make an agreement binding on any other grounds (with the later provision that the State President could, by notice in the Government Gazette, declare the Minister's decision to be final: section 117(4)); being able to prevent the referral, by an industrial council or conciliation board, of a dispute to an industrial tribunal for adjudication if such action would likely result in changes to an industrial agreement during its agreed duration (section 100(1)); being able to take over and operate, in the event of industrial action which prevented its normal operations, any enterprise delivering essential services (defined as the supply of light, power, water, sanitation works, fire extinction and the mining of coal (section 142)); and consulting employers on matters affecting the interests of employers or employees (section 150(3)). In addition, only the Minister could authorize, in writing, anyone to hold office simultaneously in more than one (registered or unregistered) trade union, employers' organization, or both (sections 47(1), 67(1)).

The Minister did not constitute the final state authority in any essentially judicial matters. He could not be appealed to over recognition or registration or the operation of workers' or employers' organizations, or the termination of membership in unions or employers' bodies. He appointed members of the Industrial Court (of record) and the chairmen of industrial tribunals (which could also act as courts of inquiry), but had no statutory right to become involved in the outcome of decisions on conflict resolution made by either of these appeal divisions of the adjudication hierarchies. The essentially apolitical nature of the Industrial Conciliation Act was also reflected in its insistence that no registered or unregistered trade union or employers' organization might affiliate itself to any political party or organization, use any of its funds to further any
individual or collective political interests, allow its property or facilities to be used for any political purposes, or receive financial or other assistance from political organizations of any kind (sections 49, 66). Such pretensions to apolitical labour relations parallel the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers. Both are concerned to develop a legal-rational bureaucracy. Max Weber’s (1947) acme of efficient organization, especially in industrialized societies.

But in some views, of course, both apolitical labour relations and the separation of powers are dismissed as mystifications of capital’s interests. These views argue that labour relations are, by definition, political, concerned with the power relations linking capital to labour. Any legislation that does not favour labour, therefore, by definition favours capital, and all ostensibly apolitical legislation falls into this category. Such views were espoused by Zanu(PF) (cf. ZANU[PF], 1980) and the new Zimbabwean government after Independence. Hence it is not at all surprising that the fundamental assumptions as well as the content of the Labour Relations Act are very different from those of the Industrial Conciliation Act.

The Labour Relations Act explicitly takes the part of labour in the capital-labour relationship, as can be demonstrated by classifying its objectives into four divisions. Firstly, this Act declares and defines ‘the fundamental rights of employees [and] unfair labour practices’, and regulates ‘conditions of employment and other related matters’. Specifically, worker organizations are given the right to recommend industrial action (including strike action: section 29(4)(g), and the Act indemnifies individual workers as well as workers’ committees and registered (but not unregistered) trade unions against civil liability for lawful collective industrial action), while employers are not given the right to lock-outs or other collective action (sections 120–123, 29(5)). In its second category of objectives, the Labour Relations Act moves on to provide for state control over the economy in ways antithetical to the assumptions of the colonial system that employment is a private matter: ‘to regulate and control collective job action [and] employment agencies; to provide for the control of wages and salaries [and] the appointment of workers’ committees’. A third set of objectives of this Act includes taking over, renaming and expanding the institutional base of colonial labour relations, providing for ‘the formation, registration, certification and functions of trade unions, employers’ organizations, employment councils and employment boards; the establishment and functions of the Labour Relations Board and the Labour Relations Tribunal’. Finally, the Labour Relations Act reveals a utopian view of what the future might hold, in seeking ‘to provide for the prevention of trade disputes, and unfair labour practices’ — a united future, without preventable conflict.

In this ideological perspective, then, the law can dissolve the inherent class antagonism between capital and labour and create industrial harmony.
It is, moreover, the duty of the state and its political functionaries to oversee the dissolution of this class antagonism. Apolitical systems must be politicized. One result of this politicization, however, appears to be the conversion of a legal-rational bureaucracy into a patrimonial bureaucracy, as controlling politicians have appropriated the state apparatus in order to achieve these goals. The Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act (No. 23 of 1981, section 5(6)) outlawed discrimination on the basis of ‘tribe, etc.’ as well as race, and the Labour Relations Act equally prohibits discrimination in employment ‘on the grounds of race, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, colour, creed or sex’ (section 5(1)). But Zimbabweans have cause to believe that their state sector now operates on the particularistic principles of tribalism, nepotism and ministerial directives on appointments. It is no longer a universalistic system, if it ever was.

It is instructive to note the sheer extent to which labour relations were politicized in the Labour Relations Act by noting what functions were vested in the Minister as final authority in contrast to the colonial situation outlined above — and I should note that this list is incomplete! The Minister currently: defines unfair labour practices (section 10); grants permission to delay or withhold wage payments (section 13(2)); allows welfare and fringe benefits to be diminished (section 16(2)(b)); makes ‘regulations providing for the development, improvement, protection, regulation and control of employment and conditions of employment’, which regulations ‘prevail over the provisions of any other statutory instrument or of any agreement or arrangement whatsoever’ (section 17(1) and (2)), including, it would appear from this wording, the law of contract. Specifically in terms of sections 17(3), 19, 20 and 22, the Minister may regulate, among many others, minimum and maximum wages, bonuses, increments, allowances, benefits, social security, retirement and superannuation benefits, wage deductions, hours of work (including overtime), rest and meal breaks, the provision of food, leave of all kinds, holiday entitlements, the establishment of and contributions to pension schemes, medical and other insurances, the settlement of disputes, the recruitment of all types of labour, whether Zimbabwean or foreign, and the reinstatement of workers suspended or dismissed without his permission.

The Minister also exercises direct and indirect control over employment councils, employers, trade unions and workers’ committees. Firstly, the Labour Relations Act sets up a deliberate monopoly system in its requirement that ‘there should be no more than one certified trade union or employers’ organization for each undertaking or industry’ (section 45(1)(d)). Secondly, ‘if the Minister has reasonable cause to believe that the property or funds of any trade union, employers’ organization or federation are being misappropriated or misapplied’, or that their affairs ‘are being conducted in a manner that is detrimental to the interests of its
members as a whole', the Minister may appoint an investigation into the organization's affairs, and may accept or reject any recommendations to withdraw its recognition by the state and for it to cease operating (section 136). For some odd reason, more control (both financial (section 61) and political) is exercised by the Minister over trade unions than over employers' organizations. 'Where the national interest so demands', the Minister may not only 'cause to be supervised ... elections to any office or post in a registered or certified trade union or employers' organization' (section 55(1)). He may also, for reasons of 'national interest', prohibit any candidate from conducting an election campaign for such office (section 55(2)(d)).

The Minister may direct employers, workers and their respective organizations to negotiate or renegotiate a collective-bargaining agreement (section 25), and that parts of such a collective-bargaining agreement (notably concerning wages) be implemented before they are ratified by the negotiating parties as required in the Act (section 83). He may also refuse to allow the registration by the state of such agreements until amended (section 84). Moreover, the Minister may: 'make such regulations as he considers necessary for the control of workers' committees' (section 26(1)); specify maximum trade union, employers' organization and employment council dues (sections 28(2), 57, 58, 64(d)), levies to support the Labour Relations Board and Tribunal (section 139), and the mode of payment of such dues (section 60); direct payment of union dues 'into a trust fund and not to the trade union concerned' (section 60(3)(b)); approve or revoke the authority of a trade union to act on behalf of non-union members, as an 'agent union' (sections 31, 32, 56); and institute accreditation enquiries into the (continued) registration of any trade union or employers' organization (sections 39, 41).

The consent of the Minister is necessary for any employer to 'threaten, recommend or engage in a lock-out' or to take punitive action in respect of continued employment, wages or benefits as a result of a lock-out (section 121), even though, as I have already indicated, employers do not in fact have the right to such collective action in the first place! Perhaps section 121 is merely making doubly sure ... Such industrial action may in any case be terminated or delayed for up to 90 days by a 'show-cause order' or 'disposal order' issued by the Minister (sections 122, 123). Any party aggrieved by the issuance of, or refusal to issue, such an order may appeal directly to the Labour Relations Tribunal (section 126(1)), but such an appeal does not affect in any way the implementation of such an order, although the Minister may, during the period in which an appeal is considered, 'give such directions to, or impose such restrictions on, any of the parties as he considers fair and reasonable, taking into account the respective rights of the parties and the public interest' (section 126(2)).

Employment boards, governing conditions of employment, are
appointed by and report to the Minister (sections 70–73, 77), who is required 'as far as is practicable under the circumstances' (section 72(2)), to ensure 'equality of representation' of the interests of employers and employees. He must 'pay due regard to' (but not necessarily appoint!) any persons nominated by any interested party to such an employment board (section 71), and may vary its investigative authority (to another board, or to a trade union) if he considers that the interests of the employees concerned 'would be more properly served' by such a transfer (section 78).

The Minister also appoints, and may suspend or dismiss, all members of the Labour Relations Board (sections 88, 91), which is the board of appeal against determinations made by the state's regional hearing officers. In turn, appeals against the Board's determinations are heard by the Labour Relations Tribunal, members of which are appointed, suspended and dismissed by the State President (sections 99–104). From the Tribunal, appeals must be made directly to the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe. At the first level of appeal in this hierarchy, there is explicit scope for political determination: 'The Minister may give to the Board directions of a general or specific nature, and the Board shall comply with such directions' (section 93(4)). Interestingly, an appeal may be made to the Board only with the consent either of the regional hearing officer, or of a member of the Board itself (section 113): thus the right of appeal is not automatic but instead is controlled by interested gate-keepers who are part of the determination system. Moreover, although the Board and Tribunal alike may co-opt non-voting experts to assist their deliberations (sections 93(5), 105(5)), political appointees, not experts, decide. For example, if an aggrieved party alleges unfair labour practices, the Minister may order either a labour relations officer of the state or the Labour Relations Board to investigate such allegations (section 114).

The comparison of new and old appeal structures shows quite clearly the different principles on which the Industrial Conciliation and Labour Relations Acts were constructed (see Table I). Laying out the comparisons in tabular form allows us to see how much authority in respect of industrial-conflict resolution has been removed from the disputing actors themselves and vested in politicians controlling the state apparatus. The authority of such politicians now extends to the lower reaches of the expanded bureaucratic hierarchy controlling both capital and labour.

As might be expected in such a structure, the Labour Relations Act provides for direct links between civil servants (notably the labour relations officers and hearing officers) and the Minister. Such civil servants must inform the Minister 'forthwith' when they order compulsory arbitration of a dispute (section 117(1)), but it is then the Minister's responsibility to refer the matter to the Labour Relations Tribunal or to appoint (at the request of the disputing parties) an independent mediator (section 117(2)). Thus a
**Table I**

**COMPARATIVE STRUCTURES OF THE INDUSTRIAL CONCILIATION ACT AND THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of appeal</th>
<th>Industrial Conciliation Act</th>
<th>Labour Relations Act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Final</td>
<td>industrial tribunal(s)</td>
<td>Supreme Court</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(chairman appointed by</td>
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<td></td>
<td>minister, four members</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>appointed by chairman)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Penultimate</td>
<td>industrial council(s)/</td>
<td>Labour Relations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>conciliation boards</td>
<td>Tribunal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(constituted by employers</td>
<td>(all members appointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>plus trade unions;</td>
<td>by State President)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>registered by Industrial</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Registrar)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>Labour Relations</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Board</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(all members appointed</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>by Minister)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>state hearing officers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of course, one must distinguish among different types of politicization. Zimbabwe's ruling party has been quite happy to politicize the state apparatus with its own ideology and personnel. But given its orientation to the perspectives of labour, the Labour Relations Act shows one startling similarity to its predecessor: section 35(c) prohibits the use of association funds, whether by trade unions or employers' associations, for 'electioneering' or any other unspecified 'political purposes'. Moreover, sections 39 and 40 allow for 'any interested party' (including the one concerned) to request the Registrar of Labour Relations to vary, suspend or rescind the registration or certification of any trade union or employers' organization and to supply his reasons for so doing. Legitimate reasons for such action are not defined in the Act, allowing the Registrar very wide latitude. Once an employers' organization or union loses its recognition by the state, given the accreditation provisions of the Act (sections 41–44), it could be extremely difficult to restore such recognition. It would seem, from these

senior politician is required to communicate between state functionaries and the political appointees to higher-level decision-making organs. Whereas colonial civil servants, not politicians, had decision-making authority over industrial relations issues, in Independent Zimbabwe civil servants merely implement at the lowest level of the system political decisions taken elsewhere in the expanded and fully politicized state system.
provisions, that an organization could lose such recognition on 'political' grounds — an irrefutable allegation that it had, indeed, used funds for some 'political' purpose.

Another aspect of politicization also merits specific attention. As I have noted earlier, one of the assumptions underlying the Labour Relations Act is that a directive state can eliminate the class conflict between capital and labour. Yet whereas the Industrial Conciliation Act had required the Minister to permit an individual to hold office in both a union and an employers' organization, the Labour Relations Act (section 45(1)(b)) requires the Registrar of Labour Relations to 'ensure compliance' with the requirements that 'a trade union shall not represent employers or managerial employees' (the latter defined as enjoying a 'confidential relationship' with an employer concerning the rights and interests of other employees), and that an employers' organization shall represent only managerial employees. There is a fundamental contradiction in a position that, on the one hand, defines the class lines ever more stringently and, on the other, avers the possibility of harmonious relations between capital and labour, for such a position explicitly prevents the development of cross-cutting ties which blur definitional boundaries through the development of mutual rather than opposing interests.

Under such circumstances, it would be naïve to expect in the future that workers and managers will immediately forget the techniques they have learned over the past decade to exert political influence within this politicized system. To put it differently, can the system be depoliticized? Certainly at this point there is no indication that government intends to depoliticize the constitution or operation of its own institutions. In its attempt to cut down the bureaucratic delays that have frustrated retrenchment since 1985, the independent state has used its 'traditional' operating principles in formulating the Labour Relations (Retrenchment) Regulations (S.I. 404 of 1990), which provide for the Minister to appoint seven members (three civil servants, two employers' representatives and two workers' representatives) to the new Retrenchment Committee. This committee must decide on applications referred to it within two weeks and make recommendations to the Minister, which he may accept or reject. If the Retrenchment Committee fails to make such recommendations, the Minister will decide anyway! Both Minister and Committee are bound by two basic principles: that retrenchment should be avoided and that its consequences should be mitigated (section 7).

It is true that various researchers (Cheater, 1986; Gaidzanwa, this volume) have reported dissatisfaction among workers with the practical implementation of these worker-oriented legal provisions, and that both politicians and civil servants (especially those supposed to implement the Labour Relations Act) have tended to develop class interests consonant
with, rather than opposed to, those of capital. Nonetheless, the political rhetoric of national unity requires that government be seen to be on the side of the workers (and peasants). It is thus unlikely that the law will alter its form of discourse and highly probable that an even larger gap will develop in the era of trade liberalization between the law and its practical implementation. In government as in industry, informal social relations and connections are therefore likely to become increasingly important.

FORMAL BUREAUCRATIC AND INFORMAL PRODUCTION RELATIONS

Larger enterprises in the Zimbabwean economy are becoming increasingly bureaucratic in their mode of operation, whether these bureaucratic procedures and relationships grow out of managerial conflict at the shopfloor level or are imposed from above (for example, in standardized practices devolved from head office in the case of subsidiaries of transnational corporations). Perhaps the most obvious index of such bureaucratization is the current popularity of the Paterson Method of job classification, which emphasizes the decision-making content of jobs in grading them as unskilled, semi-skilled or skilled and has many local variants in Zimbabwean enterprises. As Shadur (1989, 235) notes: ‘There are grounds for concluding that the Paterson Method has been adopted on a major scale in Zimbabwe as a result of the weak labour movement which has not had the expertise and strength to resist this method’, but personnel departments all over Zimbabwe have over the past decade been involved in job-regrading on this basis. However, Gaidzanwa indicates that standardized practices at ‘Gold Mine’ were very difficult to enforce, and Cheater deals with the responses of both workers and management to increasing bureaucratization more generally. Both papers, together with that of Mutizwa-Mangiza, describe some of the specific difficulties of supervisors in a situation of ongoing bureaucratization.

Supervisors have structural difficulties in all systems, of course, especially when they have been promoted from the shop-floor, and most of these difficulties centre on the differing informal social relationships between workmates and between unequals. These difficulties may be further complicated when, as Maphosa indicates, the supervisor’s promotion has resulted from his initial election to workers’ representative and/or to party political office. But there are particular difficulties for supervisors in negotiating informally with their subordinates about regular as well as overtime work when these subordinates have access to other productive resources. Gaidzanwa notes, for example, that locals from the communal land surrounding Gold Mine, having their agricultural interests tended by their wives, were less tractable than ‘foreigners’ working at the mine to supervisory ‘discipline’ at work. Yet even while they regarded their mine wages as
supplementary to their total productive resources, the local workers were also particularly threatened by any failure of this wage source, given the inadequacy of agriculture as a sole source of income under local environmental conditions. Local workers, therefore, had to confront at closer range the trade-offs available to them from (migratory or commuter) wage employment and agriculture in ways that, perhaps, workers without such options may have envied.

As what Maphosa calls ‘bureaucratic logic’ tightens its grip on the organization of production, and the ‘chain of command’ lengths inexorably (best exemplified in Parastatal), so informal social relations become more, not less, important to ordinary workers. As Maphosa and Mutizwa-Mangiza point out, even those workers elected to represent others on the workers’ committees do not have the necessary education or skills to manipulate the bureaucratic order: they must, therefore, manipulate people in order to get what they want. This falling-back by workers on personal relationships in the work-place exacerbates the politicization of ostensibly bureaucratic relations, diverting them into patrimonial forms and contradicting the original intention of state policy-makers to quash especially racial discrimination by legal-rational means.

RACE AND CLASS

The Industrial Conciliation Act was and is widely and wrongly thought to have disadvantaged workers mainly on the basis of race. In fact, as I indicated earlier, this Act explicitly outlawed differentiation or discrimination, including in industrial agreements, on the basis of ‘race, tribe, colour or creed’ in respect of work, though it did permit such discrimination on the basis of age, sex, experience, length of employment and type of premises (sections 36(2), 78(2)). The Act did not permit the Industrial Registrar to register any trade union or employers’ organization formed ‘for the purpose of furthering the interests of its members on a basis of race, colour or religion’ (section 40(1)(e) and required him to enquire publicly, for ‘reasonable cause’, into unions and organizations believed to be functioning so as to further the interests of their members on the basis of ‘race, colour or religion’ and to cancel the registration of offending bodies ‘unless cause [was] shown to the contrary’ (section 57(1)(h)). The onus was thus on such organizations to prove to the state that they were not operating in a racist manner.

But the real problem in colonial Rhodesia was not legalized, structural racism of the kind characteristic of South Africa: it was de facto, practical discrimination in everyday life, and that problem has by no means yet been resolved, eleven years after Independence. In the early 1980s, such practical discrimination was responsible for considerable industrial unrest
in individual enterprises (see, for example, Cheater, 1986). Some of the papers here address this issue in the context of removing the colonial overlap between race and class. Maphosa broadly indicates the background problems inherited from colonialism. Shadur deals with these continuing problems after independence. Cheater shows how government policy rapidly Africanized enterprise management, while exacerbating the class divide between workers and executive management. In yet more detail, Gaidzanwa shows how the response of Black managerial staff to perceived racism in promotions at Gold Mine was politicized in various ways: by calling in the local Member of Parliament and mobilizing workers’ wives in a public demonstration.

DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE POLITICIZATION OF PRODUCTION RELATIONS

Politization may be a strategy of last resort, used by managers and workers alike. Gaidzanwa, for example, notes that in contexts not involving accusations of racism, the ZANU(PF) Women’s League at Gold Mine was mobilized to demonstrate against managerial employees with whom workers were dissatisfied. Maphosa observes that such politicization, especially by members of workers’ committees, was particularly likely to occur in mining enterprises operating in relatively isolated areas. In an earlier publication, Cheater (1986, 93) described the Zimtex supervisors’ ‘takeover’ of the local Zanu(PF) apparatus in order to reduce their post-independence supervisory problems at work, which had been caused by after-hours political action against them in the workers’ village.

These examples of the politicization of work relations, whether by supervisors, managers or workers, are perhaps related to the high but unfulfilled expectations of workplace democratization found by Maphosa immediately after Independence. These expectations far exceeded the level of democratization that the state (never mind management) was prepared to allow, as both Maphosa and Mutizwa-Mangiza detail in their articles. It could be argued that the workers were deliberately misled on the subject of worker participation by political rhetoric (for example, in the ZANU(PF) Election Manifestos of 1980 and 1985 (see ZANU(PF), 1980 and 1985)), and that their subsequent politicization of work relations represents a backlash against their continuing subordination, now to bureaucratic rather than racial control. Such bureaucratic control is especially clear in the case of the parastatal enterprises, with their extraordinarily long chains of command culminating in the Cabinet as final decision-making manager, and in the Labour Relations Act itself.

The question for the structurally-adjusted future must then become: how will previously politicized workplaces be controlled, and by whom?