The African e-Journals Project has digitized full text of articles of eleven social science and humanities journals. This item is from the digital archive maintained by Michigan State University Library. Find more at: http://digital.lib.msu.edu/projects/africanjournals/

Available through a partnership with

Scroll down to read the article.
Agricultural Production and Exchange:
The Case of Central District Bukalanga area 1890-1940

by Isaac Ndai Paulos

The Central District Bukalanga area, constitutes, geographically, western Bukalanga which became part of the Ngwato state, and later reserve. It is this area which is in this paper referred to as Bukalanga, without prejudice to the rest of Bukalanga. Its incorporation into the Ngwato state started in 1895 with the London negotiations between Chamberlain and Khama. This process was sealed in 1899 when the Protectorate international and Ngwato Reserve borders were proclaimed.¹

The incorporation of the Bukalanga area, however, seems to have been decided upon much earlier, despite the stiff competition for control of the area by Ngwato and Rhodesian authorities in the 1890s.² The thrust of mercantile capitalism from the south, via the Ngwato state, had begun to shift, significantly, the focus and direction of Kalanga economy. This tended, in the long-run, to increase Kalanga interaction with and allegiance to the Ngwato state. Parsons captures this process succinctly when he states:

.... they (the Kalanga) also produced and sold grain to Ngwato and other wagoners from the south, which gave them a form of allegiance to the Ngwato state evident in the 1890s.³

This trend has also to be understood in the context of the then existing Kalanga economic and political subjection to Ndebele hegemony, and their burning political desire to end it.

When the Ndebele state fell in 1893, most of the Kalanga communities became subjected to British South Africa Company settler colonialism. This new development drove them to seek Khama's protection, and accepted the border delimitation which placed them in the Bechuanaland Protectorate. The Assistant Commissioner noted this in 1900:

The following native chiefs with their headmen were interviewed viz: Umawazwi (Mswazwi), /N/shakashokwe, Menu (Mengwe), Mazoa (Mazuwa) and Mphosa. The boundary was carefully explained to these chiefs and their people all of whom stated that they thoroughly understood what was said to them⁴

(See Map Rc 5/7).

In less than a decade from 1893, numerous Kalanga communities that were encapsulated in Southern Rhodesia had moved into the Ngwato Reserve,⁵ so that both economic and political forces pulled the Kalanga southwards.

Kalanga Chiefdoms

Ethnohistorically, Bukalanga is a motley collection of various groups forming numerous chiefdoms varying in size and extent. This is primarily the result of the eighteenth and nineteenth century Tswana and other immigrations into the area.⁶
Through a lengthy process of interaction, shared historical experience, similar environment and corresponding levels of social development, these chiefdoms evolved almost identical economic, political and social structures.

By the end of the nineteenth century, Bukalanga was still composed of these chiefdoms which had been considerably weakened. The Mengwe paramountcy, which had controlled the western Bukalanga from around 1800 when the Rozwi confederacy disintegrated, had dwindled to political insignificance. By the 1890s Mengwe's paramountcy in the area was recognised only in theory, if not as a thing of the past. Kalanga, however, continued to look to the Mengwe state with awe and reverence.

In later years, Chief Moses Mengwe was made representative of the Bukalanga to the African, later Joint Advisory Council from 1947 - 1956, the first and only time the area got direct representation.

In terms of political economy, these chiefdoms were essentially pre-capitalist, but specifically feudal social formations dominated by what Samir Amin calls the 'tributary mode of production'. Although the principal productive forces were animal husbandry and arable agriculture, the then existing feudal relations were still structured around hunting, which was also a strong branch of the economy. The juridico-political superstructure of chieftainship was therefore sustained, among other things, by regular tribute in the form of skins of wild cats and brisket of game animals killed. Chiefs and headmen were also entitled to a vast array of gifts, whose strong institutionalisation implies that they constituted a structured material-economic relation which additively reinforced the above tribute. The internal processes of infeudation were however significantly blocked by wars, military conquest and external domination. In the second half of the nineteenth century, up to 1880s, Kalanga political economy was firmly tied to the Ndebele state system.

The Bukalanga chiefdoms were economically tied to the Ndebele state in the form of grain tribute and commerce. The absence of tribute to the Kalanga chiefs within these chiefdoms structured around grain and cattle may have been due largely to this tribute to the Ndebele. The tribute demand, in the form of grain, however, tended to increase productivity in Kalanga agricultural production. Although it must be emphasised that trade within and between the Kalanga communities, as well as with the Ndebele and others also stimulated productivity. Kobokobo's remarks about the North East hold true for this area:

"Surplus agricultural production thus appears to have existed in the pre-colonial North East District stimulated by both external trade and Ndebele for tribute."

The effect of Ndebele tribute stimulating more productivity must not be stretched too far, since the Kalanga had had a similar tributary relationship to the Rozwi state up to the beginning of the nineteenth century. In fact, for some of the more southerly Bukalanga chiefdoms, their precise relationship to the Ndebele state is still problematic because of the fluctuations in the extent of Ndebele hegemony and influence. Brown captures this clearly in his discussion of the extent of Ndebele influence and tributary relations:

"To the south-west, influence over the more distant Kalanga tended to falter, depending largely on the complexities of political conflict among the adjacent Tswana..."

These chiefdoms were nevertheless more or less tied to the Ngwato state, an event which had a very similar logic - the stimulation of Kalanga agricultural productivity.
Increased agricultural production, however, occurred within the limits defined by technology and production relations. Technologically, there was widespread, if not universal, use of the locally made hoe (phan~ula). The phan~ula hoe was manufactured locally, together with other minor metallic items, by blacksmiths (generally called bo-phizha) who were found in almost every village. The use of the hoe forestalled the expansion of fields and the maximisation of production. In terms of production relations, the family remained, generally, the major unit of production, appropriation and consumption. Because of the strength of the extended family, kinship relations were still considerably important, to some extent functioning as relations of production. Grain production for tribute to the Ndebele, represented another level of Kalanga agrarian production relations, the only one which was conspicuously exploitative.

Cattle-keeping among the Kalanga in the last quarter of the nineteenth century was not extensive. This was essentially a product of the cattle plunder in the turmoil before and during the Mfecane. The Kalanga are said to have subsequently acquired most of their cattle herds through trade with different peoples at varying times. Most of my informants concurred that Kalanga bartered cattle from the Tswana, the Lozi and later the Ngwato. As a result, unequal access to cattle ownership and accumulation seems to have been a constant feature of the Bukalanga political economy. Oral traditions indicate that by and large the aristocrats were the first to acquire cattle among their people. Chief Mengwe I, for instance, is said to have been the first to own cattle, goats and donkeys among his people. As Prah notes, cattle ownership served as a material representation of economic and social power. So that besides being sources of meat, milk, wealth and means of transport, cattle were an important element in the relations to power. As far as the agricultural labour process was concerned, however, no direct link between crop and animal husbandry existed until the advent of European ploughs when oxen were used for traction (except when cattle were used occasionally to carry bags of grain on their backs).

Despite the setbacks in cattle accumulation occasioned by wars and other turmoil, the Kalanga were, by the last quarter of the nineteenth century committed to building up their herds. This process was, however, soon interrupted by the Rhodesian white settler cattle raids which continued across the Tati-Pandamatenga road until 1899. After 1899 and up to 1926 when the construction of the border fence was completed in the area, communities near the border continued losing a substantial number of cattle, which were either confiscated or killed once they strayed across the border.

Agricultural Development

Turning now to Bukalanga agriculture, trade in grain operated at various levels. Internally, grain measured quantitatively, in baskets of various sizes, could be bartered for pots and baskets, hoes and axes or equal quantities of one crop type could be exchanged for another. Trade between various Kalanga villages was also based on the same barter principles. The most conspicuous and active trading, however, existed between the Kalanga and the San, Ndebele and European traders.

The history of the relationship between the Kalanga and the San is indeed a complex one. It was characterised first by San resistance against the Kalanga intruders, and subsequently the emergence of local trade as well as their mutual participation in the long-distance trade. By the 1890s, however, two forms of economic relationships existed. In the dry season the San came into contact with the Kalanga as free traders
They camped in the vicinity of Kalanga villages and bartered baskets, meat (biltong), skins, wild fruits, salt and mokolwane (basket-making plant) bundles in exchange for Kalanga grain, tobacco and old clothing. The Kalanga held the upper hand in this trade, reinforced by the personal attachment of the San to particular Kalanga families through labour stints in the harvesting season.

The San came again during the harvesting season, helped the Kalanga in the fields and were paid in grain and also given the privilege of collecting sweetreeds, vegetables, water melons, cucumber and gourds. Hence the harvesting season was called mbuzabakgw, literally meaning the season which pulled the San back into the Kalanga communities. The attachment of the San to particular Kalanga families led to an occasional handling of the trade by the latter on behalf of the so-called 'their San'. This ranged from selling on behalf of the San traders who withdrew to their distant communities, to the selection of so-called quality goods and also price determination. During this period, the San became increasingly subservient to the Kalanga, and Kalanga-San relations assumed marked features of patron-clientage.23 The volume and value of San products were not at all commensurate with Kalanga commodities filtering into the San economy. In essence, there was non-equivalence in these transactions, leading to gross exploitation in exchange of the San by the Kalanga.

Trade with the Ndebele began once the Ndebele state embarked on a policy of political cooperation and accommodation with the subject population, instead of, as Mutunhu puts it, "continuing an unproductive policy of military confrontation, bloodshed and destruction."24 Once relative peace and stability were achieved, Kalanga, through trade, began to provide the Ndebele with most of their agricultural implements. The Kalanga were able to exchange goats and corn for beads, handkerchiefs and snuff boxes. This co-existed with the tribute demand in the form of grain made by the Ndebele Nkosi and Abenzansi social class.26 The fact that the Kalanga resented Ndebele hegemony, implied their deep resentment of the tributary relations in particular. Hence they, in Tapela's words, evaded tribute payment by hiding some of their surplus grain in caves.

The tribute evasion is explained, partly, in terms of Kalanga preference for the more symbolic relations with the Ngwato.27 The Mengwe state had had previous trading with the Ngwato, and this process was naturally revived and extended to other communities once some of them sought refuge among the Ngwato. Grain trade to the Ngwato was now accompanied by the grain trade with other wagoners from the South. This marked the advent of mercantile capitalism - the post ivory-fur trade, based on grain and cattle. However, since the Ngwato rulers had responded to mercantile capitalism by either taxing or controlling wagon traffic and/or alternatively some form of state capitalism, the thrust of capitalism into Bukalanga could easily be identified with the Ngwato state. Hence Parsons' statement that:

... such was the strength of the identification of the Ngwato state power with the nexus of capitalist trade with the south. The same nexus was also responsible for a blurring of the Ngwato frontier in the north...28

Grain and cattle the two chief commodities of the Kalanga, enabled them to enter the modern cash capitalist economy. Mandy, writing in 1889, observed that:

...... the Kalanga at least responded to trade by improving their agricultural production.29
We noted earlier that surplus production in grain existed among the Kalanga even in the phangula era. The use of the hoes for cultivation continued among the Kalanga up to the first decade of the twentieth century. This is not surprising indeed, because only about forty ploughs were recorded at Shoshong (the Ngwato capital) around 1878. Judging by the manner in which capitalist penetration in Bukalanga proceeded - gradually from the feudal-imperial centre (Ngwato capital), only a handful of Bukalanga people could reasonably have owned ploughs by 1900. Parsons captures the process of capitalist penetration of the Ngwato hinterlands succinctly when he states that:

The 1887 - 96 period saw a new phase in the development of trade and production in Khama's country created by British expansion into the Rhodesias. Long distance trade to remote markets was subsumed within a flourishing local market, the victualling trade to itinerants on the Road to the North.

A trickle of itinerant merchants trading in manufactured goods began to flood Bukalanga markets. It is not clear at all, either from written historical accounts or oral traditions, whether there were any itinerant traders in the area before. To the east, there was a thriving white settlement which had been established in the Old Tati by the 1860s. How the Bukalanga area could have remained inaccessible for the next three decades remains a matter for historical investigation.

Samir Amin, in his essays on capitalist penetration, focusses specifically on the dynamics of such penetration:

During this period (c1800 - 1885) exchange was based largely on merchant adventurers and competitive merchant capital, trading manufactured goods for local produce but without the 'centre' being able to determine directly the basis and aim of local production ... The centre can only rely on the ability of local social formations to adjust themselves to the systems' new requirements.

Although Amin's theoretical structure is open to serious questions, it is difficult to find fault with this particular assertion that the penetration of capital did not radically change the existing market and production conditions, but rather operated, initially, within the indigenous structures. This process, however, occurred largely in the 1890s among the Bukalanga people.

Commodities traded by itinerant merchants included the wooden plough. Although not very durable the wooden plough represented a revolutionary technological advance that had far-reaching implications for agricultural production and for the Bukalanga economy in general. The wooden plough was, however, soon superseded by the steel single-furrow mouldboard plough. The latter was introduced into Southern Africa by European settlers and traders, who were accustomed to tillage under more temperate conditions. Jack Goody discusses the implications of the introduction of the plough:

In the first place it increases the area of land a man can cultivate and hence makes possible a substantial rise in productivity, at least in an open country. This in turn means a greater surplus ... for the growth of differences in wealth and in styles of life... In the second place, it stimulates the move to fixed holdings and away from shifting agriculture. Thirdly, (and not independently) it increases the value (and decreases the availability) of arable land.
In Bukalanga, there was a marked tendency towards field expansion leading to higher levels of grain production. Mr Giye Guthu indicated that 2,500 square metres of piece of land was an ideal field for an average family. And as soon as families acquired a wooden plough they extended the fields by clearing and ploughing more space. This process was, however, complicated by the scarcity of ploughs and oxen necessary for traction. Access to this new technology was limited both by its scarcity as well as by lack of financial resources to make the necessary purchases. Hence those who bought ploughs were mostly among the well-to-do peasantry comprising the rich commoners, and small aristocratic stratum of chiefs and headmen. Consequently, it was the well-to-do peasantry, which most actively participated in the grain trade.

Another important element directly affecting the transition to the imported plough was the availability of cattle. Because of sheer lack of data the precise impact of the 1896 great Rinderpest epidemic on the cattle population in the Bukalanga is not clear. About 500,000 cattle were reported dead in Khama's country alone. For the Ngwato, new breeding stock were imported from Barotseland for building their herds. During field research, most of my informants also mentioned Barotseland as one of the areas from which their parents purchased cattle. Some cattle were bought from the Batawana with cartridge shells which Tawana women used for decoration and adornment. It appears, however, Bukalanga emerged relatively unscathed from the Rinderpest, because of pre-existing small cattle population in the area. Mention has already been made of the debilitating effect of Rhodesian cattle raids and appropriation on Kalanga livestock population.

Production Relations

It appears that by 1900, cattle possession had become concentrated in the hands of few people, largely as a result of the above-mentioned trade in cattle. Oral accounts mention cases where some households managed to purchase a plough, but had no cattle. In such cases kinsmen pooled their resources together to make a span. Besides this form of cooperation, ploughs were lent to those with oxen. Access to the plough and or a span of oxen led to the concretisation of social relations of production and institutions, known as ku limila, masaidzo and ku shakulila. Those with neither the plough nor oxen appended themselves to households with both and practised ku limila, that is, providing agricultural labour in return for the use of plough and draft power for a day or two every week in their fields. They also received grain on credit and repaid through labour service during weeding (a practice called ku shakulila) and harvesting season.

Although undoubtedly helpful, ku limila and ku shakulila left the poor peasantry in the more or less permanent status of subsistence farmers. Cliffe and Moorson, although focussing on the country as a whole, depicted the repercussions in the following words:

Since these (poor peasants) have not surprisingly given priority to their own production, (they) often have to make do with late or inadequate ploughing, and hence greater vulnerability to rainfall variation, and late frosts and a generally lower productivity.

In view of my informants' overemphasis on the increasing menace of birds from the beginning of this century, this means that absence of the poor peasants from their fields also increased the rate of crop destruction by birds.

The Masaidzo system, on the other hand, was not fundamentally different from the practice of farming out cattle (mafisa system) found among most Tswana groups. It
appears by 1910 the cattle population in the Bukalanga had increased considerably, largely as a result of natural increases; purchases by the well-to-do peasantry as well as by the returning labour migrants. It appears also that many Bukalanga communities increased their cattle in 1907 by bartering with the Ngwato exiles led by Sekgoma Khama in transit to the north. Mr Kwaiye Nfila of Maitengwe (Mengwe) described the process this way.

Another major thrust of cattle-grabbing among the Mongwe people occurred in the wake of Sekgoma's emigration from the Ngwato area. Sekgoma's group bartered cattle extensively in order to re-victualise their grain supplies.41

Sekgoma Khama and his followers are reported to have also offered cattle and other gifts to those Kalanga individuals they befriended. The cattle that failed to complete the journey were also left with the instantly befriended men as masaidzo cattle. When Sekgoma sent his men to collect them later, he ordered them to leave some for his temporary Kalanga trustees.42

Those who had accumulated large stocks were able to farm out part of their herds to the poorer households. The latter would derive milk, draught power as well as one heifer per year. The masaidzo herd could stay with the trustees as long as the latter wanted or in the absence of serious breach of faith. The owner would come occasionally either to inspect or take away old cows and oxen to sell. Through various methods of theft, the poor could build-up their own herd by exploiting any loop-holes in the masaidzo system. Ideologically, ku limila, ku shakulila and masaidzo systems were couched by the well-to-do peasantry, in humanitarian terms, in that they aimed at helping the poor kinsmen or checking disparity in the community. But in reality they furthered social-material differentiation since they enabled the richer peasants to exploit the labour of others. The emergence of these terms, and the practices associated with them are proof of the community's recognition that it had split into distinct classes.

Social stratification was reflected in relative success in both crop production and animal husbandry. Families which were very rich in cattle were leading grain producers. Because of their ready access to draught power, the well-to-do peasantry ploughed vast expanses of land using more than one span of oxen. Corporate (extended family) and 'co-opted' (ku limila and ku shakulila) labour were used in ploughing, weeding and harvesting. Well-to-do peasant families were often polygamous, so that there was a rough correlation between economic strength and size of family. Through repeated extension of fields and constant fallowing, the well-to-do peasantry carved out vast expanses of communal land for itself, and most of the land became "lands of so and so" referring to powerful landholders.

Agricultural Trade

The new social relations of production so far outlined also reflected the evolving character, pattern, trends and levels in agricultural production and trade. The well-to-do peasantry produced and sold more grain and cattle and the rate declined as one went down the social ladder. With regard to trading in grain, the only quantitative data collected in the field, very crude in nature, attests that the rich peasants spanned oxen to pull sledges full of bags of grain to the European itinerant traders. That is between 10 and 20 bags of grain could be sold in one season by those who had accumulated enough surplus. An average peasant family could produce a surplus of about 5 bags which they disposed of, while the poor families managed to sell only one or two basketfuls of either sorghum, maize, cowpeas, beans of groundnuts.43
All this shows that the Kalanga of this area responded positively to grain production for the market. The main commodities of this trade, however, were sorghum and maize, which, by the beginning of this century, were not very popular among the Kalanga. Then, lekwezha (finger millet) and zengwe (bullrush millet) were basic to the Kalanga economy. At the time when grain trade started in the area, sorghum was grown in less quantities and was used mainly in beer-brewing, while maize had just been introduced and its preparation for consumption was so demanding. Beach writes that maize appeared in the Zambezi Valley in the eighteenth century and had spread throughout the region by the nineteenth century, but did not become a staple among the Shona people. His Shona informants stated that maize was difficult to stamp, and because of its low moisture content (eight percent) when dry, had to be wetted before stamping. This meant that before the European traders began to buy it, maize was eaten on or off the cob.44

The same problem was faced by the Kalanga maize producers. Because it was difficult to pound, the Kalanga wetted the maize a day before, then partially dried it before pounding it in a traditional Kalanga mortar. Otherwise it was roasted or cooked when green and also cooked off the cob (mawuru) when dried, or on the cob. In essence, although Bakalanga response to the new grain trade was positive, it was, nevertheless, limited by the fact that sorghum and maize were initially not extensively grown by the Kalanga.

Lekwezha (finger millet) was popularly used for fermenting and preserving beer, in performing badzimu (ancestral) rituals and in making bread, and to some extent porridge.45 The popularity of millet and its stiff porridge, sadza as a staple of the Kalanga found expression in such statements as, 'it has lasting energy', 'it makes a man strong' and 'long lasting', both in the stomach and in storage (not easily infested).46 After the advent of the grain trade, therefore, production shifted away from millet and lekwezha towards sorghum and maize, which had become of great market value. This shift was often varied, reflecting the differential responses and levels of integration of the various strata in Kalanga society into the cash economy. For instance, the well-to-do peasantry had, and still have, a marked tendency towards sorghum and maize production. This reflected their active participation and socialisation in the capitalist market economy, while the poorer stratum, which failed to participate fully in the grain trade continued with millet production and less maize and sorghum.46b

The European itinerant traders, who are difficult to identify by name and background (since all were known by nicknames or a corruption of their real names) came from three directions: the Tati area; Ngwato (Serowe) area and Southern Rhodesia. According to information given by Maitengwe informants, the first European itinerant traders, who they refer to as Joyce and Carlo, either came from the Old Tati or Southern Rhodesia.47 The grain they bought was consequently shifted to Plumtree in Zimbabwe and the Tati District. The central communities of Nkange - Tutume areas sold grain at a spot just across the Botswana - Zimbabwean border called Majambuba (near Mahambula Hill), where one store was established. The Nkange - Tutume communities have names of Europeans peculiar to that area alone. Some traders, however, did make inroads into the interior, such as the one called Bulala or Fattleberg who stayed among the Chilagwane (Selolwane) people then residing along the Nkange River, to the east of their present Tutume settlement.48

The people of Mengwe-Dagwi-Changate, Nkange-Senete-Tutume and the Msazwi area chiefdoms are said to have conveyed their grain to trading centres established along the border, especially at Takanye and on the Majambuba plateau.49 The Msazwi chiefdom, however, gradually became a place of commercial importance since it lay
between Kalakamati (centre of evangelism and education of Kalanga on the Tati side) to the south, and most of the Bukalanga communities to the north. The fact that it became the most closely connected Kalanga chiefdom to Khama at Serowe not only enhanced its commercial importance, but it also assumed a leading role in the political link between Serowe and Kalanga communities to the north.

By about 1920, it appears the era of itinerant traders had come to a halt and had been superseded by Haskins and other more organised European traders who were subject to Khama's patronage. The Haskins firm moved into the area on hawkers licences from the Tati District. In the Central District Bukalanga alone, this firm established stores at Maitengwe (Mengwe), Nkange, Magapatona, Mswazwi, Nata, Sebina (1912) and Mathangwane. The base, however, remained in the Mswazwi chiefdom. With these shops established, the grain trade was regularised and its volume increased. A wide road was opened linking the various Bukalanga communities and ushering in a relay wagon transport system in which ox-wagons collected grain from village to village and conveyed it to the rail-head at Tshessebe in the north-east. In this relay trading network, Mswazwi chiefdom functioned as a sub-emporium. The Haskins firm hired local people with strong oxen, together with wagoners from the north-east to transport the grain while in most cases provided the wagons. This system of hiring local grain conveyors was also employed by the mining company at Malokobje, near the Mosetse River, between 1909 - 1919 to carry infrastructural material as well as grain.

European Traders and African Taxation

From 1912 to 1917 Khama and white hawkers strongly resented Haskins' monopoly of the Bukalanga grain trade. In order to cut down on this monopoly, they established alternative stores at Sebina (1912), Senete (1914, operated by Sex and Levine Brothers) and at Mathangwane in 1916. The firm also became involved in labour touting for the mines in the same period. The establishment of alternative shops to Haskins only served to widen the market for both European goods and the grain trade.

A discussion of the grain trade necessarily leads us to focussing on the material returns to the Kalanga economy in general and the agricultural production in particular. There were basically two modes of payment, the cash and 'card systems' or 'good fors'. The cash system was when the grain seller was paid in cash. But because of alleged scarcity of money in circulation, the grain traders used the 'good fors' system whereby the Kalanga brought the grain, it was weighed and the price and the price was written on a small card, and the bearer would then enter the shop to buy goods commensurate with the price of grain he sold. This is succinctly captured by the Resident Commissioner's report in 1941 and recently Moeng Sabone, when he says:

Bargaining was as bad as the system of 'good fors' under which practice a rural producer could be paid partly in goods or even paid in goods only. He would be given a promisory /sic/ note bearing the balance and the balance was said to be good for specific goods in the trader's shop.

Another aspect of unfairness lay in the fact that the card or promissory note was absolutely localised in the sense that it was valid for the shop where grain was delivered for sale. This way, it forced the Kalanga in a village to buy only at the local shop, excluding the other shops belonging to different traders in the same village. Sabone continues:
This system pinned a rural producer to a particular shop as he could not buy from any other besides that one of the dealer who gave him the promissory note. On the other hand, the promissory note was valid for a stipulated length of time, after which it expired and became useless. In this way, European traders forced the Kalanga to buy goods at their shops in order to boost their businesses. In this way also, investment or thrift among the Kalanga was curtailed and expenditure on mundane things such as clothing, blankets and foodstuffs became widespread.

Then there were colonial taxes that the people of the area had to pay from their meagre cash earnings from grain trade and sporadically from cattle sales. Taxation by the colonial administration in the Bukalanga dates back to 1899 when the Ngwato and international borders were proclaimed. That very same year, Ngwato tax collectors, travelling in ox-wagons, made their first attempt to collect 'hut tax' in the area. Although there were no records to indicate how much tax revenue was collected from the area from 1899 to the 1930s, only figures of the whole Reserve are given as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>s</th>
<th>d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1899/1900</td>
<td>3816</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902/3</td>
<td>5352</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903/4</td>
<td>5613</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904/5</td>
<td>5982</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905/6</td>
<td>6148</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906/7</td>
<td>6239</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907/8</td>
<td>7008</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908/9</td>
<td>13325</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the above total revenue collected in 1899/1900, only £64 was collected from Shashe in the Bukalanga. As for the remaining Bukalanga communities no figures are given, and the Shashe revenue portion dropped from £64 to £17, 18 in 1902/3. Neither can this sum be accepted as representing the whole of Bukalanga, because the Nshakashogwe chiefdom alone paid hut tax to the amount of £700 or £800 to the B.S.A. Company in 1899. Since they immigrated into the Ngwato Reserve the following year one may safely assume that they more or less raised the same amount since they were keen to get Khama's protection.

Tax collection in the area appears to have continuously improved over time because of the use of threats and confiscation, and age regiments were used in later years to round up people. Driven by the desire to receive the ten percent share of the total revenue, Khama collected tax vigorously. In Bukalanga, regiments were constituted on the organisational lines and nomenclature of the Ngwato to help, among other tasks, extract tax from these resentful communities. For instance, part of the Mengwe people and their chief's flight into Zimbabwe after an invasion by Kalanga regiments from the neighbouring chiefdoms partly bordered on their refusal to pay tax.

The relevance of the hut tax to the theme of this paper lies essentially in the way it compelled or induced the people of the area to sell grain which they might not have otherwise liked to part with. The Poll Tax and Native Fund were later added to the hut tax, and further aggravated the situation. The rate of taxation (hut tax) per male domiciled in Bechuanaland was 15 shillings in 1908 but also increased to £1 in 1909. Most of the households began selling not surplus grain, but a portion of the grain stored for household consumption.
At another level, the pressure of taxation forced men to go to the mines to earn the necessary cash to defray tax obligations. It is important to note that even the increase in taxes did not at all reflect the local economic conditions in Bukalanga. Be that as it may, the increase in tax rate took place at a time when grain production had declined to a trickle, owing to the devastating drought of 1907 and 1909-10 respectively. This point comes out in Parsons' statement that:

Agricultural production between the South African War and Union was marked by the beginning of a regime of falling prices combined with restrictions on external markets, made worse by drought and disease. The most surplus-oriented producers were reduced to bare subsistence, and in 1904 for the first time in many years, it was noted that Ngwato cash reserves were insufficient to tide over famine without widespread export of labour. The market for cattle absolutely collapsed between 1902 and 1910-11, through an embargo on all exports because of east coast and other fevers.

This drought which badly damaged crops was followed by epidemic which enormously reduced this quality, and hence the price offered for cattle. This can clearly be seen from the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Price (per beast)</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>£25 - 30</td>
<td>1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£20</td>
<td>1901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£4</td>
<td>1910-11 (to Southern Rhodesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£5</td>
<td>1911 (to Johannesburg abattoir)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£5</td>
<td>1912-17 (to Southern Rhodesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£1 or 15 shillings</td>
<td>1922 (to Johannesburg abattoir)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cattle export became almost impossible with the closure of the Johannesburg market in 1917, because of cattle disease, and when it opened in 1919, Northern Bechuanaland Protectorate, including Bukalanga, were excluded as areas of supply. In 1924, South Africa imposed its notorious minimum weight restrictions. As Ettinger observes, the price level of 1910 (£4) was not reached again until 1942. The restriction on cattle and grain markets destroyed the only leverage the people of Bukalanga (like in other parts of the Protectorate) had in raising cash without resources to wage labour.

Labour Migration

Labour migration, which resulted from the depression in the internal economy, was to Southern Rhodesia, the Tati area and South Africa. The fact that prior to the depression, the rate of migration was low suggests that with favourable weather, the Kalanga in this area could produce enough grain and trade it in order to generate cash income into their country. Between 1909 and 1919 extraction of copper at the Bushmen Mine at Malokobye on the Motsetse River, was commencing. This was the only economic activity of significance in the Bukalanga which could have attracted much of the labour flowing out of the area. Ironically, the mine became an importer of labour from among the Lozi, Tonga and Subiya, with only few locals. It is likely that the pay at the mine could have been dismally low, and Kalanga immigrants preferred to go to South African or Rhodesian mines which paid better wages. The company might have preferred (as was the general practice of mining capital in Southern Africa) labour migrants to locals for purposes of social control, minimisation of desertions and industrial conflicts, and the fact that migrants are more exploitable.
The outflow of labour which started after the depression was from 1913 hampered by the Union Government's decision to prohibit the Rand Mines from recruiting labour north of 22°S, owing to the high rate of mortality of labourers from those areas. This, however, did not put a stop to labour migration from these areas because it continued, and was only partially halted by the 1921-3 South African immigration and Pass Legislation. Between 1916 and 1922, drought was putting so much pressure and pushing labour out, particularly in the Bukalanga:

But by 1922 crop failure and market depression forced large numbers of Kalanga men, reportedly the majority, to go to the mines, and women to scatter from the main concentration of population along the Shashi River into the countryside.

In response to this, labour migration to South West Africa was opened to the area, and between 1923 and 1930 an average of 1,400 Kalanga were recruited annually to go there. Most of my informants had actually gone there more than once during their youthful years. The migration comprised of men of both the Maletamotse regiment, and a substantial number from the Matsapa and Masokola regiments. The predominance of the Maletamotse regiment men in the labour migration is, as one informant put it, reflected in the small number of its survivors today. Since many migrants lost their lives there through mine accidents, the effect of this on agricultural production at home hardly needs over-emphasis.

Whatever cash the Kalanga received from migrant wage-labour was, for the majority, dissipated into tax payment, expenditure on European goods, especially mealie meal and debt payment to local shops as well as to better-off households. Labour migration to South West Africa, however, was halted in 1928 and by 1930 had ceased completely. The statement of revenue for the Ngwato Reserve around this period stood as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1927-28</th>
<th>1928-29</th>
<th>1929-30</th>
<th>1930-31</th>
<th>1931-32</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hut Tax</td>
<td>£1,895.35</td>
<td>£2,118.20</td>
<td>£2,245.17</td>
<td>£2,138.67</td>
<td>£1,342.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poll Tax</td>
<td>£196.00</td>
<td>£252.00</td>
<td>£216.00</td>
<td>£201.00</td>
<td>£239.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1928 there was crop failure owing to lack of rain. In the Annual Report of the same year, the District Commissioner reported:

There have been very poor crops for several years and the inhabitants have been affected by this condition... During the year 1928... there was great lack of food resulting in large imports of grain for sale to natives who in their turn... were compelled to sell cattle in order to buy food. The death rate amongst cattle from poverty was high and resulted in a large sale of hides.

The same year the Native Fund was raised from three to five shillings in conformity with current rates in other reserves in the Protectorate.

In 1929 crop harvests were far much better, but rainfall levels went down against in 1930 as reflected in the District Commissioner's Annual Report:

... no large crops reaped in 1930 owing to the fact that good crops have been obtained in 1929, and many natives did not plough, and also owing to the lack of rain... Cattle prices have declined greatly owing to
the drought in the Union causing farmers to sell their stock at low prices causing an over-supply in the market... Hides are hardly worth handling owing to the low prices in the market. There is no sale at all for vermin skins and karosses.76

The District Commissioner gave the quantities and price fluctuations as follows:77

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattle drop in quantities</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle drop in prices</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hides drop in prices</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermin skins - no sale/drop in quantity</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Between 1928 and 1934 it appears Bukalanga agricultural production was steadily gaining ground, in spite of the acute fluctuations in rainfall. After a visit to the Bukalanga in 1934, the District Commissioner, Mr Nettleton reported:

The Makalaka had very good crops against last season and have sold a good deal of grain. I can put the quantity I saw at stores at about 10,000 bags for which they are being generously awarded 5/- per bag in goods by that magnanimous firm, James Haskins and Sons. Even if crops fail this season the position will be fairly secure. The locust infestation creates a doubt in one's mind as to the crop possibilities, but the Mokalaka is a better agriculturalist than the Mongwato and attends to his crops rather than put his trust in the Almighty and stay at home feeling secure in that trust.78

Some important observations can be drawn from this excerpt. The obvious one is that there was a steady improvement in the agricultural performance of the area. And yet the resulting grain trade could not generate surplus earnings which could be invested nor saved since the 'goods fors' mode of payment was still in force. There were at least some local grain surplus which could be carried over to the next year. There was a potentially threatening presence of locusts and birds against future crop production. It is not clear, because of lack of data, if the 10,000 bags recorded in 1934 exceeded the pre-1916 levels or even the years immediately preceding 1934. It may be that these good harvests only reflected agricultural recovery, but not improvement over the early twentieth century production levels. If this is the case, then Mr Moraka Modie's statement that 'since the 1920s agricultural production seems to have taken a negative downward trend', sounds convincing.79 Several factors may have accounted for this.

The increasing menace of birds and locusts may partially account for such a trend. Rainfall decline may be another. It appears however that the impact of the labour migration and the single-furrow mouldboard plough were more responsible. Besides, we do not as yet have any comprehensive historical data on climatic changes and birds/locusts migratory patterns in the area. But even if they may be available in the future, the data is not likely to be drastically alter the present conclusions.

The impact of labour migration, on the other hand, is generally controversial. Most of my informants argued that the impact of labour migration on agricultural production was minimal, because migration was seasonal, and any void created was immediately filled by kinsmen. The role of San labour in the Bukalanga economy, particularly crop production and animal herding appears to have widened significantly. This developed steadily until the 1940s, 50s and post-colonialism, when, once livestock population, schooling and rate of labour migration increased, Kalanga youth were largely freed
from day-to-day herding. Cattle-posts were established, in response to both livestock increase, need for distant pastures (from fields) and in pursuit of San labour. Within the Kalanga communities, agricultural wage labour was noticeable. While the adoption of youth from poor peasant families by the well-to-do became widely practised or the emergence of a new social relation of production called *kusilisa*. This was with respect to livestock herding, but unlike *masaidze* under which livestock was farmed out, here the contracted boys herded livestock which remained under the owner's control in return for a heifer after one or two years. Material goods (clothing and food) also flowed intermittently. In agriculture, the mutual aid teams (mbizi) were strengthened both as a response to expanded production and compensation for absence of labour migrants' labour. But mutual aid teams were in the end confined to the well-to-do because they alone had enough food and grain (to make traditional beer) to feed the team. Besides, they had extensive fields to merit such an endeavour. Mutual aid teams were used in bush-clearing in the fields or their extension in ploughing, weeding and harvesting. In the end they assured the richer peasants of larger grain quantities.

The above developments are, undeniably, mitigating factors with regard to the total impact of labour migration, but were inadequate as compensation. The net result was an almost total feminisation of agriculture, particularly with the devolution onto the women of the entire burden of the agricultural labour process. The absence of men was therefore felt both socially as well as in production. Initially, labour migration could be viewed as partially a salvation from poverty caused by drought, taxation and market depression. But it became in the process, a cause of agricultural underdevelopment, particularly when labour for and efforts in local agriculture shrank as people satisfied themselves, both materially and ideologically, that it was economically unpredictable, while labour migration was regarded as more reassuring and dependable.

Both objective and subjective factors were therefore decisive. This is clearly reflected in the ever-increasing rate of labour migration, even during climatically favourable years when more effort could have been concentrated on crop production. The underdevelopmental impact of labour migration in the Bukalanga became more noticeable in the late 1920s, and particularly after 1934 when labour recruitment beyond latitude 22°5 was re-opened.

The single-furrow mouldboard plough, while indeed representing a great technological advance for the Bukalanga, had very serious negative implications. As mentioned earlier, it was designed for use under temperate conditions. It becomes unsuitable for semi-arid conditions such as existing in Bukalanga, where tillage should have aimed at improving the already fragile sand soils, to reduce run-off, increase infiltration and reduce moisture loss by evaporation. But Hamilton observed:

*By virtue of its design, the mouldboard plough cannot, and never will, satisfactorily accomplish these objectives, and rather than conserving the soil and ground moisture, it openly encourages the opposite.*

This plough thus led to a steady deterioration of the soil structure and erosion by wind and water, resulting in poor crop output.

Rainfall in Bukalanga had always been problematic even before the beginning of the twentieth century. The Kalanga however had overcome such climatic constraints by evolving appropriate technologies and farming methods:
Using hoes and mattocks they raise the ground into ridges and furrows, two feet high and the same apart. On the ridges they plant corn. This method seems universal with the Makalaka. Were it not for this method (mabundo) half the crops would die from drought.  

Mr Giye Guthu of Maitengwe also described the process this way, but added that men made the first furrows, followed by women who countered this by making another one along the first thus making a ridge between. Women would then sow the seeds in lines. The new plough therefore changed the agricultural labour process, the sexual division of labour and the method of sowing - from lineal to broadcasting and mixture of crop types a practice modern agricultural science has deplored. 

The introduction of the European plough was an aspect of the genesis of underdevelopment, not only of agriculture but of technology as well. The plough gradually, but assuredly displaced local technology and completely undermined indigenous metallurgy and the position of blacksmiths in society. The technology and agricultural techniques and methods of pre-colonial Bukalanga reflected the level of development of their science which was also impaired by capitalism. For instance, the method just described demonstrated the existence of a credible/scientific knowledge - climatology, geology of/body of the area and metallurgy leading to the manufacture of appropriate agricultural technology and techniques. Notwithstanding the fact that the method was too labour-intensive, thus severely limited agricultural expansion.

The fact that the European plough drastically reduced the amount of labour power spent on crop production, the inherent efficiency of the new method and more acreage of land ploughed in a short space of time may have obscured its destructive implications. After all such an awareness demanded a level of scientific understanding beyond what they possessed about this 'white-man technological innovation', the soil and its inter-relation with the rainfall. The steady degeneration of the soil, and resultant ease with which the wind and water eroded it, attributed to the mouldboard plough led to one particularly important practice in Bukalanga: the perpetual abandonment of fields, and constant expansion into virgin lands. While this is not confined to Bukalanga alone, in this area it appears disproportionately widespread, largely due to absence of other soil fertility retention practices such as manuring. Colonial neglect is also partly responsible.

The Agricultural Department of the Colonial Administration, created in 1934, seems to have made no significant contribution to agricultural development and information in the area. This was a result of its limited capacity as well as its over-concentration in the southern part of the Protectorate. Bukalanga area received its first Agricultural Demonstrator in November, 1934. His major assignment was to form a Farmers' Association whose aims were to stimulate a greater interest in farming; raise agricultural productivity; foster mutual benefit in modern methods of farming; secure the best price for the members' agricultural produce; benefit from cheap prices of seeds; encourage crop diversification; consultative machinery with Government on agricultural matters; encourage the formation of companies for technical equipment, milling and machinery and lastly provide agricultural information and literature.

The area was too large for one Agricultural Demonstrator, and unlike in other areas to the south, Bukalanga did not have an experimental centre. The Association which he formed, called Bokalaka District Native Farmers Association, appears to have never gained any ground since in 1939 the Department changed its approach from arable agriculture to intensive measures geared to specific war requirements. Although
the fields for demonstration work were cleared as far back as 1935, it appears actual ploughing was delayed due to conflicting decisions and vacillations. For instance, in 1935 the Resident Magistrate, writing to Tshekedi Khama reported:

Rains were plentiful but ploughing was not commenced owing to the customary order from the headman not having been given ... ploughing in the fields for demonstration work have been delayed.88

This was coupled by the problem over the supply of draughts power, seeds and agricultural machinery. While the Resident Magistrate promised to send the machinery from his base at Francistown, Tshekedi was concerned about the wisdom of sending his cattle which could possibly disappear through theft.89

In the 1930s up till the 1940s, agricultural production in the Bukalanga fluctuated dramatically from total crop failure to good harvests. But these fluctuations marked, as Cliffe Moorsom observed for the whole Protectorate:

a general decline in the food producing capability, especially of the poor peasants, closely linked to a disturbing collapse of an often fragile ecology.90

For instance, for the years 1933 - 1935 agricultural performance was good, followed by a drop in 1936 and improvement once more in 1937. In 1938 the situation changed completely, as reflected in the District Commissioner's report:

There will be no crops in the Bokalaka District, but the natives there are still selling grain which they reaped last year.91

He further indicated that there would be an eighty percent crop failure, grazing very poor, condition of cattle very poor and since there was no water, the region would experience great cattle losses.

By the 1930s, Bukalanga had been effectively integrated into the capitalist system dominated by the South African sub-system. This process had dramatically altered the character of agricultural production and trade of the area, turning it from a more or less self-sufficient pre-capitalist peasant into a capitalist peasant agriculture. One that was geared for the capitalist market, as well as providing subsistence needs to the peasant household, thus covering part of the costs of social reproduction of the male migrant labourer as well as his family. Marks and Unterhalter, recognising this, warn against the tendency of talking in terms of the co-existence of capitalist and pre-capitalist or 'domestic' mode of productions:

forms of the labour processes which arose from the pre-capitalist economy are perpetuated, serve different functions and are propelled and are controlled by the laws of motion of the capitalist mode... The /peasant/ household, wherever located, is an integral part of the capitalist mode of production.92

Feminisation of Bukalanga agriculture and proletarianisation of male labour were therefore two dialectical aspects of the same process - capitalist penetration.

To the extent that Bukalanga pre-colonial agriculturalists participated actively in the mercantile grain and livestock trade implied their capitalist peasanisation. Since this process was occurring in an already internally stratified society, it had inherent tendencies towards proletarianisation. This applied to those with no crops or cattle, and the majority who went to the mines but retained their agricultural base. On the
other hand, there was a kulak stratum that thrived from cattle sales by the poor peasantry in need of cash to buy imported mealie meal in times of drought. By means of using extra-family labour through ku limila, ku shakulila, ku lisila and masaidzo, this stratum gained dramatically at the expense of the poor peasants.

The pattern of class formation and internal differentiation, particularly the development of a kulak stratum and agrarian bourgeoisie was blocked by various events, often external, to the Bukalanga political economy itself. For instance, the reinforcement of the Matimela Law by both Khama and later Tshekedi did much to deprive the Bukalanga aristocracy and rich commoner peasantry of opportunities of consolidating their economic and political power through extractive means, just as the Rozwi Mambo and Ndebele hegemony over the Bukalanga had done. Matimela were stray cattle which were trekked to Serowe since this area was under Ngwato overrule. But the cupidity of Ngwato rulers, and the hastiness with which cattle were declared matimela (strayed, unowned or lost), caused consternation throughout the peripheral regions of the Ngwato Reserve. Most of my informants emphasised that livestock owners were never given enough opportunity to inspect the so-called matimela herd, and, above all, these cattle were prematurely declared so. This occurred largely in the 1920s and 1930s, hence Simon Ratshosa's statement that:

'neo-feudalism' had developed in Botswana in which royal wealth based on the customary dues of state was translated into chief's personal and family fortunes.93

Confiscation of cattle for failure to pay tax or for some form of disobedience to the Ngwato chief also became a common feature. This aspect figured eminently in the conflict between Tshekedi Khama (chief of the Ngwato) and the Ba-ka-Mswazwi, a section of the Kalanga.94

Conclusion

Bukalanga responded to late mercantile capitalism (colonial-type trade) by increasing her agricultural production. The former, besides opening markets for Bukalanga agriculture, also transformed the latter's technology, principally, through the introduction of the plough. The increase in Kalanga crop production was, however, marked by a dramatic shift in favour of maize and sorghum, while livestock production also steadily increased despite repeated retrogressions suffered through drought and disease and colonial expropriation. All these had far-reaching implications for the social structural transformations giving rise to a kulak and labour-exporting peasantry.

Although they may be pre-figurings of masaidzo; ku lisila; ku limila; ku shakulila; and mbizi (mutual aid teams) in pre-mercantilist capitalist Bukalanga, it is proper to view these varieties of social relations of production as originating in the expanded agricultural production, induced by the grain trade and the plough. Masaidzo and ku lisila for instance could only have emerged with increased livestock population. The character of these production relations was however built upon, determined and influenced by the early feudal nature of the societies, so that these relations in a sense, marked the maturity of Kalanga feudalism. The development of the latter was hampered by the fact of external domination by the Ngwato state, as well as colonial capitalist penetration. These facts, together with vicissitudes of weather, pestilence, epidemic and colonial policy and capitalist crises in South Africa, blocked the dynamic expansion of Bukalanga agriculture. The end result was that Bukalanga was transformed into a rural labour reserve where most households had to depend partly on a declining agriculture and cash earnings from large-scale labour migration to various wage labour markets in Southern Africa.
Footnotes

This article is based on a research essay submitted to the Department of History, University of Botswana in May 1983. The oral interviews on which it is part based and which are not specifically cited are listed in the copy of the original essay deposited in the University Library.


2. Ibid., p.125.

3. Ibid., p.119 - 20.

4. (RC 5/7, 10.9.1900).

5. See RC 4/12 for the account of the quest for movement of the Nshakashogwe people in 1899. See also D.M. Malikongwa and C.C. Ford, The History of the Bakhrurutshe (The Phofu Group) and the Bakalanga of Botswana for other groups such as Senete and Mazuwa, etc.

6. Tswana immigrations are Kaa, Marobela and Mathangwane (Seleka) and the Pedi formed the Mswazwi and Selolwane chiefdoms. See also D.M. Malikongwa and C.C. Ford, op.cit.


8. Tutume Historical Text (hereafter THT) No.1 (22.7.81).


10. Ibid. Chief Mengwe said two chiefdoms, the Mengwe and Mabuwe had San as serfs. The San owned by the Mengwe aristocracy refused to be handed over to the Ngwato when Chief Khama laid claim to all San in the Ngwato Reserve. Moses Mengwe also alleged that these San were originally exchanged from a section of the Mabangana people who wanted their tribute to Mengwe stopped.


13. THT 5, 6. MTHT 4, 7, 17; Marapong Historical Text (hereafter MRHT) No.6 (bo-Phizha also known as Butale among the Mswazwi people).


15. MRHT No.6. (16.8.82).


17. Kobokobo, op.cit., p.3.

18. Parsons, op.cit. and MTHT, No.2 (29.7.82).
19. MRHT. 4 (30.7.82). Example of a certain Mr Zhiwani whose entire herd of 80 cattle, and some calves were killed, and he later died of shock.

20. MRHT. 3 (14.8.82).


22. MRHT. 6 (16.8.82).

23. Ibid and MTHT. 7 (2.8.82).

23b. This was particularly true for the Nkange area chiefdoms, while the Mengwe chiefdom to the north had serf-like relations with the San going back to the early 19th century when the Mengwe state had become a regional power. See MTHT.12 (6.8.82).


26. Abezanzi refers to the Ndebele aristocracy.


31. Ibid.

32. Tapela, op.cit., p.4


34. THT. 1; 5; 6; MTHT. 1; 6; 7; etc.


36. MTHT. 7 (2.8.82).


38. THT. 4. 6; MTHT.12 (6.8.82); 14 (7.8.82), etc.
39. THT. 5; MTHT. 1, 3, 4, 6; MRHT. 3, 4, 5, 6.


41. MTHT. 3 (30.7.82).

42. Ibid.

43. MTHT. 3 (30.7.82), MTHT. 4 (Group Interview, 30.7.82).


45. MRHT. 3 (14.8.82) and THT. 6 (26.7.82).

46. MTHT. 1 (29.7.82), MTHT. 6 (Group Interview, 1.8.82).

46b. Most respondents attributed the shift from lekwezha and millet to sorghum and maize to westernisation/modernisation; declining rainfall and growing laziness among the young generation to cope with labour-intensive production of lekwezha.

47. MTHT Nos. 1, 3, 6, 7, 10.

48. THT. 1 (22.7.82).

49. MRHT. 1 (13.8.82); MTHT. 3 (30.7.82).


51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. MRHT. 3 (15.8.82).

54. MRHT. 3 (15.8.82).

55. MRHT. 4 (15.8.82).


57. Ibid

58. BNA S.88/11 RC to HC, 19.02.41.


60. Ibid. See also the reasons for the emergence of the 'Good-fors' system on same page.

62. RC 9/7 (7.5.22).
63. RC 4/12 AC to RC, 16.7.1899.
64. MTHT. No.12 (6.8.82).
65. Parsons, "The Economic History ..." p.130.
67. Ibid, but schematically prepared by me.
72. Ibid.
73. MRHT. 1 (13.8.82).
74. Prepared by me from the following sources: Annual Reports: Ngwato District, DCS 12/21; DCS 1/17; DCS 17/11.
75. DCS 1/17, DC to HC: Annual Report (Ngwato), 1928-29.
77. Ibid.
78. DCS 19/27, Nettleton to Government Secretary, 26.11.34.
79. THT, 2 (23.7.82).
81. Ibid.
82. Work and Workers, Vol. XI, 118, February 1902, p.54 (supplied to me by H. Hamandawana).
83. MTHT. 7 (2.8.82).
84. THT. 7 (18.8.82).
86. DCS 19/24 (25.4.5).

88. DCS 1/17, RM to T. Khama, 1935.

89. Ibid

90. Cliffe and Moorsom, op.cit., p.38.

91. District Commissioner, Serowe, 20.4.38 in DCS 28/7 (11.9.40).


93. Quotation in Parsons, "The Economic History ... " p.135.

Key:

1 Nkange
2 Dagwi
3 Changate
4 Senie

5 Madikwe, Selolwane, Thini TUTUME Goshwe, Matobo, Magapatona
6 Nehakaasheguwe
7 Marapong
8 Nyamambisi area.

Scale:

0 50 100 miles