The African e-Journals Project has digitized full text of articles of eleven social science and humanities journals. This item is from the digital archive maintained by Michigan State University Library. Find more at:
http://digital.lib.msu.edu/projects/africanjournals/

Available through a partnership with

Scroll down to read the article.
Militancy and Pragmatism: The Genesis of the ANC’s Media Policy

Ruth Teer-Tomaselli*

Abstract

The African National Congress (ANC) has been working towards establishing a blueprint for transition to a post-apartheid South Africa since the drawing up of the ‘constitutional guidelines’ in Lusaka in 1988. In all these deliberations, the political, land and economic policies have taken precedence, while in the area of social reform, housing, education and welfare have featured prominently. Detailed attention to the media has been a later development. Even so, media remains something of a poor cousin relegated to a lower order of priority while other areas of concern are better articulated.

On 23/24th November, 1991, the Department of Information and Publicity (DIP) of the ANC convened a meeting of approximately 300 delegates to discuss the drafting of a media policy. The outcome of this gathering was a document entitled, Resolutions adopted at the DIP National Seminar (ANC, 1991).

The Resolutions were prefaced by a ‘Draft Media Charter’ which was also the result of the November deliberations. The Resolutions and the Charter were adopted by the ANC’s National Executive Committee on 13th January, 1992, and remain the key expositions of ANC media policy. This paper examines that policy in light of the potential and powerful impact of the broadcast media.

* Ruth Teer-Tomaselli teaches at the Centre for Cultural and Media Studies and she is also chairperson of the Democracy Education Broadcasting Initiative (DEBI)
Le Militarisme et le Pragmatisme: Origine de la Politique des Média du Congrès National Africain

par Ruth Teer-Tomaselli*

Résumé

Depuis le redressement des lois constitutionnelles à Lusaka en 1988, le Congrès National Africain (CNA) est en train d'élaborer un plan directeur qui va faciliter le procès de transition en Afrique du Sud post-apartheid. Dans cette réunion, les politiques du gouvernement, de la terre et de l'économie ont été données la première priorité tandis que le domaine de la réforme sociale, le logement, l'éducation et la sécurité sociale ont été accordés beaucoup d'importance. L'intérêt profond pour les média n'a développé que très récemment. Néanmoins, on n'a pas encore accordé aussi d'importance et d'attention aux média en comparaison aux autres domaines mentionnés ci-dessus.


Les Résolutions avaient comme préface une 'Chartre des Média' celui-ci provenant de la même conférence de novembre. Les Résolutions et la Chartre qui ont été adoptées par le Comité National Exécutif du CNA le 13 janvier 1992 restent les expositions clé de la politique des média du CNA. Cet article étudie cette politique au point de vue de l'impact potentiel et puissant des média.

*Ruth Teer-Tomaselli est professeur au Centre des Études Culturelles et des Média à l'Université de Natal, en Afrique du Sud. Elle est aussi Directrice de l'Initiative de la Radiodiffusion pour l'Enseignement de la Démocratie.
Premises and Assumptions

The starting premises of the ANC's media policy were, firstly, in the stark words of the ANC's November Resolutions, 'The National Party Government is illegitimate'; and secondly, that the central concern of any future media policy should concentrate on the control and content of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). The powerful impact that broadcasting was understood to be able to exercise over voters in the forthcoming multi-party elections elevated the position of SABC to that of the jewel in the ANC's media policy. The pre-eminence of the Corporation is spelt out in the opening statement of the 'Document on Bilateral Negotiation on Broadcasting in the Transition' (ANC, 1992a).

The South African Broadcasting Corporation is the country's major information provider with a larger audience than the rest of the media, print and broadcast combined. It is also by tradition, strongly partisan towards the National Party government which exercises a strong influence over its content and over control structures (through the appointment the SABC Board of Control by the State president).

It is significant that much of the content of the policy was adapted from contributors external to the ANC circle itself, particularly in the area of broadcast policy, in which substantial prior work had been done outside the rubric of the ANC. This antecedent work had been facilitated by organizations sympathetic to, although not necessarily directly aligned with, the ANC. The Jabulani! Freedom of the Airwaves Conference in Doorn, August 1991 (hereafter Jabulani!), was convened and financed by Omroep voor Radio Freedom, a Dutch coalition openly supportive of the ANC. Delegates were drawn from academics, representatives of various organizational structures, as well as Cosatu, the ANC DIP and members of Radio Freedom. Despite the limitations of the gathering, it represented a major advance in the level of oppositional debate in South Africa, since it was the first time such a broad spectrum of delegates had come together to discuss the future of South African broadcasting. A follow-up workshop was hosted by the University of Bophuthatswana in September of that year. Both these meetings, convened outside the auspices of the ANC, were to have a significant impact on the ANC's own policy deliberations.

A key to understanding the ANC's media policy is an appreciation of the dilemma facing the ANC delegates to the November conference, which also faced those at Jabulani! and Bophuthatswana. From the Jabulani! conference onwards, the main thrust of the ANC's media policy was the perceived need to change the status quo to make broadcasting more attractive and useful media for the opposition.
parties (particularly the ANC). It was clear to the delegates of all three meetings that some sort of legislative change was imperative in the short term: private sector broadcasters (notably Radio 702 and Capital Radio 604) formed a vociferous lobby demanding rights to broadcast on FM; an articulate, if weak lobby, called for a change in the licensing regulations which would allow for the establishment of community radio initiatives.

At the time of the Jabulani! deliberations, the Viljoen Task Group had not yet submitted its report, but there was a great deal of speculation among the Jabulani! delegates as to the contents of the expected report. There was a general anticipation that the Task Group would recommend the further break-down of the SABC into 'business units' which would then be 'privatized' into the hands of government supporting groups who would hold them in locus for the National party government. It was speculated that this would be done to safeguard the broadcasting sector against the future take-over of a new oppositional government (presumably the ANC). Thus, any discussion of 'deregulation' of the SABC was seen as the precursor to the ANC and its allies losing future control of the broadcasting sector.

Thus, there was something of an impasse: how to call for change which would empower the ANC without simultaneously ceding the entire broadcasting apparatus over to the presently dominant groups.

In keeping with much of the policy debates over a wide variety of policy areas, the 'solution' to the dilemma was to posit the concept of an 'interim period' (later referred to in more generic terms as 'the transition'). This was an undefined time span between the policy deliberations and a future point when an all party elections would take place. During this period, there was a call for a 'limited re-regulation', under the auspices of either a 'broadcasting council'; an 'interim government', or an 'international monitoring commission' (Currie, 1991). This, Clause 7 of the preface to the broadcasting proposal states, "The Patriotic Front declared that State media should be controlled by a sovereign interim government/Transitional Authority". It was envisaged that limited re-regulation would enable *ad hoc* changes to be made to make the media, and specifically the SABC, more accessible to the ANC and its allies, without allowing unilateral changes on the part of the SABC.

**Process of Media Policy**

The processes through which the media policy was arrived at were similar to those of most deliberations on ANC policy. As in other fields, the ANC actively encouraged and solicited researched analysis
from amongst sympathetic specialists outside the organization, as well as from its own branches and regions. Present at the November seminar were people working in the media structures of the ANC at the regional level, together with regional executives and media spokespeople from the different regions. Tom Lodge (1992) has identified three levels/groups which have shaped ANC policy: 'appointed specialists, elected leaders and rank and file members'. Lodge notes that the last of these are those least affected by 'the opinions of corporate elites outside the movement and conversely the most influenced by the ANC's own ideological traditions'. In terms of media policy, these categories can be identified as outside contributors; the ANC executives, particularly within the DIP but also at national Executive level; and the regional delegates. It was largely the latter who were most insistent on an all-or-nothing takeover of control of the SABC structures a move which was popularly described as the substitution of 'His Master's Voice' by 'His Comrades' Voice'.

The deliberations began, as most others of a similar nature, with contributions - 'inputs' in the argot of progressive circles - on areas such as the print media, problems surrounding the SABC and the electronic media, models for a future broadcast dispensation, the media and the law and problems facing the working journalist. Most of the 'inputs' came from outsiders. A working document, described by DIP spokesperson Carl Niehaus as a 'collection of points', was prepared from the spoken presentations, together with the prior written submissions forwarded to the conference conveners. These points were then discussed further in groups which dealt with specific policy areas. The working groups wrote up the proposals which covered their areas of interest, and finally these were put across to the plenary session, modified and adopted as the resolutions of the seminar.

The ANC's November, 1991 seminar can be seen as a crucial turning point within the ANC's approach to media. As with the previous Jabulanil conferences, much of the emphasis of the meeting was on dislodging those presently in control of the SABC's public affairs division, which is responsible for the production of news and documentaries. According to a delegate at the conference, "There was a strong feeling that all you have got to do is fight SABC content", seen very narrowly as the structure of the news bulletins, and the perceived paucity of exposure of the ANC's viewpoints and spokespeople, compared to the amount of airtime given to National Party and Inkatha. Yet a number of delegates related how the meeting was also seen as a turning point, in which the concept of media policy was widened to include areas beyond the question of direct SABC control. Said a member of the ANC's DIP:
At the start of the meeting there was still the Jabulani! kind of rhetoric - we have to take over the airwaves - they wanted total control. At the meeting there was a lobby of people who argued for a more open, independent approach. These people said you've got to see media policy as a whole: spectrum allocation - broadcasting - telecommunications - all need to be part of the debate.

The ANC drew substantially from a group of people who were advocating that the notion of independence was rationally the best approach. This meeting was seen as a crucial turning point, since for the first time the concept of independent broadcasting (as opposed to ANC controlled broadcasting) really took shape. A small grouping within the ANC's executive structures, bolstered by sympathetic outsiders, particularly the delegations from the FAWO, COM, the Community Radio Working Group, as well as some progressive academics, saw this meeting 'as an opportunity to get democratic law on the statute books'. Freedom of information in this sense applied not only to the media, but was also seen as applying to the statutory limitations on confidential documents (subject to minimum requirements of state security and invasion of privacy).

The Media Charter

The Resolutions were prefaced by a Media Charter, divided into six sections: basic rights and freedoms; democratization of the media; public media; media-workers and society; education and training and promotional mechanisms. The Charter was framed in very idealist and prescriptive terms, without indicating how these could be achieved, as seen for example in the statements: 'Measures shall be taken to ensure that all communities have access to the technical means for the receipt and dissemination of information, including electricity, telecommunications and other facilities' (Clause 2); and 'All communities shall have access to the skills of reading and writing' (Clause 3). Neither these, nor any of the other provisions in the Charter are possible to translate into strategies which can be implemented in the short or even medium term.

There are several differences between both the intent and content of Charter and those of the Resolutions. In many ways the Charter is a deliberately utopian document, which should be seen as a philosophical statement of intent. It provides the ideological guidelines against which specific proposals can be measured. The Charter itself does not - and was not designed - to say how a future government will deal with concrete issues.
document. It was widely circulated, both domestically and internationally, and drew substantial comment. The Resolutions on the other hand, were not widely circulated, but restricted to a relatively small group of people with direct interest in the media - the kind of people Tom Lodge (1992) has referred to as 'technocrats'. The Proposals were envisaged primarily as a document for and by the members of the ANC, to provide them with a rubric from which to work through further concrete issues as they arise.

Finally, the Charter is a long term document: it sets out values which will be as applicable in the apartheid government as they are under a post-pre-election period. But the Resolutions are primarily interested in the 'interim period'. This is partly because all the ANC's political energies were focused on this period and they could not see beyond it with any clarity - and partly because it would have been inappropriate to produce a document which detailed the content, cost and structure of broadcasting policies, when the majority of their constituency did not want details. They wanted an assurance that their historical exclusion from access and control of the media would be redressed.

The Resolutions

Reflecting the pre-occupation of the majority of delegates with the state of the SABC, the Resolutions were mainly concerned with efforts to restructure the SABC in ways which would be more accommodating to the ANC.

The preface to the 'Resolutions on the Control and Regulations of Broadcasting in the Interim Period' ('Noting that' and 'Believing that') testify to the problematic of broadcasting as understood by the seminar's delegates. Clauses 2 - 5 outline the understood interrelationship between the 'illegitimate' government and the SABC and TVBC broadcasting services.

In late 1991 and early 1992, a great deal of faith was placed in the decision making capacity of what was referred to as 'all party congress', later to be realized as the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). The preface includes a clause to the effect that 'The Jabulani! Freedom of the Airwaves Conference recommended that the issue of broadcasting be placed on the agenda of the All Party Conference'. Thus, the resolutions put forward by the ANC placed great demands on the All Party Congress.

The All Party Congress was entrusted with the task of appointing a 'Commission of Inquiry' to 'conduct a public survey, receive public submissions and produce recommendations within three months on
the re-regulation of broadcasting during the interim period'. In effect, this Commission would be re-doing the work of the Viljoen Task Group, whose legitimacy had been totally discredited in Clause 6 of the preface. These recommendations, in turn, would be forwarded to an 'Interim Broadcasting Consultative Committee' (IBCC), a body which would undertake the necessary re-regulations in the 'interim period'. The setting up of the IBCC was seen as an expedient to remove control of the SABC from the Cabinet (and thereby from the National Party government), and place it in the hands of groupings more sympathetic to the ANC. In the light of later deliberations on the choice and composition of the SABC's Board, it is significant that no mention is made of the composition of the IBCC; it was simply assumed that any body chosen by the All Party Congress would better serve the interests of the ANC than the present arrangement.

The list of specified tasks assigned to the IBCC is instructive, as it itemizes the chief interests of the ANC concerning broadcasting during this period. Primary among the list of interests are the control of the Corporation, evidenced by the need for the appointment of a new 'Board of Control' (and a review of 'current staffing and management'. The injunction that the IBCC should 'establish guidelines concerning the impartiality of all broadcasts especially news and current affairs programmes' underscores the importance given to these areas, as discussed above. This pre-occupation is again evident in the proposals on radio, where Clause 1 states that 'political parties should be given equal and adequate air time, on a regular basis, under their own editorial control'; while Clause 2 goes on to say: 'Policies and pertinent events concerning political parties, labour and business organizations should be reported fairly, and adequately discussed, by public broadcasters on all radio services'. Further tasks assigned to the IBCC are phrased in far more general terms, such as the all-encompassing clause that the IBCC should 'set down procedures to remove racist, sexist and ethically divisive practices from the broadcasting environment.'

**Subsequent Developments: CODESA and Beyond**

The Campaign for Open Media (COM) is an independent pressure group aligned to the ideals of the broad democratic movement (though not part of the ANC structures), set up to agitate for greater democracy within South African media. In February, 1992 COM convened a conference entitled 'Free, Fair and Open' in Cape Town, at which delegations of the ANC, DP, and NP, numerous civic and media-related organizations, academics, and the media were present. For
the first time representatives of the SABC and their ideological opponents came face to face.

The conference was very significant taking into account the ongoing development of ANC media policy. Although the issues of SABC control and broadcasting (particularly as they pertained to the composition of the SABC Board and the editorial content of the news and current affairs) were paramount, more emphasis was placed on freedom of information and the idea of a publicly accountable broadcasting service. This contrasted with an earlier emphasis which served the narrow interests of the ANC and its allies. In the light of these influences, a slightly modified version of the ANC's resolutions were taken to CODESA, where they were presented in Working Group One.

By all accounts, there was surprising unanimity on the question of the media between all parties. Four key points were agreed upon:

- the independence of the SABC from all political parties;
- the need for a regulatory standing body, which would lay down the operating rules for broadcasting (and possibly telecommunications as well);
- the re-integration of the homelands' broadcasting services into a national public broadcasting service.
- a moratorium on unilateral policy changes by the SABC.

The establishment of a regulatory body to oversee broadcasting and telecommunication matters would entail a change in legislation. At the height of the CODESA euphoria, it was assumed that this would have been possible within the time remaining in that seating of Parliament (i.e. before the end of 1992), well in time to accommodate a new SABC Board in March, 1993, when the present Board's 5-year term of office expired. However, because of the abortive nature of the whole CODESA enterprise which collapsed in April, 1992, the proposals that came out of Working Group One were not approved, and no new legislation was forthcoming.

As a compromise, the National Party offered to include the appointment of five nominated members from other groups to the already existing fifteen member Board, a compromise which was rejected by the other parties as 'tokenism' (Ramaphosa, 1992).

The question of the SABC's Governing Board remained central to the question of the ANC's media policy, particularly as the expected elections drew closer. There was a new sense of urgency, which to some extent, dictated a pragmatism which was previously absent in the organization's approach to the question. Despite the protestations
the organization's approach to the question. Despite the protestations of 'tokenism', the ANC and the government engaged in bilateral discussions around the subjects of SABC editorial policy and staffing in September, 1992. While the discussions were described as 'exploratory talks', and nothing definite was decided, it was understood that the question of co-options to the SABC Board was again raised and discussed. In a follow-up move, the Institute for the Advancement of Journalism run by Allister Sparks, supported with money from the Australian Trade Union Movement raised by the ANC, convened a closed seminar for potential members of the SABC's Board. The twenty-seven candidates at the seminar, which was by invitation only, were nominated as potential incumbents to the new SABC Board by the 'progressive' political parties at CODESA. The idea, in Spark's words, was to give the potential nominees 'the background they might need if indeed they were nominated', which in the event may have proved to be very useful, since as Mark Gevisser points out, many of them "had clearly never thought about broadcasting before" (Gevisser, 1992).

The alternative position within the ANC, and supported by outside organizations such COM and FAWO, was to steer clear of all party political control. Ultimately, this approach dominated, and further direct negotiations with the SABC were suspended.

COM sponsored a separate initiative entitled the Campaign for Independent Broadcasting (CIB), which was inaugurated on 14th November, 1993. The initiative was based on the premise that civil society, rather than the political parties, should take the lead in the area of broadcasting. CIB proposed that two CODESA chairpersons, or two judges (maybe the same people), who would be known as the Independent Media Commission, would oversee a process whereby an independent board could be chosen. This would ensure a mechanism which was relatively independent from any political party. Each political party would nominate up to ten 'eminent South Africans', without material interests in the media, and who would not be formally aligned to any political party. From these nominees, the judges would put together an 'appointment panel' of approximately seven persons (CIB, 1992).

In their bi-lateral discussions with the government, the ANC put forward a similar kind of proposal, but suggested that the appointment panel be 'established, for example, through one of the universities or through an agency such as the Institute for the Advancement of Journalism run by Allister Sparks, probably the country's best-known and internally regarded journalist' (ANC, 1992b).

However the appointment panel was made up, it was envisaged that they would in turn invite public nominations from which a short list of applicants would be selected. The Board would ultimately be
Media Commission, through a process of public interviews, not unlike the public hearings by which top posts in the American civil service are filled. Such a procedure would allow the public to scrutinize, if not control, the process of selection. In support of this strategy, the ANC noted that 'it would provide a practical demonstration of what the ANC means by transparent government and popular participation' (ANC, 1992b).

The main difference between these recommendations and those put forward to CODESA is that, for the proposal to work, the State President would have to agree to accept the Board recommended by the appointment panel. The Board would also be appointed without the necessity of a prior change in legislation. The proposal introduces the concept of government by 'rubber stamp'. The circumvention of a lengthy parliamentary procedure has precedence in the powers given to Justice Richard Goldstone's investigation into political violence, and 'other structures' arising from 'negotiations'. The ANC accepted these proposals, and took them to the bi-lateral talks between the ANC, and the NP later in January, 1993. Independent of the ANC, the CIB also conducted a number of meetings with the Minister of Home Affairs, which were summarized as "The discussions were fruitful" (CIB, 1993).

**Militancy and Partisanship**

Broadcasting policy was the only area of the Resolutions in which specific concrete proposals were systematically produced. Other areas of media policy were dealt with in more generalized and idealistic terms. In the section on 'Print Media', for instance, interest once again centered on the premises that the ANC did not have direct access to the media, nor did it receive sufficient supportive coverage: 'The government and the dominant elements of the print media will continue to distort the flow of information to influence the negotiating and electoral processes'. Two solutions were put forward - the establishment of the ANC's own newspaper, and the monitoring of "the impact of the media and its role in providing full and accurate information during the transition from apartheid to democracy".

The proposals directed the 'relevant ANC structure' to finalize its investigations and have them in form of a daily newspaper, and to report their findings to a seminar convened for the purpose as a matter of urgency. The research would need to take into account the political implications, the financial viability, the need for national availability and the question of language.
The initiative to establish an ANC party political newspaper had been under discussion for some time and negotiations with the economically embattled independent newspaper, *New Nation* fell through in 1992. At the time of writing this article, it appears that there was little economic feasibility in the idea of starting a newspaper, even on a weekly basis, because of the strong market position occupied by the two newspapers presently serving black readers in the economic heartland of the PWV area: the daily *Sowetan*, and the weekly *City Press*.

The continued existence of the 'alternative’ press during the 1980s depended on the generous external subsidies from sympathetic foreign funders and religious backers (notably the Catholic Church), but with the anticipated drying up of these sources, progressive newspapers would need to find internal funding sources. The proposed Independent Media Diversity Trust which would administer such monies, specifically excluded media owned or controlled by individual political parties as being eligible for financial support (Louw, 1992).

More pertinently, the faction advocating the establishment of a partisan media found themselves excluded from the main locus of power within the DIP structures.

Throughout, both the Media Charter and the Proposals are repeated endorsements for the ideas of media as a vehicle of empowerment for the presently disempowered. The Charter devoted an entire section to ‘Education and Training’, stressing the need for the ‘State and media institutions’ to “provide facilities for the training and upgrading of media-workers”, taking into account the need for affirmative action. ‘Training and Development’ were discussed in three different places in the Resolutions, under the section on ‘Radio’, ‘Print Media’ and ‘Research and Development’. In all three areas it was presented in generalized, non-specific terms. Under the Print media section, there was an exhortation that a “forum of media representatives from within the alliance’ be established to implement a practical media programme of action... to increase our ability to use media to inform, educate, mobilise and organize”7, an ironic twist to the Reithan ideals supposedly embodied in the SABC’s present charter. Under the heading of ‘Resolutions on Radio’, Clause 3 provides for the “encouragement and support of communities’ interests as well as the initiation and ‘encouragement of training facilities’, without any specification of how this should take place, or be financed. This vagueness, together with the opening statement that such initiatives will incorporate the “resources and skills of Radio Freedom”, led to the criticism by some members that the clauses were more of a placatory mechanism towards the militant Left within ANC structures than any strong commitment of training, development or community media participation.
Assessment

Examination of the genesis of the ANC’s media policy is instructive in as far as it illustrates the wider policy-making mechanisms of the ANC over a broad range of issues. The Media Resolutions show a degree of compromise between various factions within the Congress, as outlined above, while drawing heavily on the advice and contributions of external bodies. Particularly important in this respect were COM, FAWO and the community Radio Working Group (which included Bush Radio, the Durban Media Trainers Group, the Grahamstown Community Radio Committee and a group of media activists in Johannesburg concerned with the community radio issue).

While it is clear that some of these bodies stood in a particularly close relationship with the ANC, there have been instances of different organizations in the same area of expertise vying for positions of favoured client status with the ANC (which, after all, was perceived in the early 1990s to be the next government). One such example is provided by the negotiations around the appointment of a new governing Board of the SABC. While much of the blueprint was devised by CIB (spearheaded by COM), mention was made of a completing initiative sponsored by Allister Spark’s Institute for the Advancement of Journalism, a project previously devoted to skills’ development in the area of print journalism, (ANC, 1992b).

The ANC’s media policy has always centered on the control of the SABC, to the relative neglect of other areas of print media, private enterprise broadcasting (including M-Net), and the broader areas of telecommunications. Initially, following the ANC’s unbanning, there was a strong impetus from the ANC’s grassroots constituency not to negotiate over the control of the SABC, but to hold out for ultimate control. However, it later appeared that some pragmatists in the organization realized that the ANC’s interests would be better served by an independent control structure overseeing the SABC. In the words of the ANC secretary-general, Cyril Ramaphosa:

The ANC is committed to public broadcasting which is independent of the government of the day, and which owes its loyalty not to any party, but to the population as a whole. We propose, in other words, a broadcast service committed to providing full and accurate information to all South Africans, and which is protected from interference by any special interests - whether they be political, economic or cultural (Ramaphosa, 1992).

In media policy, as with other areas of policy debate, ANC pragmatists came to realize, by late 1992, that the traditional hardline assumption that the liberation movement would ascend to government
in the form of a 'people's assembly' following a seizure of power through 'mass insurrection' ('Mzala', 1985) was an unlikely scenario. The reality was that a stand-off situation existed in which the two strongest political entities - the ANC and NP - had to negotiate and compromise at every level of policy planning. In terms of the broadcasting sector, the ANC could not hope to achieve a majority control of the SABC within such a balance of power. The best they could hope for was a quid pro quo selection of NP and ANC supporters (with a few other parties represented in minor capacities, who might be able to swing the balance of power). Such an equal balance of party political appointments would simply act to neutralize any advantage the ANC might gain by party political appointments.

The ANC pragmatists have consequently realized that advocating an impartial broadcaster was best. Members of the DIP in particular, having gained experience of the media, realized more quickly than most other people in the Congress, that proposing outright control of the SABC by a future ANC government would be counter-productive. This realization undercut the impetus from some of the lower levels of the ANC - as well as some top level cadres - to hold out for direct control of the SABC. Nevertheless, there were still those, particularly the more militant, who held more radical views.

Put crudely, the divergent points of view range between those in the ANC who wanted the SABC under the direct control of a future ANC government, and those who prefer an independent SABC located firmly in the sphere of civil society, outside the political arena altogether. In early 1993, it appeared that the latter faction were in the ascendancy. Masipula Sitole (1992) noted with reference to the ANC's Policy Guidelines, "The ANC have read the mood of the century correctly - liberal, egalitarian and focused on human rights." However, this liberal standpoint could still crumble in a future post-apartheid scenario in which a disillusionment about the rate of change sets in.

Notes

1. The resolution covered the area of:
   Broadcasting in the Interim Period; Film and Video; Radio; State Information Services; Print Media; Regional Co-operation; Documentaries and Drama; Policy Research and Development for the Broadcast, Film and Print Media; and Suggestions.

2. The Broadcasting Council was conceptualized in various ways as an Independent Broadcasting Authority; an Independent Broadcasting and Telecommunications Authority; an Interim Independent Broadcasting and Telecommunications Authority; and finally a
'Regulatory Authority', reflecting the different strands of debate at different periods in the eighteen months between July, 1991 and January, 1993.


4. This presumably refers to the SABC Governing Board, which is more correctly referred to as simply the 'Board'.

5. Christo Viljoen was invited to the final session of the Jabulani! Conference in Doorn, in his capacity as chairman of the Viljoen Task Group. However, it was made clear that he was not invited as a participant to the conference.

6. The ANC are signatories to the CIB, and are on the plenary committee, but are not represented on its steering committee.

7. In practice, it is not clear how much of this programme has been put into operation. The ANC have relocated the equipment and hardware belonging to the exiled Radio Freedom to a studio in Johannesburg, which is used for both training and media production.

References


