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Most contributions to the burgeoning debate on 'post-apartheid' scenarios have not dealt in any substantial way with the perspectives and implications of competing projects for the southern African region. Yet this is an issue of vital importance for all the peoples and states of southern Africa. The struggles of peoples of the region (particularly of Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe) have made a major contribution to turning the tide against the apartheid oppressors and thus to creating the conditions which have made the construction of a post-apartheid order a realistic possibility in the foreseeable future. The peoples and states of the region have also been victims of apartheid's aggressive reaction to the shift in the balance of forces against it. At least 1.5 million people have died as a direct or indirect result of Pretoria's undeclared wars of destabilisation against neighbouring states, while the damage inflicted on the economies of regional states is estimated to be not less than $45 billion according to a Commonwealth Foreign Ministers' communique of August 1989 (Noticias, 11.08.89). As both the Frontline states and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) have repeatedly reaffirmed, the fundamental condition for lasting peace and development in the southern African region is the elimination of apartheid.

The present paper will focus on economic and security relations between South Africa and other regional states. It will analyse the prospects for continuity and change in these areas which the different 'post-apartheid' alternatives would be likely to open up. As most specific proposals say very little explicitly about regional relations, the analysis will have to proceed on the basis of objective possibilities which will be created by changes of various types in the apartheid system, rather than on the basis of assessing the subjective intentions of the major proponents of different types of change. This paper will explicitly limit itself to examining relations between South Africa and other regional states. No attempt will be made to examine another important dimension of the regional equation - the pattern of relations between the present SADCC member states. As a necessary basis for examining the potential for change of various 'post-apartheid' alternatives, the paper will begin by sketching the main features of economic and security relations between South Africa and other regional states as they exist now.
South Africa-Southern Africa economic relations in the 1980s

It is by now well known that the development of capitalism in southern Africa led to a high degree of integration between the economies of South Africa and those of the other territories of the region. The pattern of capitalist development which emerged was however a typically uneven one. While the principal poles of accumulation were located in South Africa, the economies of the other territories of the region became transformed under colonial rule into service economies ministering to the needs of South African capitalism as:

- Labour reserves;
- Markets for South African commodities;
- Suppliers of particular services (such as transport) or cheap and convenient resources (such as water, electricity and certain raw materials);
- To a lesser extent, outlets for investment by South African-based capital.

The regional sub-system, which emerged under colonialism was thus characterised by relations of economic domination and subordination. While South African capital derived substantial benefits from its access to cheap labour power, resources and adjacent near-captive markets, strong ties of economic dependence on South Africa were created in the neighbouring states. Lesotho, Mozambique, Malawi, Botswana and Swaziland all became dependent for a substantial part of their foreign exchange earnings on transfers from citizens working in South Africa. Traffic passing through Mozambican ports to and from South Africa provided Mozambique with another major portion of its convertible currency. South African currency circulated as legal tender in Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia, all of which were also integrated in 1910 into the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). In return for a share of customs revenue receipts, South African commodities were guaranteed unrestricted, duty free access to the other SACU members' markets. Other territories also became increasingly dependent on South Africa as a supplier. Even in those territories where productive activities were relatively more developed (settler-ruled Zimbabwe and copper-rich Zambia), essential inputs came from South Africa.

Although the South African economy derived substantial benefits from these relations right from the time they began to be established at the end of the nineteenth century, the precise pattern of regional economic interaction has varied in particular historical periods. No attempt will be made in this paper to offer any account of the history of development and change in these relations before the mid-1970s. It is, however, important to note that in the period since the mid-1970s, there
have been important shifts in the pattern of economic interaction between South Africa and the region. These have come about in part through the effects of the long downswing affecting the whole of the capitalist world economy; in part as a consequence of the specific crisis of apartheid; in part through the conscious actions of capital and the state in South Africa; and in part through the actions of the independent states of the region.

The period since the mid-1970s has seen a quantitative change in South African involvement in two important relationships in which it had historically been present as a buyer - migrant labour and transport services. In the case of migrant labour recruitment, the proportion of 'foreign' workers in the South African mine labour force (the largest employer of foreign migrant workers) declined from approximately two thirds in 1975 to around 40% in the mid-1980s, while the absolute number went down from 220 000 in 1975 to 183 000 in 1984 (Chamber of Mines Annual Report, 1984). In the case of transport services, the period saw both a decline in the use by South African clients of the transport services of other regional states and an attempt by South African Transport Services to divert to the South African network traffic from landlocked countries which had historically used the services of other regional states. South African traffic passing through the port of Maputo was thus cut to around 15% of pre-independence levels, while regional traffic passing through South African ports in 1984/5 increased to one-and-a-half times the level of 1981/2 (Financial Mail, 15.08.86).

The reasons for these particular changes are complex. There were factors deriving from trends in capital accumulation in South Africa. Workers' struggles in the mining industry, growing unemployment in South Africa, and the need to increase labour productivity in order to maintain profitability under conditions of declining average grades of ore, all combined to promote a trend towards greater mechanisation of labour processes (implying an overall reduction in demand for unskilled labour) and a policy of giving greater priority to internal South African sources of labour (Centro, 1987). In the transport sector, the need to recoup large investments made in the containerisation of South African ports in the 1970s in a context in which South Africa's own economy had become entrapped in a crisis of chronic low growth provided a strong impulse to seek new customers for South African transport facilities (Centro, 1985; Stephens, 1986).

But these were not the only factors. An essential component of the Botha regime's 'total strategy' envisaged manipulating regional economic relations for strategic purposes. Both migrant labour recruitment and transport services have been subjected to considerable political manipulation as part of Pretoria's response to the changed balance of forces in the region. The effects of the cutback in labour recruitment from the region were not spread evenly
among supplier states. Mozambique (defined as a major adversary) was made to bear a disproportional part of the burden with the numbers of Mozambicans employed on the mines falling within two years from a maximum of 118,000 in 1975 to around 40,000. Mozambique, too, was the only supplier state to be subjected to a specific ban - that imposed in October 1986 which prevented (until it was lifted after the September 1988 Songo summit) recruitment of Mozambican novices and the renewal of contracts by certain categories of already contracted mineworkers. The role of political manipulation was even greater in the case of transport services. While 'economic measures' ('special contract rates' offering substantial discounts) played some role in bringing about a transfer of traffic from the transport networks of other regional states, the major factor was undoubtedly the sabotage of facilities in Mozambique and Angola by South African-backed bandits.

The period since the mid-1970s has also seen a decline in trade between South Africa and the rest of the continent of Africa. South African exports to Africa halved between 1980 and 1985, falling from $1.412 million to $710 million (although this trade has, however, continued to exhibit a gross imbalance in South Africa's favour) (Muirhead, 1988:101).

Analysing the reasons for this decline in South African exports to the region and the continent is beyond the scope of the present paper. What is certain, however, is that if the trend towards reducing its involvement as a purchaser of migrant labour power and transport services was an intentional response by capital and the state in South Africa to changed circumstances, the reduction in exports to Africa was not. On the contrary, it occurred despite considerable efforts by capital and the state to boost trade with the continent - efforts which are continuing and, indeed, being reinforced. This drive by capital and the state in South Africa to increase involvement in relations with the region as sellers is hardly surprising. South Africa's manufacturing sector remains a net absorber rather than earner of foreign exchange (Centro, 1988). With minerals being a wasting asset, the medium and long term future of the South African economy has long been recognised as building the manufacturing sector into a significant earner of foreign exchange. As its products are not by and large currently internationally competitive, regional and continental markets are widely recognised as having a major importance in effecting such a transition. Indeed, regional trade has already made a significant contribution to the development of South African manufacturing industry. A study based on data for the period 1970-1979 found that although the combined gross domestic product of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland was equal to only 3% of that of South Africa, the increase in imports from South Africa during the decade was responsible for 23% of new value added
and employment in South Africa’s manufacturing sector (McFarland, 1983). Increasing trade with Africa has, thus, repeatedly been declared to be a major objective of both development and regional strategy. For example, the ‘inward industrialisation’ option currently in vogue in influential circles of both the state and capital in South Africa envisages expansion taking place largely on the basis of production of consumer goods for middle and lower income markets. Apart from its domestic implications, this is also seen as an optimum strategy for South Africa to break into regional markets.

There have also been many plans and proposals for South Africa to export technology and managerial skills through becoming involved in infrastructural projects in the region. This was clearly envisaged in the original formulations of the ‘Constellation of Southern African States’ strategy in the late 1970s. It was repeated in its essentials in foreign minister Pik Botha’s May 1989 call for a ‘Marshall Plan’ for southern Africa. In this South Africa is assigned the role of supplying managerial and technological experience while western Europe provides the funding South Africa lacks (The Star, 3.05.89).

In addition to trade, other areas in which South Africa has sought (with variable results) to extend its economic involvement with the region include water and energy. Here specific interests have led South Africa to seek to increase its involvement as both buyer and seller. In the area of water affairs, the major development has been the initiation of the R4 billion Lesotho Highlands Water project intended to supplement the water resources of the Witwatersrand (The Citizen, 27.10.86). In the area of energy, the state electricity utility, Eskom, has sought to increase both its purchase and sales of electrical power to regional states. Eskom’s Chief Executive, Ian McRae, has proclaimed the corporation’s ultimate goal as being to establish a regional electricity grid embracing both South Africa and the SADCC countries, by fundamental contrast with SADCC perspectives which seek to promote cooperation in ways which reduce dependence on South Africa (Leadership, VIII, April 1989).

Despite the decline in trade and labour migrancy and shifts in transport routing in recent years, there is no doubt that regional economic relations remain of considerable importance to the South African economy. Hanlon has calculated that the net transfer of foreign exchange to South Africa from regional states in 1982 was US $1520 million (Hanlon, 1986:278). His calculation is based on an estimate of South African revenue from regional trade, investment, transport services and invisibles minus the flows from South Africa to the region - customs union revenue, migrant labour remittances, and revenue obtained from exports by regional states to South Africa. The following is the net transfer to South Africa broken down by country:
To this Hanlon argues should be added:

Revenue to South African Transport Services from regional states 230
Insurance 100
& other services

Giving a

TOTAL

US $1520 million

Hanlon's calculations, however, omit one of the major 'transfers' to South African capital from the region - the surplus value appropriated from the exploitation of migrant workers from regional states. The following figures represent a crude attempt to calculate the probable magnitude of this in the gold mining industry alone.

South African Gold Mining Industry 1984: Selected Statistics

Revenue: R10399.2 million

Costs:
Stores R3682.1 million
Wages of White Employees R1013.3 million
Wages of Black Workers R1791.4 million

Revenue minus Costs (Operating Surplus) R3912.4 million

Operating Surplus per black worker R8675

Average surplus produced by foreign migrant workers
183301 x R8675 = R1590.1 million
(total number (operating surplus)
of foreign migrants) per black worker)

Converted to US $ at average 1984 exchange rate, this gives $1077.3 million.

By these calculations, South Africa currently receives at least US $2597.3 million per year from regional economic relations. This is a figure equivalent
to about 3.6% of South Africa's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or 24.1% of its imports in 1984. It is also equivalent to about 12.2% of the combined GDP of the nine SADCC member states or 46.7% of their total export earnings (Economist Intelligence Unit, South Africa Country Report 1987; Africa Insights, XV,1, 1985). In a certain sense, therefore, the transfer of value from regional states to South Africa can be considered as financing nearly one quarter of that country's imports and costing regional states an amount equivalent to nearly half their export earnings.

South Africa-Southern Africa Security Relations in the 1980s

There is no need here to do more than indicate with extremely broad strokes some of the basic features of the regional security situation in the 1980s. An extensive literature now exists analysing Pretoria's response to the changes in the regional balance of forces brought about by the collapse of Portuguese colonialism and the independence of Mozambique and Angola in 1975. This has shown how the reactive and ad hoc approach of the last years of the Vorster regime gave way to a reformulation and reorganisation of South African regional policy after P.W. Botha took over as Prime Minister in September 1978. Guided by the doctrine of 'total national strategy' developed by the top military commanders, the ultimate objective of regional policy was defined as bringing into existence a new regional alliance, known as a 'constellation of southern African states' (CONSAS). Achieving this and other shorter term objectives of Pretoria's policy towards other regional states (namely, a withholding by regional states of support for liberation movements; a maintenance and deepening of their economic ties with South Africa; the non-establishment of relations, particularly in the military field, with socialist countries; and a 'moderation' of criticisms of apartheid by regional states) was seen as necessitating the application of a 'sophisticated' mix of economic, political, socio-psychological as well as military measures. In the terminology of the strategists of Pretoria, this was to include both 'incentive levers' or 'techniques of persuasion' and 'disincentive levers' or 'techniques of coercion'.

In the event, however, after an initial abortive attempt to gain support in the region for CONSAS, Pretoria rapidly fell back on military and economic aggression as the major instruments of its regional policy. This was not applied at the same level or in the same way to all states of the region, even though most came to feel its impact in one form or another. Nor was the level of aggression identical at all times. Various phases in the application of destabilisation, varying with shifts in the regional balance of forces and with the intensity of the struggle in South Africa, can be identified (Davies & O'Meara, 1985; Davies, 1986; ANC, 1987). Nevertheless, South African
aggression and destabilisation became one of the major features of the region in the 1980s - with the effects being felt most intensely in Angola and Mozambique. As indicated earlier, the costs to independent regional states of South African destabilisation between 1980 and 1988 have been estimated as being not less than US $45 billion. Almost half the population of Angola and Mozambique has been threatened with hunger and some four million people have been displaced within or outside national boundaries. Over 1.5 million people are estimated to have died through direct military action or the effects of war on production and health facilities.

The interests of the SADCC member states

In such circumstances, the interests of the present SADCC member countries, as expressed at the level of declaratory policy if not necessarily in the practice of each member state, can be defined as:

(1) ending Pretoria's undeclared war against the region and establishing peace;
(2) transforming the historical pattern of regional economic relations from one based on domination and dependency to one based on mutual benefit and inter-dependency.

The first of these goals is straightforward enough and needs no further elaboration here. With respect to the second, it should be noted that when SADCC defined its principal objective as bringing about a reduction in dependence (mainly but not only) on South Africa, it did not do so merely as a response to Pretoria's policy of deepening ties as part of its CONSAS strategy. The SADCC perspective was based on a recognition that attaining the goals of economic liberation and development in the independent states of southern Africa necessitated the radical restructuring of historically-created patterns of regional economic domination and dependency, whatever the policies pursued by South Africa. The SADCC project thus aimed from the start at bringing about a delinking from such relationships of subordination to apartheid capitalism, through promoting cooperation in a number of areas - transport, food security, energy, industrial development, manpower planning, tourism, etc. The area in which most progress has been made to date is transport, largely due to the conjunctural imperative to reduce dependence on South African transport facilities in order to lessen vulnerability to South African economic pressure.

Apartheid has, of course, been seen as a barrier to the realisation of both the security and economic goals of the independent southern African states. Repeated policy declarations by both SADCC and the Frontline states have stated that the elimination of apartheid is the essential pre-condition for lasting peace and development in the region. This has not, however, meant
the adoption of a fatalistic approach seeing nothing as possible until apartheid is eliminated. SADCC has operated from the premise that steps can be taken now, before apartheid is eliminated, to promote some measure of co-operation and delinking. Moreover, several states have acted in various ways to restrain destabilisation while the Frontline states alliance was formed to coordinate support for anti-apartheid and anti-colonial struggles.

The ending of apartheid would in no way invalidate the goals of peace and development defined by the present SADCC member states. Nor would it, of itself, necessarily automatically guarantee the ending of existing patterns of domination/subordination. Depending on the specific nature of the post-apartheid transition in South Africa, it may not even necessarily lead to peace - a point which will be developed below. It will thus continue in a post-apartheid phase to be in the interests of the SADCC states to delink from relations which subordinate and distort the economies of their countries. It will, moreover, continue to be in the interests of these states to be part of an organisation seeking to promote cooperation among the nine and serving as a structure to represent, advance and defend their interests in relations with the outside world, including those with South Africa.

What a post-apartheid transition would do would be to create a new terrain of struggle for these objectives. What precise possibilities are opened up and what limits are imposed would depend on the specific nature of the transition. It is here that the points made in the introduction to this paper become relevant. Not all post-apartheid projects would have identical results in this regard. Some would greatly constrain the possibilities of achieving changes in the basic pattern of regional economic relations except through continued adversarial struggle with South Africa. Some may, even increase instability in the region. Others, however, may open up for the first time the possibility of struggling for the goals defined by SADCC in cooperation with, rather than in opposition to, South Africa. Such could create conditions for a project of working together with a post-apartheid South Africa to transform regional economic relations. In a certain sense this can be seen as another way of considering a question which has from time to time been raised within SADCC - whether or not a post-apartheid South Africa should be admitted to the organisation.

The remainder of this paper will examine some of the implications in this regard of the post-apartheid alternatives identified as the most probable in the immediate future at least: 'reformed apartheid'; 'power sharing after a transfer of power' and 'non-racial democracy'. It should be noted that it is possible to envisage some overlap between these categories.
Reformed apartheid

Despite the rhetoric implying an intention to abolish apartheid in phases, 'reformed apartheid' can be recognised in reality as a programme to maintain the essentials of racist minority rule under the changed circumstances brought about by the shift in the domestic and regional balance of forces since the mid-1970s. The 'reformed apartheid' project has been most closely associated with the regime led by PW Botha between September 1978 and August 1989. The five year 'action plan' on which the National Party (NP) based its campaign in the September 1989 election, spoke of:

- setting up institutions in which leaders of all groups can participate in the creation of a new constitutional future;
- a reassessment of the functions and powers of the head of state in a new system and the manner of his election;
- greater emphasis on freedom of association and disassociation in group formation;
- possible acceptance of a Bill of Rights in a new constitution;
- decriminalisation of the Group Areas Act (Weekly Mail, 30.06-06.07.89; Rapport, 25.06.89; The Star, International Edition, 05.07.89; New Nation, 07-13.07.89).

Since the rise of FW de Klerk to party leadership and the presidency, however, there has been a significant shift in the regime's declared intentions to eliminate apartheid and white minority domination. Political prisoners have been freed and the ANC unbanned. Nonetheless the evidence is not yet such as to assume a complete abandonment of reformed apartheid strategy.

Pretoria's involvement in the negotiations leading to the agreement on Angola/Namibia in 1989 and in other dialogues with regional states may be creating new opportunities for the regime to reduce its international isolation and enhance its image with the major western powers. Among other things, Pretoria's strategists are clearly hoping that this will benefit them both in the ideological struggle over the definition of the parameters of a post-apartheid dispensation and in the struggle to determine the future pattern of regional relations.

With respect to the first aspect, Pretoria's strategists appear to see some prospect for substituting a degree of regional and international endorsement for their modified 'reformed apartheid' policies for the domestic legitimacy they increasingly appear to recognise will not win directly. On the second point, Pretoria appears to see enhanced possibilities for gaining acceptance of its notion that any development in southern Africa will require a strengthening, rather than a loosening, of ties between South Africa and neighbouring states. This notion is not new and can indeed be recognised as wholly in conformity with the essential thinking underlying the CONSAS plan.
Thus whatever possibilities the post-Cuito Cuanavale conjuncture may have opened up for regional states to advance some of their interests, have to be recognised as located on a terrain still characterised by the prevalence of the struggle to defeat/defend apartheid rule at home and South African dominance in the region.

If Pretoria succeeded in reducing its international isolation and gaining a degree of international and regional acceptance for its ‘reformed apartheid’ programme, a greater convergence could be expected between South African and western policy around a project aimed at restabilising the region under South African hegemony (Martin, 1989). Such a project would aim to reconstruct relationships with South Africa. However, in view of the changes in patterns of accumulation in South Africa this would be unlikely to involve a straightforward return to the situation which prevailed in the period before the mid-1970s. In particular, the mechanisation and ‘internalisation’ policies now firmly entrenched in the mining industry would militate against any major increase in recruitment of migrant mineworkers from the region. Nor could any major increase in South African use of regional transport facilities be expected in view of the imperative for South African ports to recuperate the substantial investments made in containerisation and computerisation. Indeed, the same factors would be likely to fuel a continued drive to ensure that a substantial part of regional traffic used South African facilities. ‘Restabilisation’ would probably lead to an increase in South African exports to the region and some increase in South African investment - though in the form of supplying goods and services (including management expertise) rather than finance. Western aid and investment could, under such a scenario, be expected to be channelled into projects which tended to increase the dependence of regional states on South Africa. This might even reach the point where western states and investors accept that they should act in partnership with South African capital - although it is unlikely that they would accept Pik Botha’s formula suggested above.

At the security level, a project of regional restabilisation could initially be expected to imply some withdrawal by Pretoria from certain forms of destabilisation. However, it would be a scenario in which the domestic crisis of legitimacy of apartheid would remain essentially unresolved. Returning to a policy of seeking to export the crisis of apartheid to the region would thus remain an ever-present possibility especially at moments when the domestic crisis of apartheid was felt most intensely. Moreover, more international contact would permit South Africa to acquire more easily the means required to overcome the vulnerabilities, which forced it to back down from the cycle of escalating aggression and destabilisation which characterised the period before Cuito Cuanavale. Any permanent unilateral cessation of destabilisa-
tion would thus be unlikely, although cycles of ups and downs in such activity could be expected and the particular states singled out for aggressive assaults could change. Any more permanent reduction in the level of destabilisation would continue to depend on acceptance by a victim state of the Pax Pretoriana.

Such a scenario would create a very difficult terrain from which to struggle for the goals of the independent states of the region identified above. The goal of overcoming historical patterns of regional domination and dependency would have to continue to be pursued in opposition to South Africa. It would also have to be struggled for against the pressure of western states and investors who would tend to reinforce the dominance of South African capital. Indeed, if the western powers went to the extent of endorsing some imposed "power sharing" deal, aid and investment which currently flows to the region as part of certain western countries' attempts to promote an anti-apartheid image might dry up or even be diverted to South Africa. Finally, as indicated earlier, such a scenario would in no way guarantee even that destabilisation would be abandoned.

Alternatively, Pretoria's current diplomatic/economic-orientated approach to the region could also collapse, leading to renewed aggression with Zimbabwe and an independent Namibia coming in for the brunt of attention. The threat or imposition of counter-sanctions by South Africa might then give some real impulse to projects aiming at reducing dependence on South Africa. These would become not merely important from a long term development perspective, but a matter of short term survival for a number of states.

It is again possible that negotiations would break down, sanctions remain, but South African military aggression would be kept under leash. Such a scenario would amount to keeping destabilisation at bay while simultaneously keeping apartheid weak. The first aspect would open up some space for the advance of SADCC projects currently blocked by destabilisation. The second would enable the anti-apartheid struggle to derive maximum benefit from the new regional conjuncture, while minimising the openings created for the Pretoria regime to overcome its current economic and military vulnerabilities.

All these 'reformed apartheid' scenarios have one essential feature in common: the regional terrain would still be profoundly marked by the linked struggles to end apartheid domination at home and South African domination over the region.

**Power Sharing after a transfer of power**

The essential characteristic of proposals for 'power sharing after a transfer of power' is that they envisage some change in the political system - which
might in some cases move beyond formal racist minority rule - but would simultaneously impose constitutional and/or other restrictions which would significantly curtail the capacity of any new government to bring about changes in the socio-economic pillars of apartheid. Such proposals can be identified as being fundamentally concerned with the long term future of domestic and foreign monopoly capital. Monopoly capital has no direct interest in ending racist minority rule. It has profitably coexisted with it for years and indeed still displays considerable vacillation on the question of moving beyond it. It does not, however, depend absolutely on continued minority rule to guarantee conditions for its expanded reproduction. In the circumstances of continued unresolved crisis of the apartheid system, this force, with many reservations and vacillations, begun to contemplate a future beyond formal racist minority rule. However, since its central concern is to make both South and southern Africa safe for capitalism, any such proposals are overladen with mechanisms designed to entrench the powers of big capital and limit capacity for state intervention.

An imposed ‘power sharing’ arrangement, even if it did allow for the emergence of a ‘black’, or more likely ‘multi-racial’ government, would not necessarily lead to the end of destabilisation of the region by South Africa. The installation of an unpopular puppet regime might indeed deepen the crisis and increase instability in South Africa. If the military-dominated parallel system of administration was largely left intact, there could be both motive and means to continue destabilising the region. In this respect, the experience of Zimbabwe after the installation of Bishop Muzorewa as Prime Minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia is relevant. This not only did not end the war in Zimbabwe, it led to an escalation of cross-border raids as the internal situation in Zimbabwe became more desperate for the Smith-Muzorewa regime.

A key question would be whether or not a new ‘power sharing’ government aspired to assert itself as a regional power. Hanlon has argued that this could indeed make more difference for the region than the general political complexion of a post-apartheid government (Hanlon, 1987). If a post-apartheid South African government did harbour aspirations in this direction, it could be expected to act to defend existing patterns of economic and politico-military dominance and could even seek to forge new relations of domination/subordination. Even if it did not have overtly hegemonic aspirations, a government operating in a political system which made state intervention subject to veto by monopoly capital would be unlikely to embrace actively a project of cooperating with other regional states to transform existing patterns of regional relations. In this respect, it should be noted that the existing pattern of regional relations was hardly forged by market forces.
alone. State intervention, in the form of tariff policy, trade agreements and regulations of other kinds, not to mention the application of various forms of coercion to force peasant producers to make themselves available as migrant workers, all played a crucial role in this regard (Martin, 1986). A passive approach by the government of a post-apartheid South Africa or one which focused on immediate economic gain at the expense of restructuring, would tend to favour the reproduction of the existing relations of domination/subordination. In such a case much of the effort of South Africa in promoting economic interaction with the region might well be devoted to seeking to maximise the potential trade benefits which would presumably follow the ending of South Africa's pariah status with the transition to a post-apartheid order.

It would be prudent under such a scenario for the SADCC member states to continue to struggle for a changed regional economic order on their own in organisations which continue to exclude South Africa. However, assuming that a new post-apartheid South African government did not strive to assert itself as a regional power, possibilities might exist for negotiations over aspects of regional economic relations. Bodies like SADCC might indeed find themselves increasingly compelled to take on the role of representatives of the region in negotiations with South Africa, whether they liked it or not. The existing role of organising projects intended to reduce dependence on South Africa may become more difficult in a post-apartheid era. SADCC would lose its current anti-apartheid identification. Donors currently supporting projects sponsored by the organisation as part of their own attempt to project an anti-apartheid image may well lose interest after apartheid is officially declared to have ended. Indeed, a significant portion of aid funding currently channeled to the region could well be diverted to support projects in South Africa. It is also possible under such circumstances that the coherence of regional organisations like SADCC is adversely affected. As Hanlon has argued, ‘...the ending of apartheid will withdraw the common enemy which has been part of the glue that binds SADCC. This will strengthen the hand of those bourgeois (and petty bourgeois and bureaucratic bourgeois) forces which have continued to support trade with, and dependence on, South Africa, despite destabilisation. They would rather have luxury goods from South Africa than support the development of local industry making mass consumer goods and intermediate goods. They will argue that the ending of apartheid removes the need for SADCC, and that it is sensible to allow South African economic dominance.’ (Hanlon, 1987:441)

Such an outcome would of course weaken the position of regional states, leaving them to negotiate on a bilateral basis or to accept the terms and
conditions laid down by South Africa.

Non-Racial democracy
The project of non-racial democracy defended by organisations proclaiming adherence to the Freedom Charter envisages democratic transformations both of the political and of the socio-economic pillars of apartheid. A previous paper prepared as part of the joint Centro de Estudos Africanos (Maputo)/Fernand Braudel Center (Binghamton) project has referred to some of the complex and difficult questions raised by the latter aspect and briefly discussed some of the more recent perspectives of the ANC, SACP and MDM on such issues as land reform and policy towards monopoly corporations (Centro, 1988b). For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the democratic socio-economic transformations envisaged in the Freedom Charter are seen as realisable only after a relatively prolonged process of struggle, which will be conducted not only through institutions of a non-racial democratic state but also through trade unions and other popular organisations. The movement’s concern about the potentially disastrous consequences of any voluntaristic attempt to leapfrog over objectively constrained phases and stages of transition is reflected in such formulations as that in the ANC’s ‘Constitutional Guidelines’ stating that there will be a ‘mixed economy’ in a democratic South Africa.

The major documents of the liberation movement give very little guidance as to the likely policy of the government of a non-racial democratic South Africa towards its neighbours, however. The Freedom Charter speaks of regional and foreign policy only in very general terms. It recognises ‘the right of all the peoples of Africa to independence and self-government’ and says that this provides ‘the basis of close cooperation’ between the peoples of the continent. The Charter does make one specific point of some importance for regional relations - ‘the people of the protectorates’ (now Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) are guaranteed the freedom ‘to decide for themselves their own future’. The Charter, adopted before the independence of these countries, thus appears to leave open the question of whether these territories should become independent or part of some form of association with a democratic liberated South Africa, but it is quite specific that the decision on this question is that of the peoples of these territories themselves. The Charter, therefore appears to offer a definite guarantee to the peoples of the now independent states of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland against expansionist or incorporationist policies. The ANC’s Constitutional Guidelines adopted in 1988 are even more vague on regional relations, saying merely that ‘South Africa shall be a non-aligned state committed to the principles of the Charter of African Unity and the Charter of the United Nations and
to the achievements of national liberation, world peace and disarmament'. Beyond this the ANC has, along with SWAPO and the PAC, been invited as an observer to some SADCC meetings. On these occasions, the movement has expressed its general solidarity with SADCC and deplored the acts of destabilisation by Pretoria, but not indicated in any developed way its views on the evolution of regional relations. (Amin et al, 1987:217)

Turning from the level of declaratory policy to that of probable objectively existing options, the first point to make is that a government of a non-racial, democratic South Africa could, like any other government, be expected to act in its own perceived interest and not out of a sense of altruism towards its neighbours. The precise correlation of internal class forces and the configuration of forces on the regional plane at the time apartheid is ended will also greatly influence the content of its regional policy.

A government of a liberated South Africa would appear to have a fairly wide range of possible options in the formulation of its regional policy. At one extreme, it could opt for a rather passive, inward-looking, regional policy. Such a stance could be the result of a conscious decision or simply of a failure to formulate a more active approach. Either way, it would imply giving absolute priority to internal transformations and leaving regional economic relations largely to 'look after themselves'. At one level, such an option could appear a great temptation. The problems of a transition phase in South Africa will be enormous. Major questions of economic management, employment, urbanisation, land redistribution, among others, will have to be confronted immediately after liberation and will have to command great attention and resources. Moreover, a passive approach to the region would offer a number of short term economic benefits. A liberated South Africa would continue to benefit from the existing flows of surplus value from the region to South Africa.

While such an approach to regional relations may at first glance appear to be an attractive and hence even a likely option, such a course could in fact be risky for a liberated South Africa. Developing good relations with its neighbours will be a strategic priority for a liberated South Africa in the conditions of an immediate post-apartheid transition. At the very least, some account will have to be taken of the fact that the existing SADCC states have very different class characters and political systems. Some are dominated by class forces which identify with and benefit from the existing regional order. Some have even allied with the apartheid regime against liberation movements or permitted their territories to be used as bases for South African destabilisation against other regional states. From here, the establishment of a democratic order in South Africa may provoke some response from counter-revolutionary forces. Some attempt may be made to use regional
states to destabilise a liberated South Africa. More positively, it would clearly be in the interests of a democratic South Africa to be surrounded by neighbours who identify their own interests with the construction of a democratic, non-racial order in South Africa.

A passive approach to regional economic relations would tend to reproduce the existing patterns of exploitation and domination/subordination. At the same time, it would be utopian to imagine that a process of democratic transition in South Africa will not involve some disruption to production. Some sabotage, some illegal capital export, some hiccups caused by the emigration of die-hard racists is bound to occur. For the regional states, the prospects in such a situation might worsen compared to existing economic relations. There would, for example, in all probability be a tendency for less mine labour to be recruited; for less South African traffic to pass through Mozambican ports; for the quality of the service offered by the successor of the South African Transport Services (SATS) to regional exporters and importers to decline; for the demand for regional goods and services to decline. For some time, these losses would probably be more than offset by the gains of not being subjected to destabilisation. But in the longer term these effects could have significant effects on regional relations. In particular, they would tend to make it more difficult for the government of a democratic South Africa to cement a firm alliance with its neighbours in the region. A passive, inward looking, regional policy would for these reasons be a risky option for a democratic South Africa. Put bluntly, whatever temptation there may be to want to continue benefiting economically from the existing pattern of regional domination would have to be set off against higher strategic considerations. In particular, a government of a democratic, non-racial South Africa would ignore at its peril the imperative to forge a close alliance with progressive regional states and to win over and establish friendly ties with the majority of SADCC states.

All of these could be seen as factors which would tend to lead a non-racial, democratic South Africa towards a policy of active cooperation with other regional states. This alliance would have to have some economic base. A liberated South Africa would need to act to ensure that its neighbours in the region benefit materially from the process of liberation in South Africa, and to identify their interests as cooperating with the new state in the creation of a new regional order. At the same time, the ending of South Africa's 'pariah' status would open up certain possibilities for South Africa to advance some of its economic interests in the region.

This would suggest the possibility of a democratic South Africa reaching agreement with the other states of the region about a cooperative project aimed at transforming the pattern of regional economic relations. Any such
project would have to be elaborated through a process of negotiation and many of the details would depend on as yet unpredictable factors. In very broad terms, however, such a project could be expected to involve agreement by South Africa to provide resources to support a programme aimed at transforming the conditions of underdevelopment elsewhere in the region which give rise to dependent and subordinate regional relations. It could also, since any such transformation is likely to be a relatively protracted process, be expected to include South Africa granting reasonable, if not favourable, terms to the rest of the region in as yet untransformed relations which cannot immediately be broken. In return for this, South Africa could expect to receive preference over extra-regional suppliers in negotiated trade agreements with the region.

The rest of this paper will consider the implications of such an arrangement in just three areas - migrant labour, transport and trade. Of course in reality there are a number of other areas of economic interaction which would have to be dealt with including energy, water resources and food security, to mention just a few.

**Migrant Labour**

The supply of migrant labour to South Africa will without doubt be one of the first and most difficult issues which will have to be confronted in any attempt to forge a new mutually beneficial regional economic order. In 1985, 371,008 citizens of independent states were legally registered as migrant workers in South Africa. The breakdown by country of origin was as follows (SA Institute of Race Relations *Survey II*, 1986:729):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>27,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>139,827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>30,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>68,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>22,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>7,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>73,998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>371,008</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of these 82.55% were employed in mining, 4.63% in agriculture and 2.80% in manufacturing. To these should be added a considerable number of ‘illegal’ migrants, working particularly in agriculture and construction. In October 1986, the South African Director-General of Home Affairs claimed that
there were 1.3 million ‘illegal aliens’ in South Africa, most of them from Mozambique (*Business Day*, 30.10.87). This figure is probably an exaggeration and undoubtedly includes a number of long-term residents of South Africa with South African documentation. Nevertheless, it points to the existence of a considerable flow of clandestine migrants in addition to those going through official channels.

For Lesotho, Botswana, Mozambique, Swaziland and Malawi, migrant workers in South Africa make up a sizable proportion of the total wage earning population. The figures for 1984 were as follows:

**Migrants as Percentage of Total Wage Labour Force**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hanlon, 1986:293-305

Foreign exchange earnings from migrant labour are also of importance for these countries - whether in the form of remittances (sent voluntarily by migrant workers to their families) or deferred pay (the proportion of total wages compulsorily paid in Rands to the authorities of supplier states and reimbursed to the workers in local currency on their return from a contract). In 1982 R240 million was transferred to Lesotho by Basotho working in South Africa - an amount greater than two thirds the country’s Gross Domestic Product of R348 million (*Lesotho Annual Statistical Bulletin*, 1982, H1). The Chamber of Mines calculated that Mozambique received about R300 million in 1986 (*Weekly Mail*, 9-16.10.86).

Recent years have seen considerable fluctuations and manipulations of flows of migrant labour. These trends have had important repercussions on the economies of supplier states. The overall reduction in recruitment has taken place at a rate and pace determined by the interests of mining capital and not by the interests of supplier states. It has proceeded more rapidly than the capacity of these states to productively absorb former migrants. The net result has been that the unemployment inherent in the process of mechanisation underlying the ‘internalisation’ programme has been exported to these countries, whose rural economies have been forced to bear the economic and social costs. Moreover, this ‘exported unemployment’ has been spread unevenly among supplier states, with Mozambique suffering the most and Botswana being more affected than either Lesotho or Malawi. In addition to having to cope with the impact of an overall trend towards declining recruitment, sharp fluctuations in recruitment patterns have had serious
destabilising effects on supplier states. All of this has severely undermined any attempt by supplier states to deal, individually or collectively, with this issue on a planned basis (Centro, 1987). Instead of being able to work towards a phased withdrawal from the system, they have been subjected to fluctuating ebbs and flows which have made earnings and employment uncertain.

Any new approach to the problem of migrant labour will have to be based on a recognition of the fact that supplier states cannot, without considerable economic and social disruption, immediately withdraw from the migrant labour system. Their capacity to extricate themselves from what is ultimately an exploitative relationship depends on the generation of employment in supplier states and on the transformation of former labour reserve areas in particular. They need stability of earnings and employment from migrant labour during an interim period in which a programme of economic regeneration of former labour reserve areas is implemented. This suggests that any new cooperative approach to this question during a post-apartheid era would have to involve both short term measures and a long term programme of reconstruction.

In the short term, new agreements on the supply of migrant labour would have to be negotiated on terms which tilt the balance of advantage towards supplier states. In particular these would have to be based on at least the following principles.

First, 'foreign' migrant workers would have to be recognised as having contributed to the creation of wealth in the South African mining industry and therefore as having rights identical to those of South African workers with regard to wages, security of employment, opportunities for promotion, benefits, trade union membership, etc. In short, such workers should not be penalised in any way for their 'foreignness'. Indeed certain categories, eg long serving 'foreign migrants' must be granted the same rights to settle in the industrial areas of South Africa as will presumably be accorded to any South African.

Second, the policy of switching on and off the flow from any country at the whim of mining capital will have to be ended. The importance to supplier states of stability of employment and earnings from this source during at least an interim period will have to be recognised. Firm binding agreements on numbers which take account of these interests will have to be negotiated with supplier states.

Third, benefit and compensation payments will have to be re-examined. There are a number of problems in the current administration of these, ranging from bureaucratic delays to the fact that there are a number of ways in which the health services of supplier states bear 'hidden' costs of diseases contracted on South African mines.
At the same time the role of migrant labour recruitment in underdeveloping labour reserve areas will have to be recognised as placing an obligation on the South African mining industry to contribute to the regeneration of the productive capacity of those areas. Projects in supplier states aiming at employment creation and involving significant investments in rehabilitation of labour reserve areas will have to be supported. The aim will be eventually to create conditions which will enable the migrant labour system to be phased out in such a way that it benefits both the working class of South Africa (enlarged by an element of former migrants from regional states, who opt to remain in South Africa as permanent mine workers), who will benefit from the establishment of a stabilised labour system in the mining industry, and the populations of former labour reserve areas, who will benefit from the emergence of employment and income generating activities in their home areas. It is inconceivable that this could be achieved without some transfer of investible surplus from South Africa to supplier states. There are a number of ways in which part of the sizeable surplus created in the South African mining industry by ‘foreign’ migrant workers could be transferred for such purposes. The mechanisms would depend partly on the ownership patterns existing in a post-apartheid period but at the very least some kind of special tax levy on profits of mining companies or dividend income would have to be considered to establish a fund to channel resources to supplier states.

Transport
There are two dimensions to be considered in examining regional transport relations. The first and most important is the question of the use by regional states of South African ports and railways versus those of SADCC member states - Mozambique, Angola and Tanzania. The second dimension is the use by South African importers and exporters of facilities in other regional states, particularly Mozambique.

Both these dimensions have been greatly affected by the apartheid regime’s destabilisation policies. As an integral part of its post-1978 regional strategy, South Africa has sought to secure an effective monopoly over regional traffic. As indicated earlier, this is partly motivated by the need to recoup the significant investments made in the containerisation of South African ports since the 1970s but there is also a critical strategic dimension related to gaining additional leverage over regional states.

Some of the effects of such actions can be seen in the following table.
The table shows that regional traffic passing through South African ports increased by 1984/5 to 1.5 times the level of 1981/2. The increase is principally due to the diversion of traffic to/from Malawi and Swaziland through a combination of sabotage of routes to Mozambican ports and the application of 'special contract rates'. However, the table also shows that substantial tonnages of cargo from Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe, which would under normal circumstances pass through Mozambican and Angolan ports, are currently routed via South Africa.

At the same time there has also been a decline in use of the port of Maputo by South African exporters and importers, again a result of deliberate manipulation. South African traffic passing through the port of Maputo has been cut from around 6.8 million tons in 1973 to around 0.42 million tons in 1988.7

SADCC has, of course, not been passive in the face of this assault. It has given top priority to the rehabilitation of transport routes as a means both of reducing vulnerability to South African pressures and of promoting trade among member states. Considerable sums have been raised internationally to finance SADCC projects in the transport sector. All of this, moreover, has taken place in the face of continuing South African destabilisation, which has forced SADCC to view such projects within the context of a war economy. Considerable manpower, effort and resources has had to be deployed defending these corridors against South African-backed armed banditry.

Against this background, any approach to a restructuring of regional transport relations in a post-apartheid era will have to proceed from at least the following principles:

- The existing concentration of regional traffic through the ports of South Africa will have to be recognised as the product, in part, of South African economic and military aggression. Restructuring will therefore have to
aim at the very least at rectifying and compensating for existing distortions and imbalances.

- SADCC countries must be recognised as the 'natural hinterland' for Mozambican ports and transport services.
- SADCC must be able to recoup and benefit from the investments made in transport facilities as part of the struggle against apartheid.

This would mean that the successor to the South African Transport Services (SATS) would have to abandon its current policy of attempting to 'poach' cargo away from Mozambican ports. Rating policy must be structured in such a way that the shorter distances to Mozambican ports from a number of SADCC countries is reflected in real savings for customers using these ports as against South African alternatives. Technical support should be provided to the transport authorities of the region by South Africa on reasonable terms and the successor to Safmarine should ensure that regional ports are covered by adequate shipping services. At the same time negotiations will have to be initiated to arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement over the use of Maputo harbour by South African concerns. Negotiations of this nature should ideally specify fixed tonnages and should provide for a reasonable mix of high-rated as well as bulk cargo.

Trade

We have already referred to the fact that trade between South Africa and the rest of the southern African region is characterised by a large deficit in South Africa's favour. The following tables show the situation for each individual SADCC member state in 1982 and then compares each SADCC member's trade with South Africa with its trade with other SADCC members.

**SADCC Countries' Trade with South Africa 1982**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports from SA</th>
<th>Exports to SA</th>
<th>Deficit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2392</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hanlon, 1986:279
### Percentage of SADCC countries’ trade with South Africa, other SADCC countries and countries outside the region (1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Imports from SA</th>
<th>from SADCC</th>
<th>extra region</th>
<th>to SA</th>
<th>Exports to SADCC</th>
<th>extra region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>99.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>99.8 (1982)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>83.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>97.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>58.6 (1982)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>84.6 (1982)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>85.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>92.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>60.5 (1982)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>99.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>96.2 (1982)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>70.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SADCC, 1985:43, table 4.2

These tables highlight a number of features of existing trade patterns which will have to be taken into account in any attempt to restructure them in a post-apartheid era. First, the tables show that South Africa is a major supplier of six of the present SADCC member states. Through the provisions of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), South Africa enjoys virtually unrestricted access to the domestic markets of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. These three countries depend on South Africa for not less than 80% of their imports. In addition more than a third of Malawi’s, a quarter of Zimbabwe’s and nearly 10% of Mozambique’s imports come from South Africa. However, while the region is an important market for South African commodities, South Africa purchases relatively little from it except some raw materials from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland and raw materials and some manufactured products from Zimbabwe, under a trade agreement which dates back to the colonial period. The SACU agreement theoretically provides for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland to have reciprocal access to the South African market but in practice attempts to set up industries in these countries producing for the South African market have been blocked by various devices (Hanlon, 1986:ch9). The tables also show that intra-SADCC trade remains limited. Not one SADCC country derived even 10% of its imports from other SADCC countries, while only Zimbabwe exported more than 10% of its total exports to the rest of the SADCC region. A greater opening of regional markets to South African manufactured exports at the expense of those currently coming from outside of the region could be the major way in which a democratic, non-racial South Africa benefits materially from cooperating in the construction of a new regional
order. However, if South Africa's evident interest in increasing its sales to the region were to be accommodated through an indiscriminate opening of regional markets, several adverse consequences could follow. Existing imbalances could be enhanced, industrial development in the region impeded and trade between existing SADCC member states swamped. Any opening up of the region to South African commodities which seeks to avoid such consequences would have to proceed on the basis of negotiating specific trade agreements, which take account of the need to protect local industries and to allow trade between existing SADCC member states to increase.

SADCC trade with South Africa should be encouraged at the expense of trade with countries outside of the region, not at the expense of intra-regional trade or the development of local industries in SADCC countries. Here only a few very general observations will be made. First, the table above shows that the markets of the existing SACU members are already saturated, indeed oversaturated, with South African goods. It is undoubtedly in these countries' interests to diversify their sources of supply and in this connection the SACU agreement would merit serious review not only in respect of its revenue-sharing provisions but also in respect of the provisions which keep member states dependent on South African suppliers. The main prospects for a post-apartheid South Africa to substitute suppliers from outside the region would thus appear to lie not with those countries with which trade relations are already well established but with those countries of the region with which South Africa currently has more limited trade relations: Angola and Tanzania, at the one extreme, and, in some areas, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi.

Another element which would need to be identified is the types of commodities this trade should embrace. Any future for South Africa as an exporter of means of production lies in Africa. Indeed, this is an area in which other countries on the continent and region could benefit from trade with a post-apartheid South Africa in view of the potentially greater accessibility of South African technology in a number of spheres and the advantages of a greater proximity to suppliers. Trade in consumer goods raises more questions and would in principle need to be considered carefully in the light of local industrial development plans and the need not to swamp trade between existing SADCC member states. Nevertheless, here too there would be some prospects for increased trade with a post-apartheid South Africa.

Any restructuring of trade relations in a post-apartheid era would, however, also have to address the problem of the large deficit in South Africa's favour. This could perhaps, in part, be offset by a greater use by South Africa of services from the region - transport, electricity, water. However, the possibilities of South Africa increasing its visible imports from the region
would also need to be examined. As indicated earlier, these currently consist largely of agricultural products and raw materials plus a small quantity of manufactured goods from Zimbabwe. Among the major individual items currently imported by South Africa from the SADCC region are maize from Zimbabwe, cattle, sheep and goats from Botswana, Namibia and Swaziland, tobacco and tea from Zimbabwe and Malawi, cashew nuts and seafood from Mozambique, and clothing, textiles, furniture and electrical goods from Zimbabwe (Muirhead, 1988, 93). Any restructuring of trade patterns in a post-apartheid era would have to investigate ways in which South Africa could increase its purchases not only of agricultural commodities and raw materials from the SADCC countries, but also of certain manufactured goods - to enlarge the market and create new possibilities for industrial development in these countries. Needless to say, the type of manipulations which have excluded SACU manufactured goods from the South African market despite the formal provisions of the agreement would have to end.

Conclusions

The present paper has examined the potential impact on regional relations of competing post-apartheid projects. The independent states of the region are not mere passive forces. They are active agents in the making of the region, and may well indeed exert a considerable influence on the specific type of settlement which eventually emerges in South Africa. Nevertheless, if it is necessary to break from a mechanistic determinism, it is also important to avoid voluntarism. The settlement which emerges in South Africa will set limits and possibilities on a struggle to transform and restructure existing patterns of domination and subordination in the region.

A considerable part of this paper has been devoted to trying to identify certain principles which would have to govern a new cooperative relationship between a democratic, non-racial government of a liberated South Africa and its neighbours in the region; and examining some of the implications of a cooperative project aimed at transforming the existing pattern of regional relations in the spheres of migrant labour, transport and trade.

Transformations of the type discussed in that section of the paper will not come about automatically or through the operation of market forces. The existing patterns of domination and subordination in the region were created by state intervention. State control and intervention will be necessary to change these patterns. Since these relations are of benefit not only to the apartheid regime narrowly defined but also to a number of powerful capitalist interests, they are likely to be resisted. The possibilities of achieving such goals in cooperation with a democratic, non-racial South Africa will thus depend to a large extent on the establishment in South Africa of an order in
which a degree of democratic control can be asserted over the economy. What the present paper has tried to argue is that an alternative to the continued subordination of the SADCC member states does exist and can be struggled for. If a genuinely democratic, non-racial order were to emerge in South Africa, a possibility of cooperating with South Africa in the achievement of these goals would be opened up. If, on the other hand, a 'post-apartheid' settlement in South Africa places severe restrictions on the prospects of achieving any significant changes in the socio-economic pillars of apartheid, permitting only some change in the complexion of members of the government, SADCC member states will be compelled either to abandon their goals of economic liberation or to continue to struggle for them in an adversarial relationship with South Africa - but under circumstances where apartheid is declared no longer to exist and the level of external aid and potential cohesion of regional organisations is possibly lessened. 

Notes
2. See Martin, 1986.
3. This view has been defended by Simon Brand of the Southern African Development Bank (Weekly Mail, 15-21.07.88).
5. See Hanlon (1986); Johnson & Martin (1986); Davies & O'Meara (1985).
6. These ideas are developed in Centro (1988b).
8. Some changes in this essay have been introduced to take into account the rapid shifts in South African politics in recent months. However, it has not been possible to keep entirely up-to-date. Nonetheless, the broad lines of the argument remain extremely timely. - eds.

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