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VIGILANTES, CLIENTELISM, AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN STATE

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On the afternoon of July 22, 1990, residents of Sebokeng watched nervously as a procession of vans and buses threaded its way towards the African township's stadium, carrying men to a rally called by Inkatha. Rumours of an attack by members of the conservative Zulu movement were rife, and tension mounted during the meeting. When it ended, several hundred local youths confronted the Inkatha supporters as they came out. Firebombs were hurled at an Inkatha member's house and the two groups started fighting, but police quickly dispersed the youths with tear gas. Then hundreds of Inkatha men surged through the dirt streets, breaking windows and stabbing and shooting people, until they reached and stormed a workers' hostel controlled by political opponents.

The 24 deaths that day began two months of violence around Johannesburg that made headlines worldwide. Yet neither the Johannesburg clashes nor five preceding years of vigilante attacks on opponents of the South African state have been adequately explained. Police and press often label them 'black on black violence', stereotyping Africans as uncivilised and brutal. Academic and legal accounts have been largely descriptive, identifying the perpetrators of particular attacks rather than their common social bases. Why vigilantism arose instead of other forms of repression and how it is tied to the state also remain little explored.

This paper argues that vigilantism is the continuation of clientelist politics by other means, to paraphrase Clausewitz's dictum on war. Drawing on South African experience and other cases, counter-revolutionary vigilantism is defined as the unlicensed use of private violence to defend an oligarchic clientelist state under popular challenge. It has emerged when patronage-based power structures were threatened from below, preying upon cleavages within the groups in revolt. It is extra-legal because of institutionalised, if restricted, competition for power in the central state and decentralised due to the brokerage role of local elites. Current manifestations seem connected to the emphasis on such local leaders in 'low-intensity conflict', the post-Vietnam doctrine of indigenised counter-insurgency. In other words, political vigilantism is a type of violence characterising certain dependent societies.

Analyzing vigilantism in this way means rethinking several aspects of the
understood by comparing South Africa with other new industrial countries. Here, as in the others, foreign investment and middle-class demand spurred growth in the 1960s and early 1970s, while an undemocratic state kept labour cheap and developed certain key sectors (Ramos and Cassim, 1989; Knight, 1988; Seidman, 1991; Petras and Morley, 1981; Lipietz, 1987; Evans, 1979). The tensions of such authoritarian, dependent development, where low wages and political repression strait-jacketed growing working and professional classes, were aggravated by South Africa's apartheid policy. The white minority regime's disfranchisement, dispossessment, and segregation of the black majority deepened poverty, barred social mobility, made petty official interference a daily nuisance, and perpetuated a rigid political order more like a colony than an industrialising nation.

The turning points came when black workers struck en masse in Durban in 1973 and students led the Soweto uprising of 1976. These conflicts shook the confidence of state and capital, spawned opposition social movements like those in other semi-industrialised societies, and halted economic growth. In subsequent years, as political instability, inefficiency due to colour bars, and international sanctions worsened the foreign debt and capital flight burdens plaguing all the new industrial countries, economic regression followed. Worried by these economic problems, the emergent black movements (particularly the trade unions), and small but growing guerilla wars at home and in occupied Namibia, Prime Minister P W Botha's government instituted several important reforms. It gave legal recognition to African trade unions, municipal status and greater power to the segregated black townships, and separate chambers of parliament with little power to the coloured and Indian minorities, while lifting racial restrictions on public accommodations, sex, and marriage. But Africans remained voteless, the regime still regarding them not as citizens of ‘white South Africa’ but of rural ‘homelands’ (reserves) covering 13% of the territory (Saul and Gelb, 1986; Murray, 1987).

Far from resolving the political and economic crises, the reforms of the early 1980s laid the groundwork for the next round of anti-apartheid protest, which began in July 1984. Boycotts of elections for the coloured and Indian parliamentary chambers were launched. In the grim, crowded urban African townships, where state ownership of most land politicised housing issues, resistance mushroomed over rent hikes which the new municipal councils had imposed to cover costs and improve their scanty amenities. In townships of the Vaal Triangle, south of Johannesburg, the authorities reacted by ordering detentions, house-to-house searches, and patrols by police and soldiers. This heavy-handed reaction triggered off a chain reaction of general strikes, school, consumer, and rent boycotts, demonstrations, and violent clashes in many black areas.
The struggles soon spiralled from protests over local issues to efforts, often violent, to render the country ungovernable. The opposition called on black councillors, police, and informers to stop collaborating. Many who refused suffered firebombings of their houses or even death, some by the gruesome ‘necklace’ method. The tide of unrest touched every region. Starting in the southern Transvaal and northern Orange Free State, by early 1985 it spread throughout those provinces and into the eastern Cape. By August it had struck Natal and the western Cape. The protest movements were loosely connected by the United Democratic Front (UDF), an alliance of hundreds of local civic, youth, student, and women’s organisations (Swilling, 1988; Murray, 1987). The UDF identified itself with the banned African National Congress (ANC), the principal national liberation movement and prime mover in the guerrilla campaign. It also allied with the fast-growing black labour movement, whose leading forces formed the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in 1985. In some parts of the eastern Cape and Transvaal -- including Soweto, Johannesburg’s largest township -- the black-exclusivist Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO) also played a part in the protests. Mass action had majority support in most, but activists often used threats or force to compel the reluctant to participate (Schlemmer, 1991a:7).

By mid-1986, the rebellion’s spread seemed to have left the regime tottering. One-fifth of the 235 township councils had collapsed, which, along with rent boycotts, had brought public services to a halt in many townships. Alternative local governments based on residents’ street committees sprang up in some. These were often tied to ‘people’s courts’ which heard local disputes, where militant youths frequently dispensed rough justice. A few townships were so well organised and defended that police dared not enter. Meanwhile, ANC guerrillas stepped up bombings and raids and began training recruits inside the country (Weekly Mail, 07.12.90; Work In Progress 41; Lodge, 1987; Lodge, 1988). In these dire straits, the state sought to shore up its coercive power. White troops poured into the townships, and hurriedly-trained black township and homeland police were rushed into duty. In July 1985, a State of Emergency gave the security forces draconian powers of search and detention in the southern Transvaal and eastern Cape. Two months later, it was extended to Cape Town. Vigilante attacks against anti-apartheid activists also began to be widely reported (Haysom, 1986; WM, 13.02.86).

Five phases of vigilante activity in South Africa can be distinguished since then.

1. July - December 1985: Most reports of vigilantism came from areas outside the Emergency zones where opposition groups were small, isolated, and vulnerable. These included country townships like Tumahole, near Parys in the
northern Free State, where the rent protests had begun, and Natal’s largest, city, Durban, whose principal townships fell into the Inkatha-controlled Zulu tribal reserve, KwaZulu. In contrast, vigilante activity remained rare in the sprawling townships outside Johannesburg and the well-organised centres of the Eastern Cape.

2. January - June 1986: The generalisation of revolt in South Africa’s urban townships and many rural areas was accompanied by the generalisation of vigilante attacks. Vigilantes laid siege to the militant townships around Pretoria, Johannesburg, and the Vaal Triangle. Near Cape Town crowds destroyed the huge shanty towns around Crossroads, leaving 60,000 homeless. In Natal, Inkatha’s attacks continued around Durban and spread around Pietermaritzburg. Vigilante activity increased after the State of Emergency was lifted in March.

3. June 1986- August 1987: Reports of vigilante violence dropped sharply after a second, countrywide State of Emergency was declared in June 1986. In terms of the Emergency Regulations, police detained 30,000 people, trying to stamp out political activity by the UDF and unions. In this period vigilante action seemed to shift to a mopping-up role. In the Cape, the focus of attacks swung to the UDF strongholds of Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage. In the Transvaal reported attacks were rarer than before, though isolated cases of new opposition activity met with renewed vigilante attacks. Sporadic flareups continued in Natal and KwaZulu, but the homeland where vigilantism was most rife was KwaNdebele in the northern Transvaal. There, Pretoria’s plan to add some land, declare the reserve ‘independent’, and strip residents of South African citizenship (as had been done with four others) provoked widespread unrest. Before it was scrapped, more than 200 opponents were killed by a shadowy group called Imbokotho led by the homeland’s rulers (WIP 44; City Press, 17.05.87). A handful of attacks were reported in other reserves, but they were noticeably absent in KaNgwane, the first homeland to align with the ANC.

4. September 1987 - January 1990: When vigilante activity had wound down in most regions, bloodshed surged around Pietermaritzburg in Natal (Kentridge, 1990; Sunday Times, 09.06.91; Vrye Weekblad, 26.07.91). With only 2,000 members in the area, Inkatha launched a forcible door-to-door recruitment campaign there in September. Angry pro-UDF residents formed defence committees and fought back, gaining ground till December. In January 1988, powerful Inkatha attacks (aided by police) recaptured the city’s semi-rural periphery, but the UDF turned back crowds who tried to invade the townships. During the rest of 1988 and 1989 the fighting shifted into a war of attrition, though knives and guns repeatedly flashed in city streets that Africans frequented. In smaller towns and in Durban, young UDF supporters began to organise, arm themselves, and drive out Inkatha leaders.
5. February 1990 - present: The end of the political logjam unleashed an intense new outburst of vigilantism. On February 2, 1990, State President FW de Klerk unbanned the ANC and announced the release of Nelson Mandela, along with plans to negotiate a democratic constitution. A vigorous wave of anti-apartheid mobilisation followed, broader though less insurrectionary than in 1984-86, previously quiet townships, small towns and homelands erupting along with major urban centres. Huge demonstrations, rent boycotts and violent attacks on the persons and property of African councillors and police piled on the pressure. By year-end 40% of the black local councils had stopped functioning, twice as many as in 1986 (CP, 09.12.90; Star, 05.12.90, 20.05.91, 15.08.91; New Nation, 11.01.91). Protests also helped topple two homeland governments and convulsed several others, particularly Bophuthatswana. A drive to build ANC organisation countrywide was launched as well. These developments did not go unchallenged. Within a month of the ANC's unbanning, attacks by Inkatha on its supporters in Natal reached a new peak. In March and April forces of up to 12,000 tried unsuccessfully to overrun UDF strongholds around Pietermaritzburg. Elsewhere, vigilantes and ANC supporters clashed around the country. With the Sebokeng attack in July the vigilante war against the ANC reached Johannesburg. Late in 1990 vigilantes struck against newly-formed ANC branches in Bophuthatswana (Kentridge, 1990; WIP 65; WM, 11.01.91; S, 13.01.91).

From February to May 1991, as rent boycotts continued in most Transvaal townships, another succession of attacks struck around Johannesburg, while non-Zulu township councillors there joined Inkatha for protection against ANC supporters. In later months, as Inkatha recruited councillors and formed branches in small, recently-politicised towns of the far eastern and western Transvaal and northern Free State, attacks by Inkatha supporters on ANC members became frequent. Meanwhile, an Inkatha counter-offensive south of Pietermaritzburg methodically won back ground from ANC supporters, leaving 90,000 refugees and turning two townships near Richmond into ghost towns. Disclosures in July that the government had secretly funded Inkatha rallies and the Inkatha-organised United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA), which became known as the Inkathagate scandal, led to a Cabinet reshuffle by De Klerk but not to an immediate halt in the carnage. A new outburst of violence began in August in some Johannesburg townships and factories with UWUSA members, seemingly a show of strength after the scandal. An attack by mysterious gunmen killed 18 Inkatha members September 7, triggering revenge attacks which killed 124 other people around Greater Johannesburg during the week before the signing of a National Peace Accord on September 14.

There was evidence of an unprecedented degree of assistance from outside the townships in the Johannesburg attacks of 1990-91. Reports that police failed to
halt vigilantes, helped them, or disarmed or scattered their opponents were again legion, but there was now evidence of direct links with security forces and their allies. For the first time, vigilantes frequently used AK-47 semi-automatic rifles and occasionally even flamethrowers. The likely sources included the police or army. During December’s attacks in Thokoza, on the East Rand, Inkatha groups had lists of ANC members and Xhosa residents, presumably from intelligence sources. Military strategy also seemed to be behind a series of attacks on Soweto commuter trains and stations which targeted ‘train committee’ activists and others in their coaches, reducing once-vibrant centres of worker mobilisation to silence (NW, 01.02.91; S, 13.02.91, 26.06.91; Shubane, 1988). In several cases vigilante bands reportedly included foreigners from the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), long tied to South African Military Intelligence, or Koevoet, the South African Police counter-insurgency unit in pre-independence Namibia (NW, 13.12.90, 20.12.90, 19.07.91). In Thokoza, the nearby Phola Park squatter camp, and Swanieville on the West Rand, survivors saw whites join in vigilante attacks, possibly members of right-wing paramilitary groups strong in nearby working-class white suburbs. These facts all pointed to a dangerous development: links between the Inkatha-councillor bloc and a far right ‘third force’ in the security forces and paramilitary groups.

Vigilante attacks in South Africa took two forms: hit squads and crowds. Hit squads were small groups of men with fairly constant membership. They usually struck specific targets with fairly sophisticated weapons (guns, grenades, firebombs). Sometimes they abducted their victims; others were attacked in their homes. Some went masked, but the identities of many were known. In contrast, crowds numbered up to several hundred. Their members did not all know each other; leaders brought them together. Their targets could be whole communities, large groups of people, or specific houses or individuals, and they used primitive weapons (clubs, pangas, tools, or spears). Hit squads struck on both weekdays and weekends, suggesting that members were self-employed or on duty. Crowds usually attacked on weekends, implying that they were formed of workers. Both types of vigilantes were almost exclusively male (Beall, 1987:97).

In the early years most targets of vigilante attacks were drawn from the groups leading mass opposition to apartheid. During 1986-87, in the attacks where victims’ leanings were reported, 69% were members of UDF affiliates. The largest share, by far, belonged to youth and student groups, making up almost 40% of the cases. Activists in civic organizations were the second most frequent targets (17%), while those in UDF structures were the third (13%). Members of COSATU unions were targeted in 15% of the attacks. Homelands opposition groups were hit in 7% of the attacks, AZAPO members in 3%. However, the violence in Natal after 1987 and later around Johannesburg involved increasingly
indiscriminate attacks against particular areas or the Xhosa ethnic group.

While vigilantism is just one side of an often-violent struggle for power, it is distinguishable from violence by opponents of the state. The most important distinction lies in the two sides' styles of violence. Since the fury of 1984-86 abated, opposition violence has usually involved small groups of lightly-armed young 'comrades', striking at specific people in minority segments of the community. Vigilantes are better armed, often far more numerous, and claim many more victims, including whole families, areas, or townships (Schlemmer, 1991a:10-11). In addition, vigilantes have usually enjoyed virtual legal immunity and even been aided by the police and army, while the security forces have acted vigorously to restrain their opponents.

Vigilantism in South Africa, thus, has been linked to the nature and location of political conflict in African communities since 1985. Its origins can be traced to the structural crisis of the apartheid state, in which race discrimination exacer-
bated political and economic problems confronting other new industrial countries. Its appearance was a response to the vast countrywide surge of protest and insurrection which began in 1984. The total number of attacks has been huge, but each fits into the mosaic of local conflicts making up the national struggle against apartheid. Yet while vigilantism's ups and downs reflected local and national tempos of political conflict, in its methods and victims it revealed remarkable consistency.

The Local Level: Patrons, Clients, And Warriors

The social bases of vigilante activity in South Africa largely mirrored those of opposition to the state. If civic, youth, trade union, and women's movements led the resistance to apartheid, vigilantism involved the local government-linked petite bourgeoisie, elders, and patrimonially organised working men and youth. Their role in vigilante actions reflected the nature of support for the state in African communities in South Africa, which is rooted in local-level clientelist relations. Vigilantism was an attempt by a class of African collaborators with the regime to re-mobilise older types of authority and divide those whom the opposition sought to unite.

The state in South Africa, as in most underdeveloped societies, is a clientelist state, one where clientelism is the principal means of legitimation and admin-
istration (Powell, 1970; Flynn, 1974; Roquie, 1978; Coulon, 1972). In poor, unequal societies, the inadequate resources left subordinate groups and the state's limited institutional capacities mean it must deal with dominated groups via local-level middlemen. These brokers dispense favours and keep control through
patronage ties to clients in the subordinate groups. In clientelist relations, bonds of personal dependency are based on the exchange of essential goods and protection for obedience or labour power. The dependents of a patron make up a clientele or faction. Though clientelism is rooted in hierarchy and unequal exchange, it is legitimised on the basis of reciprocity and redistribution. Such a state recalls Weber’s notion of the ‘patrimonial state’ (Weber, 1968).

The type of clientelism prevalent in African states originated in the articulation of capitalist exchange and wage labour with the indigenous domestic mode of production. In the domestic or lineage mode -- the economy of the extended family -- male elders dominate, extracting production from women and young men in return for access to land, mates, and ancestors (Charney, 1987a). While capitalism came to dominate production via conquest and competition, under colonial rule resources for reproduction were still provided largely on patriarchal, lineage-type lines, whether real, fictitious, or metaphorical (Cruise O’-Brien, 1975; Lemarchand, 1972). Moreover, indirect rule grafted state structures onto the pre-colonial lineage system, creating a bureaucratised chiefship with new resources and unaccountable power (Berman, 1984). Male elders, chiefs, and members of the educated elite thus allocated both traditional means of subsistence and church and state largesse. Larger clan or ethnic units were pyramids of lineage segments. In such ‘soft’ states, individuals’ ties to the state derive from their positions as subjects of their patrons, rather than as equal citizens. Yet the interpenetration of the domestic and capitalist modes mean that everyone has a place in each. A middle-aged African man can see himself as an elder and a black worker; both identities are available for mobilisation. Two cross-cutting social hierarchies thus run through African societies, one of age, gender, and clan, the other, class and citizenship (Kasfir, 1986).

Far from disappearing with industrialisation, the expansion of capitalism in South Africa led to the expanded reproduction of lineage-type relations (Wolpe, 1972; Bayart, 1978). New systems of social reproduction were colonised by older social forms. As industry drew male migrant workers to town, they extended the rural social order into the hostels (dormitories) with networks of ‘homeboys’ governed by indunas, frequently elders in their own right (Wilson and Mafeje, 1963; Mayer, 1961). Urban Africans sought houses, jobs, school places and bursaries, sport supplies, administrative favours and the like from township ‘big men’. Apartheid policy reinforced ethnic consciousness by creating separate township zones and primary schools for each group, and it strengthened clientele networks by Africanising township and homeland administration (Brandel-Syrier, 1970). Dependence was even greater in the self-organised urban informal settlements which grew from the 1970s on, where the men in charge assumed chief-like powers over land and justice with no outside control. 8 (While Africans’
exclusion from the dominant bloc probably meant that a smaller proportion of resources was redistributed than in independent African states, South Africa was so much more developed that in absolute terms this largesse was substantially greater).

Inkatha, along with the KwaZulu homeland it controls, represents the most comprehensive system of clientelism in South Africa. While during the 1970s Inkatha styled itself a ‘liberation movement’ and refused the ‘independence’ Pretoria offered, Buthelezi’s breaking of the 1980 Durban school boycotts cost him his support outside KwaZulu. Essentially, Inkatha has become a cartel of rural Zulu chiefs and urban bosses. Its branches were formed on the basis of headmen’s and township wards, and Zulu traditions and rituals were incorporated into its ideology and activities. New leaders, such as Thomas Shabalala, boss of Durban’s Lindelani shacktown, were incorporated without regard to ideology if they ‘played the game’. Since it controls both rural areas and big city townships, Inkatha has more patronage and coercive power than other homeland governments and township elites. Through KwaZulu, Inkatha controls travel documents, health care, pensions, education, police, and even flood relief, while monopolising local-level resources on a vaster scale than elsewhere. Together, culture, conservatism, clientelism, and coercion gave Inkatha a signed-up membership of more than one million (Southall, 1986; Maré and Hamilton, 1987).

Clientelism and apartheid also formed a section of the African petite bourgeoisie which is dependent upon the state. Local councillors, traders, principals, civil servants, ministers of independent churches and sport club leaders make up a tightly connected elite in most townships, distinct in economic, political, gender, and even kinship terms. These men’s jobs, business sites, or financing came from the state, and their power and profit from resources which the racial order kept in short supply. The limited local-level patronage these resources afforded was enough to mobilise the cliques active in the low-participation, factional politics of government-created township councils. Understandably conservative, this local state-linked section of the petite bourgeoisie frequently allied with others interested in stability, such as police and chiefs. They were distinguishable from the larger professional petite bourgeoisie (teachers, nurses, mainline clergy, etc), who were better educated, more reliant on salaries, more militant politically, and predominantly female (Sitas, 1986:87; Charney, 1988; WIP 40).

The patronage controlled by these petite bourgeois power brokers helps explain the quiescence of South Africa’s black areas from the 1960 Sharpeville disturbances to the revolt which began in Soweto in 1976, and the precarious calm of the years after. Inkatha’s influence in particular is a major reason why Natal remained relatively calm during the widespread upheavals of 1976. Clientelism
helped contain the tensions of an authoritarian, racially-divided industrialising society by preserving the patriarchal rural order and extending neo-traditional forms of dependency into the towns. While state repression was a periodic reality, patrimonialism probably played at least as great a role in managing African communities, moulding their inhabitants' consciousness by controlling resources and encouraging unquestioning obedience to traditional forms (Freire, 1970:ch4; Charney, 1987a; Zamosc, 1990; Haines et al, 1984; Cachalia, 1983). It thus reproduced old lineage-type divisions, while creating new ones between township factions, ethnic groups, and urban 'insiders' and migrant 'outsiders'.

By the mid-1980s, South Africa's crises of accumulation and legitimacy were reflected in the erosion of patronage control in black communities. The limited land, funds, and jobs the white-controlled state could allocate had been absorbed, leaving resources for redistribution scarce. Yet the 1976 uprisings had awakened popular demands far greater than the state could satisfy and a degree of politicisation far too high to manage through old-fashioned clique politics. However, since apartheid's indirect rule policy required black areas to be self-financing, attempts to meet the new expectations forced black local councils to enact painful rent rises. The UDF thus was able to link local resentment against the councils to the national liberation struggle. Indeed, one could hardly imagine a starker challenge to the state-linked petite bourgeoisie than that posed by the new social movements connected by the UDF. They offended against its conservative values, threatened the political system underlying its patronage power, endangered its control of community institutions, and menaced its lives and homes.

Vigilantism was the riposte of the state-linked African petite bourgeoisie, and its dependents and followers, against this emergent revolutionary challenge. The key role such men played stands out across the whole sample of press cuttings compiled for 1986-87. African local councillors or homeland officials were reportedly involved in vigilante activities in 40 of the 49 communities where information was available. Local leaders connected to Inkatha have played an equally prominent role since. When clientelist resource manipulation no longer sufficed, petite bourgeois patrons mobilised men on neo-traditional lines in a violent bid to restore stability. 10 At least five patterns of vigilante mobilisation can be distinguished, all based on patrimonial forms of organisation.

1. Members, dependents, and friends of the state-linked petite bourgeoisie: Hit squads usually looked more like middle-class township cliques in arms than hired bands of habitual criminals. Their members were bound by reciprocity among family, friends, and recipients of favours. The core of Tumahole's vigilante group, for instance, consisted of about 15 people, most from four closely connected families. It started with policewoman Sophia Koza and her two brothers. Sons of a former taxi owner friendly with the Kozas joined them.
Two brothers from another family belonged to the other vigilantes' football team and were kin of the township's ex-mayor. Koza's lover led the group after publicity forced the police to drop out. Other members included two teachers angry at boycotting pupils, three students, and five unemployed young men. Their attacks escalated from revenge for damage to friends' and relatives' property into a crusade against local activists. (Ironically, they called themselves the A-Team after the American TV do-gooders) (Seekings and Chaskalson, 1986).

2. Utilising lineage-type cleavages - generation and territorial faction:
Generational conflict was a key base for vigilante mobilisation. The structural tensions between adult men and youth in the lineage order were heightened by young blacks' poor educational opportunities, limited job prospects, and involvement in crime. Clashes between young and old emerged when young people assumed leadership roles in the rebellion. Many of their elders saw this challenge to patronage politics as a threat to parental and social authority as well, and excesses against adults sharpened their resentment (Haysom, 1986:104; Bundy, 1987; Schlemmer, 1991b: 14). Lineage-type discourses stressing authority, respect for elders, and community gave clientelist leaders a vocabulary which tapped into the anger of older men against those they saw as upstarts. By emphasising seniority in the lineage system, they shifted the issue from oppression under the apartheid state. In Crossroads, the generational undertones were apparent in the vigilantes' nicknames: 'the men' or 'the fathers'. Similar attitudes were evident in Durban in 1985 where there was support for vigilantes who put down youth riots even among COSATU unionists. Most of the 130 Inkatha men arrested after further killings in Sebokeng in September 1990 were also middle-aged or elderly.

Competition between territorial clienteles constituted another basis for vigilantism. In this form of factional organisation, men who receive land from a chief traditionally owe him military loyalty. In rural KwaZulu, these obligations were the source of vigilantes Inkatha sent to the towns. (Many knew so little about the organisations whose members they were hunting that they asked for the houses of people belonging not to the UDF, but the ‘DDF’ (Haysom, 1986:52)). In urban townships and informal settlements, men in areas controlled by a particular leader were also fair game for press-ganging into his faction. Thus, before the May 1986 vigilante attacks on Crossroads, one of the local squatter chief's lieutenants, Sam Ndima, went door-to-door in the area his leader controlled to round up grown men for the fight. Vigilante ranks in Durban were swelled in the same way in 1985. In various townships, sport club members subject to local 'big men' were also drawn into vigilante activities (WIP 69:22; Makhatini, 1991; Haysom, 1986; Cole, 1987; Kentridge, 1990).
3. Playing migrant workers against township or class-based organisations: Tension between migrant workers and township residents was another source of vigilantism. In the unfamiliar urban setting migrants depend on the conservative homeboy networks emanating from the homelands. Friction is constant between them and the more affluent and politicized town dwellers, who look down on the uneducated, unrefined country men (Sitas, 1985; Segal, 1991; Mthetwa, 1990; WIP 70/71; WM, 30.11.90). In the 1980s hostel dwellers became increasingly alienated from the popular movements growing in the cities. The hostels were largely ignored by the civic organisations. Migrant leaders in the trade unions were supplanted by younger, more radical men from town. In Sebokeng, the Natal violence precipitated ethnic division in the hostels, as rising anti-Inkatha feeling among COSATU members led to ethnic tension and insults to Zulu workers from 1987 on. Yet while they had little sympathy with urban grievances and few organisational ties to township residents, these desperately poor men were particularly hard hit by mass action campaigns. During strikes and stayaways around Johannesburg, many were forced to join in or go home, humiliating them and leaving them angry over lost income. Rent boycotts bankrupted the councils running their hostels, deepening their squalor, while civic groups’ demands for the elimination of hostels threatened their toehold in town. Many hostel-dwellers, mostly (but not solely) Zulus, were therefore receptive to Inkatha (Schlemmer, 1991b:8,17); those who were not (particularly Xhosas) were driven from the Johannesburg hostels during a recruitment campaign which began in July 1990. Together, these factors explain why hostel dwellers played a prominent role in vigilante violence in Durban, Johannesburg, and elsewhere (Haysom, 1986; Segal, 1991; WIP 70/71; WM, 17.08.90, 30.11.90, 22.03.91; CP, 25.08.91).

4. Dependents or gangs hired by political leaders: The best organised, but rarest, form of vigilantism was the private army. The most notorious was based in Shabalala’s Lindelani squatter settlement near Durban’s KwaMashu township, set up by Inkatha’s local branch chairs and KwaZulu assembly members. To finance it, they imposed a levy on the shantytown’s 9,000 households. Members of the group were paid R10 each for ‘missions’, such as breaking up student meetings. To supplement its efforts, an additional 200-man force was established (WIP 43). Busloads of vigilantes from Lindelani played a major role in the struggle for control in Natal (CP, 01.06.86, 14.06.86, 22.03.87; WM, 08.05.86, 06.06.86, 22.03.87; NN, 11.12.86). An analogous role was played by youth gangs such as the Amasinyora, which became a strike force against Inkatha’s opponents as its support in KwaMashu waned in the late-1980s.

5. Feuds or communal vendettas:
This type of violence is also typical of lineage societies. Where there is no state — or, by extension, where police will not enforce the law — the only way to right a wrong is to strike back. However, the private enforcement of justice easily gives rise to vendettas. Harm to one member of an extended family, clan, or ethnic group is considered a hurt which all must help avenge, producing a symmetrical response on the opposing side. In this way, violence takes on the self-perpetuating aspect of a feud, one attack summoning another. Thus, in some areas in KwaZulu vigilante attacks have made conflicts originating in politics into communal rivalries (Kentridge, 1990; Evans-Pritchard and Fortes, 1940; Middleton and Tait, 1958; Bazin and Terray, 1983). In others there and in Kwandebele, prior clan conflicts generated vigilante violence by the side enjoying the state's favour (Richkin, 1989; S, 28.02.91).

Vigilantism’s political consequences at the local level seem to have depended on how it fits into what might be termed the ‘moral economy’ of the townships (Scott, 1976; Moore, 1978). These values include those of capitalist society, such as freedom and racial equality, and the respect for age, order, masculinity, and community traditional in lineage-based societies. This mix of ideologies reflects the interpenetration of capitalist and lineage social organisation. Vigilantes sought to disrupt opposition activity and to re-cast conflict in traditional terms. Challenges to elders, abuses by activists, harm to members of the community, an aura of machismo, and fear of chaos all bred sympathy for vigilantism. Yet vigilantes also risked offending communities by violating traditional norms of solidarity or appearing as agents of an oppressive state.

Vigilante activity in South Africa can thus be analyzed in patrimonial terms, as the mobilisation of vertical lines of authority cutting across the horizontal solidarities established among the oppressed. It was founded on consent as well as force, seeking to appeal to traditional values and restore lineage-type authority. Its effect varied with the mix of persuasion and coercion employed by the opposition and the vigilantes. Yet while clientelist politics explains how vigilantism occurred, it does not explain why the state needed it. Since vigilantism in South Africa is not just a local phenomenon but part of a national struggle for power, it must also be examined in relation to the nature of the state and its strategies.

Vigilantes and the Central State: Covert Counter-revolution

The development of vigilantism in South Africa in the 1980s, as in other states facing revolutionary challenges, posed a double paradox. If the state is viewed as a monopoly of law and force, vigilantism uses force to defend the state, yet
not by the state. Moreover, though it breaks the law with official tolerance, it is surreptitious because the state still formally adheres to the rule of law. In other words, vigilantism indicates that a state faces a legitimacy crisis so severe that its structures are breaking down. This crisis, and the type of violence to which it gives rise, reflects specific institutional features: elite competition, and the interdependence of central and local authorities. Over the past decade, such decentralised, informal repression has been encouraged by new counter-insurgency theories. But in the South African case, neither vigilantism nor conventional repression was able to turn back the mass upsurge of the 1980s.

Competition for the votes of white citizens is a long-standing feature of the South African state, alongside the administration of black subjects through local patronage networks. In the dominant group, interests have been represented and rulers legitimated through parties, lobbies, and elections, ensuring the permeability of the state to various classes’ demands within the framework of bourgeois and white dominance. Though many of the country’s laws were discriminatory and oppressive, they were enacted by Parliament and interpreted (occasionally even restrained) by the courts. Whites enjoyed public services like those in developed capitalist countries (Kaplan, 1980).

Such a state -- a clientelist oligarchy -- is not a democracy, but it is also distinguishable from a dictatorship. Dictatorship can be theorised as an attempt to resolve a crisis of hegemony by change from above: an authoritarian adaptation of the dominant class alliance and the state’s economic role to fit changes in socio-economic structure (Poulantzas, 1974: Part VII; for examples, see Petras, 1987; Corradi, 1982; O’Donnell, 1973). In this attempt, power is centralised in a single state apparatus (military, bureaucracy, party, etc). Legal limits on state action are eliminated, elections are abolished and political parties and protest stamped out. The institutions of civil society -- the press, the church, trade unions, etc -- are put under state control. Even the dominant class adopts the ideology of the ruling branch (militarism for the army, etc). Within the state, the establishment of a second hierarchy (military or administrative) creates dual channels of authority, shifting political struggle from the public scene to the corridors of the bureaucracy. Local autonomy declines sharply as the increased authority of the dominant apparatus lets it subordinate or bypass local dominant classes. Repression is the task of the police and army, subject to central control.

In South Africa, the official response to the popular upsurge of the 1980s aimed to increase and centralise state power, but fell short of full-blooded dictatorship. Tolerance of opposition and the limits to state violence were sharply reduced by the States of Emergency, but legally the Emergencies were temporary measures. The institutions of civil society were circumscribed by legal restrictions and intimidation, but retained formal autonomy. A powerful, well-staffed executive
State Presidency replaced the office of Prime Minister from 1983, curtailing parliamentary and cabinet authority, yet Parliament, elections, and the courts all still functioned. Security force influence over civil affairs was formalised in a parallel administration, the National Security Management System (NSMS). This network of 'management centres', brought together pro-government elites, including the military, police, civil servants, and conservative politicians and business people, following each echelon of the administrative hierarchy (Cabinet, provinces, regions, and local authorities). But ministries, provinces, and local government all still operated under the usual chain of command as well (Williams, 1991; Frankel, 1984:105ff; WM, 10.04.86; Africa Confidential, 08.07.87).

Far from permitting a purposeful response to the crisis, the proliferation of power centres deepened the state's incoherence and increased local autonomy. Because normal political processes continued, the state could not attain sufficient autonomy from the dominant class bloc to reorganise it, implement thoroughgoing reforms, or abandon legality altogether (Swilling and Phillips, 1989b; Charney, 1987b; Williams, 1991). In addition, international hostility to racial rule meant that intensified repression was penalised by tightening trade sanctions and financial pressures. Internecine conflict became the order of the day, hawkish 'securocrats' and dovish politicians alternating in the ascendant. With no clear locus of accountability, bureaucrats resisted orders for change. Opposition members of the white house of Parliament, the courts, and the press continually challenged acts and policies of the security bureaucracy, struggling to defend their prerogatives. These clashes, in turn, were linked to white society's growing loss of faith in the shibboleths of apartheid. Yet the factors which distinguished the South African state from a dictatorship encouraged informal, decentralised repression in response to the crisis. If the centre lacked the resolve and means to control African areas directly, this gave its local African auxiliaries more reason to try to do so extra-legally.

Moreover, vigilante action by local African elites against the opposition became official strategy as the South African Defence Force (SADF) implemented 'low intensity conflict' doctrine inside and outside South Africa. This counter-insurgency theory, developed by the US Army and popularised after its defeat in Vietnam, aims at indigenising counter-revolution. It proposes suppressing revolutionary movements by manipulating cleavages within dominated groups to divide or win them over (Miles, 1986). A leading American exponent, Col JJ McCuen, provided the theoretical basis for the NSMS, which was similar to command systems set up by the South Africans in Namibia and the British in Malaysia (Williams, 1991:37). The structure aimed to fuse the functions of intelligence, political and military control, propaganda, and social upliftment,
facilitating a strategy which combined annihilation of opposition and the promotion of moderate alternatives with the alleviation of grievances. Irregular forces such as vigilantes are a defining feature of such ‘dirty wars’: McCuen calls for ‘counter-guerilla gangs’ and ‘special constables’ as counterparts to welfare measures. In South Africa in the 1980s officers who had served in Military Intelligence, which developed the local version of this policy (Haysom, 1990; Swilling and Phillips, 1989a), commanded the armed forces, the NSMS, and the Special Forces units training counter-revolutionary movements fighting in neighbouring countries (Williams, 1991:18-26; Young, 1990). The ‘security culture’, in which victory was the only law, also pervaded the police. Most of their top officers had been drawn from the Security Branch, extensively involved in counter-insurgency in South Africa and elsewhere in the region (WM, 08.09.91).

The establishment of local-level Management Centres under military and police control in 1985-86 coincided with the appearance of vigilantes, and other evidence of the authorities’ tolerance or support for them abounded. In the reports of vigilante attacks compiled for 1986-87, police allegedly figured in them in 19 of 49 communities. The NSMS must have known about vigilante activity: its management centres received police and military intelligence and included councillors who were often personally involved. Yet vigilantes were rarely arrested or prosecuted, despite frequent and well-documented complaints to police. Within the security forces positive sympathy and fear of the opposition may partly explain this, but such pervasive inaction points strongly to support at higher levels as well.

The 1991 Inkathagate scandal produced a cascade of revelations on the extent of collusion between the security forces and Inkatha, including aid to vigilante activity (WM, 27.07.91, 02.08.91, 09.08.91; CP, 28.07.91). It was disclosed that in 1986 a force of 150 Zulus was given military training by the Special Forces in Namibia, many of whom were later involved in Inkatha attacks on ANC supporters in Natal. The same year UWUSA was founded by Inkatha and funded by the police in order to counter -- and often, to attack -- COSATU. In 1987 the AmaSinyora gang in Durban joined Inkatha; its members subsequently received weapons and training from the SADF, SAP, and KwaZulu Police. In March 1988, a Pietermaritzburg security policeman bought 24 guns for local Inkatha leaders, which were later linked to two dozen murders. Late in 1989 and early in 1990, discussions between Buthelezi and a senior Durban security policeman on ways to maintain Inkatha’s shrinking support led to state funding of Inkatha rallies in November and March, which were followed by waves of violence.

Unlike their fairly clear ties to the state, vigilantes’ relations to the dominant class were somewhat contradictory, mediated by capital’s ambiguous relations
with the apartheid state and the contending parties. For the large majority of South Africa’s bourgeoisie, loyal to constitutional politics, there was little evidence of support of vigilante activity. Indeed, the desire of liberal business to incorporate blacks into the political system helped to stymie advocates of dictatorship. However, the failure of business to denounce vigilante activities was also clear. Capitalists feared that the ANC’s policies and alliance with the South African Communist Party could lead to large-scale nationalisation. Even the most progressive were loath to publicly attack Inkatha, both because of its pro-capitalist stance and fear of its vengeance. While a few business leaders in Natal regions hardest-hit by the violence tried to mediate, most capitalists in Inkatha’s home province continued to support it. Elsewhere, however, major business figures such as the chair of the South African Chamber of Business were involved in the mediation efforts leading the 1991 National Peace Accord.

Ultimately, however, vigilantism has proved an inadequate defence for the regime. While its immediate shock effects were considerable, over time vigilantes offended against both lineage-type and capitalist values. For example, parents in Tumahole and Durban were infuriated by vigilantes who were brutal to their children and increasingly a menace to their communities. Outside Natal, at least, vigilantes suffered from the perception that they were tied to the apron-strings of the illegitimate white regime. Even in KwaZulu, the limits on Inkatha’s redistributive capacity imposed by white domination left it over-reliant on force, gradually eroding its support. Thus, over time, vigilantism has tended to become counter-productive, or at best a wasting asset without genuine social reform.

The failure of efforts to salvage the existing state by either repression or reform became increasingly patent from 1987. The NSMS funded improvements in dozens of communities where resistance had been particularly intense, faithfully following low-intensity conflict doctrine (WIP 57; Swilling and Phillips, 1989a; Boraine, 1989). Yet even with opposition muzzled and fresh resources pumped in, the old patrons proved unable to reassert control. Supporters of the anti-apartheid social movements survived both vigilantism and detentions by retreating into the private spaces in civil society from which they had emerged: schools, workplaces, and lineage groups. Their detained leaders could not be held indefinitely due to the intense disapproval the Emergency generated at home and abroad. As activists trickled back into circulation the opposition showed new signs of life. General strikes, election boycotts, a campaign to defy segregation laws, and protest marches took place, while guerilla activity and the ANC underground grew. The evident inability of either the old African collaborators or the security forces to restore order further shook the confidence of the white political elite and the dominant classes in the traditional means of rule.

When FW de Klerk became State President in July 1989, the only remaining
options were to close the political process altogether or to open it up to the excluded African majority. Closing the *res publica* implied a terrorist dictatorship, an unacceptable option for several reasons. This choice would have created a grave crisis within the white political elite and dominant classes, for it meant abandoning the traditional form of political regulation. The ingrained traditions of white politics and the crisis of confidence in white civil society both ran too deep to allow an autocratic solution. Nor was its effectiveness certain, given the resilience of the internal opposition. Moreover, the developed West now saw the colonial forms tolerable decades earlier as unacceptable risks, exerting intense pressure for their abandonment. Finally, since the state-linked African petite bourgeoisie was politically marginal, white political and economic leaders could contemplate abandoning this increasingly encumbrant ally more easily than in countries where such local patrons were integral parts of the ruling classes. De Klerk had only one viable choice: a transition to democracy which would mark the beginning of the end of South Africa’s racial clientelist oligarchy.

**Conclusion**

In the transitional period underway in South Africa since February 2, 1990, a new wave of mass mobilisation and violence against black councillors and police has been confronted by the greatest upsurge yet of vigilantism. From 1985 to 1990, township and homeland elites spearheaded vigilante attacks in a violent bid to restore the status quo. Now the actors involved in those conflicts are fighting for bigger stakes -- power in the post-apartheid order. The essence of a political transition is the absence of institutionalised rules or norms. In these circumstances, while the contesting forces prepare for electoral combat, none have abandoned tactics involving physical force as well. Ending vigilantism thus implies, initially, establishing new norms, reducing uncertainty, and encouraging peaceful politics. Ultimately, it demands structural reform to eliminate the social foundations of this type of violence.

Vigilantism is now part of the quest of the collaborationist African petite bourgeoisie for a place in the alliance ruling the ‘new South Africa’. Councillors and chiefs who traditionally ruled through patronage hope the de-racialisation of the state will reinvigorate clientelism, not abolish it. Substantial new resources to exchange for obedience within their clans, tribes, or territories could restore their power over the masses. Increasingly, Inkatha is their protector and the vehicle for their aspirations, whatever their ethnic group. Their aims would be a regime based on ethnic patronage, either through a ‘consociational’ constitution formalising minority representation (as proposed by De Klerk) or through tribalist party machines. If the old local elites can transform themselves into a conservative reigning class like those in neo-colonial African states, they will
become attractive partners for the ruling National Party (NP) and big business. Paralysing opposition through patronage and violence, they could hope to enforce acquiescence to government and capital’s inequality-widening neoliberal policies (low wages, export orientation, modest redistribution). Meanwhile, in the smaller towns and some bantustans (notably KwaZulu and Bophuthatswana, where the old order is largely intact), vigilante activity remains important in its fight to survive.

Attitudes and tactics the ANC has carried over from its years of clandestinity and revolutionary struggle also encourage vigilante action. In democratic transitions, the ‘people versus state’ confrontation generally ends with the promise of elections, as ‘the people’ fragments into a welter of competing interests, parties, and social groups (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:55-57). However, many in the ANC still expect the artificial unity of the previous era to continue, symbolised by confusion as to whether it is a liberation movement (representing the nation) or a political party (with legitimate competitors). At local level, activists still demand councillors’ resignations and use force against them and police. Such tactics are likely to drive their targets into the arms of Inkatha, and such activists enjoy far less legitimacy now than when the state would not negotiate. After the signing of the Soweto accord to end the rent boycott, Schlemmer (1991b:13) found that only 23% of Soweto’s violence-weary residents still favoured protest to drive councillors from office. Moreover, while they are understandable in areas where local authorities refuse to tolerate opposition, they have not been confined to them. Among the African public, complaints persist of intimidation to join protests (S, 13.08.91; SOW, 15.03.91) and abuses by people’s courts (CP, 05.09.91). In some places, particularly informal settlements and homelands, where the ANC has incorporated all social categories, it has also incorporated all the contradictions among them. In these areas cases have been reported where leaders sought clientelist control or become embroiled in ethnic and clan rivalries, with all the potential for violence inherent in such conflicts (Business Day, 21.03.91; S, 24.05.91).

The ‘third force’, composed of elements in the police, the military, and their allies in civilian paramilitary groups, appears to have continued to play a sinister role in vigilante activity. Official army and police investigations have done little to halt such abuses (NN, 13.06.91). It appears that Military Intelligence and the Security Police, accustomed to operating as a law unto themselves, continued with their strategy of destabilising the ANC even after its legalisation (IND, 13.06.91; NN, 19.07.91; S, 17.07.91; WM, 19.10.90). Significantly, though large cuts were made in the conventional forces budget, the funding and strength of the Special Forces units used in low-intensity conflict actually rose -- despite an announced end to their deployment outside the country (Williams, 1991).
additional pointer to the forces' covert activity emerged during Inkathagate, when De Klerk's order to stop SAP and SADF funding to political groups ended no fewer than 41 such programmes (Citizen, 31.07.91). Another ominous sign of their destabilisation strategy was the jump in violence recorded every time steps were taken towards peace between the ANC and the government, local authorities, or Inkatha, threatening the accords (Figure 1).

Up to now, negotiations to end vigilante activities have largely failed. National agreements on fair competition are difficult to enforce in a clientelist context, where power rests on monopolising resources and organisation. Local-level truces have tended to break down for the same reason, since a pause in attacks does not resolve the underlying social and political tensions. The accords also lacked implementation mechanisms independent of the parties, making peace as
fragile as the goodwill and trust between them. In addition, the ‘third force’ has had the desire and ability to undermine them, particularly since such mutual fear prevails that a single incident (even an accidental one) can reignite conflict. (This was illustrated when the September 7 killings touched off a spate of revenge attacks by Inkatha around the Reef, including East Rand townships where ceasefires had held). Thus it was not surprising that neither the meetings between the ANC’s Nelson Mandela and Inkatha’s Gatsha Buthelezi in January and March 1991, nor most of the local agreements signed, halted vigilante activity.

The National Peace Accord signed in September 1991 by Inkatha, the ANC, and government, along with church, business, and labour bodies, establishes far more elaborate rules and mechanisms to control political violence than any previous accord (S, 14.09.91; Sunday Times, 19.09.91; NN, 13.09.91). A code of conduct for political parties bans intimidation, forcible recruitment, and bringing weapons to meetings. A code for the police bans interference in politics, including funding, promoting, opposing, arming, or training members of parties; a similar code is to be negotiated for the SADF. To implement the codes, national, regional, and local peace committees are to be formed by the signatories to resolve or seek arbitration of disputes that could lead to violence. A multi-party investigative commission will have legal authority to inquire into the causes of violence, including security force action. Ombudsmen nominated by provincial Law Societies will receive complaints of police misconduct and follow up police investigations of them. The provisions are intended to establish norms of conduct, bring the law to bear behind them, and expose violations publicly. Civilian representatives on a new police advisory board will also be consulted on issues of police policy in future. The success of the accord clearly depends in large part on government’s will and ability to bring the security establishment to heel. While the record of the police and army to date makes scepticism justifiable, within both resentment has been reported over their domination and politicisation by the ‘securocrats’. In the wake of Inkathagate, the embarrassment caused the authorities by the forces’ party politicking and the demotion of the responsible department heads, Defence Minister Magnus Malan and Police Minister Adriaan Vlok, has weakened the hand of the advocates of low-intensity war. The rules and machinery set up by the accord may further restrain them and strengthen their opponents.

However, if pacification does occur, it will result not from a single dramatic agreement but a process, one which establishes a new structure of incentives for mutual trust and peaceable politics. Members of political parties who breach the code will have to be publicly disciplined or turned over the authorities, not protected -- or else the police will have to intervene on their own. If the parties are to have the confidence to rely on the law rather than self-help, an interim
arrangement for multi-party control of the security forces will be necessary as a follow-up to the peace accord. But physical violence against the police must cease if they are expected to become impartial. Likewise, rather than bombing councillors out of their homes, civic groups should draw them into local development schemes, giving them a stake in peace. During future mass mobilisations, persuasion and coalition-building will have to take the place of orders and threats. For now, the best check on vigilantism is making it a political liability, by controlling the comrades, co-opting the councillors, and creating mechanisms to render the security forces accountable to all parties.

In the long run, however, eliminating the roots of vigilantism requires institutional changes eliminating the colonial and clientelist character of the state. Since the disfranchisement and indirect rule of blacks lay behind township patronage structures, including the whole population in the political community through universal suffrage is essential. So is unification of the separate structures for the races (homelands, ministries, municipalities, etc). Turning a patrimonial state into one able to serve all citizens also demands substantial improvements in its bureaucratic capacity and efficiency (Skocpol, 1979; Skowronek, 1982). Thorough reform of the police and military is equally indispensable.

Beyond formal democratisation, ending vigilantism also requires changing the state-society relationship, replacing passive clientelism with active citizenship (Stadler, 1990; Freire, 1970; Zamosc, 1990). Reducing patronage politics means setting up redistributive programmes that offer universal access to essential services (national health insurance, compulsory free education, etc). While resource constraints would limit the bureaucracy's ability to provide such services, a democratic regime could break some bottlenecks with appeals to mass participation (volunteer-based literacy campaigns, for instance). A relatively high-wage, internally-oriented economy would also help citizens satisfy needs via the market, leaving them less dependent upon the state. However, the new state will also require structures able to allocate scarce goods fairly, by rational criteria rather than personal discretion. Finally, active voter and civic participation must be encouraged to make government accountable and prevent the re-establishment of local power monopolies.

If a change of government in South Africa merely enlarges the elite instead of transforming the state, the old patronage system will simply acquire new masters. The stresses likely in any democracy could then easily lead to a recrudescence of vigilant activity, whichever party holds power. The history of clientelist regimes in Africa and other parts of the Third World is replete with similar cases. In South Africa the foundations of vigilantism can be eradicated only if the authoritarian clientelist state gives way to social democracy.
NOTES

1. These figures are based on my newspaper clipping files, cf note 11, below, LMD July 1990, and LJB October 1990. By comparison, 8,000 people were killed in the “dirty war” in Colombia over the same period. NACLA Report on the Americas, April 1990, p.13.

2. Vigilantism had previously emerged in South Africa. In Natal province it happened during the 1959 Capo Manor riots, the 1980 school boycotts, and the 1983 University of Zululand student protests. In Johannesburg, township councillor-linked bands (makgotla) chased criminals and other opponents from at least the late-1980s to the early-1980s, while crowds of migrant workers clashed with militant youth during the 1976 uprisings. Vigilantes known as “green berets” fought to break the 1984 bus boycott in East London. What was new after 1985 was the countrywide extent and duration of vigilante activity.

3. In 1987 South Africa’s per capita Gross Domestic Product was $2,978, far nearer Brazil’s $1,573 and Mexico’s $2,316 than the US’s $15,542.

4. The account of 1986-87 is based on reports of 207 vigilante attacks published in the Johannesburg press and the ANC Weekly News Bulletin. Many attacks undoubtedly went unreported, but the sample offers some indications of trends and targets.

5. Vigilante hit squads should not be confused with the several death squads directly operated by the South African Police and military, discussed in Laurence (1990). Vigilantes killed and injured many more people, and police participation in them was limited, not under colour of law, and frequently off-duty.

6. 49% of reported hit squad attacks in 1986-87 occurred between Monday and Thursday, while 74% of reported crowd attacks took place between Friday and Sunday. This argument imitates the ingenious “calendar of terror” of the French counter-revolution in Cobb (1970:92, 144-5).

7. For instance, in Sharpeville there was “a system of patronage where “big men” were able to grant people favours in return for their allegiance, thereby enhancing their prestige and status within the community”, based on control of sporting, political, and economic resources (Jeffries, 1990:1).

8. Inanda, an informal settlement near Durban where vigilantes were active, displays “the importation of traditional systems into urban settings. In the rural areas the chief has inherited traditional powers to allocate resources and has generosity is reciprocated by loyalty and traditional tokens. In urban areas the relationship has to be built and takes the form of patronage system with tokens taking the form of money and loyalty, involving the use of violence against those opposing the leader” (Makhathini, 1991:3).

9. Traders and civil servants tended to be less well educated than other members of the class and to have had parents in similar occupations. Movement was frequent among these professions, as civil servants or principals accumulated capital to found small businesses. Senior teachers and ministers joined local councils, and councillors allocated themselves trading sites. “Big men” also often became patrons of neighbourhood sports teams, which in turn formed part of their political base. The classic discussions are Kuper (1965) and Brandel-Syrier (1970). See also Southall (1977 and 1980), and Jeffries 1990.

10. “Inkatha has increasingly controlled and dominated large townships (eg Umlazi near Durban) though its control of the most important resources, like allocation of housing, KwaZulu citizenship certificates for the purpose of buying land or a house in a KwaZulu township, etc... In contrast, the Pietermaritzburg townships, outside Inkatha’s administrative control, have... exposed... the real basis of Inkatha’s “hegemony” in Natal. The loss of its bureaucratic access to African communities and townships, the larger is its scale of violent attacks on the people” (Gwala, 1989:432). Similar links between challenges to clientelism and vigilantism are reported in Sicily (Biolo, 1974), in Colombia (Uprimny and Vargas, 1990), and in the Philippines (in Lara 1990).

11. The overlap vigilantes saw between parental and state authority was expressed by Prince Gobinca, a Crossroads vigilante leader: “The children are being very disrespectful to the fathers... We are trying to get discipline into the township. If the government, the police say they have any help for us, they can come and help us” (Cole, 1987:119). Similarly, writes Kenridge, in Natal “the older generation appears in many instances to be the aggressor, trying to coerce the youth into traditional patterns of behavior” (ILB, October 1990). See also Sitas (1986).

12. Their role can be compared to that of workers involved in traditional social organisation in 18th century Church and King Mobs (see Rude, 1964 and Thompson, 1962).
13. They resemble the hired bands 'in a political civil war' mentioned in Thompson (1962:123).
14. The importance of the lineage system in the Natal conflict was underscored by both sides' use of magic substances supplied by traditional healers who occupy important roles within it (NA, 19.11.90; WM, 23.03.90).
15. Elite democracy and clientelist power in other states plagued by vigilantism is discussed in Anderson (1988) (Philippines), Zamoroc (1990) and Uprimny and Vargas (1990) (Colombia).
16. Similar political blockage helped produced Colombia's 'dirty war'. 'Lacking a consensus for either reform or repression, the state has abandoned the fight to local elites -- including cattle ranchers, businessmen and regional political bosses, in alliance with army officers and drug traffickers -- who have opted for "private justice" as their best bet to maintain the status quo' (NACLA Report on the Americas, April 1990:14. See also Uprimny and Vargas (1990) and Lara and Morales (1990:152-7) on the results of the Philippines' "blocked transition").
17. This represented a key difference between South Africa and Colombia or the Philippines, where prolonged stalemate reflects the close integration of their rural clientelist oligarchies with local and foreign capital.
18. The parallels to efforts to sabotage President Betancur's pacification efforts in Colombia are evident. See Zamoroc (1990) and NACLA Report on the Americas, April 1990.

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BD Business Day, Johannesburg
CTT The Citizen, Johannesburg
CP City Press, Johannesburg
DR Drum, Johannesburg
ILB Innes Labour Brief, Johannesburg
IND The Independent, London
LMD Le Monde Diplomatique, Paris
NA New African, Durban
NN New Nation, Johannesburg
S The Star, Johannesburg
SOW Sowetan, Johannesburg
ST Sunday Times, Johannesburg
VW Vrye Weekblad, Johannesburg
WM Weekly Mail, Johannesburg
WIP Work in Progress, Johannesburg
WS Wits Student, Johannesburg

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