The African e-Journals Project has digitized full text of articles of eleven social science and humanities journals. This item is from the digital archive maintained by Michigan State University Library. Find more at: 
http://digital.lib.msu.edu/projects/africanjournals/

Available through a partnership with

Scroll down to read the article.
BEYOND THE FRONTIER: CIVIL SOCIETY REVISITED

Daniel Nina

...to beat one's head against
the wall is to break one's head
and not the wall.

Apparently the South African ruling class has been doing their research on re-defining the frontier between civil society and political society. The left is not too far behind. However, is there anything such as a frontier?

Engaging in the current debate in South Africa on the 'role of the civil society', one should not lose perspective of its relevance for a country coming out of a period of severe repression, censorship and marginalisation of two-thirds of its population. Civil society, then, emerges not only as part of a theoretical and abstract discussion but also as part of a practical necessity of redefining the role of the state and its relation with the individuals in society. For this, and for many other reasons, the ruling class would be talking of the need to have a strong civil society in which the state interferes little with the market forces. The left, in general, would take the argument that the civil society needs to be independent from the state in order to either become 'vibrant' or 'a watchdog over the state'; other sectors of the left would limit the role of the civil society to that of the civic organisations in the townships, and the need for those organisations to be independent from a (future ANC) government.

South African civil society has been there, well developed, a long time before 2 February 1990. In fact due to the current period of revolutionary transformation, South Africa manifests a unique opportunity to explore and participate in a civil society that is at a high level of political contestation, tension and change. The problem might be in how we are interpreting the nature of civil society today. Therefore, it would be necessary to bring our understanding of this concept onto another level - one which might need to use, in addition to the classics (Marx and Gramsci), other new theoretical sources.

The concept of civil society is sometimes taken in the South African context to be a separate and autonomous entity from the state. But civil society is also part of the state (Gramsci, 1986:160). Moreover, the division of the state between two spheres, in the Marxist and Gramscian understanding, is not more than a
methodological assumption in order to deal at the theoretical level with the (class-)state in our capitalist societies. But let’s not forget, that this exercise (the analysis of the state) is done in order to articulate a contestatory political project, which as recent history suggests - reflecting on the South African experience - has taken root in the civil society.

In addition to the above argument, the question of hegemony of the ruling class over the rest of the population and the counter-hegemonic project of the working class/classes and social sectors has to be addressed in any analysis of the civil society. In addition, the articulation of multiple correlations of forces, in a counter-hegemonic project of many alliances should also be raised.

The intention of this paper is to engage in a positive way with the on-going discussion on the role of the civil society in the ‘new’ South Africa. Its immediate aim is to provide some further tools for discussion and debate. The exercise goes as follows: firstly, a brief view on the definition and role given by the classics to this concept; secondly, some ideas on radical democracy and the new social movements; thirdly, a discussion on selected articles on the topic; and, finally, the conclusion to this paper.

Civil Society: from Hegel to Gramsci, via Marx

The emergence of the state, either arising out of the individual needs in the civil society (Hegel) or out of the necessities of the bourgeoisie for capital accumulation (Marx), has to be understood within a broader historical frame of the era of modernity. The rational individual, Hegel suggests, would empower the state with sovereign powers in order to provide him/her sufficient security to co-exist with other individuals in the civil society. In other words the discourse of modernity, seen through Hegel’s ideas, suggests that the individual would make a rational decision in order to have a universal totality, defined as the state - the ethical body.

For Hegel, the ascendant rational move of individuals would be to consolidate their system of needs under the hegemony of the state. Civil society is for him just a transitional, although important, step in human development towards some superior stage. However, civil society represents a stage of social organisation in which the individuals share their needs and wants, and are able to socialize with other individuals their common necessities. Nonetheless, this same stage would define its own limitations, imposing the need for an additional entity. Thus the state, the modern state, emerges out of this transition in which the individuals’ needs would require an external body to guide and protect them.

Hegel suggests that:

The state is absolutely rational inasmuch as it is the actuality of the substantial will which it possesses in the particular self-con-
consciousness once that consciousness has been raised to consciousness of its universality. This substantial unity is an absolute unmoved end in itself, in which freedom comes into its supreme right. On the other hand this final end has supreme right against the individual, whose supreme duty is to be a member of the state (Hegel, 1976:155-56).

As a good thinker of the modern era, Hegel would realize the transition from the civil society to the state as a rational decision of individuals who have discovered their common universality. The frontier for Hegel is there, inasmuch as the individuals want to go beyond that initial encounter in the civil society constituting then the state. However, being (partially) a product of the ‘idea’, Hegel is incapable of problematizing that transition through a material interpretation of the social relations and social forces in the civil society. Marx, another son of modernity, helped in problematizing the concept of civil society.

For Marx, the development of the civil society is determined by the consolidation of the bourgeois state. The state for Marx is a total entity in which the individuals have divided responsibilities: those as citizen of the state and those of individuals interacting in a civil society controlled by capitalist relations of production. Marx, then, interprets that the emerging of the civil society, in which all relations are determined by their correspondent exchange value, would be to the benefit of bourgeois rule. Thus, civil society, arising out of the needs of the bourgeois state, constitutes the ideal terrain for the consolidation of capitalism, whilst the state will guard it from any attempt to disrupt that process.

Marx (in On the Jewish question), addressed the situation in the following terms, from the transition of the feudal state into the bourgeois state:

The formation of the political state and the dissolution of civil society into independent individuals, who are related by law just as the estate and corporation men were related by privilege, is completed in one and the same act. Man as member of civil society, unpolitical man, appears necessarily as natural man... Political revolution dissolves civil life into its component parts, without revolutionizing and submitting to criticism these parts themselves. Its attitude to civil society, to the world of need, to work, private interests, private law, is that they are the foundation of its existence, its own presupposition that needs no further proof, and thus its natural basis. Finally, man as a member of civil society counts for true man, for man as distinct from the citizen, because he is man in his sensuous, individual immediate existence, while political man is only the abstract fictional man, man as an allegorical or moral person. This man as he actually is, is only recognized in the form of the egoistic individual, and the true man only in the
form of the abstract citizen (McLellan, 1988:56).

Therefore, the ‘young’ Marx is addressing the transition from one type of state, as a political state, which exercised totality over the whole of its population, to a new state, which will divide its role: the moral role for the political state, and the individual role for the civil society. Marx’s earliest interpretation of the civil society would continue in his later work, although addressed in a different way. In order to be free, individuals must liberate themselves from the egoistic relations imposed on them by the bourgeois rule in the civil society. Only when human beings regain the political control of their acts, from civil society to the political state, only then would they be free (Nzimande and Sikhosana, 1992:7-8).

However, Marx does not provide sufficient tools to understand how in the advanced capitalist societies the rule of the bourgeoisie would be exercised. Gramsci’s interpretations of the state (composed of the political society, or the state in the narrow sense, and the civil society (Gramsci, 1986:12)) provides additional tools to comprehend the situation.

Gramsci understood the state as a dual entity in which the rule of the bourgeoisie would be exercised either via coercion (by the political society) or by consent (in the civil society). However, no state could survive without exercising both areas of its rule: coercion and consent need each other at any time. But, in order to have adequate stability for the class rule, the rule should mostly be exercised through raising a level of consent from the non-dominant sectors. A political equilibrium must exist, in which the bourgeoisie incorporates certain claims from the non-dominant sectors (Gramsci, 1986:161). That is, the ruling class would exercise its hegemony - its capacity to lead and organise. I will come to the question of hegemony later in the text.

Gramsci’s approximation to the concept of civil society has to be understood within the totality of social relations that exist in a determined space, which is defined as the state: a state which Gramsci skillfully identified as the ‘class-state’ - the state as a totality which has been created for the benefit of the bourgeoisie (Gramsci, 1986:257). Therefore, Gramsci would recognize that this type of state could not be representative of a new type of society in which oppression as determined, amongst many other things, by the unequal relations of production, has disappeared.

As long as the class-state exists the regulated society cannot exist, other than metaphorically - i.e. only in the sense that the class-state too is a regulated society. The utopians, in as much as they expressed a critique of society that existed in their day, understood very well that the class-state could not be the regulated society (Gramsci, 1986:257).
Gramsci is referring here by regulated-society to communism (Gramsci, 1986:382), which he perceived as the class-less state.

In summary, Marx’s and Gramsci’s interpretation of the role of civil society arises out of a materialist analysis of social relations in the state - under the hegemony of the capitalist mode of production. In this sense, they put Hegel’s ‘idea’ back to earth. The state is a two-fold entity: civil society and the political society - a division that corresponds to the needs of the process of capital accumulation.

At the theoretical and practical level we can abolish the imaginary frontier dividing civil society from political society, and move the analysis towards the totality: the state. The importance would be, then, to analyse and explore the political and social challenges arising from the non-dominant classes and social sectors to the (class-)state rule - challenges that could be concentrated sometimes in the sphere of civil society, and at other times directed at the state.

**Radical democracy, new social movements and the state**

The modern capitalist state has facilitated the emergence of many social struggles that move beyond Marx’s assessment of the overdetermination of class struggle in social transformation (Laclau and Mouffe, 1989). The consolidation of liberal democracy, supported by a welfare state, and the subsumption of those societies into the logic of capital accumulation (society as a big factory (Negri, 1989)), has had a social impact that in certain ways transcends Marx’s traditional conceptions. The consequence of this has been to re-define the composition and role of the historical subject. Today, not all the social subjects struggling for their particular rights are doing so aiming at the state. The women’s movement is a clear example. Moreover, not all the social struggles are determined or arising out of the social relations of production - as the classics perceived the social tensions in capitalist societies.

This leaves us with the great possibility to engage in the struggle against oppressive relations in any instance of the (class)-state - either when dealing against the state (ie government) for civil and human rights; or in the civil society, for example, in the struggle for women’s rights or students’ rights (Guattari and Negri, 1990). The important aspect is to understand that the current struggles are no longer reducible to exploitation (illegal appropriation of surplus value) in the factory. This new era (to which capitalism in contradictory terms is (positively) responsible) allows movement of the level of struggle onto another level: from the factory to the gender question, welfare rights and civil rights via environmental and ecological issues, for example.

What we are fighting in the new era of the ‘state-society complex’ (Negri, 1989:173), cannot be limited to the conquest of the state as some social move-
ments clearly assert - however it also includes that. It is a struggle in which we are fighting for the liberation of the human being from any type of relation of exploitation and oppression - which the bourgeois rule has skillfully constructed through the modern state. The agenda is, then, to destroy the coercive element of the state and to move the consensual element to the level of real equality, in which class rule disappears as any type of oppressive relations.

I am not dealing with utopia. It is not a matter of analysing our current societies through the interpretation given by the classics almost a hundred years or more ago. It is to enrich their definitions in the light of our present material conditions, realizing how complex our societies have become. As Negri suggests, the struggle is no longer between ‘sovereign and subjects’, but it is one of ‘power and countervailing power’ (Negri, 1989:172). Moreover, this struggle would not be confined to the realm of the political society or the civil society; it would be spread, following Laclau and Mouffe’s assertive analysis, throughout the whole social tissue - the state as totality (Laclau and Mouffe, 1989:176). The intensity of the countervailing powers against the class-state ruled by the bourgeoisie, should lead towards the construction of a radical democracy (Laclau and Mouffe, 1989), one which not only would deal with the elimination (or democratization) of power relations, but that will also give way to the free exercise of subjective needs. It could be the beginning of a free human being - free from the bourgeois rule in the civil society and the ethical values of the bourgeois state.

The above argument invites us to reconsider the rational state of the modern era; it is to re-think the contribution given by Hegel on the question of civil society and the emergence of the state (Negri, 1989:169-170). But this reconsideration should not be made in order to claim ‘the end of history’, as a former bureaucrat of the US state department some time ago proclaimed. In fact what we are experiencing is, perhaps, the ‘end of modernity’ (Vattimo, 1988). It is a period in which the totalizing assertions of history, transformation and social change are put into question. In other words, not because we seize state power would we have a democratic society. The democratization of such a state would happen parallel to many multiple struggles occurring outside of the state realm, in the civil society. These struggles will be conducted by new social movements (including the working class) that break away with the unilineal and ascendant form in which history and change have been conceived throughout the modern era.

To overcome the definitions and limitations of the modern era would not only allow us to strike back against the forms of domination that the bourgeois state created (Foucault, 1980), but would also force us to reconsider the struggles/resistances developed against the bourgeois state - reflecting on VI Lenin! The equation is no longer only about the ‘seizure of power’, but of destroying
power from the very beginning. This indeed, would move the ‘historical subject’
(another feature of modernity), onto another level - neither up or down, but equal
to many new social subjects. As Negri suggests:

A basic characteristic of contemporary capitalist societies is the
real subsumption (that is, the submission) of civil society within
global capital... Indeed, real subsumption reveals the social
dichotomy not simply within civil society, which in any case is
impossible to isolate in this situation: rather, it reveals the
dichotomy to us within that determinate complex which is con-
stituted by the new composition of civil society and the state... The
problem of the governability of this complex society-state is the
same as the problem of the orderly reproduction, or the
revolutionizing, of this complex. In this perspective, the
dichotomies of society therefore tend to become completely

Negri adds that:

The class struggle has not come to an end but has been displaced
onto a terrain which pertains to the human totality. Real subsum-
tion and the horizontal organization and mass character of social
relationships deny the very possibility of formal control and
emphasize the material nature of human social relationships

Finally, I should come back to Gramsci’s conception of hegemony. Gramsci
understood hegemony as the articulation of power by the bourgeoisie in the civil
society, in order to exercise its rule. However, in the modern state, Gramsci
suggested, the bourgeoisie would attempt to consolidate its power (its capacity
to lead and organise) through the consent of the non-dominant sectors of society.
This would certainly mean that in order to rule the bourgeoisie would have to
take into consideration certain demands of the non-dominant classes or social
sectors.

However, as Gramsci analysed the civil society in which the bourgeoisie is
exercising its hegemony, it is not a ‘peaceful’ terrain. Both civil society and the
state (political society), are spheres of contestation, of struggle. This is why
Gramsci managed to created the metaphoric interpretation of the ‘war of position
and the war of manoeuvre’ between the bourgeois and the working class - the
hegemony of the bourgeoisie contested by a counter-hegemonic project

It is relevant for us to be able to identify how the counter-hegemonic project
of the working class/classes and social sectors is developed today. But this
project, which indeed would become part of the ‘war of position’ of the non-
dominant sectors of society, would have to be re-defined in the light of our
contemporary social developments. In other words, the 'historical revolutionary subject' has changed: it has become broader than our traditional conceptions. Thus the counter-hegemonic project would not only be constituted by the demands and needs of the working class, but would also include as many social sectors and non-dominant classes, allied in a revolutionary project (Guattari and Negri, 1990).

In this sense, and retaking Negri, it becomes important to understand that the subsumption of society into capitalist relations, allows the struggle of the working class to be articulated with the struggle of the new social movements that arise out of the impact of capitalism in society. The point of coincidence, in order to articulate this counter-hegemonic project would be defined by certain common aspects: in particular, the need to eliminate economic exploitation and oppressive social relations. However, it would be difficult to argue - specifically in our present time when people are talking of participatory democracy - that the articulation of a counter-hegemonic project would be done under the hegemony of the working class, not to mention the uncritical adherence to democratic centralism.

The counter-hegemonic project of the working class/classes and social sectors, would have to be conducted on equal terms. This would mean, on the one hand, that the articulation of the project could not be determined by the 'final word' of any of the classes or sectors participating in the project. On the other hand, and in relation to this first argument, the nature in which that same project would exist could only be democratic - equal participation in decision-making and responsibilities for those involved.

The above arguments certainly question the conceptions of the vanguard party, democratic centralism, seizure of power and the role of the ‘historical subject’ - the working class. However, they (the arguments) try to explain the transformation that has occurred within the social subjects interacting in our contemporary states. The position goes towards elaborating a project that could become capable of challenging the ruling class, and that also incorporates the demands of the new social movements to eliminate oppressive practices, which are not necessarily determined by the dichotomy of capital-labour force - but without resigning to the workers struggle.

Therefore, the consolidation of a counter-hegemonic project today should take into consideration the following factors: firstly, although the conceptual division of the state in two spheres is theoretically correct, the struggle for democratizing the state has to be seen as a comprehensive project - happening both at the same time in the civil society and political society. Secondly, the ‘historical subject’ that will transform society has changed. Today, any transformative project of unequal relations in society, will certainly include the working class, but must
also need to be articulated with other social struggles, which are not necessarily determined by economic relations of production. Thirdly, and related to the previous point, the articulation of a counter-hegemonic project, could only be constituted today by the articulation of multiple hegemonic practices/discourses, within a democratic frame.

At the end, we might be returning to the ‘young’ Marx (of On the Jewish question) who has been enriched by almost 150 year of changes. This would mean closing the gap in the class-state, between the civil and political societies, and launching then onward a social movement for revolutionary transformation.

**Encountering the South African debate**

Anglo-American is part of the civil society. The Boy Scouts are also part of it. The ANC Women’s League is also part of the civil society, concentrating their efforts not only on empowering women, but also towards a non-sexist South Africa. They are all operating through the realm of the state (in the broader sense). However, the debate in South Africa tends to perceive the problem in fragmented terms: there is one version of ‘associational socialism’ (Swilling, 1991); there is a more materialistic and struggle-orientated version (Narsoo, 1991); and there is one version of greatly limiting the scope of the civil society to the tension between township civic organisations and the ANC (Nzimande and Sikhosana, 1992; Botha, 1990).

Swilling’s position is, perhaps, the most complicated one due to the subtleties of his analysis. Throughout his article there is a recognition of the ‘end of modernity’: there is no longer a totalizing discourse that could explain and solve all the problems. In this sense, Swilling’s socialist views will be able to recognize ‘the democratic acceptance of diversity, uncertainty and pluralism’ (Swilling, 1991:21). An ‘associational socialism’ - constituted by voluntary associations coming together - which would strengthen the local government instead of the national government (Swilling, 1991:23). However, by not exploring the nature of the dominant hegemony in society, Swilling’s argument looks as if we were living in the realm of a ‘happy family’, where lots of good talks could solve all the problems. In this sense, by avoiding dealing with the complexities of the ruling class hegemony, Swilling denies the existence of the struggle against such hegemony - in appearance ‘associational socialism’ has no class, gender, race, or any other social subject.

On the other hand, and closely related to the above argument, another problem with Swilling’s position is the question that for him most of the solutions rest on creating new structures of local government. He avoids getting into a more concrete discussion on how those new structures of power are going to be established, on what kind of democratic practices. He reduces the situation by
arguing that ‘(S)ocialists seek to promote democratic decision-making at every level of society’ (Swilling, 1991:23). Moreover, who are the subjects of this ‘associational socialism’? Is Anglo-American in the same position of interests as the Alexandra Civic Organisation? I doubt it.

Narsoo, on the other hand has a more comprehensive analysis of the civil society as it is operating today. ‘Civil society’, as he entitled his article, is ‘a contested terrain’ (Narsoo, 1991:24); and, as he wisely argued ‘(T)he independence and diversity of civil society does not in itself ensure greater equity and freedom’ (Narsoo, 1991:27). In contrast to Swilling, Narsoo has no illusion that any change for transforming civil society would happen without struggle. However, who are the subjects, if any, who would conduct the struggle? Those subjects, in Narsoo’s article, are still unknown.

One of the problems with his article is that he mainly (although relevant within the South African debate) narrows the debate of civil society vis a vis the state. In other words, civil society is responsible for transforming the state. Thus the struggle is mainly focused on the individuals, concentrated in organizations, against the state authority. In this sense, and perhaps similar to Swilling, Narsoo perceived the civil society as something separate from the state, without dealing with the question of the hegemony exercised by the ruling class - either in civil society or in the political society. Nonetheless, he also raised important considerations in relation to the independence of civil society from the state, and socio-economic developments in this country (Narsoo, 1991:26). Thus he distances himself from a ‘neo-conservative’ discourse that will defend the independence of civil society as the way forward to solve the problems created by apartheid.

The state, nevertheless, has the crucial role of orienting and providing society with a framework in which to address these problems. We may fall into the trap of not recognising the major role of the state in shaping civil society to suit its own project and thereby disguising its impact. In our haste to distance ourselves from the Stalinist bureaucracy we may find ourselves in bed with the rabid freemarketeers (Narsoo, 1991:26).

Botha has a clearer understanding of the complexities of using the concept of civil society. His paper exclusively addresses the issue of the role of the civic organisations in relation to the ANC and the state. It is an important article because from the beginning he is addressing the question of civil society in relative terms, without clearly defining the frontier: ‘(B)ut of crucial importance is that there exists an interconnection between civil, political society and ideology’ (Botha, 1990:7). In this sense, he recognises that the frontier is more flexible than a determined line. Botha, then, would engage the role of the civic
organisations in the terrain of civil society (responding to the needs of their constituencies) and that of the political society (responding to the demands of the political organisations that are aiming for state power). Hence it is not difficult for him to conclude that:

The notion that civics are autonomous from and independent of political organisations and state organs has to be seen in relative terms. The extent of those terms is an outcome of negotiation between civics and other organisations of civil society, the political movement and the state. That autonomy cannot be considered outside of space and time. It is an autonomy which is determined by a configuration of factors internal and external to the specific institutions of civil society, at any given conjuncture. (Botha, 1990:14).

Botha's article represents, then, an interesting exercise of practical importance, although of limited reach. Civil society, as he examined it in his article, certainly includes the civic organisations of the African township but also goes beyond them - an aspect that he forgot to raise.

Finally, Nzimande and Sikhosana engage in the debate of the role of civil society by (correctly) defining the theoretical limits of the concept. Therefore, their analysis moved into Marxist and Gramscian theories to explain that civil society could not be understood if it is not within the broader perspective of the class-state. Thus, they would tend to eliminate any dividing line between the civil and the political society (Nzimande and Sikhosana, 1992:3-10).

However, the problem with this article is not with the theoretical discussion of the concept, but with the 'programmatical' party line: the vanguard party and the historical subject would articulate a solution to our current social struggles. In this sense, these two authors would conceive the role of the civil society as determined and controlled by the needs of the party, which is seeking to achieve state power. Thus, for Nzimande and Sikhosana, the civic organisations, for example, in the civil society should articulate the people's demands in relation to the demands of the party/state (Nzimande and Sikhosana, 1992:24). State, party and civic organisations become just one and the only. Although agreeing with the first part of their article, it becomes difficult to have empathy with this second part and the overwhelming role of the state/party. As I discussed above, the democratization of the state would take place at the same time in the civil and political society - through very harsh and never-ending struggles. Moreover, by refusing the notion of democratic socialism, these two authors avoid completely the question of what kind of democratic practices are going to be taking place.

Furthermore, these two authors do not assess in their analysis the role and
emergence of the new social movements. The working class has a predominant part to play in the social transformation. Thus, the possibility of any social alliances, under equal hegemonic correspondences is, from the beginning, non-existent. The seizure of state power, as the main objective of the struggle is still seen as the relevant factor in order to bring democracy into society (Nzimande and Sikhosana, 1992:13).

Conclusion

The ‘journeys through the civil society’ as Negri suggests (Negri, 1989:169), recognises no frontier: the state, in the broader sense, is an open field for contesting struggles against exploitation and oppression—which in our current capitalist society is constituted by racism, sexism and capitalist exploitation, amongst other oppressive forms. The struggle, then, is one for democratising any relation of power, for the equal distribution of wealth, and for allowing each social and individual subjectivity to flourish.

The transformation of society and its liberation (although this process is a never-ending one (Laclau, 1990:173)) from undemocratic relations, would not happen by coincidence. The articulation of multiple social forces (from the workers in the factory to the gay movement) in a counter-hegemonic movement should be seen as the first step towards a ‘new’ society. However, the articulation of this project would have to be done, from the very beginning, by exercising democratic practices of decision-making, representation and participation, and moreover, respecting the differences of the ‘other’. This position would reconsider the hegemonic role of any ‘historical subject’ - each subject should have equal share in constituting the foundation of the counter-hegemonic project.

The hegemony of the ruling class and the existence of oppressive relations must be contested. It will not be an easy task, and the locus of the struggle is spread throughout the whole social tissue. The articulation of those many instances of contestation founded on democratic principles, would determine the beginning, in the last instance, of a ‘new’ South Africa.

NOTES:

1. The question of the end of modernity and what does it represent for continuing the struggle for a democratic, non-racist and non-sexist South Africa will have to be made somewhere else. This would certainly require to do a radical approach to the question of postmodernity. See in general Vattimo (1990), and Negri (1989).

2. The authors also developed this argument in another article focusing on the role of the civic organisations in this process of transition (Nzimande and Sikhosana, 1991).
REFERENCES
Hegel, GWP (1976) - Philosophy of Right (New York: Oxford University Press).
Narsco, Monty (1991) - 'Civil society - a contested terrain', in Work in Progress, 76.
Nzimande, Blade and Mpume Sikhosana (1991) - 'Civics are part of the National Democratic Revolution', in Mayibuye, 2(5).
Nzimande, Blade and Mpume Sikhosana (1992) - 'Civil society and democracy: a critique of some aspects of "democratic socialism" (forthcoming publication).
Swilling, Mark (1991) - 'Socialism, democracy and civil society: the case for Associational Socialism', in Work in Progress, 76.